Implementing the Rule of Law in Brazil: Distance Between Theory and Practice. by Toulson, Carile Zenedin Marchioro.
Implementing the Rule of Law in Brazil: 
Distance between Theory and Practice
by
Carile Zenedin Marchioro Toulson
Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
School of Law 
Faculty of Business, Economics and Law 
University of Surrey
March 2012
© Carile Zenedin Marchioro Toulson 2012
ProQ uest Number: 27750213
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent on the quality of the copy submitted.
in the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 27750213
Published by ProQuest LLC (2019). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
Ail Rights Reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 - 1346
STATEMENT OF ORIGIN A LIT Y
"'fhis thesis and the work to which it r t^rs  are the resrdts o f my own efforts. Any ideas, 
data, images or text resulting from the work o f others (whether published or unpublished) 
are fully identified as such within the work and attributed to their originator in the text, 
bibliography or in footnotes. This thesis has not been submitted in whole or in part for 
any dther academic de^ee Or professional qualification. I  agree that the University has 
the right to submit my work to the plagiarism detection service TurnitinUKfor originality 
checks. Whether or not drafts have been so-assessed, the University reserves the right 
to require an electronic version o f the final documera (as submitted) for assessment as 
above. "
Marchioro Toulson
ABSTRACT
Sustained since the early history of Brazil, the mutually beneficial relationship 
between the state and elites has been perpetuated throughout the centuries to the 
detriment of the rights, freedoms and interests of the rest of the population. By 
analysing primary and secondary sources on Brazil’s history, legal system, current 
affairs and general legal and political theory, as well as current and past domestic and 
international legal frameworks, this thesis highlights, in the case of Brazil, law’s role 
in cementing social and economic inequality, mirroring society’s class relations and 
providing the ruling classes with a tool for their continued socio-political-economic 
dominance, pinpointing the consolidation of their power on the development of a 
Coimbra-graduated consensually unified political elite during Brazil’s formation as a 
nation-state.
Political and social sciences’ publications have concentrated on exploring Brazil’s 
legal system’s ingrained injustices, whilst Brazilian law research has been historically 
isolated from other sciences and unduly affected by the prejudices of the legal 
profession. This research links law with other disciplines by analysing the historical 
foundations of the inequities promoted by Brazil’s legal system as well as presenting 
both a theoretical and a practical framework for change. Theoretically, a conception 
of the rule of law, suitable to explaining why the observance of formal legality has not 
promoted the convergence between the country’s legal framework and its socio­
political reality, is advanced. Importantly, such formulation offers an ideal that both 
matches Brazil’s aspirations and is compatible with the Western liberal democratic 
ideals defining the international world order into which the country is increasingly 
willing to participate. Practically, the often neglected conditions for the 
implementation of the rule of law are established, providing Brazil with the conditions 
for a rupture with its elitist past and the imposition of limits on the government’s 
exercise of power.
Carile Zenedin Marchioro Toulson 2012
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INTRODUCTION
“South American Giant Comes of Age”  ^ and “Getting it Together at L a s f a r e  recent 
media headlines paraphrasing Brazil’s future prospects in the face of its historical 
inability to fulfil its economic potential, a situation symptomatic of the country’s deep 
contrasts. A vast territory, Avhere a few own large estates {latifmdios) contrasts with 
the situation whereby many are driven to ascertain their share of land ownership 
through illegal settlements;^ an abundance of highly fertile arable land with high 
poverty and inequality rates;"  ^ a wealth of natural resources with the country’s 
historical underperformance in the global market economy.^ This scenario is even 
starker when constitutional rights and guarantees, enshrined in the 1988 Constitution,^ 
are contrasted with the reality of a great proportion of the Brazilian population. The 
principle of dignity of the human person (Article 1, III) contrasts with the reality of 
over 10% of Brazilians living in extreme poverty,^ with appalling and degrading 
prison conditions nationwide,^ and with the criminalisation and exclusion of the poor.^ 
The rights to life and security (Article 5) are set against widespread and pervasive
 ^ JP Rathbone, 'South America’s Giant Comes o f Age' Financial Times, Special Reports, 28th June 
2010)
 ^ J Prideaux, 'Getting it Together at Last' The Economist, Special Report on Business and Finance in 
Brazil, 12th November 2009)
 ^ J Holston, Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions o f Democracy and Modernity in Brazil (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton 2008), pp. 116-45
 ^ TPR Caldeira and J Holston, 'Democracy and Violence in Brazil' (1999) 41 Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 691, p.714; R Carroll, 'Land of Contrasts' The Guardian, Inside Brazil, 14 March 
2008) 1; PS Pinheiro, 'Democratic Governance, Violence, and the (Un)Rule o f Law' (2000) 129 
Daedalus 119, p. 119; TE Skidmore, 'Brazil’s Persistent Income Inequality: Lessons from History' 
(2004) 46 Latin American Politics and Society 133, p. 133
 ^ P Kingstone, 'Sobering Up and Going Global: Brazil’s Progress from Populism and Protectionism' 
(2009) 15 Law and Business Review o f the Americas 105, pp. 105-6; Prideaux, 'Getting it Together at 
Last'; Rathbone, 'South America’s Giant Comes o f Age'; D Wilson and R Purushothaman, 'Dreaming 
with BRICs: The Path to 2050' (Report No. 99, Goldman Sachs, October 2003), p 15 
 ^ Constitution o f the Federative Republic o f Brazil o f 1988 (translated in English) (Law Library of  
Congress, U.S., Political Database o f the Americas, Georgetown University)
’ Data from the Brazilian Institute o f Applied Economic Research (Institute de Pesquisa Economica 
Aplicada - IPEA) for 2008, Extreme poor are those with average household per capita income o f up to 
one quarter o f the minimum monthly wages (IPEA, 'Dimensao, Evoluçâo e Projeçâo da Pobreza por 
Regiao e por Estado no Brasil' (Comunicados do Ipea Comunicado No 58, Institute de Pesquisa 
Economica Aplicada - IPEA, 13th July 2010), p.3).
 ^ L Bitencourt, 'Crime and Violence: Challenges to Democracy in Brazil' in JS Tulchin and M 
Ruthenburg (eds). Citizenship in Latin America (Lynne Rienner Publishers, London 2007) 171-86, 
pp. 174-6
 ^Caldeira and Holston, 'Democracy and Violence in Brazil', pp.695-6; Holston, Insurgent Citizenship: 
Disjunctions o f  Democracy and Modernity in Brazil, pp. 13-4
levels of state and non-state violence/^ illustrated in Brazil’s average homicide rate of 
25 per hundred thousand, compared to the European and Asian averages of less than 2 
per hundred thousand/^ The social rights to health, social security, assistance, 
education, work and leisure (Article 6) and the pursuit of social welfare (Chapter II, 
Articles 194 to 204) opposes the lack of provision of basic needs and public services 
to many/^ The state’s constitutional mandate to protect and advance the social and 
individual rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution (Preamble and Article 4) 
co-exists with high levels of state corruption, impunity and lack of accountability of 
state officials, an authoritarian and punitive approach to law and order and a general 
lack of respect for the legal system by state officials. Currently, this reality is 
apparently being transformed by the country’s rapid economic developm ent,but 
fear, distrust, depletion of community life, devaluation of democracy and other socio­
political and economic consequences of the country’s staggering levels of violence 
taint Brazil’s progress.
Understanding Brazil in the face of these contradictions will provide the basis for the 
main assignment to be undertaken by this thesis, namely to ascertain whether the lack 
of application of rights enshrined in the Brazilian constitution, most notably by state
Bitencourt, 'Crime and Violence: Challenges to Democracy in Brazil'; Caldeira and Holston, 
'Democracy and Violence in Brazil', p.697; Carroll, 'Land o f Contrasts'; Pinheiro, 'Democratic 
Governance, Violence, and the (Un)Rule o f Law', pp. 122-3
" JJ Waiselfisz, 'Mapa da Violência 2010: Anatomia do Homicidios no Brasil' (Mapa da Violência, 
Instituto Sangari, Sao Paulo 2010), pp. 17-41 
Pinheiro, 'Democratic Governance, Violence, and the (Un)Rule o f Law', p. 124 
Caldeira and Holston, 'Democracy and Violence in Brazil'; AF Cooper, 'Labels Matter: Interpreting 
Rising Powers through Acronyms' in AS Alexandroff and AF Cooper (eds). Rising Sates, Rising 
Institutions: Challenges fo r  Global Governance (Brookings Institution Press, Washington 2010) 63-79, 
pp.68-9; S Karstedt and G LaFree, 'Democracy, Crime and Justice' (2006) 605 The Annals o f the 
American Academy o f Political and Social Science 6, pp. 13-4; PS Pinheiro, 'Transiçâo Politica e Nao- 
Estado de Direito na Republica' in I Sachs, J Wilheim and PS Pinheiro (eds), Brasil: Urn Século de 
Transformaçoes (1 edn, Companhia das Letras, Sao Paulo 2001) 260-305, pp. 192-6; OV Vieira, 
'Inequality and the Subversion o f the Rule of Law in Brazil' (Working Paper CBS-84-07, Centre for 
Brazilian Studies, University o f Oxford, Oxford 2007), p. 18
L Brainard and L Martinez-Diaz, 'Brazil: The “B” Belongs in the BRICS' in L Brainard and L 
Martinez-Diaz (eds), Brazil as an Economic Superpower?: Understanding Brazil’s Changing Role in 
the Global Economy (Brookings Institution Press, Washington 2009) 1-13; AM Nassar, 'Brazil as an 
Agricultural and Agroenergy Superpower' in L Brainard and L Martinez-Diaz (eds), Brazil as an 
Economic Superpower? Understanding Brazil's Changing Role in the Global Economy (Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington 2009) 55-109; Rathbone, 'South America’s Giant Comes o f Age'; J 
Wheatley and R Tapper, 'Surfing a Big Wave o f Confidence' Financial Times, Special Report: Brazil, 
8th July 2008) 1-2
TPR Caldeira, City o f  Walls: Crime, Segregation, and Citizenship in Sao Paulo (University o f  
California Press, London 2000); Caldeira and Holston, 'Democracy and Violence in Brazil'; N  Cardia, 
'The Impact o f Exposure to Violence in Sao Paulo: Accepting Violence or Continuing Horror?' in S 
Rotker (ed) Citizens o f  Fear: Urban Violence in Latin America (Rutgers University Press, London 
2002) 152-83, pp. 163-4
officials, and consequently, the low degree of observance of the rule of law by the 
Brazilian legal system, is likely to change in the near future and what the conditions 
for change are. Intrinsic to this endeavour is the task of establishing the role of law in 
perpetuating as well as transforming the status quo, which will entail assessing law’s 
function in reinforcing class relations and social inequality and its ability to serve as a 
tool of social inclusiveness, social and legal equality, legal obedience by state officials 
and fairness. In so doing, this thesis proposes, on a basic level, to identify Brazil’s 
legal system as deeply contradictory, that is, one in which the observance of legal 
formality does not preclude the perpetration of inequalities, inequities or the lack of 
participation by the majority of the population in the political decisions affecting 
them. Consequently, this thesis will highlight Brazil’s subscription to a form of the 
rule of law that is unsuitable to addressing the widespread transgression of citizens’ 
rights by the Brazilian government and, further, advance a substantive theory on the 
rule of law, which claims to be able to address the disjunct between constitutional 
principle and practical reality, thus providing the country’s legal system with a theory 
that can lead it to converge its socio-political-economic reality to the precepts of the 
1988 Constitution. Lastly and, most importantly, this thesis will advance a theory 
enouncing the conditions for the implementation of the rule of the law and, with that, 
bridge the gap between theoretical discourse and the practical implementation of the 
ideal, an often overlooked link by legal theorists and international development aid 
specialists.
Many of the answers to these questions undoubtedly lie in the country’s early history. 
With its territory demarcated by the Treaty of Tortesillas, between Portugal and Spain 
in 1494 to resolve their territorial conflict after Christopher Columbus reached 
America in 1492, Brazil was split by Portugal into fifteen land divisions, the 
hereditary captaincies, running parallel to the Equator and ending at the Line of 
Tortesillas to the west, each to be settled, managed and protected by a Crown 
appointed donatary.^^ Since it lacked the resources to do so itself, Portugal’s intention 
had been to colonise the new territory with private money, whilst keeping ultimate 
ownership over the colony. With only two of the captaincies in the northeast coast -
C Prado Jr., Formaçào do Brasil Contemporâneo: Colônia (3rd edn, Brasiliense, Sac Paulo 1948), 
p.31; R Roett, The New Brazil (Brookings Institution Press, Washington 2010), pp.20-1
CdriUc Z d^t/lh  HM cflout Trutltc**^
Sao Vicente and Pernambuco -  thriving, the experiment failed.N onetheless, this 
form of settlement by large landed estates {latifundios) was to have significant and 
centuries-long impact on the country’s history, land use, economy and p o litic s .A s  
Roett contends, “[o]ver the centuries, the survival of this form of settlement 
contributed to income inequality, limited the internal market, and maintained a strict 
division between haves and have-nots.”^^
The control over large swathes of land by a few families and clans, coupled with weak 
Portuguese administrative presence in the colony in the beginning of the colonisation 
process, which started in earnest in the mid-1500s,^° provided the basis for strong 
local rule, giving rise to the politics of rule of local bosses {coronelismo) that was to 
dominate the country in the early twentieth century.^ ^ The eighteenth century saw the 
discovery of minerals in the centre-south, particularly in and around the state of Minas 
Gerais, gradually, but significantly, heightened Portugal’s interest in the management 
of the colony. Until then, the royal administration, centred in the city of Salvador, in 
the northeast coast, was distant and isolated and its few administrative staff were 
unable to control the vast territory. The civilian Governor Generals (Governadores 
Gerais), appointed to oversee the settlement of the colony, were not supported by an 
effective military personnel as in Spanish America, thus exercising at times a more 
symbolic than actual command over the colonial occupancy.^^ The new-found mineral 
wealth prompted Portugal to exert stricter supervision over Brazil’s affairs to ensure 
minimal deviation of the mined gold destined for Lisbon.^^ Besides mineral 
exploration, sugar cane, which is ideally suited to the soil and climate of Brazil, 
became one of the main sources of colonial income. As the Brazilian indigenous 
people proved to be an unreliable and unsuitable work force, Portugal resorted to 
enslavement as a solution to the problem, conveniently employing its experience as
EB Bums, A History o f  Brazil (2nd edn, Columbia University Press, New York 1980), pp.32-4; 
Roett, The New Brazil, p.21 
B Fausto, A Concise History o f  Brazil (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999), p. 12; Holston, 
Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions o f  Democracy and Modernity in Brazil, pp. 118-45; Prado Jr., 
Formaçào do Brasil Contemporâneo: Colônia, p. 117; Roett, The New Brazil, p.21; KS Rosenn, 'The 
Success o f Constitutionalism in the United States and its Failure in Latin America; An Explanation' 
(1990-1991) 22 (1) University o f Miami Inter-American Law Review 1, p.22 
Roett, The New Brazil, p.21 
"°Ibid.,pp.23-4
TE Skidmore and PH Smith, 'Brazil: Development for Whom?' in TE Skidmore and PH Smith (eds). 
Modern Latin America (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) 137-76, p. 153 
^  Roett, The New Brazil, p.21 
Ibid.
leader in African slave trade in the fifteenth century to its advantage/"^ As with the 
creation of large land holdings, the reliance on slave labour and dependence on natural 
resources were to be the foundation for the country’s economic model and social 
structure for centuries to come?^ Underscoring these elements was a mutually 
beneficial relationship between the state and elites, sustained until nowadays to the 
detriment of the rights, freedoms and interests of the rest of the Brazilian population. 
As will be seen in Chapter 1, the consolidation of this centuries-long relationship lies 
in two crucial and intertwined aspects: Portugal’s strict policy on education and the 
formation of a consensually unified political elite, whose members came from the 
same social and economic strata and, most importantly, were educated in law at 
Coimbra U niversity .T he Roman Law subject taught at Coimbra promoted the divine 
power of the kings and reinforced, rather than challenged, the socio-political 
constitution of colonial Brazilian society, including the political centralisation of 
power and the stratified, aristocratic and landed divisions of the country’s social 
system.^^ The Coimbra law-graduates dominated the state bureaucracy and the 
judiciary.^^ With a homogenous ideology and a common socio-economic background, 
they produced a stable monarchical regime until the Proclamation of the Republic, 
sixty-seven years after the Declaration of Independence in 1822, enforcing a social 
system based on title, privileges and nepotism favouring the elitist minority, and lack 
of enjoyment of rights, disenfranchisement, slavery and destitution suffered by the 
m ajority .Form ing a small group bonded by their access to education and their 
dominance of the functions of central government, the ruling classes were successful 
in containing, in the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries, the dissemination of 
revolutionary ideas for a more democratic, equal and rights-based society that were 
gaining force elsewhere, particularly in France and the United States (U.S.), by both
Ibid., pp.21-2 
Ibid., pp.20-4
J Barman and R Barman, 'The Role o f the Law Graduate in the Political Elite o f Imperial Brazil' 
(1976) 18 Journal o f Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 423; JMd Carvalho, 'Elites and State 
Building: the Case o f Nineteenth Century Brazil' (1982) 24 Comparative Studies in Society and History 
378; Holston, Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions o f  Democracy and Modernity in Brazil, pp.121-3; E- 
S Pang and RL Seckinger, 'The Mandarins o f Imperial Brazil' (1972) 14 Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 215
Carvalho, 'Elites and State Building: the Case o f Nineteenth Century Brazil', pp.382-7 
Barman and Barman, 'The Role o f the Law Graduate in the Political Elite o f Imperial Brazil', pp.425- 
6; Carvalho, 'Elites and State Building: the Case o f Nineteenth Century Brazil', pp.381-3 
Barman and Barman, 'The Role o f the Law Graduate in the Political Elite o f Imperial Brazil', p.425- 
9; Carvalho, 'Elites and State Building: the Case o f Nineteenth Century Brazil', pp.381-4; Pang and 
Seckinger, 'The Mandarins o f Imperial Brazil', p.220
quashing social mobilisation and rebellion and instilling a view of society that only a 
few were willing to question.^® As Roett contends, the elites created the myth that 
slavery in Brazil was less cruel and repressive than in other places and that 
miscegenation between white male owners and black slave women, which gave rise to 
the mulatto race, was to form the basis for a new social entity suited to the young 
tropical society.^^ In this way, the ruling classes provided slaves with a natural place 
in society, thus avoiding the explicit racial divide experienced in the U.S. and South 
Africa, albeit instituting a form of slavery that was as inhumane and degrading as 
anywhere else.^^ Hence, although the limits imposed on the exercise of citizenship in 
colonial Brazil were not greatly different from that of many European nations,^^ the 
political liberalisation and expansion of citizenship that took place in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries in European countries such as England, France, the 
Netherlands and Germany, as well as the U.S., saw those similarities fade away.^ "* As 
European and American revolutions questioned the authority of an all powerful 
sovereign, opening debate in society and, consequently, leading European nations and 
the U.S. to becoming more tolerant to principles such as equality, universality and 
indivisibility, Brazilian citizenship became more exclusionary and differentiated, 
tainted by violence and corruption.^^ Aided by Portugal’s policies on education, 
including the control over the information accessed by the few literates in Brazil,^^ on 
political power, exercised by a strong central govemment,^^ and on dealing with 
rebellions and dissenting thought, preventing regional uprisings - which had led to the 
break up of the Spanish colonies in the Americas - from gathering strength,^^ the 
ruling classes implemented their own version of citizenship and revolution from the
Carvalho, 'Elites and State Building: the Case o f Nineteenth Century Brazil'; Holston, Insurgent 
Citizenship: Disjunctions o f  Democracy and Modernity in Brazil ; SL Maram, 'Labor and the Left in 
Brazil, 1890-1921: A Movement Aborted' (1977) 57 Hispanic American Historical Review 254; Pang 
and Seckinger, 'The Mandarins of Imperial Brazil'
Roett, The New Brazil, p.22 
Ibid.
Holston, Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions o f  Democracy and Modernity in Brazil, p.39 
Ibid. ; BS Turner, 'Outline o f a Theory of Citizenship' (1990) 24 Sociology 189, pp.205-9 
Holston, Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions o f  Democracy and Modernity in Brazil, p.39; Turner, 
'Outline o f a Theory o f Citizenship', pp.205-9 
Barman and Barman, 'The Role o f the Law Graduate in the Political Elite o f Imperial Brazil', p.429; 
Carvalho, 'Elites and State Building: the Case o f Nineteenth Century Brazil', pp.385-8; Pang and 
Seckinger, 'The Mandarins o f Imperial Brazil', p.220 
Carvalho, 'Elites and State Building: the Case o f Nineteenth Century Brazil', p.393 
RM Levine, The History o f  Brazil (The Greenwood Histories o f the Modem Nations Series, 
Greenwood Press, London 1999), pp.62-3
top, securing Brazil a smooth transition to independence/^ Inspired by struggles for 
self-determination worldwide, not least in the neighbouring territories, and fuelled by 
a sense of national pride and nationalism, which developed more rapidly after the 
Portuguese royal family’s move to Brazil in 1807, Brazil’s independence relieved the 
elites from the high taxes imposed by Portugal, whilst ensuring the continuation of the 
socio-political status quo/^ Accordingly, the centralising monarchical system 
favoured by elites, survived the independence process,"^  ^ and so did s l a v e ry th e  lack 
of enfranchisement of women, poverty and il l i teracysocial  status based on title and 
nobility and the dominance of Coimbra-graduates in central government and the 
judiciary, until the generation died out in the 1870s/'^ The idea that graduating in law 
was indispensable for those seeking to join the national elite perpetuated its 
popularity, with ever increasing numbers of Brazilians entering the national law 
schools that had been established from 1827/^ Throughout the centuries, law 
continued to be a symbol of power and status, buttressing the unequal foundations on 
which Brazilian society stood/^
The independence process would not be the last time that change more commonly 
associated with revolution and popular mobilisation would be carried out by and be 
tailored to the interests of the elites. Having driven the first Emperor, Dom Pedro I, to 
abdicate his throne in favour of his son in 1831,"^  ^ and enjoyed the long conciliatory 
reign of Dom Pedro 11,"^  ^the political elite of the Empire was supplanted in importance 
and clout by the powerful landed elite who, together with the military, ended the 
Empire in 1889 by implementing a form of Republicanism that rhetorically resembled
RJ Barman, Brazil: The Forging o f  a Nation, 1798-1852 (Stanford University Press, Stanford 1994), 
p.6; L Bethell, 'On Democracy in Brazil: Past and Present' (Occasional Papers No.7, Institute o f Latin 
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that of the U.S, but in practice was a nationalised version of the local oligarchic rule 
that dominated regional politics/^ One year prior to the declaration of the Republic in 
1889, the institution of slavery, which had been indispensable for providing labour to 
the large estates that produced Brazil’s staple agricultural commodities, was 
abolished. Although the end of slavery antagonised the economic and political elites, 
ultimately leading to the coup that ousted the Emperor and inaugurated the new 
Republican system, the process was not driven by social and humane reasons, but 
largely by economic considerations as well as by the realisation that, with the 
outlawing of transatlantic slave trade in 1850, the continuing reliance on slaves was an 
ever more precarious endeavour.
Throughout the First Republic (1889-1930), landowners of the states of Sao Paulo and 
Mina Gerais, and sporadically Rio Grande do Sul, alternated themselves in power, 
with regional oligarchs dominating the rest of a predominantly rural Brazil.^* Slave 
labour was replaced by an immigrant work force, attracted to Brazil by the promise of 
a new life. Accustomed to free labour and maltreatment of slaves, landowners tied the 
new immigrants to bonded labour, requiring them to repay the cost of their journey to 
Brazil and their maintenance on the farms with years of hard work/^ The harsh 
conditions in rural areas led many immigrants and migrants from the hinterlands to 
seek a better life in Brazil’s urban centres, particularly Sao Paulo, which were 
undergoing a phase of rapid growth and development.^^ Lack of training and safety 
equipment in the factories, long working hours, and the general absence of workers’ 
rights caused the emergence of a strong union movement, founded and led in large 
part by educated European immigrants, many of whom were acquainted with unions 
and workers’ movements in their home countries.^"  ^ Threatened, the elites convinced 
the population at large of the danger of a Bolshevik Revolution in Brazil, employing 
the state apparatus to criminalise and persecute union leaders.^^ The containment of
Carvalho, 'Elites and State Building: the Case o f Nineteenth Century Brazil', pp.392-3; JD Needed, A 
Tropical Belle Epoque: Elite Cultural and Society in Turn-of-the-Century Rio de Janeiro (Cambridge 
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History o f  Brazil, pp.69-70 
Levine, The History o f  Brazil, p.78; Skidmore and Smith, 'Brazil: Development for Whom?' pp. 151-3 
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social mobilisation was part of the elites’ overall goal of consolidating their power and 
preserving unity, which, without the strong authority of the Crown, required the 
maintenance of order and control of opposition, within and outside the elite class/^ 
This strategy also encompassed building a strong state apparatus whilst allowing the 
local bosses or colonels to dominate local politics, thus ensuring local peace and 
according the right to vote to only a privileged few/^
Being one of the forces that ousted the Emperor in favour of the Republic, since the 
political change of 1889, the military stood ready to intervene in national politics 
whenever necessary/^ Its new importance in the national political scenario in the 
1930s was a result of growing discontent within the armed forces with Brazil’s belated 
drive towards modernisation and industrialisation. Their calls for a national 
convergence on the advancement of other economies and for a renewal of nationalism 
and centralisation of power coincided with the decline of the rule of the local bosses.^^ 
In October 1930, in a coup d’état that ousted Washington Luis, the newly elected 
president, Getulio Vargas -  one of the candidates who lost the elections and the leader 
of the lieutenant’s movement {Movimento Tenentistd) - assumed the presidency of the 
provisional government. In 1937, Vargas consolidated his position by installing a 
dictatorship known as ‘New State’ {Estado Novo).^^ By centralising power and 
applying heavy state intervention, through a combination of traditional and populist 
policies, Vargas reorganised Brazilian society and regulated the work force, ruling 
through a system of alliances.^^ His demagogic style and his appeasement of 
heterogeneous and conflicting interests ensured his popularity with the masses, whose 
rights, especially labour, had been protected meaningfully for the first time in the 
country’s history, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 1, but alienated the support of 
the m i l i t a ry . In  1945 another coup ensued, leading Vargas to take his own life.^^
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Through the next two decades, the presence of the military was felt ever more 
strongly, until in 1964 a military dictatorship that would last for over twenty years was 
established/"^
Although the struggle of social movements and workers’ unions for the instatement of 
democracy and the protection of citizens’ rights and freedoms, as well as their role in 
harnessing popular support for the Direct Now (Diretas Jo) Campaign - demanding 
direct presidential elections through demonstrations that led millions of Brazilians 
onto to the streets in the 1980s - were significant elements in the process of 
democratic opening that ended the military regime and culminated in the promulgation 
of the 1988 Constitution,^^ this was ultimately a negotiated process. As such, the 
compromises involved ensured amnesty for those responsible for the gross violations 
of human rights and the open and extensive encroachment on the rights and freedoms 
of the Brazilian population.^^ Infighting and disagreements within the armed forces, 
the progressive weakening of the economy and the coming to power of a more liberal 
faction of the army in the mid-1970s contributed to the slow liberalisation of the
67regime.
Historically, meaningfiil socio-political changes in the Brazilian society followed a 
model that suited the national elites, not once driven by popular revolution, but by the 
need for a change in a manner that accommodated the interests of the ruling classes 
and, largely, without the assignment of more democratic power to the people or a 
more substantial protection of their rights and freedoms. This elitist form of political 
revolution, endured since the Proclamation of Independence from Portugal, was 
considerably, although only partially, overcome in the transition to democracy in the 
1980s, when the population seized the opportunity not only to mobilise and apply
Ibid. ; Roett, The New Brazil, p.55; TE Skidmore, Brazil: Five Centuries o f  Change (2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2010), p. 147
Carvalho, Cidadania no Brasil: O Longo Caminho, pp. 180-3; Pinheiro, 'Transiçâo Politica e Nâo- 
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Society (United National University Press, New York 2001) 19-44, pp.30-1; Pinheiro, 'Democratic 
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Democratizaçâo Brasileira: Um Balanço no Processo Politico desde a Transiçâo' (2001) 15 (4) Sâo 
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pressure from below, but also to participate actively in the writing of its constitution in 
an unprecedented way, contributing to a constitutional text that recognises a range of 
civil, political, social and cultural rights/^ This has not prevented the disparities 
between legislated text and social practice that highlight the inobservance of the 
Brazilian population’s rights in practice in spite of their extensive formal protection. 
Although the birth of the Workers Party {Partido dos Trabalhadores - FT) in 1980, 
the increased compartmentalisation and specialisation of the Brazilian social 
movements and the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution have changed gradually the 
paternalistic relationship between the state and the Brazilian population,^^ the close 
alliance maintained between elites and the state has persisted, as the interests of an 
elitist minority continue to be pursued in spite of, or to the detriment of, the 
constitutional rights and guarantees of the majority of the population. Counting on a 
passive and disorganised populace, the Brazilian dominant classes have successfully 
insulated themselves from revolt by punishing and persecuting those who have 
challenged their power, by excluding the poor and uneducated masses, by sustaining a 
system based on privileges and nepotism and by maintaining a paternalistic 
relationship with the rest of population, which has largely accepted its lowly place in 
society. This scenario has set the basis for Brazil’s legal system, which has been 
permeated by favouritism towards Brazil’s elites,^® unfairness,^* unequal treatment of 
different classes,^^ lack of access to justice for the lower classes,^^ restricted access to
JD French, Drowning in Laws: Labor Law and Brazilian Political Culture (University o f North 
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Fiction?' (2007) 14 (2) Murdoch University Law Journal 28. See Appendix 1 for an insight into the 
main fundamental rights protected by the Constitution.
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land and property for the many/"* and excessive protection of land and property rights 
for the few/^
Despite the pattern that Brazil has historically followed, this thesis will argue that a 
social consciousness, initiated via resistance to the dictatorship regime in the 1970s, 
began to regain momentum more recently to the benefit of Brazil’s poor and excluded. 
As Brazil experiences a period of unprecedented economic and social development,^^ 
it is facing the possibility of finally attaining deeper and more substantial social and 
institutional change. Such change depends, however, on the enforcement of the 
precepts of the Constitution, the promotion of wide institutional reforms and the 
imposition of limits on abuses of power by state officials. At the heart of this project is 
the implementation of the rule of law. Widely promoted as the essence of an 
inherently fair and just legal system, the concept of the rule of law is deemed to foster 
accountability, stability, transparency, as well as to solve a wide range of problems, 
from corruption to poverty and inequality, to violence and authoritarianism, thus 
fomenting a greater degree of legal obedience.^^ The rule of law’s advancement by 
international financial institutions, regional blocs, transnational organisations and 
governments has led to its worldwide pursuit, through initiatives that concentrate on 
the enactment of laws and institutional reform.^^ Despite this, rule of law building 
efforts in a number of countries in Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa, in 
the past decades, have produced only nominal results, failing to deliver the end results
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promised/^ As will be seen in Chapter 2, this is due to a disconnect between the 
theoretical discourse of the rule of law and its practical implementation. Although 
promoting the implementation of a conception of the rule of law that is formal in 
nature, international aid specialists have promised end results that are only 
encompassed by substantial formulations of the ideal.^ ** In addressing this disjuncture, 
this thesis will, firstly, explore the most authoritative conceptions of the rule of law, 
with a view to establishing the most coherent and adequate theory for explaining the 
case of Brazil. As formal conceptions of the rule of law are concerned with rules of 
legal validity, rather than the contents of laws, they are open-ended and universal, 
characteristics which have appealed both to legal theorists and international 
institutions.^* By following a set of formal requirements, which generally include the 
manner in which laws are enacted, their temporal dimension and the clarity of the 
norm,^^ those advocating a formal version of the rule of law contend that legal systems 
become more predictable, certain and transparent.^^ Accordingly, citizens’ freedom is 
enhanced by their knowledge of the actions that incur government sanctions and 
responsibilities towards each other, and economic market transactions are facilitated 
by estimations of their likely costs and benefits.^"* Nonetheless, although undoubtedly 
desirable qualities, they cannot prevent legal systems from harbouring laws of 
inequitable or evil content.^^ Indeed, Brazil’s own observance of legal formality has 
not prevented a divide forming between the formal recognition of citizens’ rights and 
guarantees and their frustration in practice. On the contrary, by sustaining an alliance 
with the Brazilian dominant classes, the state has relinquished its obligation to 
promote and respect the enshrined constitutional rights of the majority of the
T Carothers, 'The Problem o f Knowledge' in T Carothers (ed) Promoting the Rule o f  Law Abroad: In 
Search o f  Knowledge (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C. 2006) 15-28, 
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population, whose cooperation it has deemed dispensable. Substantial formulations of 
the rule of law, on the other hand, accept the importance of procedural aspects of legal 
rules, but go beyond this by incorporating propositions of political morality.^^ 
Congruent with the most common understanding of the meaning of the rule of law, 
they generally encompass rules of legal validity, as well as individual rights and 
democracy. Very importantly, they incorporate limitations on abuses of power by the 
state and, as such, are in line with the “historical tradition”^^  of the rule of law.^  ^By 
limiting the exercise of power by state officials and condemning abuses of power and 
the use of coercion, they offer Brazil a more adequate benchmark of analysis of its 
legal system and a more suitable theoretical framework to guide future change. For 
this reason, in Chapter 2, three very distinctive authoritative conceptions of the rule of 
law are advanced; Hayek’s, Rawl’s and Dworkin’s theories are examined in depth and 
the most suitable theory to explaining the case of Brazil, as well as offering the 
country both a practical theoretical foundation for change and an ideal worth pursuing, 
will be adopted. Secondly, in Chapter 3, this thesis will advance a theory on the 
implementation of the rule of law that not only makes sense of Brazil’s historical lack 
of the ideal, but also offers a realistic and theoretically sound proposition for its 
implementation in the future. In its analysis of adopting Weingast’s political theory on 
elites and rule of law in Chapter 2, this thesis argues that the implementation of the 
rule of law is ultimately dependent on the will of the elites.^ ** This is because public 
officials will only comply with the established legal rules when perceiving this as 
necessary to achieving or maintaining power -  that is, when it is in their interest.^* 
Sustaining a high degree of legal obedience by state officials is, therefore, a 
coordination problem and, as such, citizens and elites must join in policing the state by 
denouncing major transgressions and pressurising the government to fulfil its
Craig, 'Formal and Substantive Conceptions o f the Rule o f Law: An Analytical Framework', p.467; 
AC Hutchinson and P Monahan, 'Democracy and the Rule o f Law' in AC Hutchinson and P Monahan 
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constitutional mandate/^ Where the most likely and stable relationship in society is 
that maintained between the state and the dominant classes/^ which is often the case, 
achieving such coordination is problematic, since the elites’ cooperation is more 
useful and valuable to the government than that of the rest of the population/"* 
Weingast claims that this model of societal interplay can only be supplanted when an 
extraneous and sufficiently compelling factor provides incentives for the elites to 
police the state with the masses, forgoing privileges gained from siding with the 
government/^ Only then, may the rule of law be implemented and the country’s 
democracy consolidated. Accordingly, this thesis contextualises Weingast’s theory by 
claiming that one or a combination of elements taking place in the Brazilian society 
could turn the implementation of the rule of law into a possibility in the near future. 
The first element offering the elites an incentive to act is the empowerment of the 
masses. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, the birth and dissemination of national 
movements since the 1970s and the transition to democracy in the 1980s have 
contributed to the emergence of an “insurgent citizenship.”^^  In the context of Brazil, 
the insurgent citizen is more aware of his or her rights and, as a result, demands the 
respect for the democratic and civil rights granted by the Constitution on the basis of 
equality.^^ This is partly due to the adaptation of social movements’ discourse, from a 
needs-based to a rights-based approach and their successful dissemination, among the 
lower classes, of demands centred on a “right to have rights.”^^  In addition, the 
struggle for the end of the dictatorship and the subsequent promulgation of the 1988 
Constitution have culminated in the constitutionalisation of a substantial range of 
rights and freedoms, which has, to a certain level, led to the appropriation of rights
^ Weingast, 'The Political Foundations o f Democracy and the Rule o f Law'; Weingast, 'A Postscript to 
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99language by the poor, in learning to reclaim rights persistently denied by the state. 
According to Schor, the role that society plays in upholding the constitutional 
protection of fundamental rights and civil liberties is important for the entrenchment 
of Constitutions.***** Although this thesis argues that this is not enough, in itself, for the 
implementation of the rule of law and the consolidation of democracy, it may provide 
the elites with an incentive to forge a coalition with the rest of the population. 
Furthermore, it will be shown in Chapter 5 that the country’s recent economic growth 
has also contributed to the empowerment of the masses and will continue to do so if 
current policies to end poverty, as well as to provide wide financial credit and social 
security to the poorest sectors of the population, are sustained.****
The second element is economic growth. As will be seen in Chapter 5, Brazil has been 
experiencing rapid economic growth in the last decade.***^  With it, institutional and 
infrastructural changes are taking place to accommodate the needs of international 
markets and foreign investors.***  ^Additionally, societal groups who have been largely 
excluded from government policies, are gaining prominence in the political arena. As 
the poor are gradually lifted out of poverty, their consumer power has increased and, 
consequently, so has their political bargaining power.***"* The Brazilian middle class is 
also expanding rapidly.***^  It is possible that, denied the same privileges as the elites, 
they will apply pressure to the elitist minority to forge a coordination mechanism in 
order to demand the accountability of state officials. Of course, the rapid economic 
growth experienced by Brazil brings with it a whole new set of possibilities and 
challenges for the country, many of which can only be met if the elites are willing to 
relinquish some of their privileges and side with the rest of the population in imposing 
limits on the state. Among them are standards of democracy and the rule of law
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imposed by international financial institutions;^®  ^ the need for more efficiency and 
excellence in important geopolitical areas, from agriculture to energy, oil and gas 
production, a goal which is necessarily dependent on achieving lower levels of 
corruption and wide institutional and infra-structural r e f o r m s ; t h e  realisation by 
elites that violence, especially state-condoned, has created an unsafe and unsound 
environment for their businesses and is likely to hamper the attractiveness of the 
Brazilian market to foreign businesses and i n v e s t o r s ; a n d  Brazil’s increasing 
international prominence and its willingness to play a more active role in regional 
politics, the agenda of developing countries and the reform of multilateral 
institutions/®^
The third element refers to the less positive influence of violence. In Chapter 6 it will 
be demonstrated that, when it comes to violence levels, the country can be considered 
at crisis point. In addition to increasing criminal violence, state violence has been a 
feature of the Brazilian society for generations, due to the endemic lack of 
accountability and impunity of state officials.^^® This, in turn, has led to further crime, 
a widespread sentiment of fear and distrust,^ the deterioration of the community and 
of collective life,^^  ^ the ‘démonisation’ of those socially and economically excluded 
and further dichotomisation of society, the support by the Brazilian population of 
controversial and democratically dubious policies to tackle criminality, and, very 
importantly, the discredit of Brazil’s courts and legal system. Although the poor and 
black suffer disproportionately from Brazil’s high crime rate,^^  ^violence has reached 
astounding levels in the country’s major urban centres, affecting the elites’ daily
Barrionuevo, 'Brazil Rides Wave of Growth'; Wheatley, 'The Economy: An Impressive List o f  
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l i v e s /D e s p i te  having more resources at their disposal to deal with the permanent 
threat of crime, as well as the pecuniary consequences of it, the extent of the problem 
has meant that elites have not been able to insulate themselves from it as in the past/^^ 
consequently, they have been growing frustrated with the repercussions of increasing 
levels of violence and the inefficiency of the successive governments in dealing with 
the issue/Furthermore,  a significant aspect of high rates of criminality is the threat 
posed to democratic stability/^® These and other consequences of crime will be 
explored in Chapter 6, where it will be argued that high levels of violence may be one 
of the factors providing the elites with an incentive to coordinate their interests with 
those of the rest of the population. The pervasiveness and extensive nature of the 
problem, as well as the fact that violence affects elite lives and livelihoods, means that 
crime may be a compelling element motivating them to accept a compromise on their 
short-term privileges for the protection of their long-term well-being.
As will be seen in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, a further persuasive incentive for the elites to 
desire, or appear to desire, more meaningful change, including the downward 
transferral of rights, democratic decision-making and legal certainty, is that imposed 
by foreign eli tes .Part ic ipat ing in an increasingly globalised and normalised 
international world order requires national ruling classes to abdicate some of the 
control over decision-making processes which directly affect political outcomes. In 
addition, the clientisation of international players and the motivation to ratify 
international treaties and join regional blocs compel national elites to adhere to 
international standards. In this sense, the rulings of transational courts and the 
reports, conditionalities and recommendations of international organisations add 
pressure on the dominant classes to comply with transnational normative frameworks 
and international legal rules. Once elites have put in place a wide system of rights’ 
transfer, even if only nominally, law may continue to evolve in a manner not
117
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anticipated by the ruling classes, engendering further positive change in the legal 
system/^"^
If compelling enough, in themselves or combined, these factors may break the 
centuries-long pattern of elitist privileges and state abuses of citizens’ rights cemented 
by the Coimbra law-graduates in the pre and post-independence period. In so doing, 
Brazil’s public officials will become more law-abiding and will accept limitations on 
the exercise of their power, the legal system will be more predictable and transparent, 
and the population at large will enjoy the rights and freedoms enshrined in the 1988 
Constitution. This is an ambitious goal, however, which requires the will and help of 
the elites. By identifying the possible incentives present in Brazilian society at this 
point in time, this thesis not only anticipates the possibility of change, but also 
furnishes the Brazilian population with knowledge of the elements that are likely to 
exert influence on the dominant classes, thus allowing them to turn this into an ever 
more likely reality.
ED Genovese, 'Of the Willing and the Obedient' in ED Genovese (ed) Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World 
the Slaves Made (Vintage Books, New York 1976) 3-97, pp.25-7; EP Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: 
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CHAPTER 1 
BRAZIL’S STATE-BUILDING 
Elite Influence and Social Exclusion
In this Chapter, the history of Brazil between the years prior to its independence 
through to the rule of one of its most iconic Presidents, Getulio Vargas, will be 
analysed, so as to demonstrate that during that period of Brazil’s history, a powerful 
and influential elite formed and a pattern of social exclusion and repression was set. 
Accordingly, special emphasis will be given to the role of the elites in the formation of 
the nation in the years prior to the country’s independence from Portugal in 1822 and 
during the Imperial period (1822-1889), as well as to social exclusion and the 
repression of social movements during the early 1900s. The historical involvement of 
the military in the affairs of the nation, which culminated in the coup that installed a 
dictatorship from 1964-1985, will be analysed in Chapter 4, where the process of 
transition to democracy and its implications to the legal system and the empowerment 
of the masses will be further explored.
1.1 The Concept of Elites
The definition of elites adopted by this thesis is that presented by Burton, Gunther and 
Higley: “persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful 
organizations, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially.”  ^ This 
definition encompasses organisations across society, that is, within the government, 
the military or the main opposition to the establishment, as well as areas ranging from 
political, economic, social and cultural sectors.^ In addition, elite members possess a 
variety of backgrounds and ideologies, adopting differing stances on political.
‘ J Higley, R Giinther and M Burton, 'Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes' in J 
Higley and R Giinther (eds). Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern 
Europe (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1992) 1-37, p.8 
2 Ibid.
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economic and social arrangements/ In order to be considered part of the elite, 
however, individuals must enjoy recognisable authority within an organised sector, be 
it part of the regime in power or the opposition/ Moreover, they ought to be able to 
affect political outcomes both regularly and substantial. As Burton, Giinther and 
Higley’s contend, together with the control of strategic positions in powerful 
organisations and institutions criterion, these elements distinguish elites from other 
influential individuals or persons able to substantially^ or regularly^ affect the outcome 
of political decisions.^ This is not to say that every important political decision 
affecting a policy or regime will be influenced by elites; rather, it means that elite 
members have enough power and resources to affect political decisions concerning 
their interests.^
Higley and Burton classify elites as ‘disunified’ or ‘consensually unified’.^  By 
‘disunified’ they mean national elites that lack consensus, thus producing unstable 
regimes, characterised by democratic periods interspersed by authoritarian ones. This 
is the most common type of e l ite .T h e  rarer ‘consensually unified’ national elite, on 
the other hand, is able to produce a stable regime which may evolve to democracy 
when favourable conditions, especially economic, exist/*
“[ujnless regime changes are preceded or accompanied by elite 
transformations -  from disunity to consensual unity, in cases of 
democratic transitions, or from consensual unity to disunity, in cases of 
democratic breakdowns -  they should be regarded as strictly 
temporary.”*^
' Ibid.
 ^Ibid., p.9
 ^ The criterion ‘substantially’ refers to the fact that outcomes concerning issues that fall into the ambit 
of elites’ interests and location would be greatly different had they not been influenced by them (Ibid.).
 ^By ‘regularly’, the authors mean that the elites are able to affect political outcomes on a regular basis, 
as their “individual points o f view and possible actions are seen by other influential persons as 
important factors to be weighed when assessing the likelihood o f continuities and changes in regimes 
and policies.” As an example o f this, the authors note that someone who is a political assassin is able to 
affect political outcomes in a substantial, but not in a regular way, whereas an elector o f a democratic 
election is able to affect political outcomes regularly, but not substantially (Ibid.).
" Ibid.
* Ibid.
 ^J Higley and MG Burton, 'The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns' (1989) 54 
American Sociological Review 17, p. 17 
Ibid.
" Examples o f such elites can be found in Sweden, the United Kingdom (U.K.) and the U.S. (Ibid., 
pp. 17-8).
Ibid., p. 18
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This classification is highly relevant since, as will be seen, Brazil’s early independent 
history is marked by the formation of a ‘consensually unified’ ‘political elite’,w h o s e  
members were bound not only by the exercise of the higher-ranking positions of the 
political system in the pre-independence years and throughout Brazil’s Empire,*"* but 
also by their endorsement of shared socio-political ideas such as the support for a 
monarchical system and the conservation of a socially uneven society, based on class, 
title privileges and unequal distribution of wealth.*^ As Carvalho explains, more than 
just a socially cohesive group, the political elite denotes a group that has been 
politically created and trained to perform the functions of government and that can, 
therefore, significantly influence the political system.*^ According to Pang and 
Seckinger, this concept bears similarities to that of the Chinese ‘mandarin’, a 
phenomenon describing the ability of centrally controlling political agents to unify and 
devise a national ideology supporting existing social and political practices and 
institutions in society.*^
The political elite during Brazil’s Empire was unified,*^ since they had the power to 
influence the country’s political decisions by enforcing the elements of a national or 
official ideology tailored to securing political stability through the preservation of 
political and social continuity.*^ As will be contended, the Brazilian political elite’s 
formation and significance in the country’s early history was to set the framework for 
a system based on elitist privileges, social exclusion and inequality that was to 
delineate Brazil’s socio-political make-up.
Barman and Barman, 'The Role o f the Law Graduate in the Political Elite o f Imperial Brazil'; 
Carvalho, 'Elites and State Building: the Case o f Nineteenth Century Brazil'; Pang and Seckinger, 'The 
Mandarins o f Imperial Brazil'
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1.2 History of Brazil
1.2.1 Pre-Independence Period to the End of the Empire (1800s-l 889)
Between its independence and the declaration of the Republic in 1889, Brazil’s 
Empire ran the country with relative calm and without major revolutionary 
opposition/® Isolated plots against the crown sought, mostly, regional autonomy 
rather than the country’s independence/* One of the few exceptions was the Northeast 
region civil war between 1835 and 1841. Known as the Cabanagem, it was initially a 
slave insurgency but evolved progressively into a racial war. As the revolution was 
initiated by people of colour, the repression unleashed by the imperial government 
was especially severe and 30,000 insurgents were killed during the conflict. To avoid 
further uprisings, the government forced Brazil’s indigenous population (mdios) in the 
region into gang labour, thus preventing them from attaining tribal independence/^
According to Bethell, although Brazil’s independence was a rebuttal of colonialism 
and absolutism from Portugal and, as such, was undeniably a product of the 
“democratic revolution”^^  that swept the Americas in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries,^"* the intention of the Brazilian elite was never to assign sovereignty to the 
people. The goal of those seeking independence was to achieve political and economic 
autonomy from Portugal “without sacrificing the stability so crucial for the 
maintenance of the unity of Brazil and existing socio-economic structures built, above 
all, on African slavery.”^^  Accordingly, a “conservative ‘revolution’”^^  ensued and 
independence was accomplished without major social mobilisation or upheaval.^^ This 
fact is, for Carvalho, evidence of the power of the Brazilian elites at the time.^^
Many are the explanations for Brazil’s achievement of independence as a unified 
nation in contrast to the break-up of the Spanish colonies in the Americas. Some are
Bethell, 'On Democracy in Brazil: Past and Present', pp.3-4; Levine, The History o f  Brazil, p.57 
Levine, The History o f  Brazil, p.57 
Ibid., pp.62-3
^ Bethell, 'On Democracy in Brazil: Past and Present', p.3 
Whose ideational foundation lay in ideas espoused by the French and American revolutions (Ibid., 
pp.3-4).
Ibid., p.3 
Ibid.
Ibid., pp.3-4
Carvalho, 'Elites and State Building: the Case o f Nineteenth Century Brazil', pp.3 79-82
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economic in nature, related for instance to the mining cycles of the colonies, whilst 
social factors such as slavery, are said to have been decisive in maintaining socio­
political cohesiveness/^ One of the most common interpretations is, however, of a 
political nature and it concerns the presence of the Portuguese royal family and court 
in colonial Brazil/® As Levine argues, Portugal’s heavy-handed and swift quashing of 
uprisings from those demanding regional autonomy and advocating republicanism, as 
evidenced in the Cabanagem War, undoubtedly served as a deterrent to many/* As he 
contends, with a population of fewer than three million inhabitants^^ scattered around 
a vast geographical area, it is surprising that Brazil remained unified after 
independence, particularly in the face of the strength of separatist movements in the 
Spanish colonies/^ For the scholar, this is not, however, a sufficiently compelling 
argument to explain why the country remained unified after independence, since it did 
not prevent the break-up of the Spanish colonies/"* Hence, despite acknowledging that 
Portugal’s strict control over the colony’s affairs in the 1800s and its harsh approach 
to regional rebellions were important to the maintenance of relative peace in colonial 
Brazil and, consequently, of political and territorial integrity, Levine believes that the 
Portuguese Crown’s presence in Rio de Janeiro at the time of Brazil’s independence 
was crucial to the continued national unity/^
In 1807, seeking refuge from the Napoleonic invasion of the country,^^ Portugal’s 
royal family and its court fled to Brazil under the protection of a British naval escort/^ 
After a short stay in Salvador, the royal court was relocated to Rio de Janeiro, which 
was, significantly, designated the capital of the Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the 
Algarve/^ Dom Joao VI Alcantara de Bragança e Bourbon^^ and the Portuguese
Ibid.
^Hbid.,p.382 
Levine, The History o f  Brazil, pp.59-63 
Including 1.2 million slaves (Ibid., p.59).
”  Ibid., pp.59-63 
Ibid., pp.57-63 
Ibid., pp.59-63 
Ibid., p.57
According to Valença, the royal convoy that travelled to Brazil under the protection o f the British 
was composed of 15,000 people. Apart from the royal family, the Court was composed o f “members of  
the Council o f State, ministers, advisers, officials, the Treasure personnel, upper echelons o f the Army, 
Navy and Church, members o f the aristocracy as well as professionals, businessmen and servants” 
(Valença, 'Patron-Client Relations and Politics in Brazil - An Historical Overview', p.9).
Levine, The History o f  Brazil, pp.59-60; Valença, 'Patron-Client Relations and Politics in Brazil - An 
Historical Overview', p.9
Dom Joao VI was declared Portugal’s Prince Regent in 1799, governing in the name o f his mother. 
Queen Maria, who was declared mentally unfit for office in 1792. Between 1792 and 1799, D. Joao was
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court’s presence in Rio de Janeiro had a great impact on the colony, not least by the 
elevation of Brazil’s colonial status to that of kingdom in 1815. Accordingly, early in 
the nineteenth century, Dom Joao implemented a number of measures which boosted 
Brazil’s progress and the development of a national culture."*® For instance, through 
the promulgation of the Decree of F* of April 1808, which repealed the Charter 
prohibiting the establishment of factories and manufacturing in colonial Brazil,"** the 
colony began to produce fine textiles as well as gold and silver products. A 
gunpowder factory was also opened and mineral extraction encouraged."*^ In addition, 
commerce and foreign trade controls were lifted,"*^  the first printing press was brought 
to Brazil, schools were established - including a fine arts school in Rio de Janeiro 
mirrored in the French model -  and scientific expeditions were promoted. A Charter 
of October 1808 created the first national central bank, which was also given the 
power to issue bank-notes, substituting gold and silver as currencies."*"* Dom Joao also 
brought official documents, whole libraries and, most importantly, Portugal’s royal 
treasury with him,"*^  allowing his first years in power on the new continent to be 
marked by economic stability."*^
With Brazil’s ports open to foreign trade, imported items available in Europe, sought 
after by the local elites, flooded the country, turning Rio de Janeiro into a major port."*^
effectively conducting the affairs o f government, but it was not until 1799, when hopes for Queen 
Maria’s health recovery faded completely, that he was formally invested in the position o f Prince 
Regent (Barman, Brazil: The Forging o f  a Nation, 1798-1852, p. 18).
Ibid., p. 19; Levine, The History o f  Brazil, pp.58-9; LV Queiroz, 'O Direito no Brasil Colônia' RERE - 
Revista Eletrônica sobre a Reforma do Estado <www.direitodoestado.com.br/rere.asp> accessed 13th 
April 2011, p.I2; Valença, 'Patron-Client Relations and Politics in Brazil - An Historical Overview', p.9 
Alvara de 5 de Janeiro de 1785 (Rainha D. Maria I) (Registre na folha 59 do Livro dos Alvaras na 
Secretaria de Estado de Négociés da Marinha, e Dominies Ultramarines e Imprensa)
Queiroz, 'O Direito no Brasil Colônia', p. 12
Levine, The History o f  Brazil, p.58; Valença, 'Patron-Client Relations and Politics in Brazil - An 
Historical Overview', p.9. Before this, Portugal had complete control o f trade to and from the Colony 
both by demanding that, in the main, colonial commerce pass through its ports, and by not allowing 
colonial vessels to call at overseas ports. In addition, Portugal discouraged manufacturing in its colonies 
in general, and forbade it completely whenever the manufactured products competed with its own 
products (Barman, Brazil: The Forging o f  a Nation, 1798-1852, p. 19).
Alvara de 12 de Outubro de 1808 (Principe Regente Dom Joao VI) (Colecçâo das Leis do Brazil de 
1808, Rio de Janeiro: ImprensaNacional, 1891, pp.l48 e 153)
Valued at 22 million pounds at the time (Valença, 'Patron-Client Relations and Politics in Brazil - An 
Historical Overview', p.9).
Levine, The History o f  Brazil, p.58. As Levine contends, money issued by the Central Bank o f Brazil 
was used by Dom Joao to finance military advances against Spain in the south o f the continent. The 
central bank was liquidated upon Dom Joao’s return to Portugal and its deficit became Brazil’s national 
debt (Levine, The History o f  Brazil, p.58).
Levine, The History o f  Brazil, pp.57-8. The appetite o f the upper classes for imported goods 
ultimately hampered efforts for the development o f manufacturing in the country (Levine, The History 
o f  Brazil, p.58).
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In exchange for Britain’s help, Dom Joao VI and King George III signed the Anglo- 
Portuguese Treaty of Alliance and Friendship in Rio de Janeiro on the 19**^ February 
1810,"*^  offering Britain preferential access to the Brazilian market as well as 
continued protection from the British of Brazil’s extensive coastal line and other far- 
flung Portuguese territorial assets/^ This deal had a significant impact on both 
nations. For Portugal the disadvantages were clear and far-reaching, whilst for Britain 
the treaty not only opened the ports of Brazil, potentially a major market, but also 
provided it with easy access to the rest of Latin America.^® The greatest effect of the 
treaty was felt in Brazil, however, as the opening of its ports ultimately entailed its 
economic independence from Portugal.^* Accordingly, in 1816, two-thirds of the 
vessels anchored in Rio de Janeiro were foreign, the majority of them from the British 
Navy. Although the port of Salvador received, at the time, more Portuguese ships than 
foreign ones, this changed in the course of the following five years, when Portuguese 
ships were outnumbered by foreign vessels in all Brazilian ports.^^ The treaty thus 
sparked meaningful economic, political and social changes in the colony, translated 
into rapid economic development, increased political clout with Portugal and political 
importance before other nations, and deep social changes, not least through the arrival 
of waves of Portuguese immigrants and African slaves. Importantly, Levine believes 
that the treaty also played an important role in the maintenance of Brazil’s national 
unity upon independence. As Britain preferred to trade with Portugal’s territory in the 
Americas as a single bloc, this became a meaningful economic consideration in the 
pre-independence struggle and a major contributor in silencing dissidents calling for 
regional autonomy.
With rapid development, a sense of Brazilian nationalism began to take shape, a 
phenomenon bolstered by two other further important factors. Firstly, with Napoleon’s 
invasion, Portugal became socially and economically unstable,^"* which, together with 
the knowledge that Brazil was protected by the British Navy, led many Portuguese
Tratado de Aliança e Amizade e de Comércio e Navegaçâo.
Levine, The History o f  Brazil, p.58; Queiroz, 'O Direito no Brasil Colônia', p. 12; Valença, 'Patron- 
Client Relations and Politics in Brazil - An Historical Overview', p.9 
Valença, 'Patron-Client Relations and Politics in Brazil - An Historical Overview', p.9 
Levine, The History o f  Brazil, p.59 
Ibid., p.57 
Ibid.
Ibid., pp.57-8
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merchants and farmers to seek a new life in the New World/^ with around 25,000 
Portuguese immigrants entering Brazil shortly after the arrival of the Portuguese 
court/^ According to Levine, the new wave of immigration was different from 
previous ones, as the arrivals did not belong to the Portuguese elite as had been the 
case previously, but were part of the “groups that would form the basis for the 
Brazilian ‘middle sectors’, the forerunners of the middle class that would emerge 
decades l a t e r .Second ly ,  nationalist sentiment grew when the royal family refused 
widespread calls from Portugal, most notably from the Portuguese Parliament, the 
‘Cortes’, for its return after Napoleon’s defeat to the British in the Battle of Waterloo 
in 1815. Dom Joao’s decision to remain in Brazil prompted hostility from the 
Portuguese people, a feeling that soon became mutual. New immigrant merchants 
from Portugal began to be scornfully known in Brazil as “mascates,”^^  a pejorative 
term for tradesmen or peddlers, whilst Portuguese officials refused to ship tax receipts 
to Brazil and began to regard the multiracial colony as backward, fuelling ever greater 
resentment and fostering a sense of nationalism and cultural pride in Brazil.^^
Although the political argument advanced by Levine is persuasive and widely 
accepted, Carvalho believes that Brazil avoided fragmentation for a different reason. 
Despite recognising the importance of the Portuguese Crown’s presence in Brazil, 
Carvalho argues that the nationalism it inspired, tighter controls of insurgencies it 
promoted and greater resources it brought, were not sufficient to guarantee that the 
country would become independent as a monarchy, rather than as a republican 
nation.^® For Carvalho, this fact was a result of the political elite’s preference for the 
monarchical system, which both liberals and conservatives believed to be the colony’s 
most suitable political system to avoid national unrest and fragmentation.®* Although 
backed by popular support, particularly from Rio de Janeiro, the elite’s promotion of 
the monarchy was not as well received in other parts of the colony and suffered strong 
opposition in the north, where the ideas of republicanism and secession from the 
capital were gaining momentum.®^ Despite this, the elite’s power and influence
55 Ibid., p.58
Valença, 'Patron-Client Relations and Politics in Brazil - An Historical Overview', p.9
Levine, The History o f  Brazil, p.58
Ibid.
Ibid.
Carvalho, 'Elites and State Building: the Case o f Nineteenth Century Brazil', pp.3 81-3 
Ibid., pp.382-3 
Ibid., pp.381-3
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guaranteed not only the maintenance of geographical and political unity, but also the 
permanence of the monarchical system for well over half a century after its 
independence.®^
1.2.1.1 Brazilian Political Elite
As Barman and Barman point out, “[e]lites do not appear fully formed. They emerge 
from existing socio-political structures which, in the case of Imperial Brazil, evolved 
during the Portuguese colonial regime.”®"* Accordingly, Portugal’s policy on education 
was decisive in forming the Brazilian elite.®® The great majority of the population in 
pre-independent Brazil was poor, of colour - black, mestigos (mixed race) or mulatos^^ 
-  and uneducated, whilst the elites, comprised of a small group of individuals from the 
white upper classes,®  ^ were the few to have access to formal education.®^ Scattered 
around a vast geographical territory, the elites were mostly educated in law at 
Coimbra University in Portugal.®  ^ The Portuguese Crown vehemently opposed the 
creation of universities in colonial Brazil, only allowing the establishment of two 
medical universities and two military academies after the Portuguese court had settled 
in the colony,^® a political policy founded on Portugal’s belief that the pursuit of 
higher education ensured the continued dependence and obedience of the Brazilian 
upper classes.^* With such a strict and restrictive policy, Portugal limited access to 
education in general, and further education more specifically, to a few rich and
“  Ibid.
^  Barman and Barman, p.429 
Ibid; Carvalho, 'Elites and State Building: the Case o f Nineteenth Century Brazil', pp.3 82-7; Pang and 
Seckinger, 'The Mandarins o f Imperial Brazil', p.220
^  The mulatto race (in Portuguese mulatos) arose out o f the intermarriage o f white settlers and African 
women (Roett, The New Brazil, p.22).
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influential families/^ For Barman and Barman, access to education was the privilege 
of so few in Brazil at the time that literacy could be considered a defining 
characteristic of the Brazilian elite/^ Indeed, Carvalho contends that Brazil’s educated 
class formed the great majority not only of the political elite in the colony, but also of 
the independence movement leadership/"*
In addition to controlling who received education, Portugal supervised closely what 
was taught at its Universities. For instance, at the School of Law in Coimbra, the main 
destination of young Brazilians, the Roman Law subject advanced theory supporting 
the power of the kings. Coimbra’s students were kept from what were considered the 
most dangerous aspects of the French Enlightenment, as only the Christian and 
reformist aspects of revolutionary thought were allowed to be disseminated at the 
University.^® As Carvalho explains, the University of Coimbra had, since its 
foundation in 1290, been under the influence of the University of Bologna, the leading 
institution in the teachings of Roman law at the time. The prominence of the study of 
Roman law was also visible in Coimbra; amongst its academics, many had studied at 
Bologna,^® hence being known as bolônios (literally, persons who come from 
Bologna).^^ This changed in 1759, however, when a powerful minister of King José I, 
the Marquis of Pombal, expelled the Jesuits, who had controlled Coimbra’s College of 
Arts in the first half of the eighteenth century, from Portugal and launched a campaign 
to promote the empire’s economic recovery. Among the measures implemented was 
the reform of the University of Coimbra, which was to champion natural science 
subjects, such as zoology, botany and mineralogy. In addition, reform leaders 
encouraged students to acquaint themselves with the ideas of European 
Enlightenment, narrowing the gap between the Portuguese education and that of other 
European Universities.^^ In 1777, with King Jose’s death and consequent removal of 
the Marquis of Pombal from power, the reforms were abandoned and the University of 
Coimbra’s focus returned to civil law.^  ^Despite this, the Enlightenment ideas that had
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inspired the French and American revolutions were not completely absent in colonial 
Brazil. Some, notably within the priesthood, had more access to ideals including that 
of modernisation, rule by popular sovereignty, expansion of citizenship and social 
rights, than those studying at European universities, save for the minority who went to 
study in France and England or who went to Coimbra in the 1760s and 1770s, when 
the University was at a more revolutionary period of its history.^® Notwithstanding, 
barring the experiences of a few, Portugal was successful in containing the 
dissemination of the revolutionary ideas which inspired the American Declaration of 
Independence in 1776,^* the American Bill of Rights in 1789,^^ and the French 
Declaration of Man and of the Citizen in 1789.^  ^ By concentrating education in one 
place, the Portuguese Monarchy was able to prevent Brazilians from having access to 
ideas promoting, inter alia, freedom and equality, universality, self-determination and 
sovereignty of the people, which were gaining force elsewhere, an important factor in 
the efficacious control of the ideology prevailing in the pre-independence period and 
further.^"* Most importantly, this policy allowed the Portuguese Crown, with the 
support of the Brazilian elites, to effect a smooth transition to independence and 
secure the survival of the monarchical regime.^® As Carvalho asserts, although the 
dissemination of Roman Law to other countries in Europe diversified the scope of the 
subject, in Portugal Roman Law was persistently employed as a tool for the 
consolidation of the power of the kings.^® By promoting and further advancing a 
theoretical and ideological endorsement of monarchical dictatorship, the bolônios 
promoted a strong defence for a centralising and powerful state. These ideas would 
influence future Brazilian leaders,^^ as “[t]he concentration of training in one place 
and in one discipline gave the elite a solid ideological homogeneity.”^^  This point is 
reinforced by Barman, who contends that Brazil’s transition to independence and, 
consequently, its formation as a nation-state, was not prompted by the massed
Ibid.
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population; rather, it was secured by a few, belonging to the exclusive group of literate 
upper classes/^ Individuals who had been influenced by the ideals of European 
Enlightenment - either at Coimbra in its reformist years or at other universities in 
Europe - and who genuinely longed for a rupture of the status quo and for the creation 
of a more egalitarian society, could certainly be found among those politically active 
at the time of the Brazilian independence/® The predominant majority of those 
involved in the independence struggle belonged, however, to the elite group that had 
graduated in law at Coimbra University/*
Law’s influence and importance was perpetuated during the Empire. As Barman and 
Barman contend, law graduates, who had been prominent in the Portuguese 
administrative tradition, also secured the majority of key positions in the political 
institutions of the Empire, especially in the Senate and Council of Ministers, and in 
the judiciary. Their dominance was to increase over the years. In the middle of the 
Empire, for example, seven out of ten ministers and senators were law graduates.^^
The prevalence of law graduates in key positions in government ensured law’s 
elevated status in Imperial Brazil, when the subject came to be perceived as a 
necessary asset for those with elite ambitions. Not surprisingly, when national law 
schools were established in 1827 and onwards, they became the most popular choice 
amongst Brazilian students.^^
The predominance of law graduates in the higher echelons of the Empire thus 
guaranteed the formation of a tightly knit political elite, whose members came from 
the same social strata and shared the same theoretical and ideological beliefs. The 
formation of Brazil as nation-state saw law being utilised as a tool for the 
advancement of the interests and privileges of an elitist minority, to the detriment of 
the rest of the population.^"* Accordingly,
“Brazilian Law Schools have traditionally been places destined to form 
power elites and not democratic places opened to plural critique. As a 
result, lawyers in Brazil tend to use their knowledge mainly as a sign of
Barman, Brazil: The Forging o f  a Nation, 1798-1852, p.6 
^ Carvalho, 'Elites and State Building: the Case o f Nineteenth Century Brazil', p.386 
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class differentiation and as an instrument of power, rather than a tool to
understand debates and transform reality.” ®^
As the oldest university course in the country and the one most closely associated with 
political power, particularly in the nineteenth century, the science of law was 
presumptuously perpetuated as a “queen science,” ®^ only looking to other sciences 
when convenient or expedient/^ This, according to Nobre, only started to change in 
the 1990s, when, worldwide, historians, social scientists, philosophers and economists 
began to take a more direct interest in juridicial questions and, in the specific case of 
Brazil, with the consolidation of university research systems and the promulgation of 
the 1988 Constitution, which became a reference in political debate/^ As the early 
history of Brazil unfolds in this Chapter, it becomes clear that the system of elite 
privileges, undemocratic politics and social exclusion secured by the law in the 
formation of the nation-state laid the foundation for its endurance for generations to 
come. For this thesis, this can be changed with the implementation of the rule of law 
in Brazil, for law can be a means to achieve a more equitable, socially balanced, 
democratic and just society as much as it can be a tool for the perpetuation of class 
division, social inequality, iniquity and socio-political repression. As will be seen in 
Chapter 2, this depends on the conception of the ideal of the rule of law adopted, as 
well as on the realisation of the conditions for its implementation.
1.2.1.2 Brazil’s Independence
Two years after the death of Queen Maria in 1816, Dom Joao, the Prince Regent, was 
crowned King of Portugal in Rio de Janeiro. This was the first coronation of a 
monarch in the Americas and had, according to Levine, profound effects on Brazil.^^ 
Threatened by Brazil’s growing importance and autonomy, the Lisbon Cortes ordered 
the return of King Joao to Portugal in April 1821 under military pressure. Six months 
later, Portuguese Parliamentarians voted in favour of abolishing the Kingdom of
Ibid.
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Brazil, thus reinstating Brazil’s status as a colony.*®® Defying the Cortes, Pedro I, 
King Joao’s son and heir and Brazil’s Prince Regent, refused to return to Portugal.*®* 
He declared Brazil an independent state on the 7**^ September 1822, declaring himself 
Brazil’s Emperor in December.*®  ^ The independence of Brazil was not recognised 
until 1824 by the U.S. and until 1825 by Portugal and Great Britain.*®® This did not 
deter D. Pedro I and his head of government, José Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva,*®"* 
from exercising power in a politically autonomous manner and awarding the Empire 
of Brazil a new flag and a national constitution in 1824.*®®
According to Levine, the smooth transition to independence and the endurance of the 
monarchical regime under the Portuguese Bragança dynasty for sixty-seven years 
suited the Brazilian elites and power holders.*®® As he posits, the notions held by the 
few members of the Brazilian elite at the time of independence were no different from 
those of the elites in most European countries, including Spain, Austria, Italy, the 
German states, and even England during the first part of the nineteenth century.*®  ^The 
Brazilian elite, as did their European counterparts, believed and supported the power 
of the kings, rejecting the ideals of republicanism as too radical.*®  ^As Levine argues, 
“[t]hey enjoyed the trappings of royalty, including the creation of Brazilian titles of 
nobility, given by the monarch to subjects he personally deemed worthy.”*®*
Independence provided Brazilian political power holders with an opportunity to 
implement a new view of national modernity, whilst concomitantly accommodating 
and perpetuating the mentality and many of the practices of the old colonial regime.**® 
At its core was a new economic system bound to bring more prosperity to the upper 
classes by freeing them from the high taxes and duties imposed by Portugal; excluded 
from it were ideas inherent to the French and American revolutions, which inspired 
the struggles for independence in Brazil’s neighbouring territories, such as the
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recognition of the rights and freedoms of a broader section of the population and more 
socially inclusive and democratically driven political systems/** Accordingly, those 
responsible for devising a constitutional monarchical system for the newly 
independent Brazil could be regarded as economic, but not political, liberals.**^
1.2.1.3 Empire (1822-1889)
The political system of the new Empire was established by the 1824 Constitution/*® 
Article 3 established that the new political system was a Hereditary, Constitutional 
and Representative Monarchy. According to Article 10, the Political Powers of the 
new Empire were the Moderating Power, exercised by the Emperor and his F* 
Representative (Article 98); the Executive Power, exercised by the Head of the State, 
that is, the Emperor (the first being Dom Pedro I -  Article 4), through the State 
Ministers (Article 102) and under the advice of the State Council, which was 
exercised by the Counsellors of the State, who the Emperor appointed for life (Article 
137); the Legislative Power, performed by a bi-cameral General Assembly composed 
of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies (Articles 13 and 14); and the Judicial 
Power (Title 6**^, Articles 151 to 164). The country was to be divided into provinces, as 
before (Article 2), which were to be governed by Provincial Presidents, also appointed 
by the Emperor (Article 165). Senators were appointed by the Emperor, albeit his 
choice was restricted to a list submitted by each province, produced after a process of 
election and selection (Articles 40 to 44); Deputies were chosen in national indirect 
elections (Article 35), disputed initially by the Liberal and Conservative Parties and 
after 1870, also the Republican Party.**"*
Bethell argues that, by nineteenth century standards, suffrage was unusually extensive 
in Brazil. Articles 90 to 95 of the 1824 Constitution guaranteed the right to vote to 
male citizens who were bom free. Catholics, 25 years of age or older (21 years, if 
married) and who had a modest income (initially of 100 milreis) from property, trade 
or employment. In 1870 this amounted to up to ten per cent of the whole population of 
just under 10 million inhabitants, a far higher proportion than that achieved in England
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even after the second reform bill of 1867.**® Despite this, elections in Brazil were 
indirect and general voters, called votantes, only elected so-called eleitores, who 
effectively voted for the members of the Chamber of Deputies and who qualified 
under a higher income threshold. In 1870, for instance, the number of eleitores was 
around 20,000, compared to approximately 1 million votantes. Furthermore, voting 
was open (oral), not secret and turnout was low. Intimidation, fraud and the exercise 
of patronage by local bosses, particularly landowners and agents of the Crown, were 
also rampant.**®
Brazil’s elites exercised a very strong influence on central government during the 
Empire, a fact which Carvalho argues was not accidental. For him, the nature of the 
political elites determined not only a smooth transition to independence and the 
continuation of the monarchical system, but also the prominence of the state apparatus 
in Imperial Brazil which, as in Portugal, played a major role in the decisions and 
general affairs of the nation.**^ Although King Dom Joao came to power with the 
support of merchants, who had contributed to weakening the power of Portuguese 
barons, Portugal’s modem state was not characterised by the presence of a liberal 
market economy, as in England.**^ The King exercised strong control over the growth 
of Portugal’s commercial capitalism - based on its stalwart naval position and on the 
discovery of colonies -  and centralised political power as a means of protecting his 
reign from the challenge posed by the growing force of the bourgeoisie as a dominant 
class, as in France. In addition, Portugal’s political elite, formed predominantly of 
public employees, supported the supremacy of the state and, consequently, the 
weakness of the institutions of political representation.***
This was also the case in Brazil, where central government employed 70 per cent of 
the country’s civil servants at a cost of up to 60 per cent of the central budget.*^® In 
addition, the 120 law graduates from Coimbra were again to exercise a very prominent 
role during the Empire. For example, of the 64 people graduating in law at Coimbra 
between 1824 and 1826, 42 reached what Barman and Barman call the Empire’s 
‘peripheral political elite’. More than half of those, 32 graduates, eventually attained
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higher posts, becoming part of the ‘middle elite’, whilst as many as 9 came to occupy 
the highest posts in the Empire, becoming part of the ‘core political elite’/^* Despite 
this. Barman and Barman argue that the Coimbra law graduates were largely excluded 
from the posts closest the Emperor Dom Pedro I. By choosing for his limited circle of 
advisers individuals who had a different profile*^^ and were much older*^ ® than the 
graduates, Dom Pedro I alienated and increasingly antagonised the young 
Brazilians.*^"* The sons of the upper classes had developed a strong sense of 
nationalism and became ever more discontented with Dom Pedro I’s political style 
and exercise of power, believing he was not prepared to abandon the old colonial 
system established by Portugal.*^® There was suspicion in Brazil that the Emperor was 
still deeply connected to Portugal’s interests and many feared that he might reverse the 
independence process.*^® In addition, some local bosses opposed his over-centralised 
style of ruling. Although Dom Pedro I had bought the allegiance of some with 
positions and titles of nobility, many continued to demand change. Weakened by the 
“wave of nativism and liberalism,”*^  ^ which had created a strong opposition to his 
power, and faced with a Liberal Party revolt in April 1831, Dom Pedro I abdicated 
from power in favour of his five year old son Dom Pedro II. The transitional 
arrangement established that Brazil was to be ruled by a Regency*^^ (1831-1840) of 
three men until Dom Pedro II reached majority and could assume power.*^*
In 1834 a constitutional amendment, the 1834 Additional Act,*®® changed some of the 
terms of the original transitional arrangement. Regarded largely as a Liberal Party 
manoeuvre, the Additional Act prescribed that the Council of State was to be 
abolished until Brazil had a new Emperor and that the Regency was to be ruled by one 
man, chosen through national elections. As there were only two parties at the time, the 
Liberals and the Conservatives, their candidates were alternated in power. Valença
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contends that this made little difference to the nature of the Empire’s political elite, as 
the supporters of both parties were from the same economic and social strata/®*
Upon reaching the age of 15 in 1840, Dom Pedro II was declared of majority, crowned 
prince, and the Council of State was re-established. Dom Pedro II renounced his 
position as head of the Executive and, in 1848, created a new post with executive 
powers, that of head of the Council of Ministers.*®  ^ Skilled in accommodating 
divergent interests, the young Emperor was, unlike his father, unwilling to interfere 
with established interests or exercise power in a manner that antagonised the political 
and social classes. The success of his approach underscored a great part of his 49 year­
long reign, which became known as the ‘conciliation period.’*®® Despite this, a strong 
central government, where law graduates were again prevalent, was opposed by many 
and political interests had to be accommodated.*®"* Legislative debates reveal that there 
were calls not only for the reform of the legislature, particularly in regard to the 
overrepresentation of public employees from other areas in Congress,*®® but also 
opposition to the size and over-bureaucratic nature of central government.*®® In 
addition, as the government depended heavily on the taxes levied by exports of staple 
agricultural products, such as sugar, coffee and tobacco, on which the economy was 
based,*®  ^ the Empire’s stability was conditioned on an alliance between the 
bureaucracy and the landed elite, which was not necessarily always stable.*®  ^ As 
Needed contends, during the Empire, state bureaucrats had been recruited among the
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old elites.*®* This older generation, whose influence could be felt until the mid- 
nineteenth-century, were educated at Coimbra or attended the first classes in the new 
law faculties of Recife and Sao Paulo.*"*® From 1850 onwards, a new coffee producing 
elite, which first established itself in the coffee region encompassing the state of Rio 
de Janeiro and the edges of the states of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais, began to gain 
influence, prestige and economic dominance. This new generation was composed of 
men trained exclusively at Brazilian universities, most of them the sons of coffee 
producers from Sao Paulo. The Province of Sao Paulo had been steadily growing in 
importance, particularly since the decline of the coffee plantations around Rio de 
Janeiro in the 1880s. Their economic strength, largely due to their tax contributions, 
was not matched by the limited political power they had in the national arena. Despite 
being able to afford their sons’ exclusive and expensive privilege to higher education, 
paulista coffee planters did not feature prominently in the national political scenario, 
where nepotism within the old elites was prevalent.*"** The frustration with this 
situation was more prominent among sons of planters studying in urban centres. The 
new graduates or bacharéis, unable or unwilling to retain their status based on the 
land, sought careers in the bureaucracy, but grew increasingly bitter and alienated by 
the entrenched privileges promoted by the elitist hierarchy of the monarchy.*"*^
An urban social class also began to grow in numbers and importance. Historically, this 
class, composed of liberal professionals, petty bureaucrats, clerical workers and small 
shopkeepers, had been squeezed between the strata of the wealthy, made up of 
powerful planters and merchants, and the numerous poor classes of black and mulatto 
slaves and freemen, among them house servants, artisans, plantation labourers and 
small farmers. The emergence of a more influential urban class was a reflection of the 
increasing importance and impact that urban centres were to have in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, a change fuelled by rapid urban population growth and urban 
investments in infrastructure and cultural activities. Outside the direct influence of the 
large landowners who controlled the countryside, this new stratum was ready to access
Members o f the old elites came primarily from Portugal, the Northeastern region and the hinterlands 
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and absorb European ideas and thought, acquiring a taste for change inspired by the 
new European political models/"*®
Furthermore, slavery became an increasingly contentious and pressing issue from mid­
nineteenth century as, with the end of the transatlantic slave trade (1850-1852) and an 
inability and unwillingness of slaves to reproduce sufficiently to meet the demands of 
the planters, national politics was pervaded by disagreements between the landed 
elites, who fiercely defended slavery as fundamental to the sustenance of Brazil’s 
commodity-based economy, and members of the government and the political class, 
who regarded it as backward and detrimental to Brazil’s economic advancement/"*"* 
Notwithstanding, the struggle for the end of slavery in Brazil also denotes how 
intertwined the elites and the state were at the time. Unlike in the U.S., abolitionists in 
Brazil were mainly concerned with the objective impact of slavery on the nation’s 
image and economy, rather the rights of black people or the brutality of the institution. 
Undoubtedly, there were notable exceptions to this. Joaquim Nabuco, the son of a 
powerful landowner and senator, was a fervent and outspoken opponent of slavery, as 
he believed it to be socially reprehensible and unjust. Nabuco dedicated most of his 
working life to the Abolition cause, speaking out publicly at a time when open debate 
about social issues was frowned upon.*"*® Save for a few, however, Brazilian 
abolitionists were more likely to denounce the barbarism of African slaves than of 
their owners, as they were much closer to the institution, for it was widely practiced 
and culturally accepted in Brazil, than their American counterparts, where opponents 
to bondage were mostly from non-slave states.*"*®
The contentiousness and divisiveness of the slavery issue were evidenced in the 
parliamentary debates on, arguably, the most important electoral reform of the 
nineteenth century, the Saraiva Law,*"*^  enacted in January 1881. Although several 
reforms attempting to make Brazil’s electoral system more honest and effective had 
taken place throughout the 1800s,*"*^  the Saraiva Law was the most democratically
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significant.*"** Elections for the Chamber of Deputies became direct and the law 
increased significantly the qualification of voters. Despite wrongly being hailed as 
introducing universal suffrage, as women were still excluded from voting, the Saraiva 
Law extended voting to a large proportion of the male population. The age threshold 
was lowered to 21, income and religious qualifications were removed, and naturalised 
citizens and former slaves or jfreemen gained the right to vote. Notwithstanding, 
literacy was introduced as a new qualification. In a country where 80 to 85 per cent of 
the population was illiterate, this restriction alone ensured that 1 million citizens were 
excluded from voting. As a result, although the electorate increased from 25,000 to 
150,000,*®® in 1886 still less than 1 per cent of a total population of between 13 and 14 
million voted in the direct elections for the Chambers of Deputies.*®* According to 
Bethell, the debates on the 1881 reform reveal that, with the idea of abolition 
gathering strength and the end of slavery looming, the political elites felt threatened 
by the possibility of freed slaves attaining the levels of income that qualified them to 
vote. As Bethell argues, the elites believed that the concession of further voting rights 
to sections of the “dangerous classes”,*®^ composed in the main of black, mulattoes 
and mestizos, threatened the stability of society, hence being denounced as 
demagoguery and tyranny, rather than democracy.*®® Like most pro-reform Liberals, 
José Antonio Saraiva himself was wary of extending the right of suffrage, as he 
believed that, by doing so, the poor and ignorant could come to dominate the 
propertied and educated.*®"* As Bethell remarks
“Liberalism may have been the dominant ideology in 19* century
Brazil but, as in Spanish America, it was liberalism of a predominantly
and increasingly conservative variety as it adjusted to the realities of an
Negocios do Imperio em 21 de Agosto de 1846)), o f 1855, when the law known as Circles’ Law {Lei 
dos Circulos) established the vote for the Chamber o f Deputies by districts or circles (Decreto n° 842, 
de 19 de Setembro de 1855 (Lei dos Circulos) (Altera a Lei de 19 de Agosto de 1846)), and o f 1875, 
when the law known as the Third’s Law (Lei do Ter go) instituted, for the first time, the pre­
qualification o f voters or the electoral card (Decreto n° 2675, de 20 de Outubro de 1875).
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authoritarian political culture, economic underdevelopment and a
deeply stratified society.”*®®
Similarly to the Abolitionist movement, the support for Republicanism that began to 
acquire momentum in the 1880s promoted the need for change in the political status 
quo, whilst in great part seeking to advance and protect the interests of the national 
elites.*®® According to Needle, the year most commonly associated with the beginning 
of the end of the monarchical regime is 1868, when a political crisis, fuelled by 
infighting related to the Paraguayan War (1865-70), revealed deep contradictions in 
the monarchy’s constitutional powers.*®  ^ In that year, a General long favoured by 
Dom Pedro II and in whose hands the Emperor laid his hopes of winning the war, Luis 
Alves the Lima e Silva, the Marquis and later Duke de Caxias, compelled the Emperor 
to choose between him, a fierce loyalist to the Conservative Party, and the Progressive 
Liberal ministry in power. Aware of the Emperor’s predilection for the General and 
acknowledging the political instability of the situation, the leader of the ministry 
offered his resignation. With his post vacant, the Chamber of Deputies, dominated by 
the Liberal Party, had expected the Emperor to follow custom and appoint another 
Progressive Liberal to establish a new ministry. Seeking Caxias’s approval and, with 
that, victory in the War, the Emperor ignored custom and placed a Conservative in the 
position. In addition, in exercising his power to select a new senator among three 
proposed candidates, the Emperor, in consultation with the Conservative-dominated 
Council of the State, appointed as senator a candidate who had the support of neither 
the plurality of provincial vote nor of the Progressive Liberal ministry.*®  ^ The events 
of 1868 antagonised the Liberals, who, during 10 years of exclusion from ministerial 
powers, mobilised their factions in attacking the Conservatives and the Emperor. Most 
factions’ demands were confined to the imposition of limitations on the Emperor’s 
constitutional powers and on championing the Abolitionist movement. One of the 
factions went much further, however, by issuing a Republican Manifesto in 1870 and 
demanding the end of the monarchy.*®* In 1873, Republicans from the state of Sao 
Paulo organised the party apparatus for their province. Peculiarly, neither the
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Republican Manifesto nor the paulista Republican Party supported the Abolitionist 
movement. Needle attributes this to two factors. The first is that the leadership of the 
Brazilian Republican movement, based mostly in Rio and Sao Paulo, was interested in 
advancing its own interests and political goals and, therefore, chose to evade divisive 
social i s s u e s . T h e  second is that the Party’s two main membership bases were 
widely different. Rio’s membership base, comprised of bacharéis or students from law 
and medical faculties, the military and polytechnic schools, newly graduates, career 
professionals and public servants, as well as a growing number of entrepreneurs, was 
largely urban-based and dreamed of a modem and politically more inclusive Brazil. 
Their activism was motivated by their resentment against a predominantly agrarian 
society and a traditionally conservative political establishment that imposed 
restrictions on mobility, business and industry. Sao Paulo’s rural and elitist base, on 
the other hand, was content with Brazil’s mral society and envisaged Republicanism 
as a means to redistribute power in a way sympathetic to their interests. They aimed 
for a decentralised federal political system where each unit of the federation would 
have full control of their own revenues and be mled by its own elite-elected 
representatives.A lthough the revolutionary ideas advanced by Rio’s Republicans 
were often at the centre of the Republican’s demands, it was the paulista Republican 
Party who became d o m i n a n t . A s  Needle argues,
“[o]nly the paulista Republicans possessed the links to the 
preponderant class strength represented by the elite, a socio-economic 
base for power the urban-based middle-sector elements in the 
movement necessarily lacked.”
Conflicts between the country’s political and economic elites, particularly large 
landowners, reveal that power during the Empire was not always exercised in an 
unchallenged fashion. Despite this, the survival of the monarchy for nearly seven 
decades after independence demonstrates that, were it not for a unified political elite, 
the country might have taken the same path as the Spanish colonies in the Americas,
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where regional forces grew stronger, eventually leading to s e c e s s i o n / A s  Carvalho 
contends,
“[a] unified elite was instrumental in consolidating the political power 
of the dominant classes by neutralizing the consequences of their 
internal divisions and by keeping at bay political mobilization from 
below.”^^ ^
In order to contain social and political dissent, the elite had to build and support a 
national state apparatus, which eventually became a major political actor in its own 
r i g h t / F o r  Carvalho, the role of the political elites and their alliance with the state in 
nineteenth-century Brazil provides a very strong indication of the influence elites have 
exercised throughout Brazil’s h i s t o r y / A s  will be argued throughout this thesis, such 
a mutually beneficial relationship between the state and its elites has been a feature of 
Brazil’s socio-political setting, a relationship that has been perpetuated throughout the 
centuries due to its advantages to both sides. For the government it provides stability 
and centralisation of power, whilst offering the elites a medium through which they 
can influence political outcomes affecting their own interests. As it will be seen in the 
next section of this Chapter, with the end of the Empire, the consensually unified 
political elite that had dominated central government for over a century gave way to 
the power of Brazil’s landed elite, which was to have a strong influence on the 
economic, social and political make-up of the Old Republic and beyond.
1.2.2 Old or First Republic (1889-1930)
Brazil’s elites played a central role not only in the preservation of the monarchical 
system and the maintenance of the country as a unity, but also in the disintegration of 
the E m p i r e . A s  Pang and Seckinger contend, the political elite, or mandarins of 
imperial Brazil, came under direct attack and had their power undermined by Brazil’s 
powerful coffee and sugar elites for failing to adapt the national ideology to suit the
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interests of regional economic n e e d s / A f t e r  1850, Brazil’s economy was based 
largely on a growing coffee sector in the central-south, but sugar cane exports in the 
Northeast had also been rapidly recovering after years of d e c l i n e , a n d  the sugar 
barons demanded more money and attention from central government. With a national 
ideology based on political and administrative centralisation, the Imperial political 
elite proved inflexible and unable to adapt to an agricultural export economy that 
required greater regional control and diversified commodity-oriented policies in order 
to grow.^^^ Furthermore, the social and political effects of the end of slavery proved 
decisive in the dissolution of an already decaying Empire. Accordingly, slavery was 
one of the elements providing a very fine balance during the Empire as, although the 
state was as dependent on slavery as the landowning elite, it was also the only force 
capable of putting an end to h/^^ As Carvalho contends, “[tjhis is also the reason why 
the regime was, on one side, able to survive for sixty-seven years, but, on the other, 
very vulnerable.”^^  ^ The process of the abolition of slavery began in earnest in 1871 
with the promulgation of the Rio Branco Law,^^  ^also known as the Law of Free Birth 
{Lei do Ventre Livre), which granted children bom to slave parents freebom status. 
The gradual process of abolition continued with the adoption of the Saraiva-Cotegipe 
Law,^^  ^also known as the Law of Sexagenarians {Lei das Sexagenaries), which freed 
slaves at 60, culminating with complete abolition in 1888, when Princess Isabel, the 
Emperor’s daughter and then regent, signed the Golden Law {Lei Aureaf^^ outlawing 
slave labour. As Carvalho argues, the vulnerability of the Empire was evidenced by 
the fact that one year Princess Isabel was cheered in the streets of Rio de Janeiro for 
signing the law abolishing slavery, the next her aging father was deposed and sent into 
exile in a bloodless coup d’état in a concerted plot by the military, a social class he 
had until then overlooked, and the powerful republican landowners of the most 
affluent coffee areas in the country.
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On 15 November 1889, the Republic was proclaimed and its new flag was flown in 
Rio de Janeiro/^^ Although it was no coincidence that the Proclamation of the 
Republic happened in the centenary of the French revolution, the most significant 
political change in Brazil since its independence was achieved without a revolution or, 
as in the process for independence, an expressive social mobilisation/^^ Hence, 
despite the notable change in Brazil’s political system, those who expected there to be 
a shift in the power and social structures of the Empire of the Portuguese Orleans and 
Bragança Dynasty, were disappointed/^^ Power continued to be held by a small elite 
and not shared with the majority of the p o p u l a t i o n , a s  greater democratic 
participation was not in the plans of the landed oligarchy and the disaffected military 
officers who carried out the coup against the Em peror/A ccordingly, the Constituent 
Assembly that was to design the new Republican Constitution was elected in 
September 1891 under the old imperial rules/^^ Although the 1891 Constitution^ 
established a more democratic political system, as the now president and vice- 
president, as well as both houses of the legislature (Chamber of Deputies and Senate), 
the state assemblies and the municipal council were to be directly elected, it 
incorporated most of the electoral legislation of the Empire. Hence, despite 
meaningful efforts to enfranchise women in the Constituent Assembly, the proposals 
were ultimately rejected. In addition, the Electoral Law of January 1892, Rosa and 
Silva Law (Ze/ Rosa e Silvd)}^^ maintained literacy as a qualification (Article 1, § 3o, 
2o), and continued to exclude the great majority of the adult population from the 
electoral system. Although increased participation ensured that the new sections of the 
Brazilian urban classes, including some workers, voted in the 1898 presidential and 
congressional elections, the electorate represented less than 2.7 per cent of the total 
population at the time.*^^
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462,000 Brazilians voted in the 1898 elections. The population o f the country stood at 17.1 million 
at the time (Bethell, 'On Democracy in Brazil: Past and Present', p.6).
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Despite this, the period between 1870 and 1924 was characterised by modernisation 
and the ideas of progress that swept Latin America, as the region integrated into the 
global capitalist system. The Brazilian economy, largely based on the exportation of 
commodity staples and rubber extracted in the Amazon, received strong investment in 
railways, shipping, commerce and urban services, particularly from Britain. 
Socially, the period was marked by the end of slavery, the influx of foreign immigrant 
workers, and the migration to major urban centres, especially Sao Paulo. In politics, 
the Republican Party issued its first Manisfesto in 1870, also the last year of the 
Paraguayan War. In 1871, the Viscount of Rio Branco became the President of the 
Council of Ministers, and his government implemented a programme of reforms to 
address Brazil’s major problems, such as slavery, immigration, military conscription, 
the judicial system, Church-State relations, the National Guard and the system of 
weights and m e a s u r e s . A n  ideological renewal took place with the dissemination of 
the ideas from European schools of thought, such as evolutionism, materialism and 
positivism. The sociocultural evolutionist theories of Auguste Comte and Herbert 
Spencer promoted ideas of progress and modernisation in the form of Republicanism 
and industrialisation, as well as advances in sciences and technology. An urban and 
educated class was arising out of new scientific and technological study centres, 
prominently among them the Polytechnic in Rio de Janeiro, the School of Mines in 
Ouro Preto and, by the twentieth century, the Butanta Institute in Sao Paulo and 
Manguinhos Institute in Rio de Janeiro. Areas, such as engineering, geology, 
hygiene, criminology and public health expanded significantly and great emphasis was 
given to sanitary reform, prompted by the efforts of the internationally recognised 
sanitary reformer Oswaldo Cruz and his team, from the Maguinhos Institute. In 
education, schools began to adopt an American-led educational programme, which 
emphasised pragmatism, the introduction of physical education in the curriculum and 
greater student participation. Secularism gained prominence in the new Republic, 
and the separation of Church and State (Article 72, § T  of the 1891 Constitution) 
brought fundamental changes to society, such as the creation of official birth and 
marriage registration, the establishment of secularised cemeteries and the endorsement
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of new religious practices, breaking the monopoly that the Catholic Church had over 
the lives of Brazilians/^^ Technical and technological innovations, including the 
telephone, gramophone, cinema, typewriter and the electric tram, revolutionised the 
habits of the populations living in urban centres/A ccording to Carvalho
“[e]ven the collective consciousness underwent transformations.[...] 
Republican propaganda was partly constructed around the argument 
that the republic was part of an American identity, and that the 
monarchy was a residue of old Europe.” ®^^
As Carvalho points out. Republican allusions to America were a specific reference to 
the U.S., a country that epitomised ideas in favour of economic liberalism, federalism, 
and entrepreneurial initiative and against centralism, ruralism, bacharelismo^^^ and the 
monarchy.St rong evidence of the Republicans’ adherence to the U.S.’s spirit is the 
fact that the flag carried around the streets of the city of Rio de Janeiro upon the 
Proclamation of the Republic was a copy in green and yellow the Stars and Stripes.^^^
Despite the drive towards modernisation, perhaps not surprisingly, but counter to the 
general assumption of the modernisation theory, such changes were met with sporadic 
but emphatic resistance, especially in rural Brazil, which comprised nearly the whole 
c o u n t r y . T h e  revolt of the Kilo’s Breaking {Quebra Quilos) was an example of the 
discontent the reforms engendered.^®  ^ In 1871, the government adopted a new metric 
system of weights and measures, which was to be implemented over the course of 10 
years. Dissatisfaction with the new system led to a revolt in Rio de Janeiro and later, 
in 1874, to a rural revolt in parts of the North-eastern region. The revolt was mainly 
carried out by small farmers through concerted attacks on symbolic government 
property, such as registry offices, municipal chambers, tax offices, but also on 
business premises and Masonic lodges.^®  ^The changes implemented by the Viscount 
of Rio Branco, a Mason who insisted on the separation of the Church and State,
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threatened the values, traditions and deeply religious ancient customs that defined the 
life of most of those living in the backlands, the vast hinterlands of Brazil away from 
the Atlantic coast, known as sertanejos?^’
One of the most significant revolts was that of Canudos, a rural and remote place in 
the interior of the Bahia state. Led by the charismatic Antonio Conselheiro, it became 
a symbol of political resistance in 1893.^ ®^  Conselheiro advocated a traditional and 
religious way of life and condemned taxes levied by the municipalities after the 
Proclamation of the Republic, showing his contempt for political power holders by 
burning the official publication with details of tax collections. Faced with persecution 
by the authorities, Conselheiro retreated to Canudos, where he built a holy 
community. As a result, Canudos became a symbol and bastion for the values of the 
sertanejos, which included religious marriages, processions and rituals of piety and 
penitence as well as community and brotherhood spirit and a paternalistic view of the 
state in the form of the Emperor.^^^ In an attempt to eradicate any resistance, the 
government responded by attacking Canudos in 1886 and, after four other military 
expeditions, obliterating it completely in 1887, in one of the most brutal massacres the 
country has ever seen.^ ^®
These revolts are, for Carvalho, evidence that the values of the ‘sertanejos’ were at 
odds with those of the “urban modernising elites.”^^  ^ Despite this, a vast geographical 
rural area, under the direct power of large landowners, remained quiet and broadly 
unaffected by the revolts that sprung up.^^  ^As Carvalho contends,
“[t]he rest of the rural world was the kingdom of the ‘coronets’, who 
dominated the state republican parties, gave support to the federal 
government and lent stability to the oligarchic republic. This world, as 
well as the Republic, from which 95% of citizens were excluded, 
included nothing modem. It was a world of illiteracy, paternalism, 
semi-servile labour and an absence of rights.”^^ ^
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Apart from scattered social unrest, the political scenario was marked by instability, 
allowing the oligarchs of the most powerful states in the country to gain prominence 
and eventually secure the dominance of national politics/^"^ The first president in 
power. Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca, clashed with Congress over his financial 
policies and his interventions in the affairs of the states. Suffering debilitating health, 
Deodoro da Fonseca resigned in November 1881 and his vice-president. Marshal 
Floriano Peixo, took power.^^^ Floriano Peixoto came to be known as the Iron Marshal 
as he dealt severely with a number of state revolts that sprang up across the country. 
Local factions in Rio Grande do Sul were fighting a bloody revolt, whereas naval 
officers affiliated with the monarchists were causing disturbances in Rio de Janeiro. In 
order to quash the rebellions, Peixoto employed censorship, martial law and 
executions.^^^ In 1894 the first civilian President was elected. Prudent the Morals from 
the state of Sao Paulo, and although stability had been re-gained, a system of 
oligarchical rule had already been established in each state of the count ry.^In the 
midst of national agitation, oligarchs emerged from the most prominent political 
parties and forces in each state, which they came to control via a closely organised 
state apparatus.^^^ The political turmoil that characterised the first years after the 
landowner elite-military coup that deposed the Emperor Dom Pedro II, provided the 
ideal scenario for the consolidation of their power nationally.^According to 
Skidmore and Smith
“[t]he resulting power structure was a ‘politics of the governors’ at the 
national level, and the ‘rule of the colonels’ (coronelismo) at the local 
level. The colonels were the rural bosses who could produce bloc votes 
in any elections. In return, they obtained control over state and national 
funds in their area of influence. At the state level the political leaders 
used their deals with the colonels to bargain on the national level.”^^ ^
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Oligarchs of two of the most powerful states dominated the presidency by striking a 
power-sharing agreement, known as Coffee with Milk {Café com Leite)?^^ The state 
of Sao Paulo’s coffee oligarchy and the dairy producers from the state of Minas Gerais 
secured the landowner elites of both states interchangeable periods in power/^^ Rio 
Grande do Sul, on the other hand, “was able to tip the balance when the two larger 
states were at odds.”^^ ^
With the absence of the crown to maintain unity, the elites were left with the task of 
consolidating their power and containing opposition, both from within its divided 
class as well as from below/^"^ In order to avoid losing power, the Brazilian elites had 
no alternative but to build a strong state apparatus that would keep political thought 
and action under the control of a central govemment/^^ Both the political elites and 
the dominant social and economic classes now had, as their common objective, the 
maintenance of order and the control of political mobilisation/^^ With the oligarchs’ 
dominance of the management of state politics^^^ and suffrage the privilege of a 
few,^^  ^ the population could be controlled and the elites could continue to advance 
their own political and socio-economic interests. As Skidmore and Smith point out, by 
restricting suffrage to literate adult male citizens, the electorate in the presidential 
elections before 1930 amounted to no more than 3.5 per cent of the country’s total 
population, increasing to only 5.2 per cent in 1930.^^^
During the process of the abolition of slavery, immigrant workers were attracted to 
Brazil to substitute slaves as labourers in the farms of the landed elite.^ ^® Three million 
immigrants, most of them Italians, arrived in Brazil between 1884 and 1920, 60 per 
cent of whom headed to the state of Sao P a u l o . W i t h  Sao Paulo rising to political 
and economical dominance, coffee exports increased dramatically and 
industrialisation boomed.^^^ Although landowners had subsidised immigration to 
replace slave labour, they were not prepared to pay the new European arrivals decent
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living wages and tied them to debts that were to be paid with years of hard work/^^ 
Faced with the arduous life in rural areas, European immigrants and migrants from the 
hinterland flocked to the state’s capital to fill its jobs, promoting the city of Sao 
Paulo’s rampant demographic and economic growth, which was now competing with 
Rio de Janeiro’s industrialisation/^"^ By 1893, foreign-born citizens amounted to 55% 
of the total population of the city of Sao Paulo/^^ World War I, high inflation, world 
economic crisis and changes in the immigration laws reduced the number of 
immigrants, but by 1920 they still made up 36% of the total population of the city,^^ 
more than half of the state’s manufacturing workers and 58% of its transportation 
labour force/^^
Working conditions in the factories at that time were very poor. Training and 
equipment to protect workers from the hazards of the job were lacking, as was 
protection against unfair dismissal. Women and children were hired at lower wages, 
and in many cases men were dismissed to give way to this cheaper work force. 
Employers were also wary of workers’ manifestations of dissatisfaction hiring thugs to 
threaten and instil fear in those involved in trade unions.^^^
European immigrants were, however, often educated and familiar with the ideas of 
workers’ movements in their home countries.^^^ They also had significant union 
experience and were, in many cases, affiliated to anarchism and communism, which 
represented alternative platforms for workers to debate political and social issues.^ "^ ® 
By 1906 anarcho-syndicalism^"^^ had become the main labour movement in Brazil and, 
until the 1920s, its leaders were at the forefront of national labour activism, 
dominating the labour press and organising the activities of most unions across the 
country.^"^  ^ Despite the dangers that their struggle represented, immigrant workers 
turned anarchist and anarcho-syndicalist ideals into moral demands for better working
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conditions, decent living wages and housing/"^^ Those who took part in strikes and 
protests courageously ignored the great risk of repression by employers and the 
authorities/"^"^
In order to prevent their message from gaining wider appeal, authorities criminalised 
the militant unionist movement and labelled its organisers as revolutionaries/"^^ Other 
nations at the time were ready to repress popular movements and criminalise workers 
fighting for better working conditions, but the generalised and violent attitude of the 
police towards workers in Brazil was successful in “breaking the spine” "^^  ^ of the 
national workers’ movement/"^^ Imprisonment of workers without formal charge, 
police checks in places they frequented, strike clampdowns and the declaration of a 
state of siege were all part of a policy to keep popular movements at bay and 
guarantee their repression and criminalisation/"^^ The population was, in many cases, 
supportive of such policies, as the elites, fearful that Brazil could follow in the steps of 
the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, successfully propagated a feeling of apprehension 
and distrust about the communist and anarchist movements/"^^ As Pinheiro points out, 
by depicting the ghost of revolution in every protest, those in power often alternated 
their policies between minor socio-political reforms and brutal repression/^® The 
concerted action between industry and government was eventually successftil in 
discouraging militant unionism and, throughout the 1920s, efforts continued to 
prevent the recurrence of the movement/^ ^
Despite the rapid growth of its major cities, during most of the Old Republic Brazil 
was still an essentially agrarian society/^^ The 1920 census, for instance, revealed that 
95% of the population of Minas Gerais, the most populated state in the country, was 
classified as rural. By contrast, the same census demonstrated that land ownership 
remained a privilege of the few, with 300,000 landowners estimated to own three-
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quarters of all land in the vast national territory. As Smith points out, Brazil’s “[rjural 
society continued, therefore, to be dominated and controlled by an oligarchy 
consisting of the big landowners, planters and ranchers.”^^ ^
In the 1930s, the role of oligarchs entered a period of decline.^^"  ^A new urban polity 
was formed, encouraged by the development and growing importance of the major 
cities which, due to industrialisation, urbanisation and mass migration from poor states 
and rural areas, were shaping an urban culture that was fundamentally distinct and 
removed from the oligarchic system in place in the hinterlands.^^^ This new national 
scenario prompted radical ranks of the Army to break away from the oligarchic 
structures and demand modernisation, industrialisation and centralisation of power.^^® 
Attempts to pressurise political power-holders for change were made throughout the 
1920s, where a few unsuccessful revolts divided the opinion of the nation, including 
its oligarchs. In October 1930 a new revolt, the “lieutenant’s movement”,^ ^^  ensued, 
successfully deposing the then newly elected President, Washington Lufs. The 
intention of the movement was to place one of its representatives in power in order to 
ensure the end of the colonels’ influence and interference in national politics and their 
economic privileges.^^^ As will be seen in the next section of this Chapter, this new 
phase of Brazilian politics was dominated by the figure of the populist Getulio Vargas, 
whose two non-consecutive periods in power were marked by authoritarianism and 
populist policies that extended labour rights whilst repressing democratic processes 
and working class organisation. During Vargas’s government, regional oligarchs lost 
power, but the clientelistic system of patronage they consolidated in the Old Republic 
was federalised. The elites thus continued to influence directly the country’s political 
outcomes to the detriment of the rest of the population. As before, their alliance with 
the government was stable because the exclusion and repression of the majority made 
both sides better off.
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1.2.3 Getulio Vargas (1930-1964)
A former governor for the state of Rio Grande do Sul, Getulio Vargas was defeated in 
the presidential elections of 1930. As the leader of the lieutenant’s movement, 
however, he was placed in power by the military Junta and made the provisional 
President of Brazil in November 1930.^ ^® Decree n° 19.398 of 1930 established a 
Provisional Government {Governo Provisorio),^^^ suspending the 1891 Constitution 
until a new elected Constitutional Assembly reorganised the state constitutionally 
(Article 1°). The head of the Provisional Government, Getulio Vargas, was to exercise 
discretionarily not only Executive Power, but also Legislative Power (Article 1°) 
through Decrees (Article 17). Accordingly, the National Congress, State Legislative 
Assemblies, Municipal Chambers or Assemblies and any other legislative or 
deliberative institution were dissolved by Article 3° of the Decree.
Getulio.Vargas applied heavy-handed state intervention to reorganise the Brazilian 
economy and society and to regulate the labour force.^®^  He was a charismatic leader 
and attracted the support of the lower classes by granting labourers a wide range of 
social rights for the first time in the country’s history, creating a sense of pride and 
dignity among the country’s working-class.^®^ Despite this, Vargas’s new category of 
social citizenship created a division between the legalised and regulated and the 
informal working force, who were not entitled to the same rights guaranteed by the 
Brazilian labour code, the Consolidation of the Labour Laws {Consolidaçào das Leis 
do Trabalho, CLT),^®  ^which was promulgated in 1943 and incorporated many of the 
labour laws introduced by the government since 1930.^ ®"^
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According to Holston “Vargas reformulated the citizenship of workers precisely to 
eviscerate any alternative public sphere of autonomous working-class organisation.” ®^® 
An example of that was the Law of Two-Thirds of 1930, which required that two- 
thirds of every company’s workforce be of Brazilian nationality, thereby restricting 
the access of immigrants to the formal labour market.^ ®® Although the discrimination 
was justified on the basis of the protection of national citizens against the Great 
Depression’s impending unemployment, one of the convenient consequences of the 
law was to remove foreign-born citizens from the labour movement.^®^ This measure 
was also reinforced by Decree n° 19.482 of 1930, which restricted, for a year, the 
entry of foreigners into Brazil.^®  ^ With those measures, European immigrants, who 
comprised the majority of the leaders of labour organisations,^®® did not have easy 
access to the country or the regulated labour market and were, consequently, 
prevented from joining workers’ unions.^^®
Vargas’s government was marked by a reversal of the economic liberalisation of the 
beginning of the century, as well as by the increased state presence in the economy. 
With Brazil’s economy suffering heavily with the 1930s world depression,^^^ Vargas 
was increasingly convinced that the country was at a disadvantage following the world 
market model, as this made it vulnerable to economic f luc tua t ions . In  the midst of a 
worldwide economic turmoil, Vargas saw this as an opportune moment to make a bold 
move. With the backing of the military, Getulio Vargas led a dictatorship on 10^  ^
November 1937, which became known as ‘New State’ {Estado Novo), holding power 
from 1937 to 1945. Although general elections were planned for 1938, Vargas 
cancelled them and abolished all political parties.^^^
In the years that followed the military coup, Vargas ruled the country with a mixture 
of traditional and populist policies, personally dealing with antagonistic and 
heterogeneous interests through the creation of a system of alliances. An example of 
this was his handling of the demands of an expanding working class. On one hand.
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Vargas enacted protective labour laws, such as the CLT, and used the help of union 
activists, the 'pelegos\ to appease working classes’ demands. On the other, he 
attended to the interests of businesses and employers in general by setting up 
compulsory syndicates to replace existing labour unions’ structures, which were 
dominated by the Communist and Anarchist Movements.^^"^
By enacting the CLT, the most protective compilation of labour laws the country had 
ever seen, Valença argues that Vargas was making use of populist measures and 
expanding the role of the welfare state in order to provide the growing urban working 
classes the intermediation and centralising functions previously exercised by local 
bosses in the rural areas:
“[t]he Vargas period as a whole (1930-1945) saw a movement from a 
state centred oligarchic system to the fédéralisation of patronage 
practices. This brought the ‘floating’ of political elites up and down, 
from local to state and federal levels. Not surprisingly, the way that 
local politicians had played the political game in the past was 
incorporated into the way that locally-based, state-based and 
nationally-based politicians played the political game in later 
periods.”^^®
Although undoubtedly expanding the labour rights of Brazilians, the legislation 
enacted by Vargas created two classes of labour workers, one under the regulatory 
system centralised by the government, and the other unregulated and stripped of the 
rights recognised by the state. By excluding foreigners, and thus the leaders of union 
movement, from the first, Vargas successfully ousted from the regulated labour 
workforce those who most fiercely opposed the inequalities and unfairness deeply 
rooted in the Brazilian society. In so doing, Vargas employed the law successfully as a 
means to both empower and weaken the working classes. Labour legislation also 
appeased the demands of ordinary Brazilians, whilst the state continued to maintain a 
mutual relationship with the elites. Although recognising and promoting the rights of 
the masses more extensively than any other Brazilian head of state, the national 
patronage system created by Vargas perpetuated a socio-political reality of elite 
protection that had been consolidated during Brazil’s formation as a nation-state.
Ibid.
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Accordingly, in the years leading up to the country’s independence from Portugal and 
throughout the Empire, law was the common denominator of a consensually unified 
political elite and was thus pursued as a means of attaining power, class differentiation 
and privilege, social exclusion, and unequal distribution of wealth. The teaching of 
law, both at Coimbra and at the Brazilian law universities, advanced the permanence 
and perpetuation of the socio-political status quo, ensuring the survival of monarchical 
rule and of a system of privileges of a few based on title, nobility, class and economic 
status, long after the French and American Revolutions had influenced political 
reforms worldwide, not least in the Spanish colonies in the Americas, based on the 
ideas of citizens’ rights and freedoms, and rule by the people. Law thus reinforced 
class division and the power of those on top and guaranteed that political change in 
Brazil was not driven by revolution from below but was led by the elite, ensuring that 
political change was achieved in a way sympathetic to its interests. The repression of 
dissenting thought and the appropriation by the elite of the ideals of Independence, 
Republicanism, Anti-Slavery and, later, labour rights and unionisation, guaranteed that 
the masses would be, throughout the country’s history, excluded from the mutually 
beneficial relationship between the state and the elite, which guaranteed that state 
abuses of citizens’ rights would go unpunished and that elite’s interests and privileges 
would be protected. As will be seen in Chapter 2, law can serve benevolent and 
equitable purposes as well as evil and exclusionary ones. The observance of the letter 
of the law does not necessarily prevent abuses of power once its precepts can be used 
to consolidate the power of a minority against that of a majority. The rule of law is 
historically a means of limiting the exercise of power and promoting accountability, 
stability and transparency and, for this reason, can be said to offer Brazil an ideal 
capable of guiding it towards a fairer and more inclusive society, where the 
government and its agents are kept in check.^^® This is, however, conditional on the 
formulation of the rule of law adopted. In addition, unless the conditions for its 
implementation are present, the rule of law can only remain a distant and unachievable 
ideal. Hence, in Chapter 3 a conception of the rule of law that is most suited both to 
understanding Brazil’s legal system and providing it with the right framework for 
positive change will be adopted and the conditions for its implementation will be 
assessed.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CONCEPT OF THE RULE OF LAW
The ideal of the rule of law is central to the arguments advanced in this thesis. As will 
be seen in this Chapter, an elusive form of the rule of law has been the symbol of 
success or failure of states in their obligations with their citizens and the international 
community, for the rule of law has become itself a synthesis of the core Western 
liberal democratic values. As such, the relationship between governments as well as 
the regulatory system of the international order are permeated by the pursuit of this 
ideal, which has become one of the primary demands of diplomatic and trade 
relations, international financing, foreign investment and the accession to international 
institutions. By analysing Brazil’s adherence or non adherence to the rule of law, this 
thesis will, firstly, offer an understanding of the relationship between the established 
domestic law and its observance by the government, state officials and the Brazilian 
population and, in this sense, help to shed light into the relationship between the 
Brazilian state and its citizens. In this first task, the main aim is to understand the 
contemporary underpinnings of Brazil’s legal framework in relation to the country’s 
legal and socio-political reality in order to assess whether historical patterns of elite 
favouritism and state abuse have or could, in the near future, be replaced by more 
egalitarian set of community principles and practices, which are followed and 
respected both by the population at large and by the state and its agents. Secondly, the 
degree of observance of the rule of law will highlight Brazil’s fulfilment of Western 
liberal democratic values in relation to the country’s position in the world order, its 
ambition to grow economically in the globalised international market economy and its 
future political prospects in the international arena. In order to undertake these tasks, 
this Chapter will lay out important considerations about the ideal of the rule of law as 
well as analyse the most plausible and widely accepted conceptions of the ideal. Once 
formal and substantive formulations of the rule of law have been explored, their 
suitability to Brazil will be assessed in Chapter 3, where a theory on the ideal will be 
adopted and its observance by the Brazilian legal system will be investigated.
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2.1 The Concept of the Rule of Law: General Considerations
As Vieira argues, since the concept of the rule of law was revived by scholars like 
Hayek in the mid-twentieth century, the idea became commonly accepted and widely 
employed in political and legal theories/ In Western liberal democracies the term has 
become synonymous with an inherently positive and indeed indispensable 
precondition of advanced legal systems and the answer to the ills of states suffering 
from a wide range of social, political and legal instabilities and inefficiencies. It is 
hailed as a “universal human good”  ^ by governments, international agencies and 
organisations, as well as legal and political commentators.^ As Kleinfeld contends,
“[l]ike a product sold on late-night television, the rule of law is touted 
as able to accomplish everything from improving human rights to 
enabling economic growth to helping to win the war on terror.”"^
Despite being “the pre-eminent legitimating political ideal in the world today,”® the 
definition of the rule of law, as well as the requirements and conditions for it to be 
implemented, are hotly disputed among scholars.® Competing, as well as widely 
divergent, formulations of the rule of law are offered by a range of legal theorists, with 
significant implications for studies assessing jurisdictions’ on the basis of their 
compliance with the rule of law.^ According to O’Donnell, “the rule of law should be 
seen as the legally-based rule of a democratic state,”  ^but support for the ideal of the 
rule of law can be found in non-Westem and non-democratic nations.® Government
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officials and heads of states from culturally, politically and economically distinct 
societies - Presidents Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe), Hu Jintao (China), Prime Minister 
Vladmir Putin (Russia), and former President Abdurrahman Wahid (Indonesia) - have 
publicly pronounced their commitment to the ideal of the rule of law/® As Keith 
points out, the West’s conception of the rule of law is intrinsically linked with the 
notion of a liberal democratic state and a market economy, a view historically 
dismissed in China and Marxist-Leninist writings as ‘bourgeois propaganda’/^ 
Accordingly, Peerenboom argues that, as opposed to the Liberal Democratic vision of 
the rule of law, which is permeated by the ideas of market capitalism, multiparty 
democracy and a liberal interpretation of human rights, there are at least three other 
competing conceptions of the rule of law suited to or serving non-Westem political 
agendas: 1. Statist Socialist Rule of Law, a state-centrist socialist conception; 2. Neo- 
Authoritarian or Soft Authoritarian Rule of Law, which rejects both a liberal 
interpretation of rights and democracy; and 3. Communitarian Rule of Law, 
encompassing multiparty democracy and a market economy, but with an interpretation 
of rights that gives prominence to communitarian and collective rights over civil and 
political individual rights/^ As Peerenboom contends. Western commentators’ claims 
that China lacks the mle of law refer to a Western Liberal Democratic version of the 
mle of law, despite there being little support for liberal democracy among 
intellectuals, legal scholars, state leaders and the general public in China. 
Notwithstanding, Peerenboom regards analyses of the Chinese system through 
Western formulations of the mle of law as relevant. Apart from public support for 
the mle of law from its leaders, China has also began implementing a range of legal
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and political reforms, which have led to a continuing convergence between the 
Chinese legal system and that of the most developed Western nations, despite their 
very distinctive natures/® Although it is doubtful that the primary motivation for the 
reforms is grounded in the need to protect individual rights, the drive for economic 
growth and possibly the will to attract foreign investors and integrate China further 
into the global economy, have led the country towards implementing a series of rule of 
law building programmes/® Hence, criticisms of whether it is desirable to interpret the 
Chinese legal system through an idealised Western conception, or more narrowly a 
U.S. account of law and legal institutions, are met with the argument that, although in 
the long-term a parallel version of the rule of law better suited to the Chinese society 
is likely to develop, the Westem-style rule of law ideal will inescapably and 
persistently be used as a benchmark of analysis of China’s legal reform efforts by 
legal scholars both in and outside China. In addition, even though it may be counter­
productive and presumptuous to interpret Chinese legal institutions through the lens of 
liberal democratic Western benchmarks, the value of which may also be questionable, 
the challenges faced by China are underscored by the pressures, constraints and 
interests of globalisation and an international legal order and, as such, are increasingly 
similar to those encountered by other Western and non-Westem market economies 
and pluralist societies.
China’s example is particularly relevant to the case of Brazil. Analysing the country 
through a liberal democratic version of the mle of law is pertinent not only because 
Brazil’s constitutional system has mirrored and been inspired mainly by the 
constitutions of European countries and the U . S . , b u t  also because appraisals by both 
Brazilian and foreign commentators of the country’s efforts in consolidating its 
democracy will inevitably and consistently involve a Westem liberal democratic 
definition of the mle of law. In addition, the more Brazil’s role in intemational 
organisations and institutions and its engagement in a globalised market economy
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grow/® the more it will be subjected to the impositions of an intemational order 
shaped by developed Westem nations and, hence, informed by West’s variants of the 
mle of law. As Carothers argues, economic globalisation offers a compelling reason 
for countries to adopt the mle of law, as intemational investors demand stability, 
transparency and accountability from governments.^® Moreover, intemational 
agreements, regional blocs and intemational institutions and organisations are also 
informed by Westem values and postulates and the liberal democratic version of the 
mle of law is an intrinsic part of that. Accordingly, commitment to the mle of law is at 
the forefront of trade talks and multilateral agreements,^^ and its implementation or 
existence has become a basic demand for accession to multilateral organisations, such 
as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)^^ and the European Union (EU).^  ^
The ideal of the mle of law has also been consistently employed outside legal and 
political academic debates by intemational financial organisations and development 
aid institutions promoting it as a pre-condition for the establishment and development 
of market economies.^"^ Westem-funded supra-national organisations such as the 
World Bank and the Intemational Monetary Fund (IMF), for instance, have actively 
engaged in the endorsement of legal and judicial reforms in developing countries and 
imposed stmctural and institutional changes, such as the promotion of good 
govemance and the implementation of the mle of law, as conditionality of financial 
assistance to recipient countries.^® According to Kleinfeld, in the past twenty years, 
over 1 billion U.S. dollars has been spent by developed economies and intemational
" LAM Bandeira, 'Brazil as a Regional Power and Its Relations with the United States' (2006) 33 (3) 
Latin American Perspectives 12; Brainard and Martinez-Diaz, 'Brazil: The “B” Belongs in the BRIGS'; 
A Hurrell, 'Brazil: What Kind o f Rising State in What Kind o f Institutional Order?' in AS Alexandroff 
and AF Cooper (eds), Rising States, Rising Institutions: Challenges fo r  Global Governance (Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington 2010) 128-50; Nassar, 'Brazil as an Agricultural and Agroenergy 
Superpower'; Rathbone, 'South America’s Giant Comes o f Age'; J Wheatley, 'Superpower is Ready to 
Feed the World' Financial Times, Special Report: Investing in Brazil, 5th November 2009) 4 
Carothers, 'The Rule-of-Law Revival', p.6 
" Kleinfeld, 'Competing Definitions o f the Rule o f Law', pp.31-2; Stephenson, 'A Trojan Horse in 
China?' pp. 195-7
"  NATO, 'NATO Handbook' (NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels 2001), p.66 
" Articles 2, 21 and 49 o f the EU Treaty (Treaty on European Union (Treaty o f Maastricht) 1992, 
Official Journal o f the European Union, Cl 15 09/05/2008)
Tamanaha, On The Rule o f  Law: History, Politics, Theory, p .137; Vieira, 'Inequality and the 
Subversion o f the Rule o f Law in Brazil', p.4
"  G Barron, 'The World Bank & Rule of Law Reforms' (Working Paper Series No 05-70, Development 
Studies Institute, London School o f Economics and Political Science, London, December 2005); G 
Garcia, 'IMF Conditionality and Rule of Law: Exceptional Powers and Banking in Malaysia and 
Venezuela' (PhD Thesis, Faculty o f Law, University o f Wollongong, Wollongong 2009); World Bank, 
'Initiatives in Legal and Judicial Reform' (Working Paper No 25082, Legal Vice Presidency, World 
Bank 2004)
62
organisations on rule of law building programmes in developing economies or 
countries transitioning to democracy/®
Over-use of the term in political rhetoric and over-reliance on the rule of law as a cure 
for all ills, through attempts to promote it as a set of institutional arrangements 
common and ‘transferable’ to socially, politically and culturally diverse societies,^^ 
may however depreciate the value of the ideal of the rule of law in academic 
discourse/^ As Stephenson argues, although the term’s ubiquity is problematic to 
political and legal theorists, it is convenient and indeed advantageous to political and 
public discourse, as its ‘neutrality’ lends it a politically exploitable malleability/® 
According to Kleinfeld, the conceptual blur over the meaning of the rule of law may 
have its roots in the attempt by practitioners seeking to build the rule of law abroad to 
understand it through a more practical and ‘transplantable’ perspective, in which its 
implementation can be sought through an objective list of institutions to be reformed, 
away from the traditional theoretical viewpoint, which assigns primacy to the end- 
goals to be achieved/® Thus, instead of being defined by the “end purposes it is to 
serve in society”®* the rule of law is accorded a set of “institutional attributes,”®^ 
including ‘good’ laws, a ‘well-functioning’ judiciary, and a ‘good’ law enforcement 
apparatus, a definition that has come to dominate rule of law building efforts 
worldwide and which, if followed, can drive countries onto an apparently ‘easy’ path 
towards achieving the rule of law/® The confusion, for Kleinfeld, stems from 
rhetorical references to the rule of law by organisations seeking to promote it 
worldwide as a fusion between “ad hoc laundry lists”®"* detailing institutions that ought 
to be reformed and “high-flying”®® ends expected to be achieved once the rule of law 
is in place. The problem with this approach is that reforms of single institutions may 
not lead to the cross-institutional reforms needed to produce end-results. Moreover, 
such efforts - which have, in practice, tended to be imposed, hasty, short-sighted and
Kleinfeld, 'Competing Definitions o f the Rule o f Law', p.31
Barron, 'The World Bank & Rule o f Law Reforms', p.3; Kleinfeld, 'Competing Definitions o f the 
Rule o f Law', pp.33-4
Stephenson, 'A Trojan Horse in China?' pp. 196-7; Tamanaha, On The Rule o f  Law: History, Politics, 
Theory, pp.4-5 
Stephenson, 'A Trojan Horse in China?' pp. 196-7 
Kleinfeld, 'Competing Definitions of the Rule o f Law', p.33 
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p.34 
Ibid.
63
under-resourced -®® may undermine rule of law ends and, in consequence, thwart 
efforts in understanding strategic rule of law building based on society’s particular 
circumstances and systemic problems, on the principles it seeks to uphold and ends it 
endeavours to achieve.®  ^For Tamanaha, there is already evidence of the decline of the 
rule of law in the West, with a growing divide between theoretical discourse and rule 
of law advocacy by governments and development specialists.®^ Modest positive 
results, despite decades of capital-intensive investment in developing the rule of law in 
a wide range of countries in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa 
and the Middle East, have illustrated the fact that the rule of law “appears 
mysteriously difficult to establish”,®® and highlighted seldom-recognised challenges, 
limitations and shortcomings in projects attempting to do so."*® The rule of law’s 
failure to work as an almost ‘black box’ solution to deepening democracy through 
transplanted laws and institutional enhancement underscores the fact that the main 
obstacles to rule of law reforms are not technical or financial in nature, but political 
and human."** As Carothers points out, the first and easiest phase in implementing the 
rule of law is that of revising and re-writing constitutions, laws and regulations. The 
second phase, involving far-reaching institutional reforms designed mainly to 
strengthen legal institutions, such as courts, police, prosecutors, public defenders and 
prisons, are burdensome and slow."*^  The most challenging and significant step in 
achieving the rule of law is, however, the third phase, which entail increasing 
government’s compliance with the law."*® For Carothers, legal and institutional 
strengthening are important elements in laying the foundations for type three reforms, 
as clearer laws and regulations and more efficient institutions demand more 
accountability and transparency, help oust corruption and patronage and facilitate the 
deterrence of human rights violations."*"* Despite this, reform will succeed
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“only if it gets at the fundamental problem of leaders who refuse to be 
ruled by the law. Respect for the law will not easily take root in 
systems rife with corruption and cynicism, since entrenched elites cede 
their traditional impunity and vested interests only under great 
pressure.”"*®
For this reason, Carothers affirms that type three reforms rely significantly less on 
technical and institutional measures than on fundamental changes in the culture, 
values and attitudes of those in power."*® The impetus for such shift ought, he argues, 
to come from the top, although upward pressure from citizens demanding protection 
of their human rights and other non-state activities, such as campaigns against 
corruption, are important in boosting this process."*^
Carothers’s view of the stimulus necessary for governments and state officials to 
respect the law is contentious, however. Authors such as Schor attribute far greater 
weight to pressure exercised from below in stimulating legal and political change. He 
argues that the rights revolution has taken place due only to legal mobilisation, 
whereby suits demanding the effectuation of rights have successfully achieved 
political reform."*  ^ As Schor claims, “[r]ights are won by legal victories that rest on 
strong pressure from below.”"*® He concedes, however, that such pressure is reliant on 
the provision of support structures facilitating the pursuit of rights through the courts 
which, in turn, has its roots in a political framework conducible to such reforms.®® The 
limitation of this view is the lack of insight into how a majority, which has historically 
been subjugated to an elitist minority, comes to appropriate its rights and apply 
pressure for their effectuation. Importantly, Schor’s theory is also silent about the 
circumstances required to convince political power holders and elites that changes to 
the structure, institutions and attitudes from which they derive their privileges are 
desirable. Schor claims that good laws are important in this process, as they 
institutionalise rights and protect the political and economic rules that will foster 
equality, to the detriment of the protection of the elites’ interests,®* whilst
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acknowledging that “[g]ood rules facilitate but cannot dictate socially desirable 
behavior.”®^ Thus, constitutions only become behaviourally, as well as formally 
entrenched, when they gain broad societal acceptance, which requires an attitudinal 
shift by citizens and the elites in supporting constitutional rules against abuses of 
power. Debate and citizen mobilisation towards socially constructed constitutions 
ensure ‘devolution of power’ from political actors to citizens, who will enforce 
constitutional rules as limits on political power holders and, in this way, encourage the 
emergence of horizontal accountability in society, alongside pre-existing vertical 
accountability ensured by democratic elections.®® Again, Schor’s argument overlooks 
the means and conditions in which citizens and elites may come together to enforce 
constitutional rules against rights violations and abuses of power as well as the 
motivations for elites to forego their privileges in favour of a more egalitarian and law 
driven system. As will be argued in this Chapter, these are essential elements of the 
rule of law and, therefore, finding out the conditions for their realisation is pivotal if 
the rule of law is to be implemented in practice.
Despite the politicisation of the rule of law, the overrated, magnified and short-sighted 
claims of what it can achieve, and the limited results that rule of law building projects 
worldwide have produced, its desirability in a Westem liberal democratic nation, such 
as Brazil, cannot be underestimated. Greater social and political stability, transparency 
and, generally, a government limited by law are not only demands of an intemational 
order into which the country is increasingly willing to participate, but is also desirable 
as a means for Brazil to consolidate its democracy. As Carothers argues, the ideal of 
the mle of law is inherently linked with that of liberal democracy. The rule of law, 
even in its thin conception, implies government respect for the constitution and the 
sovereign authority of the people, which are founded in law. Democratic institutions 
and processes are rooted in the legal system, despite transcending it. Law also 
regulates basic elements of a market economy, such as property rights, contracts, 
labour, taxes and dispute resolution, without which economic institutions would not 
function and government’s involvement in the economy would be inefficient and 
unfair.®"* For Tamanaha, the implementation of the mle of law enhances certainty, 
predictability and security both vertically, between citizens and the government, and
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horizontally, among citizens/^ As he contends, by being able to anticipate the 
government’s likely response to their actions and act freely in any situation not 
prohibited by law, an important element of citizens’ liberty is protected.Certainty, 
predictability and security enhance citizens’ interaction, since conduct engagement 
and choice making are facilitated by citizens’ knowledge of the actions that would 
incur legal disputes and of the legal duties of responsibility and care they have 
towards others.^^ In addition, the implementation of the rule of law may also help to 
address the problems of corruption, crime and violations of rights, which tend to 
afflict countries transitioning to democracy to the detriment of institutional and 
structural reform efforts.^^ As Tamanaha explains, even when the rule of law means 
government under the law, it demands that all public officials’ exercise of power be 
consistent, be within the established legal rules and not be informed by inappropriate 
considerations, such as prejudice, whim, arbitrariness, will or foul disposition, among 
others.^^ By restricting discretion, wilfulness and arbitrariness, the rule of law prevents 
government officials from carrying out their duties in a corrupt way, as well as inhibits 
state crime and violation of rights, hence helping to maintain a peaceful social order.^® 
In addition, predictability, stability and security facilitate economic growth in a market 
economy, for two reasons. Firstly, decisions can be made more efficiently when the 
costs and benefits of prospective transactions can be anticipated, thus safeguarding 
and encouraging contractual obligations. Secondly, the fruits of labour are protected 
when arbitrary expropriations of property are prevented.As Tamanaha asserts, when 
the rule of law is understood as government limited by law, it is indeed a universal 
human goodJ^ The benefit of government officials acting within the established legal 
framework and of law being applied fairly, efficiently and uniformly to all, ordinary 
citizens and public officials alike, is clear.Notwithstanding, practical circumstances 
may nullify the primary benefits assigned to the rule of law. For instance, certainty, 
predictability and security guaranteed by individual freedom do not ensure that the
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scope of action within which the invidual may act is not narrow or oppressive. 
Citizens may also be poorly informed about the established law or unwilling to 
consider it before their actions, periling these same vertical and horizontal benefits.^"  ^
In addition, attempts by governments and development specialists to implement the 
rule of law worldwide have highlighted the fact that the conditions for rule of law 
building have to be propitious if efforts in achieving it are to succeed. Consequently, 
both the rule of law conception adopted and the conditions for its implementation are 
crucial not only to its realisation, but to its endurance.
Given the historical lack of respect and observance for the established law by the 
successive Brazilian governments and their public officials, as portrayed in Chapter 1, 
it is expedient to determine whether the country has, during its transition to 
democracy, achieved the rule of law. In order to establish that, and in view of the wide 
variety of formulations of the rule of law available, it is first essential to adopt a theory 
of the rule of law most apt to providing a suitable explanation of the relationship 
between Brazil’s socio-political context and its legal framework, particularly the use 
or misuse of the law by the ruling classes. In addition, a formulation of the rule of law 
ought to match Brazil’s aspirations as well as incorporate Western liberal democratic 
values that have come to define the normativity of the international order and the 
relationship between states. As Tamanaha points out, in spite of the amplitude of 
variants of the rule of law not all formulations are acceptable.^^ Indeed, he asserts that 
“[t]here is a relatively short list of plausible conceptions”^^  offering sufficiently 
distinguishable palpable elements and implications that are tangible and relevant to the 
historical-political context in which they are inserted.^^ This Chapter will thus 
investigate the most congruent and acceptable definitions of the rule of law and adopt 
a theory that is most suitable to understanding Brazil’s transition to democracy and the 
relationship between the established law and its observance in practice. Once a 
conception has been adopted, in Chapter 3, Brazil’s present socio-legal-political 
reality will be contextualised in view of the definition of the rule of law endorsed, 
which will lead this thesis to answer whether the country has achieved the rule of law 
and, if not, under what circumstances it may come to do so. In the process, the
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conditions for the implementation of the rule of law will be established, bridging the 
gap between the rule of law’s theoretical discourse and its practical applicability to the 
case of Brazil.
2.2 The Two Main Categories of Rule of Law Conceptions: Formal and Substantive 
Formulations of the Rule of Law
There are two main categories within which contested visions of the rule of law fall.^  ^
Formal versions of the rule of law, advanced by scholars such as Lon Fuller, in The 
Morality o f  Law, and Joseph Raz, in The Rule o f Law and Its Virtue, conceive of the 
rule of law as pre-requisite to an effective legal order .According to Craig, formal 
conceptions of the rule of law are not concerned with the content of the law, but with 
its formal attributes, including, among others, the manner in which it was established, 
its clarity and temporal dimension.^® Substantive versions of the rule of law, on the 
other hand, defended by authors such as Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls and, arguably, 
Friedrich Hayek,^^ suggest that the concept of the rule of law involves the acceptance 
of certain postulates of political morality. Accordingly, theorists championing 
substantive formulations of the rule of law recognise the importance of the law’s 
formal characteristics, but go beyond this by linking procedural and substantive 
justice.^^ As Hutchinson and Monahan contend, the ‘thinner’ version of the rule of law 
is but one dimension of a liberal theory of justice within ‘thick’ formulations.^"^ 
Besides formal attributes, the law is also to encompass “a particular vision of social
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justice, structured around the moral rights and duties which citizens have against each 
other and the state as a whole.”^^
Formal and substantive versions of the rule of law vary across a spectrum where thin 
and thick conceptions are classified in accordance with the number of requirements 
they incorporate. Although formal formulations are generally concerned with the 
sources and form of legal rules, rather than their content, the boundaries between the 
two categories may, at times, be blurred, with formal formulations effectuating 
substantive implications and substantive formulations relying strongly on formal 
requirements.^^
2.2.1 Formal Conceptions of the Rule of Law and their Suitability as a 
Benchmark for Comparison of Legal Systems
The thinnest conception of the rule of law is often articulated in the expression ‘rule 
by law and not by men’, meaning that government, or the sovereign, can only conduct 
its affairs through laws.^^ For Raz, the original definition of the term is, in its broadest 
sense, that all shall obey the law and be ruled by it, although its narrow sense, that 
government shall be ruled by law and be subject to it, has prevailed in political and 
legal theory.^^ As Tamanaha points out, this definition is the partial meaning of the 
German law state, Rechtsstaat, but it is not adopted by any Western theorist, once 
devoid of a clear meaning. All contemporary states follow the rule of law in this 
narrow sense, a definition which imposes minimal limitations on the government and 
its officials, one of the essential conditions of the rule of law ideal.^^ 
Notwisthstanding, traditionally formal legality has been the preferred meaning of the 
rule of law in modem Asian societies, such as in China and Indonesia, among others.^®
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A thicker formal conception of the rule of law is that of formal legality, which has 
gained wide-raging endorsement.^^ Raz, one of its main proponents, has defended it 
against substantive theories, by arguing that any formulation attempting to describe 
what are good or bad laws ought to propound a “complete social philosophy.”^^  
Accordingly, the rule of law is but one virtue that may be incorporated by legal 
systems and, as such, is not to be mistaken for other political ideals, such as 
democracy, justice, equality, and human rights.^^
Raz’s conception of the rule of law goes beyond the application of law and order to 
the government, since to say that a government authorised by law should have its 
actions founded on it is tautologous.^"^ Consequently, the rule of law can only be 
considered a political ideal when it incorporates the conditions for the validity of 
rules, both general and particular, which include not only those contained in the 
constitution and ordinary legislation, but also ministerial regulations, policemen’s 
orders, regulations of limited companies, trading licenses requirements, and so on.^  ^
As Raz points out, if the law is interpreted, in layman’s terms, only as a set of open, 
general and stable rules, ‘government by law’ becomes too strict a requirement which, 
possibly, no legal system can meet.^^ For this reason, Raz considers particular laws, or 
legal orders, to be crucial instruments for the executive and the judiciary to exercise 
their functions and, as such, as much part of the law as constitutional rules and 
legislative acts. Such particular laws are to be guided by open and relatively stable 
general rules, and hence are to be subject to them. This, for Raz, is one of the main 
principles of the ideal of the rule of law.
Apart from the two basic principles of a formal conception of the rule of law, that is, 
that people should be ruled by law and obey it, and, that people’s behaviour should be 
guided by the law, Raz lists as the main principles of validity of legal rules: that all 
laws should be prospective, open and clear; laws should be relatively stable; particular 
laws, or legal orders, should be guided by open, stable and general rules; there should 
be an independent judiciary; courts should have the power to review the 
implementation of the other principles; courts should be accessible; and crime-
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preventing agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law.^^ This inexhaustive 
collection of principles can be greatly strengthened, or weakened, by other aspects of 
the community, such as a free press.^^
Fuller’s conception of the rule of law, on the other hand, is based both on the 
distinction between ‘morality of duty’ and ‘morality of aspiration’, and on the 
definition of the dividing line between where the pressure of duty ends and the pursuit 
of excellence begins.^® According to Fuller, law cannot seek to “compel a man to live 
up to the excellences of which he is capable.”^^  Rather, it only excludes from a man’s 
life “the grosser and more obvious manifestations of chance and irrationality”^^  and, in 
that, provides individuals with the essential conditions for living a rational life.^  ^ For 
him, misunderstandings about what law should encompass often arise when defining 
the yardstick separating the two kinds of aspirations, as there is a tendency in 
widening the scope of duty by considering what is bad in human conduct as the 
antithesis of what is perfectly good/^ For Fuller, laying out a comprehensive 
conception of morality of aspiration as a means of determining bad behaviour is futile 
and unnecessary. As he contends, the rule prohibiting a man to kill another relates to 
the morality of aspiration only in so far as no aspiration can be realised by someone 
deprived of his or her life and, as all other human endeavours, does not relate to the 
fulfilment of a utopie ideal of man’s excellence.^^ For this reason. Fuller asserts that, 
like any other human tool, law cannot be perfectly designed for a particular purpose, 
but should be imperfectly suited to reasonably accomplish, through rules and 
institutions, an indefinite range of purposes.^^ As he remarks,
“[w]e know enough to create the conditions that will permit a man to 
lift himself up. It is certainly better to do this than try to pin him to the 
wall with a final articulation of his highest good.”^^
The conditions for individuals to fulfil their own aspirations and for rulers to govern 
legally involve a set of requirements and, as such. Fuller’s formulation of the rule of
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law condemns illegal or extra-legal use of power.^^ The eight principles of legality
established by Fuller are: generality, as rules should be valid for all and cases should
not be decided on an ad hoc basis; publicity, so as to allow those affected by the rule
to know what they are expected to observe; prospectivity, as retrospective legislation
both is unsuited to guide action and undermines the integrity of prospective rules;
clarity and intelligibility, as rules should be understandable; non-contradictoriness;
possibility of being followed; predictability, so as not to be subjected to frequent
changes that would prevent individuals from orienting their actions based on the rule;
and congruency between rules and their actual administration.^^ According to Fuller, a
system that fails, in the absolute sense, to meet any of these principles cannot be
considered a system of law.^^° Fuller acknowledges, however, that, unless there is a
total failure in the fulfilment of any of these principles, any legal system can observe
his formulation of the rule of law, including regimes harbouring iniquitous laws, such
a Nazi Germany under Hitler. In these cases. Fuller contends that it will be up to each
individual citizen to decide whether to adhere or not to the regime and the rules it 
101imposes.
Similarly, Raz points out that a formal conception of the rule of law is not only 
compatible with authoritarianism and gross violations of human rights, but that its 
requirements can be equally or better met by undemocratic legal systems based on 
religious prosecution, or racial segregation, or extreme poverty, or gender inequality, 
or any other inequitable or evil content. A rule of law which incorporates only 
formal requirements is therefore neutral and open-ended. This “empty quality” 
has appealed to legal theorists and institutions promoting the rule of law abroad, such 
as the World Bank, due to its universal application.^®  ^Despite this, the rule of law as 
formal legality is often considered a moral good, once individual autonomy and 
dignity are enhanced by people’s ability to plan their actions and decisions based on 
the knowledge of their legal implications.^®® Raz, on the other hand, considers the rule
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of law to be morally neutral. The fact that the rule of law may enable the law to serve 
bad purposes does not make it less of a virtue. Similarly, the sharpness of a knife 
cannot be considered a bad attribute just because it can make the knife more harmful 
to others. As such, Raz contends that the rule of law does not stop being one of the 
most important inherent value of laws because it can be achieved by regimes that 
entertain reprehensible or despicable systems.*®  ^Instead, he regards conformity to the 
rule of law to be a “virtue of law in itself’^ ®^ and thus the rule of law to be “the 
specific excellence of the law.” ®^® Tamanaha disputes both interpretations of the 
morality of the rule of law in its formal conception because “the morality of the law is 
a function of the uses to which it is put.”^^® Accordingly, the rule of law will be 
immoral if it serves an immoral regime. This is because the legalisation of an 
inherently inequitable and unfair system, for instance one harbouring racial or ethnic 
segregation, may endow it with a pernicious and malevolent legitimacy, making it 
more evil because the efficiency and efficacy of its rules are used for base purposes 
and may produce nefarious consequences.^By aligning the rule of law with only a 
set of formal requirements, legal theorists supply dictators and tyrants with the legal 
basis for their despicable actions. In addition, by adopting this version of the rule of 
law, international institutions, organisations and governments legitimise, in the 
international arena, the commitment to the rule of law of regimes that comply with 
formal legality whilst perpetrating gross violations of human rights. As Horwitz 
contends, the rule of law in its formal conception
“creates formal equality -  a not inconsiderable virtue -  but it promotes 
substantive inequality by creating a consciousness that radically 
separates law from politics, means from ends, processes from 
outcomes. By promoting procedural justice it enables the shrewd, the
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calculating, and the wealthy to manipulate its forms to their own 
advantage. And it ratifies and legitimates an adversarial, competitive, 
and atomistic conception of human relations.”^
Another relevant criticism of formal legality is that, as a theory concerned with the 
main function of rules and their qualities, it is no more than a conception about the 
nature of rules. Consequently, a formal conception of the rule of law has the same 
scope and contains the same elements as philosophical and sociological analyses of 
rules and rule-following.^^® As Tamanaha asserts, “[i]n the end there is nothing 
distinctive about the formal rule of law as a separate ideal. It is about (legal) rules.”*
The worth of formal legality as an independent conception of the rule of law is also 
questionable when rule of law violations and their consequences for legal systems are 
considered. As Summers points out, non-conformity with one or more requirements of 
formal legality does not necessarily seriously threaten the rule of law.*Thus ,  some 
departures from the principles of a formal conception can be justified and, in some 
cases, are even desirable. As he contends, a law may best suit its desired end by being 
vague, or retroactive legislation may be justified, or judicial interference with the 
meaning of a statute may make it clearer.**® In the same vein, Raz asserts that 
compliance, or non-compliance, with the rule of law is a matter of degree.*^® A legal 
system can never achieve full conformity, as it would be impossible to assess all of its 
laws, general and particular, to determine total compliance; even maximal conformity 
is undesirable, as, overall, some level of controlled administrative discretion is 
beneficial.*^* Complete non-compliance with the rule of law, on the other hand, would 
strip the system of its status as a legal system. *^  ^As Summers argues, a system that 
abandons its rules cannot claim conformity with the rule of law, and for that matter 
cannot claim to be a legal system, for instance just by adopting moral principles 
relevant to legal matters.*^^ Hence, were significant violations of the rule of law to
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occur across the breadth and length reached by the principles of formal legality, the 
system would cease to be a legal system, as its rules would not be considered law-like 
rules. If this is the case, then the great majority of modem legal systems, if not all, 
comply, to a degree, with the mle of law in the formal sense. As will be seen further in 
Chapter 3, Brazil can also be said to observe the rule of law via its compliance with at 
least some of the principles of formal legality,*^® making a formal conception of the 
mle of law an inadequate benchmark for comparison. Its unsuitability for analysing 
the case of Brazil and determining whether its legal system has, since its transition to 
democracy, come to protect Brazilian citizens against abuses of power, as well 
relinquished its elitist bias by promoting a more equitable and uniform application of 
the law, is clear. By prescribing only the manner and form which legal mles are to 
observe, formal legality abandons the mle of law’s long historical tradition of 
embodying protection against tyranny, based on substantive limitations on the 
sovereign’s exercise of power founded on natural law, Christian morality, shared 
customs or the good of the community.*^® Although the limitations will vary according 
to the society, culture and political and economic arrangements in place, the need for 
imposing limits on government and those in power was present in ancient Athens and 
throughout the Medieval period as much as it is today and, indeed, will never cease to 
exist. For Tamanaha, this continues to be the general understanding of the meaning of 
the mle of law, if such a common view of the ideal can be said to occur. As he 
asserts, “[t]he great contribution to human existence of the mle of law in this sense is 
that it provides one answer to this need.”*^  ^ Despite formal legality’s standing 
amongst legal theorists, the mle of law’s more widely accepted meaning is associated 
with a substantive conception, which incorporates formal legality, democracy and 
individual rights.*^® This is evident in the mismatch between the rhetoric and practice 
of mle of law building projects worldwide. Governments and mle of law aid 
specialists hail the ideal as indispensable to achieving democracy and economic
Ibid., p. 1700
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growth, as well as to addressing a wide range of problems from corruption to human 
rights violations, whilst offering rule of law building solutions based on a checklist of 
institutions to be reformed and legislation to be promulgated. Hence, a template of 
formal legality implementation is commended as the way to achieving ends which 
can, in reality, only be incorporated by a substantial version of the rule of law.*^ ® As 
Kleinfeld posits,
“[i]n fact, it is arguable that reformers often do not want the rule of law 
at all -  or at least not the technocratic, proceduralist version they 
proclaim.” *^*
Brazil’s historical observance of formal legality has not fostered the main benefits 
associated with a formal conception of the rule of law, such as accountability, 
efficiency, uniformity, security in the application of the legal rules, or respect for the 
established law by public o f f i c i a l s . I n  addition, formal legality’s emptiness with 
regards to society’s fundamental principles and values makes it an inadequate 
benchmark for comparing and analysing legal systems beyond the formal application 
of rules and the main characteristics of institutional arrangements. In this sense, its 
universal application ceases to be a positive attribute, as it robs it of meaning and 
value. Its achievement both by legal systems containing acceptable standards of 
principled and effective protection against abuses of power as well as by those 
harbouring tyranny, gross violations of human rights or deep inequalities, makes the 
rule of law in its formal version a theory about the nature of rules, rather than an ideal 
worth pursuing.
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2 2 2  Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law and their Applicability to 
Brazil
As with formal legality, there are variations of substantive conceptions of the rule of 
law. All of them incorporate the requirements of a formal conception, but go further 
by including moral elements in the definition of the ideal of the rule of law.*^  ^
According to Fallon, a substantive conception of the rule of law implies “intelligibility 
of law as a morally authoritative guide to human conduct.”*^"*
It is inevitable that theories incorporating moral requirements will differ in their 
definition of what the law, ideally, should be, both in content and scope. Plausible 
substantive theories ought, however, to encompass a basic list of moral requirements, 
among them limitations on the use of power, even when exercised in conformity with 
a positivist notion of legal validity.*^® As Fallon argues, the rule of law is not only a 
concept of law, but also an i d e a l . A s  such, substantive conceptions of the rule of 
law rarely claim to possess definite answers about all the elements and requirements 
of the law or to supply its full content. Their claims are often about the interpretation 
of the meaning and scope of some legal concepts and principles, such as equality, 
property and fairness, based on substantive political morality.
Substantive conceptions of the rule of law thus vary both in scope, like formal 
conceptions, and in the interpretation of moral values that they incorporate. For 
O’Donnell, for instance, the rule of law can only be regarded as fully implemented 
when there is the assumption that the legal system is, itself, democratic. To be 
considered so, O’Donnell contends that the legal system must uphold not only 
political freedoms and guarantees, but also the civil rights of the whole population, 
and ought to have in place liability and accountability systems by which all public 
officials are held to account for unlawful acts they have c o m m i t t e d . A n  even 
broader version of the rule of law was laid out in the Delhi Declaration,*^® signed by 
the International Commission of Jurists at the 1959 Conference in New Delhi, which
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declared the rule of law to be a “dynamic concept”*"*® encompassing not only civil and 
political rights, but also social, economic, educational and cultural rights and 
conditions necessary for the realisation of man’s aspirations and dignity.*"**
According to Fallon, there are only a few plausible and consistent substantive theories 
of the rule of law,*"*^  amongst the most influential are those formulated by Hayek, 
Rawls and Dworkin.*"*  ^ Although Hayek’s theory may be regarded as a formal 
conception of the rule of law, its concern for liberalism and the protection of 
individual liberty and its formulation of a rule of law designed to serve as an 
instrument for the protection of property and a market economy, qualify it as a 
substantive formulation of law for this thesis.*"*"* Hayek’s theory exerted great 
influence not only on legal and political philosophy, but also on governments’ goals 
and policies. His teachings were applied as an alternative to the Welfare State by 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan and, more recently, inspired policies on 
international globalisation and financial markets de-regulation.*"*® Rawls’s version of 
the rule of law, on the other hand, gives primacy to distributive justice and to a system 
of fair cooperation in society. His liberal theory stands in direct contradiction to 
Hayek’s, by seeking to conciliate the ideas of political freedom and of equality.*"*® 
Dworkin’s theory is, like Hayek’s and Rawls’s, one of the leading accounts of law in 
modem legal philosophy.*"*  ^His rights conception of the mle of law offers an attack 
on positivism and an alternative formulation of the law, individual rights, legal 
interpretation and the principles that are to guide judicial decisions.*"*  ^ The 
distinctiveness of Hayek’s, Rawls’s and Dworkin’s conceptions of the rule of law is
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thus not superficial. The three scholars have formulated complete philosophical 
theories espousing their understanding of society and the legal system and, 
consequently, of the rule law. The meaning of the latter in all three theories is 
therefore contingent on the former and thus cannot be grasped independently from the 
general postulates of their accounts of law and political philosophy. For this reason, 
Hayek’s, Rawls’s and Dworkin’s conception of the rule of law will be investigated in 
view of their wider theoretical foundations. In so doing, this thesis will be better 
equipped to adopt, in Chapter 3, a theory that works both as a general conception of 
the rule of law and as a formulation applicable to the case of Brazil and, as such, that 
can and may offer Brazilian society an ideal and a framework for substantial reform of 
its legal system, away from one in which abuses of power and elites’ privileges are 
entrenched and towards a more equitable and law abiding system, where citizens 
rights are generally protected and the law is applied more uniformly and efficiently to 
all.
2.2.2.1 Hayek’s, Rawls’s and Dworkin’s Conceptions of the Rule of 
Law
Hayek’s interpretation of individual freedom in the negative sense, which entails the 
idea that individuals can only be free when not prevented by other persons from doing 
the things that they regard both as crucial to their own existence and as necessary to 
the preservation of what they most value,*"*® is the foundation for his conception of the 
rule of law. The preservation of individual freedom, and thus of a spontaneous social 
order, is dependent upon conditions of validity of legal rules and minimal legislative 
interference.
The theory of spontaneous order, which Hayek denominates a “grown order,”*®® is an 
endogenous or self-generating social order which, although a product of human 
activity and interaction, is not created through human design.*®* As Hayek explains, a 
spontaneous order is formed of individual elements interacting with one another
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through unplanned exchanges and subject to different circumstances.*®^ Its high 
degree of complexity places it, as a totality, beyond human comprehension. This is 
because human beings are unable to understand every single one of its elements, as 
well as the circumstances affecting them and, therefore, their knowledge of the order 
only goes as far as understanding its general character and features. It follows that it is 
impossible for humans to design the plurality of ends and outcomes obtained by the 
interaction among the multitude of elements composing the order, although they are 
able to alter some of the rules of conduct to be followed by the elements and, with 
that, influence the general character of the order. The evolution of the system is thus 
determined by a process of auto-selection in which only those elements that are best 
suited to the overall progress of the social system survive. This means that the order is 
deprived of any concrete purposes or ends and hence cannot be deliberately made.*®® 
A constructed order is, on the other hand, an exogenous order which is created with 
purposes and ends, as an organisation would be.*®"* This artificial order is, for Hayek, 
flawed as a social system model, as he believes that it is impossible for human beings 
to possess a rational understanding of all of the social processes involved in the 
community. For Hayek, the mind is as much a product of the evolution of the process 
of interaction of the individual with his or her natural and social surroundings as the 
rules of conduct regulating social institutions.*®® Both the mind and the rules of 
conduct are thus the result of the natural selection of practices, habits and ideas that 
proved most successful to individuals in the pursuit of their own aims and purposes, as 
they increased the chances of the human group survival.*®® Men learn from experience 
and from adopting abstract rules of conduct, originated from the continued use of 
actions that acquire legitimacy within the group because of their positive 
consequences in society.*®  ^ Hence, culture consists of a complexity of practices and 
rules of conduct
“[...] which have prevailed because they made a group of men
successful but which were not adopted because it was known that they
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would bring about desired effects. Man acted before he thought and did
not understand before he acted.”*®^
For Hayek, the Great Society of modem times is a spontaneous order characterised by 
a complex network of individuals, institutions and organisations pursuing a myriad of 
aims.*®® Individual liberty, or the ability of individuals to plan their own destiny based 
on the knowledge of where they stand in the social order,*®® is essential in order for 
the individual, as well as for society as whole, to achieve its purposes.*®* This is 
because only by allowing individuals to use their knowledge without constraints, save 
for the application of general and universal mles of conduct, can the best opportunities 
be created for the achievement of individual purposes and aims.*®^  In this vein, Hayek 
believes that “the value of freedom rests on the opportunities it provides for 
unforeseen and unpredictable actions [and thus] we will rarely know what we lose 
through a particular restriction on liberty.”*®® The restriction or coercion of freedom is 
normally balanced in terms of the attraction of achieving concrete and visible ends 
versus the preservation of its unknown effects. This leads to the sacrifice of the ideal 
of freedom in the great majority of cases, as such an individual case-approach tends to 
accentuate the advantages of a tangible gain whilst masking the many, but unknown, 
disadvantageous or harmful effects of sacrificing the ideal of freedom.*®"* As Hayek 
believes that only when there is freedom can society accommodate changes and adapt 
to changing times and circumstances, as well as provide equal opportunities to all its 
citizens and create general wealth growth, he contends that freedom should be treated 
as a supreme principle, which must not be sacrificed for the achievement of particular 
ends or advantages.*®® The distinction that Hayek employs between a spontaneous and 
a constmcted order is also applied to his understanding of the concepts of law and 
legislation and, ultimately, of the mle of law.*®®
For Hayek, legislation is the deliberate making of law, whilst law is as old as society 
itself and is comprised of mles of conduct which guarantee the peaceful existence of
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individuals in society.*®  ^ Law belongs to a spontaneous order and is far older than 
legislation, which is part of a constructed or man-made order.*®  ^ Hayek thus refutes 
the common understanding that all law is, and ought to be, an invention of the 
legislator and attributes this “fallacy”*®® to constructivist rationalism.*^® He argues that 
law existed even before man developed language coherent enough to express it in 
commands, as the observance of a group’s rules has always been a pre-condition for 
individuals to be accepted as members of the group. As he posits, these rules might 
not have been known, as they developed independently of human will, but their later 
discovery only denotes an awareness that certain acts did not conform to the accepted 
practices of the group. *^*
Based on this distinction, Hayek classifies law as ‘rules of just conduct’ and 
legislation as ‘rules of organisation’. Whilst the former is universal in character and 
forms the basis of the spontaneous order, *^  ^ the latter consists of rules necessary in 
order to enable governments to exercise their functions, as they cannot act by ad hoc 
commands.*^® Modem societies require mles that determine their stmcture, aims and 
functions and these mles are dictated by legislation. As he contends,
“[t]he law of organization of government is not law in the sense of 
mles defining what kind of conduct is generally right, but consists of 
directions concerning what particular officers or agencies of 
government are required to do. They would more appropriately be 
described as the regulations or by-laws of government. Their aim is to 
authorize particular agencies to take particular actions for specified 
purposes, for which they are assigned particular means. But in a free 
society, these means do not include the private citizen.”*^"*
Although rules of just conduct cannot be created by men with specific ends or 
purposes, as they are to evolve independently in society, it is important that they are 
clear and widely known, so citizens of a Great Society can decide how best to act
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based on the knowledge of the rules governing societal interactions and institutions.*^® 
Such knowledge is, therefore, essential not because rules of just conduct set the means 
to a particular end, but because they describe the conditions of freedom.*^® As Hayek 
contends, the public good is achieved not when governments devise rules to guarantee 
the satisfaction of specific needs, but when they secure the conditions that provide 
individuals and societal groups with the opportunities to achieve their own needs and 
aims, preserving in this way the spontaneous order. *^  ^As he puts it,
“[...] it becomes clear that the role of government in that process 
cannot be to determine particular results for particular individual 
groups, but only to provide certain generic conditions whose effects on 
the several individuals will be unpredictable. It can enhance the
chances that the efforts of unknown individuals towards equally
unknown aims will be successful by enforcing the observance of such 
abstract rules of conduct as in the light of past experience appear to be 
most conducive to the formation of a spontaneous order.”*^ ^
For this reason, Hayek’s formulation of the rule of law, or rather “the rule of what the 
law ought to be,”*^® requires that all laws enacted by government conform to certain 
principles.*^® Laws of the nation should guide the individual on what kinds of conduct 
are appropriate in different situations, but should not restrict freedom in a way which 
disrupts the order that individuals depend on to make their choices and achieve their 
aims.*^* In view of accomplishing that, Hayek prescribes that rules of just conduct 
should be abstract, general and universal.*^^ The abstract element means that rules of 
just conduct should not serve particular ends, but should be end-independent
commands guiding individual action in spite of the achievement of specific needs. *^®
The general character of the law refers to the fact that laws should not single out 
individuals or societal groups as the receivers of coercive force or privileges.*^"* Hayek
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posits that the generalisation of a rule is a moral question, for it is not always desirable 
or even possible to apply a rule generally, as this may produce harmful effects to some 
members of society in given situations.*^® By universal, Hayek means that laws should 
be equally applied to all citizens.*^® As Touchie points out, one of the most important 
considerations for this element of Hayek’s theory is that laws should not grant 
immunities and, therefore, should be applied equally not only among individuals, but 
also government officials and administrators.*^^ In general, aceording to Hayek rules 
of just conduct should also be of a negative character. The great majority of rules of 
just conduct should prohibit, rather than command, the individual to act in a certain 
way, as each individual should be free to act in a manner that he or she chooses. *^  ^
Exceptions to this are, for example, positive duties imposed by family law, which are 
the result of the circumstances of the individual (such as being a parent) rather than of 
his or her actions.*^® In this vein, Hayek contends that rules of just conduct cannot 
eliminate all uncertainties, as their purpose is to prevent conflict and facilitate 
cooperation between members of society, whilst allowing the individual to act in 
accordance with his or her own plans and decisions.*®®
For Hayek, no Constitution has so far succeeded in achieving the aim of preventing 
arbitrary action, which follows that the prevention of arbitrariness is not a necessary 
effect of the observance of a Constitution.*®* This has made Hayek increasingly 
sceptical of the evolution of classical liberal constitutional project, as he believes it 
has failed to limit power both widely and adequately enough.*®  ^ Consequently, 
although Hayek supports the idea of representative democracy, he is particularly 
concerned with distortions of modem mass democracies, especially in regard to the 
arbitrariness of majority mle and the abuses committed by governments in the pursuit 
of their interests.*®® For him, modem Constitutions have expanded significantly and
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constitutional building processes have become vulnerable exactly to the political 
power holders they were conceived to protect individual freedom from. *®"*
Like Hayek, Rawls’s theory is embedded in the tradition of political liberalism. 
Despite this, their theories diverge widely in their interpretation of what both 
liberalism and individual freedom entail, on the weight that the principle of equality is 
to be accorded and on the idea of distributive justice. Rawls develops justice as 
fairness by considering which theory of justice best defines the principles necessary to 
realise liberty and equality in a society understood as a fair system of cooperation 
between free and equal persons. In addressing the question of how the fair terms of 
cooperation are to be determined, Rawls conceives the idea of the original position,*®® 
whereby the fair terms of social cooperation of a well-ordered society are to be agreed 
by its participants - that is, free and equal persons — in essence reviving and recasting 
the social contract idea.*®® As Rawls posits, a political philosophy is firmly based on 
society and the world and, therefore, does not attempt to unveil any method of 
reasoning that is dissociated from the tradition of political thought and practice. In this 
vein, a political conception of justice has to be in line, after appropriate reflection and 
at all levels of generality, with people’s firmly held convictions of justice. The role of 
the original position is to organise such convictions, from the most general to the most 
particular, by reflecting on the values, standards and principles that people do or 
should accept. This exercise is necessary because political philosophy cannot coerce 
people into accepting a set of convictions.*®^ In addition, a common conception of 
justice allows citizens in pluralist societies, who disagree on a moral authority or 
endorse deeply distinct comprehensive doctrines, to establish fair terms of cooperation 
between them under conditions that are fair for all.*®^
The central organising idea from which Rawls’s theory departs - society is “a system 
of cooperation over time, from one generation to the next”*®® - is combined with two 
other fundamental ideas to form a conception of justice, that is, cooperating members 
of society are free and equal persons and society is a well-ordered system regulated by
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a conception of justice/®® By consolidating these ideas, justice as fairness seeks to 
address the shortfalls of political liberalism which, according to Rawls, has, so far, 
struggled with different conceptions of the good, since antagonised by different 
religious and philosophical doctrines. His theory is thus an attempt to address two 
fundamental questions. Firstly, which conception of justice would most appropriately 
regulate the fair terms of cooperation of a well-ordered society composed of free and 
equal citizens, who are fully cooperating members of society over a complete life? 
Secondly, in a complex pluralist society, where there is reasonable opposition between 
religious, philosophical and moral doctrines that are irreconcilable by nature, what are 
the grounds of toleration?^®*
In addressing the first question, justice as fairness proposes that two principles of 
justice are to guide the basic institutions of society on how to realise the values of 
liberty and equality. As Rawls posits, for centuries there has been no agreement on 
how a constitutional democracy should organise and run its basic institutions so as to 
satisfy the fair terms of cooperation between free and equal citizens. Liberty and 
equality have been generally regarded as conflicting values, with a traditional split 
between the democratic ideal associated with Locke, which assigns primacy to 
freedom, and the ideas propounded by Rousseau, which stress the pre-eminence of the 
ideal of equality.^®  ^Justice as fairness addresses this apparent conflict, as well as the 
first question, by establishing a point of view from which the two principles of justice 
can be considered more appropriate to realising the values of liberty and equality than 
other principles of justice.^®®
The agreement in the original position prescribing the two principles of justice can 
only be valid from the perspective of political justice if it observes a set of conditions; 
these are determined by Rawls by extending the general rules applicable to 
agreements of everyday life and adapting them to regulate situations within the 
background of the basic structure. For the terms of this agreement to be considered 
fair, the situations affecting them have to be fair and valid. Hence the conditions must 
ensure, first and foremost, that the free and equal persons stand on a fair footing and 
that no one has an unfair bargaining position over others. In addition, they ought to
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safeguard the agreement from threats, such as the use of force and coercion, deception 
and fraud, which may place some citizens at an advantage. In order to meet such 
conditions, Rawls elaborates the idea of the original position, which symbolises a non- 
historical and hypothetical situation, with a feature he denominates the veil of 
ignorance, which ensures that the parties are not aware of any bargaining advantages 
they might have over others.^ ®"* These include their social position, the comprehensive 
doctrines that they and the persons they represent endorse, their race, ethnic group or 
sex, or any native endowments they possess, such as strengths and intelligence. For 
Rawls, protecting this agreement from the influence of advantages that individuals 
may have acquired, either through social and historical circumstances and tendencies 
or accident, is paramount as a basis of political justice, as well as an essential feature 
of justice as fairness as a social contract theory. According to Rawls, the original 
position, together with the veil of ignorance, guarantees that any agreements made by 
the citizens’ representatives are fair, as the parties are free and equal as well as 
properly informed and rational.^®® Agreements made in the original position are 
specifically concerned with determining the principles of justice for the basic structure 
and, as such, specify the fair terms of social cooperation between free and equal 
citizens.^®®
Although Rawls and Hayek view society and law in fundamentally distinct ways, 
Rawls also assigns great importance to the form of legal rules, a requirement 
necessary to sustain society and protect the fundamental values to which he gives 
primacy.^®  ^ Rawls contends that first principles of justice should be general and 
universal as well as public. By general he means that they should be understood 
independently from a specific name or description and, by universal, that they can be 
applied consistently and coherently to all moral agents, in this ease the citizens of the 
well-ordered society in question. The generality and universality requirements are 
common in moral philosophy, unlike the demand that justice as fairness makes that 
first principles of political justice be public. As these principles are designed to 
address the basic structure, the publicity condition requires the parties in the original 
position to consider both the social and psychological consequences likely to stem
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from them when they come to be publicly recognised and mutually acknowledged by 
citizens, as well as to ascertain whether they fulfil their objective of regulating the 
basic structure of society/®^ The two principles of justice enunciated by Rawls are:
“(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate 
scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the 
same scheme of liberties for all; and
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, 
they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to 
the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society 
(difference principle).” ®^®
These two principles determine how the basic institutions in a liberal society can most 
appropriately realise the values of liberty and equality by stipulating the manner in 
which they are to deal with basic rights, liberties and opportunities as well as with 
claims of equality. Hence, they illustrate the content of a liberal political conception of 
justice by establishing and giving priority to certain basic rights, liberties and 
opportunities along with measures that guarantee the means for the effective 
enjoyment of citizens’ liberties and opportunities. Furthermore, Rawls argues that the 
two principles enunciate an egalitarian form of liberalism, as they assure the fair 
value, rather than only the formal protections, of political liberties and fair equality of 
opportunity. In addition, by including the difference principle, they also guarantee that 
any inequalities attached to offices or positions are accommodated in such a way as to 
ensure that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of 
society.^*® By so doing, the difference principle seeks to regulate the social and 
economic inequalities that citizens are likely to encounter during a complete life.^** 
Justice as fairness gives priority to the first principle over the second and, within the 
second principle, the principle of fair equality of opportunity is to be given priority 
over the difference principle.^
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The first principle of justice comprises three main elements. The first element is that 
the basic rights, liberties and opportunities are to be specified, since constitutional 
democratic regimes are managed through bills of rights and declarations of the rights 
of man.^ *® The list of equal basic liberties is to include the freedoms of thought, 
conscience and association, political liberties, such as the right to vote, the rights and 
liberties covered by the rule of law, as well as the rights and liberties specified by the 
physical and psychological liberty and integrity of the person. As Rawls contends, this 
list can be compiled in two different ways. The first is through a historical exercise, by 
comparing the basic liberties protected in different democracies and selecting those 
that have been regarded most fundamental and upheld by the most suceessful regimes. 
The second is through an analytical process, by examining the liberties that best allow 
free and equal persons to develop and exercise their two moral powers through the 
promotion of adequate political and social conditions for them to do so.^ *"* According 
to Rawls, following the latter analysis would warrant the conclusion that equal 
political liberties and freedom of thought allow citizens to judge how just the basic 
structures and policies of society are, and that liberty of conscience and freedom of 
association enable citizens to formulate, revise and rationally pursue their conception 
of the good.^*®
Rawls notes that, unlike the second principle of justice, the first principle regulates not 
only the basic structure of society, but also the constitution of the state, written or 
unwritten. According to him, the liberties listed, in particular freedom of thought and 
association and equal political liberties, should be constitutionally protected. In 
addition, the constituent power of the state should be institutionalised in the same 
manner as a regime, that is, it should be guided by a bill of rights that includes the 
rights to vote and hold office as well as formal procedures regulating constitutional 
amendedments * ®
Like Locke, Rawls considers the constituent power to be different from the ordinary 
power of the legislature.^*^ This distinction is the embodiment of the first of five 
guiding principles of constitutionalism formulated by Rawls. Accordingly, the 
constituent power is exercised by the people and encompasses the power to establish a
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new regime, whereas the ordinary power is exercised by state officials and the 
electorate in day-to-day politics. In this sense, the ordinary power is established and 
regulated by a framework instituted by the constituent power of the people upon the 
dissolution of the existing regime. The second principle concerns the distinction 
between higher law, which emanates from the people, and ordinary law or legislation, 
which derives from the legislature. For Rawls, the constituent power of the people is 
expressed through higher law, whereas the ordinary law is the expression of the 
ordinary power of Congress and the electorate. Since higher law has the authority of 
the will of “We the People,” it guides and binds the ordinary power.^*^ The third 
principle is that the constitution consists of a people’s principled expression of its 
political ideal in higher law and, therefore, its principles should clearly and visibly 
guide the basic institutions of society. As such, the constitution is to be free of any 
unnecessary details and qualifications that would detract the wide support it ought to 
enjoy. The fourth principle is that, by enacting a constitution, including a bill of rights, 
the body of citizens is settling, conclusively and ultimately, constitutional essentials, 
such as the equal basic political rights and liberties, freedom of speech and 
association, as well as the rights and liberties protecting citizens’ security and 
independence, like freedom of movement, the right of choice of occupation and the 
protections of the rule of law. For Rawls, without such a set of fixed procedures, 
citizens have no reasoned democratic power, for only through a set of procedures that 
guide and inform ordinary laws can citizens express, if they wish, their democratic 
will.^ *® The fifth principle is that the ultimate power in a constitutional government is 
to be held by the three branches of the state, which are to be related to one another in 
the constitutional manner established and are each to be responsible to the people. It 
follows that neither the legislature nor the constitutional court can exercise ultimate 
power in a constitutional govemment.^^® The distinctions between constituent and 
ordinary power, as well as between higher and ordinary law, characterise Rawls’s 
view of constitutional democracy as a dualist conception. He rejects the idea of 
parliamentary supremacy, as he assigns an important role to supreme courts in 
protecting the higher law and, therefore, in preventing transient majorities and interest 
groups with influence over legislatures from eroding the law through legislation. He
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refutes the argument that it is undemocratic for courts to perform such a role for, 
although anti-majoritarian with respect to ordinary law, the effective fulfilment of this 
function supports the higher authority of the people?^^ As Rawls posits “[t]he court is 
not antimajoritarian with respect to higher law when its decisions reasonably accord 
with the constitution itself and with its amendments and politically mandated 
interpretations.”^^ ^
Although Rawls attributes an important role to supreme courts, he contends that the 
constitution does not amount to what the Court states or interprets it to be. The 
constitution is rather the expression of what “the people acting constitutionally 
through the other branches eventually allow the Court to say it is.”^^  ^ Matters 
regarding the most important aspects of the constitution, such as rights it ought to 
enshrine, as well as matters that require more urgent political agreement in a pluralist 
society, are considered by Rawls as constitutional essentials. Basic rights and liberties 
fall within this category because they protect fundamental interests. The first principle 
of justice is superior, and given priority over the second precisely because it deals with 
constitutional essentials and because the power of the people, including creating a new 
government and establishing the constitution, is superior to the ordinary power of day- 
to-day politics.^ '^  ^ This means that the application of the second principle, within 
which is the difference principle, presupposes the fulfilment of the demands of the 
first principle by society’s basic institutions, an imperative requirement in a well- 
ordered society. Such priority of the first principle over the second prevents the basic 
rights and liberties contained in the first principle from being traded for economic and 
social advantages, which the difference principle regulates.^^^
Whilst the first principle covers constitutional essentials, the second principle 
demands fair equality of opportunity and prescribes that any inequalities are to be 
regulated by the difference principle. The requirement of fair equality of opportunity 
has been introduced to address the shortfalls that formal equality has created in the 
system of natural liberty, where equality is met by opening careers to talent. As Rawls 
denotes, a common criticism of Locke’s theory is its failure to address the social 
conditions under which fair agreements are to be entered into, despite prescribing a
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just initial state and determining that fair agreements are to regulate people’s social 
circumstances and relations with one another. For Rawls, such requirements can 
guarantee that social conditions remain just only for the inceptive period, after which 
the combination of a number of separate agreements entered both by persons and 
associations will inevitably erode the social conditions which are essential for 
agreements to be free and fair. Accordingly, Rawls contends that, over time, wealth 
and property will likely concentrate in few hands, which would undermine “fair 
equality of opportunity”^^ ,^ as well as the value of political liberties.^^^ Hence, Rawls 
argues that fair equality of opportunity entails not only that public offices and social 
positions meet this requirement in the formal sense, but that citizens similarly 
motivated and endowed should have a chance of attaining the same achievements and 
cultural level. In this vein, those who have the same degree of talent and ability, which 
they are willing to apply, should have equal chances of success, regardless of their 
social class of origin, which Rawls considers to be the social class individuals are bom 
into and develop until the age of reason. The aims of fair equality of opportunity, or 
liberal equality, can only be achieved if conditions are enforced on the basic stmcture 
of society. The first of these requirements is that the effects of a free market system 
must be adjusted by political and legal institutions, so as to guarantee that the long­
term trend of economic forces does not foster excessive accumulation of wealth and 
property or promotes political domination. Furthermore, society must ensure equal 
opportunities of education for all, regardless of their ineome.^^^ According to Rawls, 
the difference principle, together with the first principle justice and part of the second, 
fulfil the idea of legitimate expectation, as they should be applied through a public 
system of mles. This means that their demands are foreseeable and do not entail 
continuous or regular interference with the plans and actions of individuals to any 
greater degree than, for instance, a system of taxation.^^^
The inequalities to which the difference principle applies consist of discrepancies 
between citizens’ reasonable expectations on primary goods and those they have 
attained. Primary goods are what people require in order to fulfil the role assigned to 
them by a political conception of persons as fully cooperating members of society.
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hence comprising what free and equal persons require as citizens. Accordingly, 
primary goods are the conditions and means necessary for citizens to develop and 
fully exercise their two moral powers and pursue their conception of the good. They 
are, thus, distinct from both what human beings, outside a normative conception, can 
rationally desire, and from the requirements and needs specified by a moral 
comprehensive doctrine. It is implicit that the attainment of such goods does not entail 
the achievement of citizens’ overall happiness or their good, as defined by a moral, 
philosophical or religious comprehensive doctrine, as justice as fairness considers the 
notion of primary goods solely within a political conception of justice.^^^ According to 
Rawls, there are five kinds of primary goods: basic rights and liberties; freedom of 
movement and of choice; income and wealth; powers and prerogative of offices and 
positions of authority; and the social bases of self-respect. Citizens’ life prospects 
consist of their expectations on such goods over a complete life. The least advantaged 
members of a well-ordered society, where citizens have equal basic rights and liberties 
and where fair opportunities are secured, are thus the ones with the lowest 
expectations on primary goods.^^  ^ Rawls emphasises that justice as fairness does not 
question the ownership of individual endowments, as the basic rights and liberties 
ensured by the first principle of justice secures the psychological and physical 
integrity of persons. What he considers a common asset is the difference between 
persons or the distribution of such endowments.^^^ In this sense, justice as fairness 
assumes that the idea of rewarding citizens on the basis of their moral desert, rather 
than of deservingness, affronts the precepts of justice, which promote narrowing the 
differences between citizens. Measures to that effect include, for instance, offering 
free means of education and skills attainment, attracting people to positions where 
they would be most needed from a social perspective, and encouraging people to 
accept the burden of certain responsibilities, provided free choice of occupation and 
fair equality of opportunity are duly respected. It is important to note that justice as 
fairness refutes the idea of moral desert, but not of desert of entitlement under fair 
conditions, which it sees as fully compatible with a political conception of justice. As 
Rawls posits, justice as fairness denies that people morally deserve their initial place 
in society or their place in the distribution of native endowments, but it acknowledges
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that citizens are entitled to social positions or offices they come to hold later in life, as 
well as to have their education and other skills realised, provided these entitlements 
are earned under fair conditions?^^
Finally, the foundation of Dworkin’s theory lies both in political and legal philosophy. 
Dworkin contends that law as integrity is a nonseeptical theory of legal rights. Unlike 
conventionalism, it does not recognise legal rights as deriving from past political 
decisions, but maintains that people’s legal rights consist of whatever rights stem from 
“the principles that provide the best justification of legal practice as a whole”.^ "^^  
Integrity, for Dworkin, is both a political and an interpretive principle.^^^
As he posits, political integrity presupposes a deep personification of the community, 
in the sense that the community or state can be committed to the ideals of fairness, 
justice and procedural process, and be faithful or unfaithful to them, just as an 
individual can. Dworkin attributes moral agency and responsibility to the community 
by considering it a special kind of entity, capable of holding its own principles, 
independently from those held by the individual citizens who belong to it. Hence, 
similarly to individuals, the community can abide or not by its principles, act in good 
or bad faith, and act with or without integrity.^^^ This personification does not entail 
an adherence to a metaphysical theory, however, as Dworkin does not intend to 
accredit the community a mind, an independent will or any other attributes of a real 
person. What he proposes is to consider the community through the perspective of “a 
complex, two stage way of reasoning about the responsibilities of officials and citizens 
that find natural expression in the personification of the community”.^ ^^  Illustrations 
of the working personification of the community are collective guilt - for instance, 
Germans may feel guilty for the atrocities committed during the Nazi regime - and the 
special and complex responsibility enjoyed by state officials, which is far more 
extensive than the one entertained by other citizens of the community.^^^
Within political integrity, two principles can be identified. The legislative principle, or 
integrity in legislation, requires those who create law to strive to make the state’s 
entire body of laws morally coherent. The adjudicative principle demands from those
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responsible for deciding law’s meaning and application that they conceive and enforce 
it, as much as possible, also in a morally coherent manner. A utopian state, where 
officials would always act justly and fairly, would not require integrity as a distinct 
political virtue, as coherence would be automatically ensured by officials of the state. 
Ordinary politics is, however, permeated by conflicting ideals, thus requiring integrity 
to be treated as an independent ideal.^^^
The ideal of integrity - or ‘treating like cases alike’ - is a further ideal required in 
ordinary politics, in addition to the political ideals of fairness, justice and procedural 
process, which are shared by ordinary politics and the utopian political theory.^ "^ ® 
Political fairness entails the right distribution of political power; in the U.S. and the 
U.K. this has come to mean the provision of equal influence by all citizens in the 
decisions governing them.^ "^  ^ The ideal of justice denotes that political institutions, 
regardless of how fairly they have been chosen, should make just decisions and apply 
them justly. Hence, the acceptance of justice as a political virtue requires that state 
officials distribute resources and protect civil liberties in a way that secures a “morally 
defensible outcome.” "^^  ^The ideal of procedural process concerns the right procedures 
for ascertaining whether citizens have violated laws enacted by the legislature.^"^  ^ The 
ideal of integrity, on the other hand, demands governments’ actions towards citizens 
to be carried out in a principled and coherent manner, so as to apply the standards of 
justice and fairness to all in society.^"^ For Dworkin the ‘virtue of political integrity’ 
encompasses more than treating like cases alike, as he conceives it as parallel to the 
ideal of personal morality.^"^  ^As he contends
“Integrity becomes a political ideal when we make the same demand of 
the state or community taken to be a moral agent, when we insist that 
the state act on a single, coherent set of principles even when its 
citizens are divided about what the right principles of fairness and 
justice really are.” "^*^
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In addition, the principle of integrity informs all the other political ideals. This means 
that the adoption of integrity as a distinct political ideal demands not only the 
obedience to rules, but also the adherence to the principles of fairness, justice and 
procedural due proeess.^"^  ^Accordingly, integrity informs the community’s conception 
of fairness by demanding that the decision about what an enacted statute means be 
informed by the political principles that justify the legislature’s authority. The 
integrity of the community’s conception of justice requires that the law be informed 
by the same moral principles necessary to justify the substance of the legislature’s 
decisions. The integrity of the community’s conception of procedural process 
demands that, in law enforcement, a balance be struck between accuracy and 
efficiency, taking into consideration the moral aspects of this decision. In a more 
practical way, integrity also informs the content and application of both, legislation 
and adjudication. Integrity in legislation requires that those creating law through 
legislation be coherent in principle. Integrity in adjudication, in its turn, requires that 
those deciding what the meaning of law is should enforce it in a coherent way.^ "^  ^ In 
sum, for Dworkin, integrity as a principle lends “life to law as we know it.” "^^^
Although these ideals often conflict in ordinary politics, adherence to the ideal of 
integrity as a distinct political virtue demands members of the community not to 
compromise the principles they endorse in an attempt to achieve greater consensus in 
sensitive matters involving moral rights. Hence, Dworkin rejects compromised 
outcomes in difficult moral questions. On the issue of abortion, for example, he 
dismisses solutions which, for instance, contemplate the prioritisation of abortion 
groups’ proposals in proportion to their numbers, although some citizens may regard 
this as fairer. Likewise, he considers the compromises in the American Constitution 
on slavery, which addresses the issue of state representation in Congress by counting 
only three-fifths of slaves in slave states and prohibits Congress from limiting the 
states’ original power to import slaves before 1808, as deep violations of the ideal of 
integrity. These are stark examples of violations of the ideal of integrity; nonetheless, 
Dworkin contends that the principle integrity is infringed in any ease where legislative 
compromise leads the community to enact and enforce laws which, although coherent
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individually, cannot be regarded as expressing a coherent account of justice or fairness 
or procedural due process. As he concedes, this less dramatic breach of integrity is 
often encountered in legal systems and, despite the impossibility of organising all the 
community’ statutes and common law rules into a single coherent principle, integrity 
as a political ideal should still be embraced. Compromises are thus considered to be 
morally wrong, as Dworkin believes that the community as a whole, rather than its 
officials individually considered, should act in a principled way.^^°
For Dworkin, the acceptance of integrity as a political virtue transforms the polity into 
a special kind of community, namely one which assumes that the monopoly of the use 
of force is based on its moral authority. Integrity not only protects society from 
official corruption and favouritism, but also makes the legal system more efficient. 
This is because, when adopting the principle of integrity, society accepts being 
governed not only by the rules flowing from past decisions, but also by any other 
standards flowing from the principles informing those decisions. As the set of 
recognised public standards increase and people become more aware about what the 
principles informing such standards demand in new circumstances, society will 
require less detailed legislation, with the consequent decrease in the need for 
adjudication of conflicting issues. Although the effectiveness of this process is 
proportional to the community’s level of agreement about which principles flow both 
from its past decisions and from its rules and standards, integrity provides the 
community with a tool for change, even if not always entirely effective in practice.^^^ 
Aside from these practical consequences, integrity also creates moral and expressive 
outcomes. As Dworkin contends, integrity promotes a special aspect of self- 
government; it requires that citizens play an active role in developing the community’s 
public standards by demanding that they apply these standards to their relations with 
others. Once a community accepts integrity as an ideal, citizens are allowed to make 
demands on others and, therefore, cannot forgo demands on them. This means that 
citizens will themselves share and expand the moral dimension of political decisions. 
In this way, integrity “fuses citizens’ moral and political lives”^^  ^ and “infuses 
political and private occasions”^^  ^ in a mutually beneficial way and in a manner that
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has not only a practical, but also an expressive, value. Aecordingly, integrity offers a 
practical opportunity for organic change, expressively encouraging people to relate to 
each other in accordance with the principles of the community, regardless of whether 
they agree on the specific demand of every principle in particular circumstances.^^"^
A community that endorses integrity as a political ideal is a community of principle, 
according to Dworkin. As such, its citizens will acknowledge that, as members of a 
genuine political community, they are governed as much by principles as by the rules 
enacted through political compromises. Accordingly, members of this community 
regard politics as an arena for debate, a platform through which they can reach 
agreements on the principles to be adopted by the community and on their 
understanding of justice, fairness and due process. Moreover, members of a 
community of principle agree that their political rights and duties derive not only from 
the rules flowing from the past decisions of their political institutions, but, above all, 
from the scheme of principles that substantiate those decisions and are endorsed by 
them. They accept that other members also have rights and duties flowing from the 
same scheme, and that these rights and duties exist independently of formal 
recognition or from citizens’ full approval of the scheme. This is because citizens of a 
society of principle recognise that the adoption by the community of legal rights and 
duties is a matter of historical fact.^^^
The community of principle provides, for Dworkin, the best defence of political 
legitimacy and, therefore, the best justification for the use of force by the state.^^^ This 
is a very important aspect of integrity in law, as it shows how integrity informs the 
moral authority of law. Dworkin believes that any conception of law must include a 
justification for the use of coercion by the state. As he posits, the law’s legitimation 
for the use of coercive power is intrinsically linked with the classical problem of 
political obligation. Ascertaining whether citizens have a moral obligation in virtue of 
law, that is, whether they have a real obligation to obey the rules enacted by the 
legislature despite disapproving of them or deeming them morally wrong in principle, 
is a question of great importance. This is because the lack of such moral obligation 
may offer a serious threat to the legitimacy of the state’s use of force, if not
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undermining it altogether?^^ A community of principle, which places integrity at the 
core of polities, incorporates and supports legal obligations within the general class of 
associative obligations it encompasses. Aecordingly, the legitimacy to impose legal 
obligations is founded on the communal obligations of members who share a concern 
for all based on a “sufficiently special, personal, pervasive, and egalitarian” 
relationship with their community and on widely accepted standards.”^^ ^
Central to the idea of a community of principle is the basic distinction that Dworkin 
makes between rules and principles. Although both legal sources regulate legal 
obligations, they operate differently. As Dworkin contends, “[rjules are applicable in 
an all-or-nothing fashion.”^^  ^This means that, once the facts established by a rule are 
met, either the rule is considered valid and applicable in deciding the case, or not valid 
and, therefore, irrelevant to the decision. Although there are exceptions to this, in 
general they will be specified, so the rule’s statement is as accurate and complete as 
possible.^^^ A principle operates differently as, even when its conditions are met, its 
inobservance does not necessarily, or automatically, generate legal obligations. As 
with the principle that no man shall profit from his own wrong, the law will not 
prohibit men from benefiting from all wrongs they have committed. In fact, the 
opposite is often true, adverse possession being an example.^^* In addition, principles 
are different from other standards, such as policies. For Dworkin, a policy is a 
standard setting a goal to be reached, generally promoting the improvement of an 
economic, social or political aspect of the community. A principle, on the other hand, 
is a standard that ought to be observed not because its observance advances a political, 
social or economic goal, but as a requirement of justice or fairness or a dimension of 
morality.^^^ Accordingly, arguments of principle support individual rights, whereas 
arguments of policy support collective goals.^^  ^ This distinction is essential to 
Dworkin’s theory, as he contends that judges should make decisions based on 
considerations of principle and not of policy; this means that his conception of 
individual rights derives from principles and not from the pursuit of common goals.^ "^^
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For Dworkin, the acceptance of principles as law and, therefore, as standards to be 
followed by judges when deciding cases, poses a serious challenge to positivism 
(especially as propounded by Hart)?^^ Similarly, Dworkin’s conception of the rule of 
law is a direct response to what he regards as an inadequate formulation of the ideal 
by positivism. According to him, there are two main and very distinct conceptions of 
the rule of law. The first is denominated the ‘rule-book conception,’ and is based on 
the assumption that state power should not be exercised against citizens unless 
authorised by the rules established in a clear rule book available to all in the 
community.^^^ Public rules contained in the rule book ought to be observed by 
ordinary citizens as well as by the government until they are changed. Amendments 
and abrogations have also to be prescribed in the rule book. This conception is not 
concerned with the rules’ contents, insisting only that the rules set out in the rule book 
should be followed until changed. Although those who defend the rule-book model 
care about the contents of the rules, they regard this to be a matter of substantive 
justice, an ideal which is independent and does not form a part of the ideal of the rule 
of law.^^^
The second version of the rule of law is what Dworkin denominates the ‘rights 
conception’, a  much more ambitious project than the rule-book model. According to 
the rights conception, citizens have political rights against the state as a whole, and 
moral rights and duties with respect to each other. Such moral rights are to be 
recognised in the positive law so as to guarantee, whenever possible, their 
enforcement through judicial or other non-judieial institutions, upon individual 
citizens’ claims.^^^ Unlike the rule-book conception, no distinction is made between 
the rule of law and substantive justice. This formulation demands, however, that the 
rules established in the rule book both prescribe and enforce moral rights. Such 
requirements make the rights ideal wider and more complex than the rule-book 
conception. As Dworkin contends, a community that implements the rule-book model 
can only fall short in one dimension, when police force is enforced against individual 
citizens in a manner not stipulated in the rule book. The rights conception has, on the
R Dworkin, 'Political Judges and the Rule o f Law' (Maccabaean Lecture in Jurisprudence, The 
British Academy, London, 13 December 1977), p.261 
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Other hand, at least three dimensions in which the political community may fall short. 
The first dimension is the scope of individual rights it seeks to enforce. Accordingly, 
the community may fail in the enforcement of the rights it recognises citizens to have. 
The second dimension is the accuracy of the rights it enacts, as the community may 
fail to provide for the protection of important rights, albeit prescribing some individual 
rights against the state. The third dimension is the fairness of the enforcement of the 
rights it prescribes. The community falls short in this dimension when it adopts rules 
that may disadvantage the poor or other minority groups in securing the rights the 
state has recognised.^^® According to Dworkin, “[t]he rule of law on this conception is 
the ideal of rule by an accurate public conception of individual rights.”^^ ^
One of the main objections to the rights conception of the rule of law is that it is 
undemocratic to allow judges who are unelected and, therefore, unaccountable to the 
community, to make political decisions.^^^ For Dworkin, the assertion that the rule- 
book model serves democracy better than the rights conception is the product of a 
misunderstanding both of how judges ought to decide hard cases in the rights model 
and of the political neutrality of the answers found by the judge when applying 
semantic, psychological and counterfactual questions to decide hard cases in the rule- 
book conception. As he contends, although the rights model recognises the rule book 
as a source of moral rights, it refutes the idea that it is the only source of rights in 
court. When faced with hard cases - that is, controversial cases in which no clear rule 
exists, the rule warrants more than one interpretation or more than one rule is 
applicable - judges should consider, firstly, whether the party has the moral right to 
receive in court what he or she is demanding, and, secondly, which interpretation best 
fits the parties’ moral rights.^^^ In seeking the principles which they believe capture 
such rights, judges not only conform with the rule book of the community, but uphold 
citizens’ democratic moral right to see the rights enacted by the representative 
legislature enforced by the courts.^ '^  ^ As the rights conception prevents judges from 
deciding cases by appealing to principles that are incompatible with the rule book of 
their jurisdiction, judges will make political decisions by applying principles that they
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p.269 
Ibid., p.268 
Ibid., pp.267-8
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believe best translate the moral rights enshrined in the community’s legal 
framework.^^^
In addition, Dworkin argues that, on close scrutiny, the application of semantic, 
psychological and counterfactual questions to decide hard cases in the rule-book 
model inevitably requires judges to make political decisions, despite the general 
assumption that, because they are aimed at finding the will of the law-maker, these 
questions are politically neu tra l .Semant ic  questions are the first to be asked by 
judges when faced with hard cases. Their objective is to uncover crucial words in the 
rule or statute that reveal the likely intention of the legislature. For Dworkin, the 
inferences obtained by their application are deceptive, as they inaccurately imply that 
the rule’s statement leads to a particular conclusion, when not only they could have 
led to another, but they may run counter to the real intention of the legislature, which 
was clearly expressed in the words of the rule.^^  ^ In this sense, semantic questions 
may solve an issue that the legisture has purposefully left unanswered.^^^ The group 
psychological questions, which seek to understand the decisions of the legislature 
rather than the words of the rule, also presuppose, rather than clearly demonstrate, that 
the selected legislative intention was pertinent to answering the case. Except in the 
rare cases when legislative hearings, debates on the floor of the legislature, other 
provisions of the statute in question, or provisions of statutes in related areas, reveal 
clear and conclusive legislative intentions, including the effects likely to ensue from 
the enactment of the rule or statute, Dworkin believes that no definite answers can be 
found by analysing legislative history.^^^ As he contends, even if one considers the 
intention of a particular legislator, it is illusory to believe that his or her words on a 
particular matter extend to different, but similar, issues. This is because the legislator 
may have failed to consider the aggregate issues with all their consequences. He or she 
may also have foreseen other consequences likely to follow from a statute with clearer 
wording and have intended it to remain obscure in some matters, for instance due to 
fears of alienating an important section of the electorate or creating untoward 
controversy.^^® Even when the interpretation is consistent with the legislator’s voting
Ibid., pp.268-9 
Ibid., p.267 
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history and the arguments he or she previously exposed in hearings or on the 
legislative floor, this interpretation would still be about what the legislator ‘should’ 
have intended rather than what he or she ‘did’ intend, as the legislator may have been 
ignorant or have had good reason to dismiss consistency/^^ Counterfactual questions, 
on the other hand, are designed to infer what legislators would have decided or 
intended had they been compelled to address the issue at stake. Although these 
questions do not attempt to reveal a particular decision or intention of the legislature, 
their answers are regarded to be within the spirit of the legislature’s will. Accordingly, 
the argument goes that finding this latent will is more desirable and in consonance 
with the democratic ideal than allowing unaccountable judges to make political 
decisions.^^^ Dworkin considers this argument unsound for a number of reasons. On a 
philosophical level, it is arguable whether, had the legislature been forced to make a 
decision on a specific issue, it would have voted one way or another. In addition, a 
variety of different counterfactual historical questions could be asked on any 
legislative decision, thus warranting different answers. Unless the counterfactual 
technique was regulated by a set of principles, its credibility would be questionable. 
Furthermore, even if following a canonical historical form, no lawyer or judge would 
accept answers that were genuinely and exclusively historical.^^^ A further argument 
in favour of the counterfactual questions contends that, in addition to enacting 
provisions for the statute book, the legislature also sets general policies to be pursued 
and principles to be respected. Hence, when faced with hard cases, judges should 
decide in a manner that complies or flows more naturally from the general legal 
framework of the community, including rules, policies and principles, a reasoning that 
could also be applied to the group psychological questions. Ultimately, this argument 
goes, observing the principles endorsed by the legislature through legislation advances 
the spirit of democracy.^^"  ^ However compelling, Dworkin argues that these 
justifications cannot hide the fact that judges will be making political decisions when 
applying semantic, psychological and counterfactual questions, for, like the 
interpretive exercise required by the rights model, their nature is evaluative, rather 
than purely descriptive.^^^
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For Dworkin, although presenting competing adjudicatory processes, both the rule- 
book and the rights conception of the rule of law are compatible with the general 
ideals of a just society. This is because, even if the courts enforce only the rules 
prescribed in advance by the legislature, a community that observes the rule of law is 
a better community.^^® Notwithstanding this, Dworkin emphasises a fundamental 
difference between both political ideals. In order to achieve a just society, the rule- 
book model requires a high degree of compliance. If government is seen to 
consistently act contrary to the rules in the rule book, in particular the rules of 
importance to its citizens, it cannot be considered a just government. Even if 
compliance is high, however, the ideal of justice will not be fulfilled if the rules are 
inherently unjust. Distinctively, compliance with the rights conception of the rule of 
law has the opposite effect. When a high rate of compliance is achieved on each of its 
dimensions, society can almost certainly be considered just.^^^ The two conceptions of 
the rule of law also differ in their philosophical neutrality. As mentioned, the rights 
conception is more vulnerable to philosophical objections, as some commentators 
question the existence of controversial moral rights which do not enjoy overall support 
from the community or disagree that individuals have rights that have not been 
bestowed on them by enactments of the legislature or other official decisions, or 
question the purpose and efficacy of conceptions of rights.^^^
Dworkin believes that the controversy on the debate on the politicisation of the 
judiciary is, in general, based on a crude vocabulary, as its arguments generally fail to 
make a crucial distinction between arguments of political principle and arguments of 
political policy. As he posits, whereas the former are related to the political rights of 
individual citizens, the latter demand judges to promote a conception of the public 
welfare or public interest. For Dworkin, this distinction is paramount, as he considers 
that judicial decisions should not be founded on arguments of political policy, but 
should instead be grounded on arguments of politieal principle and, therefore, on the 
individual rights flowing from the community’s principles.^^®
Hayek’s, Rawls’s and Dworkin’s formulations of the rule of law are founded on sound 
philosophical and political theoretical postulates and, in consequenee, offer persuasive
Ibid., pp.262-3 
Ibid., p.263 
Ibid., pp.263-4 
Ibid., p.261
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versions of the ideal. Their suitability to this thesis depends, however, on their ability 
to provide, firstly, an account of the Brazilian legal system as a whole, including the 
correlation between positive law and the legal system’s fundamental principles and 
their application in practice and, secondly, a theoretical framework that is both fitting 
for Brazil and worth pursuing. In Chapter 3, some important criticisms of the three 
theories will be investigated, so as to offer an understanding of some of their 
deficiencies and weaknesses in providing Brazil with a conception on the rule of law. 
Provided one of the three theories fulfils both tests, a theory on the rule of law will be 
subsequently adopted.
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CHAPTERS
CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RULE OF LAW IN BRAZIL 
Law as a Tool for Social Change
As seen in Chapter 2, a conception of the rule of law eannot incorporate only formal 
requirements, as it would be compatible with authoritarianism, gross violations of 
human rights or legal systems with inequitable or evil content. Very importantly, the 
prescription of formal conditions of rule validity does not demand substantial limits on 
the exercise of power and, for this reason, does not offer a benehmark of analysis and 
comparison of jursidictions, since not distinguishing legal systems on the basis of 
law’s application in practice. Given law’s deeply contextual and political character, 
the formulation on the rule of law has also to be compatible with the context into 
which it is inserted. In the case of Brazil, this means that the rule of law ought to 
uphold, support and advance the fundamental principles of the Brazilian society. 
Among others, important rights and principles upheld by the 1988 Constitution are 
democraey (Art. 1), dignity of the human person (Art. 1), primaey of human rights 
(Art. 4, II), equality (Preamble and Art 5, I), the exercise of individual and social 
rights (Preamble), freedom (Preamble and Art. 5, II), well-being, security and justice 
(Preamble and Art. 5). Finally, a conception of the rule of law that is suitable for 
Brazil, and for meaningful legal change, must not only offer legal systems an ideal 
worth pursuing but also a theory capable of being implemented in practice. As 
Tushnet argues, “[sjpecifying a particular right is [...] either an act of political rhetoric 
or a commitment to social transformation.”  ^ As the rights, principles and ideals of a 
community, are deeply socio-political in nature, they ought to be part of a general 
strategy and counsciousness that entails their realisation as a fact of social life.^ These 
demands ensure that the rule of law will both provide the community with a 
theoretical foundation that translates its deeply held principles and ideals and, as such.
‘ M Tushnet, 'An Essay on Rights' (1984) 62 Texas Law Review 1363, p.l380  
 ^Ibid., pp.1379-80
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will infiltrate its political and legal culture, whilst also offering a practical and 
achievable set of principles to be advanced by the legal system and upheld in general 
by society as a whole. In view of finding a theory that can fulfil these aims, in this 
Chapter the substantive theories on the rule of law presented in Chapter 2 will be 
scrutinised and their suitability to Brazil will be assessed.
3.1 Important Criticisms of Hayek’s, Rawls’s and Dworkin’s Formulations of the 
Rule of Law and their Suitability to Brazil
Considering the arguments above, although Hayek’s aecount of the praetical short­
comings of majoritarian democratic systems aptly describes the current cireumstanees 
of Brazil’s democracy, where successive democratic governments have abused power 
and privileged some groups to the detriment of others, his coneeption of the rule of 
law is empty of moral meaning and, therefore, does not refleet society’s principles and 
ideals. His view of social order only simplistically represents modem society, namely 
one in which minimal regulation and maximal individual freedom do not lead to 
confiision or eonstant aecusations of encroachment upon individual liberty. His silence 
on aspects of the law that regulate disputes and legal argumentation contradicts his 
own depiction of the individual as an intelligent being whose ageney is likely to foster 
accusations of violations and whose interpretation of the negative duty of the 
government is likely to find mles, albeit general and clear, to be detrimental to his 
freedom.^ Aceordingly, his conception of the mle of law, centred on the idea that the 
legal framework of a complex and pluralist society should be neutral, or based only on 
abstraet and general principles of just conduct,"  ^ creates normative and practical 
problems, the main one being how society would solve eonflicts between different 
liberties. As Bellamy argues, Hayek attempts to answer this question in two ways. His 
social solution determines that mles of just conduct emerge through a process of 
natural social selection by which mles granting individuals and organisations the best 
ehances of success in achieving their needs and goals will survive, whilst mles that 
work to the detriment of soeiety as whole will disappear.^ Rules do not emerge 
spontaneously, however, and it is the responsibility of citizens to reach an agreement
 ^Waldron, 'The Concept and the Rule of Law', pp.59-60 
Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order, pp. 17-9
Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism: Towards a Politics o f  Compromise, pp.29-30
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on the rules of just conduct that will govern their soeial order, a situation which may 
result in the collapse of the coordination of the spontaneous order/ In this vein, the 
lack of regulation, and of a definition of what the publie good entails, may lead society 
to fail to achieve this coordination or may lead to a coordination that is stable, but 
inefficient and detrimental to its market system. As Bellamy asserts, unless some 
interference in the markets is allowed in these cireumstanees, “the spontaneous order 
gives way to disorder.”  ^ Aware of this possibility, Hayek founded his theory on a 
philosophical premise perceived by Kant, which allows for the proteetion of the rights 
essential to the freedom of the individual whilst coneomitantly foreseeing the 
possibility of interference in the order by a legitimate government when necessary to 
protect the individual’s liberty. Sueh a philosophical thesis elaims that the maximum 
degree of individual freedom consistent with an equal degree of liberty to all should 
be guaranteed. In order to achieve this, Hayek believes that society’s legal framework 
should be composed of universal rules of just conduct designed to protect the private 
sphere of the individual from undue governmental interferenee.^ Although both social 
and philosophical answers were envisaged by Hayek to be applied eoncomitantly, 
Bellamy contends that they are not necessarily mutually supporting and might, at 
times, be contradietory.® As he points out, the social explanation of the question is the 
antithesis of rational constructivism, as it conceives that rules of just conduct emerge 
independently from reason. The philosophical account, on the other hand, “offers a 
defence of the liberal order on rational grounds. Thus the second thesis eontradiets the 
anti-constructivism of the first.”
In addition, Bellamy argues that Hayek’s theory presents other practieal difficulties in 
a pluralist society. Complex societies require government provision of services and 
macro-policies ranging from welfare to environmental protection and energy needs. It 
is difficult to conceive of a social order without public regulation on such matters and, 
consequently, it is hard, if not impossible, to imagine an order where the state plays an 
increasingly expanded role, but where general norms can be neatly distinguished from 
the pursuit of particular interests. As Bellamy posits, the fact that governments are 
compelled to design and implement a high amount of distinct and complex policies,
" Ibid., p.30 
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inevitably involving a number of eonflieting demands, means that their legislative 
powers inescapably grow. This, in turn, leads to the amalgamation of law and 
legislation, which cannot happen without “the first being simply absorbed by the 
second and the state swelling into a bureaucratic monolith controlled by a self-serving 
clique, as Hayek claims it will.”^^ Furthermore, as Tamanaha contends, theories whieh 
over-rely on the principles of formal legality as a proteetion for the security and 
predictability of transactions ignore scores of situations in which discretion, judgment 
and context-speeific adjustments are desirable, or indeed, necessary. The precepts of 
formal legality can therefore be detrimental when applied to complex problems 
requiring negotiations of eonflieting interests or in places where social understandings 
incorporate strongly shared communitarian v a lues.M ore  importantly, not only have 
Western welfare systems been a testament that administrative diseretion can be kept 
within legal restraints, contrary to Hayek’s most pessimistic warnings, but the 
observance of legal formality ean inhibit, rather than foster, individual freedom, by 
giving an excessive advantage to property owners and those with the means to protect 
their interests.
As has been demonstrated in Chapter 2, law can be manipulated and employed to 
advanee the interests of those in power and of societal groups with greater bargaining 
leverage in the political and social arenas. Although law in itself cannot change 
societal structure and interplay, it can provide an ideal for society to follow. A system 
based on a conception of the rule of law that gives primacy to individual freedom and 
the protection of both private property and a market economy not only protects the 
liberty of the individual to the detriment of the principles and values of the 
community, but also fosters inequality and conflict in society. The adoption of a 
formulation of the rule of law by this thesis signifies more than providing the 
Brazilian legal system with a framework for the theoretical enactment of seemingly 
efficient and procedurally adequate rules, containing the minimum guarantees of the 
rights of the individual. The rule of law is also seen as an ideal, a goal worth pursuing, 
capable of providing legal systems with a theoretical framework that goes beyond the 
embodiment of formal rules, sinee also encompassing the respect for substantive 
individual rights and liberties and democratic ideals aimed at aeeording equal concern
"lbid.,p .37  
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and respect for ail. Hayek’s defenee of individual freedom at the expense of other 
equally important rights such as equality, and his excessive reliance on the market 
forees, leaves society vulnerable to the influence and exploitation of powerful 
economic groups and institutions, thus allowing the subjection of those with the least 
economic and political bargaining power to the whim of influential stakeholders 
capable of manipulating the markets and directly affecting political outcomes. In 
addition, a combination of unchecked liberalism and the rule of law can be detrimental 
to demoeracy itself. As seen with the neoliberal reforms promoted worldwide for 
over two decades by international financial institutions, particularly the World Bank 
and the IMF, the countries that ‘voluntarily’ aceepted the pre-conditions to aid did so 
at the expense of demoeratic processes. Economic and political reforms labelled 
‘structural adjustment’ and ‘good governance’ programmes, translating a version of 
the rule of law advaneing liberal values ultimately designed to disseminate 
institutional arrangements prevalent in industrialised Western nations, were pursued 
through agreements forged behind closed doors between international lending 
agencies and government technocrats, thus bypassing or ignoring the need for broad 
domestic consent.D espite being packaged as universally benefieial, these imposed 
solutions bind domestie legislatures in a substantial way, amounting to what 
Tamanaha regards as “a form of ‘economic constitutionalism’ that precludes policy 
choices and polities in conneetion with a large range of internal matters.” For 
Tamanaha, this undemoeratic drive to implement a liberal version of the rule of law 
across the world is a product of Hayek’s teachings. Accordingly, although classic 
liberalism’s prohibition on substantive equality and distributive justice, was justified 
on the need to proteet private property and free markets, Hayek aseribed it directly to 
the survival and integrity of the rule of law. By linking the rule of law with elassic 
liberal values, Hayek’s formulation of the ideal, based on minimal government 
interference and a set of formal requirements, was hailed as the version best apt to 
advancing development and increasing overall wealth.^® Attempts to realise it in 
practiee have shown, however, that equating the rule of law with the claims of 
economic elites, particularly the satisfaction of property rights, tramples on the needs
Ibid. ; Tamanaha, 'The Dark Side o f the Relationship Between the Rule o f Law and Liberalism' 
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of the majority, whose rights and welfare are sacrifieed for the purported benefit of 
society as a whole/®
Furthermore, this thesis also subscribes to Bellamy’s scepticism of Hayek’s minimal 
state project in a contemporary pluralistie society. The modem state is expected to 
regulate soeiety in a range of ways, from micro to macro economic, social, political 
and environmental policies. Although it is debatable whether it would be possible for 
the state to exercise the minimal role envisaged by Hayek on a national level, it is 
unthinkable that this can be implemented in a globalised world facing diverse 
economic, environmental, politieal and international institutional challenges as well as 
the constant threat of terrorism. The world economic crisis of 2008 has shed 
invaluable light onto the consequences of lax regulation and market freedom, 
highlighting lessons that contradict the core liberal assumptions made by Hayek. 
Rather than less, calls are for more regulation and state interference in markets and for 
greater institutionalisation of international financial organisations.^^ In addition, even 
if the constitutionalisation of rights is seen as a strategy by power holders to neutralise 
the power of social movements and the demands of minority groups and, thus, 
maintain the existing balance of power in society, the rights diseourse can be 
eventually appropriated by the masses and employed as an ineentive for the 
hegemonic but threatened elites to act in imposing limits on the state’s abuse of 
power.
Finally, Hayek’s conception of the rule of law is morally empty and thus cannot be 
considered an ideal in itself. Its preoccupation with the form of legal rules ignores the 
principles and values whieh society ought, ideally, to refleet. His minimal state and 
individualistic system would create, it is argued, more, and not less, inequality and 
protection of elitist interests in the Brazilian society. Consequently, Hayek does not 
offer Brazil a framework for a more equitable and law abiding legal system suitable to 
guiding it through the consolidation of its democracy.
The most serious short-coming of Rawls’s theory lies, on the other hand, in the 
vagueness of its main elements and eonsequent lack of concrete applicability, 
particularly as a tool for social and political change. The ideas of the original position.
Ibid., pp.23-9
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the basie stmcture and of overlapping consensus offer a range of uncertainties and 
obseurities, and their application to fundamental law ehange in a particular case seems 
fraught with difficulties. Wolff, for instance, disputes that the original position offers a 
viable cognitive standpoint from which citizens can reasonably choose a coneeption of 
justiee. As he contends, if the parties are behind a veil of ignorance and their 
knowledge goes only as far as understanding their role in the original position, all the 
knowledge necessary for the adoption of a conception of justice, for instanee of 
political affairs, economic theory and the bases of social organisation, would have to 
be timeless and, therefore, possessed by all independently from the time and space 
they have existed. This assumption makes it impossible for the parties to gauge 
whether their knowledge is part of the belief system of a eivilisation that no longer 
exists, for they will be oblivious to whether they are the first generation of their 
society or the first person in the history of the universe.^^ In addition, Wolff refutes 
Rawls’ conception of social reality as a natural conception. As he argues, “[o]ur 
knowledge of society is a collective human project, a project of self-understanding 
and also o f  self-alteration Society cannot, therefore, be understood independently 
from human interaetion and from the personal pereeptions and feelings of those who 
are part of it. Hence, the resulting patterns of interactions between soeiety’s members 
will influence the development of its economic, cultural, political and religious 
practices. Accordingly, Wolff considers society or social reality to be “a collective 
human product”^^  and, as such, the nature of its knowledge is fundamentally distinct 
from the nature of the knowledge of natural reality. As he posits, whilst the knowledge 
of nature is objective and can be independently conceived, the knowledge of society is 
inherently subjective, once social reality relies on the systematie personification of 
objective praetices, giving rise to a false consciousness. This systematic misperception 
is expressed by the degree of understanding or misunderstanding members of society 
will have at a given point in time and this, in turn, will influenee their behaviour and 
expectations about changing or sustaining the status quo. The knowledge of social, 
political, cultural and religious practiees can thus be developed into theories only 
when fundamental ehanges in patterns of behaviour are understood and analysed not 
only by theorists, but also by the partieipants in those interactions: “whereas natural
RP Wolff, Understanding Rawls: A Reconstruction and Critique o f  a Theory o f  Justice (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton 1977), pp. 119-23
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knowledge is atemporal, soeial knowledge is historical, self-reflective, and 
constitutive as well as descriptive.” ®^ In this vein, Wolff argues that persons in the 
original position would only be able to understand the theories necessary for them to 
choose a conception of justice if they possessed a deep understanding of the society 
for which that theory was developed.^^
In addition, Cohen disputes, on an elementary basis, Rawls’s notion of distributive 
justiee and, on a more fundamental basis, the very notion of the basic structure. 
Accordingly, on the former, Cohen questions Rawls’s views on the application of the 
principle of equality as a matter to be established by democratic politics, since 
deriving from the constitution-making process rather than from class struggle.^^ For 
Cohen, Rawls’s conception not only justifies inequality when it benefits the worst off, 
but also recognises inequality as just when and since inequality is required to improve 
the position of the least advantaged members of society, since the production of 
material rewards ean only be derived from the motivation based on économie 
inequality.^® In warranting inequality in situations where it benefits the worst off, 
Cohen asserts that Rawls is, in fact, offering a mere factual defence of it and is unable 
to aseertain effectively that “ineentive-based inequality is just, on his own conception 
of justice, but, at most, that it is regrettably unavoidable.” ®^ Although Cohen does not 
fundamentally oppose Rawls’s difference principle, he disputes its application, for he 
cannot envisage which inequalities would satisfy the test which establishes that 
inequalities are only acceptable if and when they are to the benefit of the least 
advantaged. As he posits,
“affirmation of the difference principle implies that justice requires 
(virtually) unqualified equality itself, as opposed to the ‘deep 
inequalities’ in initial life chances with which Rawls thinks justice to 
be consistent.”^^
Cohen argues that the ineentives argument expresses a misconstrued application of the 
differenee principle. Those with special talents or endowments either support the
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difference principle, that is, consider that inequalities are unjust save when they are 
necessary to improve the situation of the worst off, or do not support it, in whieh case 
they will disagree that the difference principle is a rule of justiee. If the latter is the 
case, society would not be just in accordance with Rawl’s eonception of justiee, for 
his conception requires that members of society affirm and uphold the principles of 
justice.^^ If the former is true, however, and talented people^"  ^ advance the difference 
principle by applying it in their daily lives, it would be questionable why their work 
should be eompensated more handsomely than that performed by the untalented. 
Aceordingly, the question would be whether their extra pay would indeed be 
necessary to better the position of the least advantaged members of society. If, in 
response, talented people conceded that higher rewards are necessary due to their own 
unwillingness to work as productively for ordinary rewards as they would for higher 
compensation, this would be tantamount to condoning and reinforcing inequality, as 
their better remuneration would consequently ensure a lower compensation to the 
untalented. For Cohen, it follows that high rewards can only be regarded as necessary 
if one concedes that talented people are not informed by the difference principle, as 
rare are the cases when those with talent are unable to perform at the same rate and 
quality without a more generous remuneration. It follows that the inequality justified 
by the difference principle can only happen in a society where this principle is not 
accepted by all.^ ® According to Cohen, this means that
“the justice of a society is not exclusively a function of its legislative 
structure, of its legally imperative rules, but is also a function of the 
choices people make within those rules.” ®^
Unlike Rawls, Cohen believes that it is possible for personal justices and injustices to 
occur within a just structure. Similarly, he argues that it is impossible for distributive 
justice to be achieved merely by structural means, contrary to what justice as fairness 
prescribes.^^ As he contends, injustices in the distribution of equality exist not when 
inequalities of goods reflect differences in the efforts of people’s labour or the
33 Ibid., p. 127
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preferences and choices people make concerning their income and leisure, but when 
they reflect the variety of lucky or unlucky circumstances affecting it. These 
differences, which Cohen calls “differences of advantage,”^^  are a function of both the 
structure and of people’s choices within it.^ ® Accordingly, if justice is applied to the 
basic structure, the worst off occupy a low position in society only in as much as the 
best off favour inequality. This dispels Rawls’s assertion that the least advantaged 
members of society can accept their inferior position with dignity, once they are aware 
they would be worse off in a less equal system."^ ® Furthermore, Cohen believes that, if 
the basic structure itself is designed to guarantee the implementation of the principles 
of justice, this would, per se, ensure their observance in all situations, without the 
requirement that free and equal moral persons act from them and apply them in the 
circumstances required."^^
On a more fundamental basis, Cohen opposes the very idea of the basic structure, as 
justice “requires an ethos governing daily choice which goes beyond one of obedience 
to just rules.”"^  ^As he contends, Rawls conceives the basic structure as a framework 
comprising a set of institutions stipulating the rules members of society should 
observe and to which the principles of justice apply. It follows that the principles of 
justice neither condemn nor approve people’s actions within this structure. For Cohen, 
this model is not only vague, as it is unclear which institutions belong to the basic 
structure and whether they should be necessarily coercive in nature, but also flawed."^  ^
Accordingly, only in a coercive structure could people’s personal choices not inform 
the structure, for the structure would arise from more specialised choices pertaining to 
the law. A less formal and non-coercive structure, like the family, can only maintain 
its character when the choices of its members are considered part of it. As he 
contends, non-coercive structures can only be sustained when its agents choose to act 
within its constraints and pressures. Hence, conventions within an informal structure 
can only exist if there is conformity validating it in a self-enforcing manner, thus 
increasing the pressure on others to confbrm.^"  ^ For this reason, only in a coercive
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structure is it feasible to distinguish between the “choices which institute and sustain a 
structure and the choices that occur within it.”"^  ^ By establishing that a non-coercive 
structure is, at least partly, constituted by conforming behaviour, Cohen argues that 
objections against his claim that the maximisation of economic reward is against the 
difference principle are only acceptable if coerciveness is attributed to the basic 
structure, a point about which Rawls’s theory is ambiguous. At times, Rawls includes 
in the basic structure institutions, such as the family, which depend less on law than on 
usage and convention. In addition, Rawls conceives the basic structure as the primary 
subject of justice because its effects are profound and felt from the outset. This entails 
that the effects of the basic structure are not applicable only to coercive institutions, 
but extend to important informal institutions in society.^^ Furthermore, Cohen regards 
Rawls’s conception of the basic structure as deeply ambiguous. It either applies to 
social practices and patterns of personal choice and, in this case, the restriction of its 
application to the basic structure would collapse, or, by regulating only the basic 
structure, it would allow injustices to take place."^^
These criticisms provide an insight into the intricacies and indeterminacy of some of 
the basic elements of justice as fairness. Despite hailing his own theory as practical, 
and not metaphysical, the complexity of some of the most important ideas permeating 
Rawls’s theory makes his conception of the rule of law notably difficult to apply in 
practice. As such, justice as fairness is unable to provide Brazil with a clear 
framework or set of principles that can be observed by the country’s legal system as 
well as by government officials and Brazilian citizens. As Pogge posits,
“[i]f this theory can make no contribution to the practical tasks of 
facilitating agreement and alleviating injustice, then it ends up self- 
condenmed.”'^ ^
In fact, Pogge goes further by stating that political philosophy itself should not be 
solely concerned with the affirmation of principles, but should instead aim at 
conceiving them in an appealing manner, so as to motivate the pursuit for their gradual 
implementation."^^ In constructively criticising Rawls’s theory, Pogge attempts to
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develop a more concrete and progressive view of justice as fairness, an approach that 
goes against the direction of Rawls’s own later works, which tended towards 
“abstraction, vagueness, and conservatism.” ®^ His endeavour is undertaken as a 
recognition that Rawls’s theory is in danger of losing its relevance and meaning if 
conceived purely as a compendium of well organised ideas and conceptions. Without 
meaningful implications beyond its language, such an arrangement of ideas cannot be 
characterised as a theory, as dissociate from its subject matter. Although Rawls could 
have argued that the role of the philosopher does not involve, for instance, the 
assessment of whether the difference principle is satisfied when applied in practice to 
a particular setting, Pogge contends that the philosopher still ought to provide experts 
in other fields with enough tools and information to evaluate empirical data on the 
implementation of his theory in practice.^ ^
Significant adjustments undergone by Brazilian society signal an opportune moment 
for the consolidation of the country’s democracy and the implementation of the rule of 
law. By harnessing the power of positive and negative consequences emanating from 
the accommodation of the processes of transition to democracy, constitutionalisation 
of rights and widening of the concept of citizenship, Brazilian citizens are able to 
press for social and political reforms founded on a theory of the rule of law that can 
best promote the achievement of their common goals. The vagueness and obscurities 
of important elements of Rawls’ conception of justice does not offer Brazilians with a 
theory that can progressively guide the country into the right direction, thus making 
the implementation of the rule of law hard to achieve in practice. Examples of the 
uncertainties left unanswered by Rawls’ theory are the lack of specification of the 
economic, political and social institutions that are required in a well-ordered society 
and the indeterminacy of the framework, goals and structure that such institutions are 
supposed to have. Furthermore, the difficulty of Rawls’ theory in practice is 
compounded by the vagueness of the parameters for judging what empirical data is 
relevant and what is required of such data when analysing the effectiveness of 
attempts to implement justice as fairness in p rac tice .A s Pogge remarks
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“[t]he beauty and power of Rawls’ conceptions are wasted insofar as
they cannot be imported into the political arena.
Dworkin’s conception of the rule of law has also faced criticisms and challenges. For 
instance, the applicability of his theory beyond the American legal culture is not 
unequivocally accepted. Gavison alleges that Dworkin’s concept of law as necessarily 
local challenges general jurisprudence, which aims at analysing the most general 
aspects of society in order to identify institutions and practices that could be similarly 
implemented in different cultures.^"  ^As Gavison contends, since law is embedded in 
all societies and reveals similar core features across different legal cultures, it is not 
only possible, but indeed desirable, for universal legal theories to attempt to formulate 
general conceptions of law as a social phenomenon, as this provides invaluable 
insights into law in general. As she posits, universal concepts of law are general and 
abstract and, for this reason, do not always appropriately answer practical questions of 
law in a particular community; nonetheless, their conceptualisation as an ideal can 
undoubtedly benefit the understanding of law as a w h o le .T h e  locality of Dworkin’s 
conception of law thus diminishes, for Gavison, the value of general jurisprudence. 
Similarly, Atiyah and Summers contend that Dworkin’s substantial view of the role of 
the judges, according to which judges should seek to improve and develop the law 
when faced with hard cases, is incompatible with the high degree of formality 
accorded to legal rules in many legal systems. Also incompatible with that formality is 
Dworkin’s theory of law as interpretation, which reduces the formal attributes of legal 
rules by advocating that they be interpreted constructively in light of the community’s 
legal practice and in accordance with the principles of integrity, justice, fairness and 
procedural due process.^^ Contrary to Gavison, however, Atiyah and Summers 
advocate jurisprudential relativism,^^ as they argue that jurisprudence’s primary 
subject matter should not be a universal analysis of the law in all societies, but the 
study of its core features in particular societies. As such, not only Dworkin’s concept 
of law, but other general theories, can best serve a particular jurisprudence when
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inserted in the legal culture into which they were developed.^^ The significance of this 
thesis’s adoption of a theory on the implementation of the rule of law further in this 
Chapter lies precisely in bridging this theoretical-practical divide, thus allowing 
theoretical formulations of the ideal to have practical employment and be suitable to 
different jurisdictions.
Dworkin himself concedes that interpretive theories are, by nature, best suited to a 
particular legal culture, usually that to which its author belongs.^® For Twining, 
Dworkin’s view is over-cautious and discredits the significance and value of his own 
theory. As he contends, although Dwokin’s concept of law is overwhelmingly based 
on Anglo-American legal materials and is open in the scope of its applicability to civil 
law and other jurisdictions, this is also true of other theories, such as that of Austin,®® 
Maine®  ^ and Holland,®  ^a fact which has not compromised their contribution to general 
jurisprudence. According to Twining, despite the fact that jurisprudence ought to be 
necessarily local and particular to be practical, this does not mean that the core 
elements of jurisprudential theories, such as Dworkin’s, only apply to a specific legal 
system.®  ^Twining argues that Dworkin’s Law’s Empire is, at the very least, a general 
theory of adjudication, and at best a theory of law. As he argues, although Law’s 
Empire includes concrete examples of interpretation, these are few and of illustrative 
character. Moreover, although some of Dworkin’s writings are local in nature, they 
can be regarded as the application of his general theory in practice.®"  ^In fact. Twining 
believes that Dworkin has paid his own theory a disservice by claiming to advance a 
theory of adjudication. For him, this has left it open to objections that judges from 
different society are institutionalised in distinct ways and, therefore, would not 
necessarily apply the same methods and perform the same role as Dworkin’s 
Hercules.®  ^For Twining, rather than advancing a theory of adjudication, Dworkin has 
formulated a theory of interpretation of legal norms and, for this reason, Hercules is 
not a role model for actual judges, but is, rather.
Ibid., pp.264-6
Dworkin, Law's Empire, p. 102 
^  J Austin, The Province o f  Jurisprudence Determined (John Murray, London 1832)
HS Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History o f  Society, and Its Relation to Modern 
Ideas (John Murray, London 1861)
63
TE Holland, The Elements o f  Jurisprudence (Claredon Press, Oxford 1916)
W Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (Butterworths, London 2000), pp.40-I
Ibid., p.41
Ibid., pp.44-5
120
“a symbol for the Upright Interpreter, who is loyal to the system -  that 
is for anyone who is concerned to reach the correct or ‘best’ or ‘right’ 
interpretation of the law. This includes upright officials, good citizens, 
and other participants who wish to make decisions based at least in part 
on clear understandings of what the law prescribes. One doubts 
whether labelling Dworkin’s theory as a ‘theory of adjudication’ is 
making it the best it can be. It has much wider reach than that.”®®
In this vein. Twining considers Dworkin’s concept of the law to be a theory of 
interpretation and argumentation. Accordingly, Dworkin’s answer to the central 
question his theory poses, namely what is the right interpretation of a proposition of 
law in hard cases, can be applied widely to others jurisdictions. In addition, law also 
exercises a social function and, therefore, the constructive interpretation propounded 
by Dworkin is required not only of judges, but also of officials and citizens alike.®  ^
This function of law and other general ideas of Dworkin’s constructive interpretivism 
are applicable, according to Twining, to other Western and even non-Westem cultures 
and discourses.®^
This is also the view adopted by this thesis. Although it is patent that it is not be 
possible to implement some of the more specific elements of Dworkin’s theory to civil 
law jurisdictions, this thesis argues that the general concepts elaborated by Dworkin 
can and should be applied to Brazil. Accordingly, this thesis contends that Dworkin’s 
theory of law is general, if not universal,®® and that his ideas on the primacy of 
individual rights, the application of principles as law, of law as constructive 
interpretation, of the interpretation of law as a moral and argumentative exercise and 
of integrity as a political ideal, offer all law jurisdictions abstract ideas and values 
worth pursuing and a general theory that enhances not only law in theory, but also in 
practice, allowing the community to take a more active role in shaping the contents 
and applicability of their rules and principles. Hence, although Dworkin’s Law as 
Integrity will arguably never be achieved by any society, it remains an ideal worth 
pursuing.
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According to Vieira, conceptions of the rule of law are problematic in the sense that 
they are not helpful in understanding the social, economic and political conditions that 
offer the most favourable environment, and thus that command the highest degree of 
compliance by state officials and individuals, for the ideal of the rule of law to thrive 
in practice/® Although this thesis acknowledges that the abstract ideals formulated 
through conceptualisations of the rule of law are limited in terms of offering palpable 
elements aiding jurisdictions to consolidate the rule of law, it argues that legal theories 
are not designed to have an immediate practical application to specific cases. As 
Dworkin points out, a convincing theory of law should be able to pass two tests. First, 
the theory must prove itself persuasive as a matter of political morality and second, it 
must produce a convincing explanation of legal practice.^^ These two elements offer 
the theoretical framework for their application in practice. It is the role of political and 
social scientists and other professionals to understand the environment in which the 
conception will be applied and, through a deep understanding of the theory and a 
comparative exercise, define what institutional and normative changes are required in 
each specific case.^^ As Dworkin contends, governments are motivated by political 
goals, for instance making their nations more prosperous, religious or powerful, but 
their ultimate intention is to remain in power. Although the abstract ideals of law he 
formulates may not have an immediate practical application, they guide and constrain 
the exercise of power by governments. Accordingly, Dworkin’s theory prescribes that 
law, informed by the community’s principles, will not licence the use of force by the 
state, regardless of how useful, noble or beneficial the ends in view are, unless 
coercion is either condoned or required by the individual rights and responsibilities 
flowing from the community’s system of principles. In order to determine which rules 
and responsibilities allow or demand the use of coercion it is necessary to look at past 
political decisions regulating the use of force, according to the best interpretation 
possible and in consonance with the system of principles embedded in the 
community.^^ This is, for Dworkin, essential to understanding his theory, as the 
acceptance of this abstract conceptual idea
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“[hjelps to explain the complex relation between law and the other 
social phenomena. How is a community’s law different from its 
popular morality or traditional values? How is it different from what 
true justice requires of any state, no matter what its popular convictions 
or traditions? Our conceptual account provides this short answer to 
both these questions: it is different from each because its content may 
depend on the other.
For Brown, the concept of law formulated by Dworkin offered a breakthrough in 
Legal Theory as it critically scrutinised, for the first time, the balance between 
individual rights and the community’s needs. Its most invaluable contribution has 
been the recognition of moral rights against the government, thus declaring that 
governments cannot infringe certain rights even if their reasons for doing so are based 
on the common good.^® As she contends, “Dworkin’s method does not abandon law; 
but rather redefines what counts as law.” ®^ By declaring that principles are as much 
part of the law as rules, Dworkin has endowed legal systems with an endless source of 
interpretation and adjudication, thus allowing judges to solve hard cases without 
having to step outside the law.^^ Dworkin’s interpretation of the established law 
begins with the historical intent and the meaning of the text itself, a process which is 
important in unveiling the principles intended to “guide society through time.”^^  The 
next interpretive step, however, sets his theory apart from Originalism by expanding 
the interpretation of the legal rule and demanding that the principles applicable be 
governed not by the original understanding, but by the moral judgment of the present- 
day judge/® As Brown contends,
“[tjhat approach facilitates consistency and fidelity to constitutional 
ideals such as liberty and equality, without straitjacketing society with 
outgrown conceptions of what those concepts actually require in 
specific cases.” ®^
Ibid., p.96
Brown, 'How Constitutional Theory Found its Soul: The Contributions o f Ronald Dworkin', p.49
Ibid., p.5I
Ibid.
Ibid., p.50 
Ibid.
Ibid.
123
According to Brown, this search for principles in society’s collective past provides a 
defence for Dworkin’s theory against criticisms that it bestows judges with excessive 
powers. Although Dworkin himself concedes that judgments will never be completely 
free from judges’ personal influence, his theory prescribes that judges’ interpretation 
of legal rules are to be informed by an inquiry into law designed to reveal the 
community’s, rather than their personal, shared experiences and values.^^
The agency aspect of Dworkin’s theory is, for this thesis, an essential component of 
law building. Political integrity “personifies the community”^^  by accommodating the 
idea that the community may be faithful or unfaithful to its own principles, which are 
distinct from the principles held by society’s members or groups separate ly .A s 
Allan contends, “Law as Integrity demands consistency of principle, not of policy: it 
does not require that we should all be governed by the same goals and strategies of 
policy on every occasion.” "^^ This is paramount if a community is to be guided by its 
long-term values and principles, rather than its short-term policies and goals, which 
can be, and generally are, construed to serve disproportionately the interests of those 
with higher bargaining power. The case of Brazil is instructive as, throughout its 
history, its legal system has favoured political and social elites to the detriment of the 
great majority of the population.^® Hence, the adoption of Dworkin’s concept of law 
offers Brazil invaluable general theoretical underpinnings to guide the country through 
the significant social, political and economic changes that it is currently undergoing. 
In addition, it provides Brazilians with a concept of the rule of law which accords 
them primacy in determining the principles that are to inform their community and 
legal system.
Very importantly, Dworkin conciliates the ideals of democracy and justice by 
propounding that an equal status for all citizens can only be achieved in a democratic 
system, therefore stating that democracy is a means to achieving justice.^® In this vein, 
the generally accepted idea that rights may compromise democracy - founded on the 
belief that the ideals of justice and democracy are positioned in the opposite ends of a
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spectrum, with rights working as trade-offs in between - is rejected by his theory. 
Central to his arguments is the repudiation of the majoritarian premise, which insists 
that the defining goal of democracy is to allow the majority to inform the collective 
decisions of political institutions. For Dworkin, the aim and value of democracy is 
rather that collective decisions be made by political institutions which treat all citizens 
with equal concern and respect.A lthough it also requires that officials making 
political decisions be chosen in popular elections, this constitutional conception of 
democracy is primarily concerned with the idea that the political institutions of the 
community should be informed by the right of all citizens to be treated as equals. It 
follows that majoritarian procedures designed to inform political institutions should 
only be employed “out of concern for the equal status of citizens, and not out of any 
commitment to the goals of majoritarian rule.”^^  Accordingly, the legitimacy of the 
decisions of political institutions should be assessed by the degree to which they 
adhere to the conditions of equal status for all citizens, and not to the degree of their 
compliance with majority rule.^ ®
Dworkin’s conception thus harmonises the ideas of constitutionalisation of rights and, 
consequently, the imposition of constraints on the power of the majority, with the 
ideal of democracy. His theory offers an understanding of democracy that is consistent 
with the promotion of justice, by prescribing that the institutions of government work 
independently but with the aim of achieving a common goal, namely that of 
promoting equal concern and respect for all citizens.®® Furthermore, Brown contends 
that Dworkin’s conception eliminates the “moral regret”®^ element present in the 
apparent dichotomy between government legitimacy and the rights discourse, 
evidenced every time the courts overturned legislative acts that trampled on citizens’ 
rights. As Brown asserts, the role of the courts in invalidating unjust laws embodies 
the fulfilment of what Dworkin sees as the ultimate goal of legitimate governments.®^
Hence, Dworkin’s theory provides limits on democratic governments as well as an 
aim worth pursuing. By prescribing that societies be informed by the ideal of integrity, 
Dworkin encourages communities to find the system of principles from which the
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rights and duties of its members should flow; very importantly, this system should be 
informed not only the actions of its political institutions, but also of all of its members. 
His conception of the law is optimistic and directed into the future. Rather than 
discordant with democracy, it is fully compatible with democratic ideals whilst, at the 
same time, consistent with the pursuit of respect for citizens rights. As Brown 
contends,
“[a]t the end, it is a question of optimism or pessimism. The schools of 
constitutional thought to which Dworkin has sworn eternal opposition 
are characterized by scepticism, cynicism, distrust, and pessimism. 
Dworkin’s works, by contrast, have fought valiantly for the proposition 
that the American people can do better, that our form of government 
was conceived under the sun of enlightenment, that it committed us to 
the ideals expressed in the Preamble of the Constitution.”®^
This is as valid for Brazil as it is for the U.S. Although this thesis will demonstrate 
that Brazil is a long way from achieving Dworkin’s conception in practice, the 1988 
Constitution is an important benchmark in the country’s pursuit of the implementation 
of the rule of law. In view of that, it will be argued that Dworkin’s conception of the 
rule of law offers important general underpinnings that shed light on the case of Brazil 
and its attempt to consolidate its democracy. It also provides legal and political 
theorists, as well as legal practitioners, governments and citizens alike, with a set of 
principles as an ideal to be pursued. As Dworkin contends, law does not consist of 
only rules and principles, but it also involves political attitudes and the community’s 
sense of itself. Law, therefore, reflects the principles held by the community and its 
commitment to them.®"^  As he puts it,
[l]aw’s attitude is constructive: it aims, in the interpretive spirit, to lay 
principle over practice to show the best route to a better future, keeping 
the right faith with the past. It is [...] a fraternal attitude, an expression 
of how we are united in community though divided in project, interest 
and conviction. That is, anyway, what law is for us: for the people we 
want to be and the community we aim to have.”®®
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Once a conception of the rule of law has been adopted, it is paramount to analyse 
whether Brazil conforms to the ideal formulated by Dworkin, so as to understand the 
country’s present and future legal prospects in consolidating the democratic ideal and 
promoting the respect for the individual rights and freedoms enshrined in the 1988 
Constitution/® Hence, in the next section of this Chapter, the main pragmatic 
dimensions of compliance with Dworkin’s version of the rule of law will be laid out 
and contextualised into Brazil’s present legal and socio-political reality in order to 
assess whether the country has achieved the rule of law in its efforts to consolidate its 
democracy since the mid-1980s.
3.1.1 Dworkin’s Conception of the Rule of Law in Practice: The Case of 
Brazil
According to the rights conception of the rule of law adopted, there are at least three 
dimensions of state failure: accuracy, scope and fairness.®  ^ The state may fail in the 
dimension of accuracy by neglecting the recognition of important rights, despite 
acknowledging some individual rights against the state.®  ^As will be demonstrated in 
Chapter 4, the 1988 Constitution of Brazil, promulgated through a constitution- 
making process that encompassed meaningful democratic participation,®® contains a 
wide range of provisions promoting the defence of civil and human rights and 
democratic ideals.^ ®® Title II of the Constitution, particularly Article 5, is said to 
enshrine an authentic bill of rights, ^ ®^ as it protects an extensive array of fundamental 
rights, among them the right to life, liberty, equality, security and property. The
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Constitution also recognises a range of second and third generation rights, such as the 
right to health, education, work, and leisure (Art. 6) and the right to an ‘ecologically 
balanced environment’ (Art. 225).^ ®^  Art.l also declares the dignity of the human 
person and Art. 4 the primacy of human rights as fundamental principles of the 
Constitution, which must be upheld by the ‘democratic government under the rule of 
law’.^ ®® Art. 1 of the Constitution further protects the principle of a representative 
democracy by recognising the rights of universal suffrage as well as plebiscite, 
referendum and popular proposal of new legislation.^®"  ^ In addition to its very 
extensive list of rights. Art. 5 offers an added protection of the rights explicitly 
mentioned by stating that they do not preclude the recognition and protection of any 
other rights stemming from the democratic government under the rule of law, as well 
as from international conventions ratified by the government.^®® Based on the 
substantive protection of fundamental rights by the Brazilian Constitution, Brazil’s 
legal system can arguably be said to fulfil the dimension of accuracy of Dworkin’s 
rights conception of the rule of law.
The second dimension where states may fail is in the scope of the individual rights 
they claim to enforce. In this vein, states might recognise the rights of individuals, but 
refuse to enforce them.^ ®® As it will be seen more in depth in Chapter 6, state violence 
in Brazil is not only endemic, but is also met with impunity. ^ ®^ In addition, as seen in 
Chapter 1, Brazil’s legal history has been marked by the lack of accountability of state 
officials and the protection of elite interests to the detriment of the rights and freedoms 
of the rest of the population. In Chapter 5, it will also be demonstrated that, despite the 
social rights enshrined in the Constitution, Brazilian society sustains high levels of 
poverty, deprivation and inequality. Moreover, the consolidation of the rule of law as 
envisaged by Dworkin cannot be achieved unless citizens have wide access to justice 
to claim the rights the state recognises they have. As Dworkin posits, the courts might 
take upon themselves the special responsibility of protecting individual rights, but this 
project can only be successful, and the minorities empowered in the process, to the
Zimmermann, 'Constitutional Rights in Brazil: A Legal Fiction?' pp.28-30 
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extent that access to the courts is, in practice, available to them/®^ In this vein, the 
pervasive lack of access to justice in Brazil, as in the Latin American region, may 
provide a substantial hindrance to the implementation of the rights conception of the 
rule of law. As Ungar contends, lack of access to justice is widespread in Latin 
America, where over 80 percent of the population is discouraged from seeking justice 
due contradictory and outdated law, a range of obstacles posed by the legal systems - 
including linguistic, educational, physical and financial - and the backlog of court 
cases. ^®® According to Ungar, access to justice may also be frustrated by the courts 
adoption of an over-formalistic application of the law, such that,
“an exclusive attention to the semantic form of a law can frustrate its 
larger purpose and spirit, leading to unjust application or unfair 
interpretation in real-life cases.”^^®
Legal formalism also encompasses the use of language permeated by archaic 
expressions and over-technical and inconsistent terminology, making it 
incomprehensible to those outside the legal profession.^Accordingly, the procedural 
formality of Brazil’s legal system, including the extensive right of interlocutory 
appeal, is reinforced by the formalism of Brazil’s legal training and practice. 
Distanced from other human sciences and carried out as translation of law practice, 
law teaching and research in Brazil have historically been disproportionately affected 
by the pressures, prejudices and culture of professional practice. This isolation from 
other human sciences has rendered Brazilian law persistently formalist and, therefore, 
focused on the systematic and consistent application of the statutes produced by the 
legislature, rather than on the analysis of concrete cases embedded in an evolving 
social con t ex t .^Law training is an extension of this, as formalist jurists teach 
students to hold the position of law professionals, rather than to question socio­
political realities and their relation to the law.^ ^® Legal formalism reinforces the
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entrenchment of existing institutions and related power positions by preventing the 
emergence of new demands to the legal system/^® In addition, the lack of wide- 
reaching binding precedents^ compounds the delays and inefficiency of the Brazilian 
judicial s y s t e m , w h i c h  is seen ultimately as
“dysfunctional: agonisingly slow, beset with frivolous cases designed
to evade justice and enmeshed in useless procedure.”*^®
Although formally entrenched, the rights of the majority of the population are 
frustrated by the government’s neglect of its mandate to protect and advance the 
constitutional precepts in practice. As a result, the Brazilian legal system falls short in 
complying with the scope dimension of Dworkin’s conception of the rule of law. 
Thirdly, states may fail in the fairness of rights’ enforcement when they adopt rules 
that impede minorities or other disadvantaged groups from securing their rights.*^® 
Land law is an instructive example of this distortion in practice. According to Holston, 
Brazilian land law does not seek to resolve conflicts or provide effective means of 
adjudication in land disputes. Rather than incompetence or corruption alone, Holston 
argues that the vagueness, indecisiveness, confiision and dysfiinctionality of the 
Brazilian land law system have been purposely promoted by those standing to benefit 
most from it. Dating back 400 years, land legislation was historically linked to the 
interests of the colonisers. Its intricacies were sustained through the country’s 
independence, benefiting the upper classes and the political elites throughout the 
Empire. With the end of slavery looming in the late nineteenth-century, the prospect 
of land ownership was employed to attract prospective immigrants by the landed 
elites, who manipulated the law and its complexities to withdraw their promises once 
the new European arrivals reached Brazil. Nonetheless, although originally
Ibid., pp.41-62
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designed to perpetuate the interests of the ruling classes, the endurance of old patterns 
of “calculated disorder” through the legalisation of illegal practices, usurpations and 
eneroaehments have been gradually appropriated by the poor who, faced with the lack 
of access to land, have asserted their right to land ownership through illegal 
settlements which they have sought to legalise by,
“regularly eompet[ing] in legal arenas from which they have been 
excluded — not because the law is more concerned with justice or 
resolution, but because they have learned, in large measure through 
land struggles, how to use the law’s complications to extralegal 
advantage.”^^®
Another example of how the Brazilian legal system may be unfair in the enforcement 
of rights was the application of the now revoked Art. 192, § 3° of the 1988 
Constitution, which limited the application of ‘real interest rates’ to 12 per cent per 
year. This precept was to be applied to all mutual loan contracts, particularly bank 
financing, such as mortgages, credit limits, credit card rates and leasing. Despite 
this, the constitutional rule was never observed by the Brazilian banks. Contrary to the 
decisions of the country’s lower courts, the Supreme Federal Tribunal pronounced on 
the matter in 1991 in the Action of Direct Uneonstitutionality {Açâo Direta de 
Insconstitucionalidade - ADIN) No 4/DF, by interpreting the constitutional precept to 
be not ‘self-applicable’, that is, by declaring that its full effectiveness is dependent on 
the enactment of further complementary legislation.^^® The court’s ruling followed a 
report of the Central Bank describing the possible adverse consequences that the 
limitation of real interest rates to 12 per cent per annum could have on the country’s 
economy, including vastly pessimistic assumptions and predictions of the 
constitutional rule’s impact on Brazil’s future economic prospects. That report was 
supported by formal written opinions of well-known authors, among them Ives 
Gandra da Silva Martins, Caio Taeito, José Frederieo Marques, Hely Lopes Meirelles 
and Rossah Russomano - the majority commissioned by the Brazilian Banking 
Federation (Federaçâo Brasileira do Bancos - Febraban) - offering legal reasoning for 
the lack of self-applicability of art. 192, § 3°. According to them, the heading of the
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article prescribes that the national financial system is to be regulated by 
complementary law; as an integral part and ancillary to the heading (caput) of the rule, 
paragraph (§) 3"^ ’^s full applicability is, therefore, subject to the enactment of further 
legislation. The Central Bank’s report and formal opinions were followed by Formal 
Opinion No SR-70 of the General Consultancy of the Republic, signed by the then 
President, José Samey, which argued that it would be inconceivable for any 
subsection or paragraph contained in the article to be self-applicable, when the reform 
of the whole set of regulations of the financial system was awaiting further legislation. 
Technically, the Opinion goes, the paragraph is an outspread or extension of the main 
precept and, as such, it follows the same rules as the caput. Despite this and due to 
the clarity and self-explanatory nature of paragraph 3*^ ,^ the constitutional literature is 
almost unanimous in characterising it as a self-applicable constitutional precept. 
José Afonso da Silva has defended its self-applicability by arguing that it is 
independent and not subordinate to the legislation mentioned in the caput. According 
to him, if the text was a subsection of the main article, rather than a paragraph, its 
effects would be dependent on the enactment of further ordinary legislation. As a self- 
explanatory paragraph, however, it produces immediate effects. In his dissenting 
opinion in the ADIN No 4/DF, the Minister of the Supreme Federal Tribunal, Paulo 
Brossard, also emphasised the importance of merit over pure technicality, and the 
need for law to be given the unequivocal meaning intended. Now revoked by 
Constitutional Amendment 40/2003,^®® paragraph 3"^  ^ of Art. 192 of the Constitution 
was until then one of the most controversial issues of Brazilian constitutional law and 
demonstrated the inconsistencies of a system with two very different realities, the 
formal and the practical. The lack of its applicability by Brazil’s highest court also 
shows the deep interests which are often protected, at the expense of the rights of the 
majority of the population. Enacted as a protection against usury, its observance 
would have greatly benefited the Brazilian lower classes, who are heavily dependent 
on credit to acquire a wide range of essential items, including relatively low value
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purchases such as clothing, home appliances and school materials/^ ^ With low 
disposable income, their reliance on financial credit is not only a luxury, but a need. 
Hence, the lack of applicability of Article 192, §3° burdened the poor 
disproportionately, as it affected their incomes and livelihoods the hardest. 
Accordingly, despite the constitutional entrenchment of a range of social rights, 
contradictions in the country’s legal system means that they are not upheld in practice, 
to the great disadvantage of a large proportion of its population. By adopting rules and 
interpretations that disfavour the poor, Brazil’s legal system deprives the most 
disadvantaged members of society of the rights secured by the 1988 Constitution, 
consequently failing on the fairness dimension of Dworkin’s conception of the rule 
law.
The evidence above, which will be further explored throughout this thesis, briefly 
demonstrates that Brazil may not claim to observe Dworkin’s conception of the rule of 
law. Despite formally protecting the rights and freedoms of the individual and 
democratic ideals, these are in great part frustrated in practice by, among other factors, 
an inequitable and inefficient legal s y s t e m , h i g h  criminality,^®® deep social 
inequalities and endemic poverty,*®"^  and the widespread abuse of state power, most 
notably through police violence.^®® In view of this and given the current political, 
social and economic changes taking place in Brazil, it is important to analyse whether 
the societal adjustments likely to accommodate them provide a favourable
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environment for the implementation of the rule of law and the consolidation of the 
country’s democracy.
3.2 Change in Sight for Brazil -  Weingast’s Theory on the Implementation the Rule 
of Law
Although the rule of law, particularly Dworkin’s conception, is for this thesis an ideal 
worth pursuing, it should not be seen as a metaphysical concept without practical 
applicability.^®® In spite of its intrinsic and vital value as an ideal, which exerts 
influence by living in the political consciousness of a nation, ^ ®^ and which may lead to 
a gradual cultural change by being rhetorically espoused by those in power until it 
becomes inescapably part of what all believe the law to be,^ ®^  the possibility of its 
actualisation and implementation ought to be present if the rule of law is to benefit 
fully legal systems. The legalism which surrounds discourses on the rule of law has 
led theorists and rule of law development specialists to look for juridical solutions as a 
means of achieving the value. ^ ®® On this view, law is a source of its own normativity 
and is thus followed because rules enacted in accordance with a set of formal 
conditions are obeyed, creating a system where actions observe anterior rules. 
Nevertheless, this approach ignores law’s deep roots in its socio-political context and, 
therefore, either underestimates, understates or discredits the value of political or other 
non-legal methods and conditions for its implementation. Indeed, the short­
sightedness of such solutions has been evidenced in practice with the minimal or
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modest results that prolonged worldwide efforts in rule of law building, based on legal 
and institutional reforms, have delivered/"^^ In attempting to address this oversight, 
this thesis, by deploying Weingast’s theory on the implementation of the rule of law, 
will lay out the general conditions for the achievement of the ideal in practice and, 
subsequently, apply them to the case of Brazil. In so doing, this thesis will establish 
the so often neglected means and conditions for the achievement of the rule of law, 
making it worth pursuing not only as an ideal, but also as an achievable value.
As Maravall and Przeworski contend, a conception of the rule of law ought to be 
considered within a context where political actors promote their interests and advance 
their goals through every instrument available to them.^ "^ ® Accordingly, although the 
ability of powerful political elites to embrace or resist the rule of law through strategic 
calculations cannot, per se, explain the circumstances in which the rule of law will 
emerge, these factors are significant and cannot be overestimated. In this vein, 
Weingast asserts that for democracy to be consolidated and the rule of law 
implemented, the elites must see this as advantageous to them and, together with the 
citizenry, must hold government officials to account as a means of maintaining limits 
on the state and ensuring the enforcement of the rules laid out by the legal system. 
For the political scientist, government limits can only be sustained if political power 
holders feel constrained to keep within the established acceptable boundaries.’"^® This, 
in turn, requires that the interests of citizens and elites be coordinated and that they 
reach an agreement on the limits to be imposed on the s t a t e . S u c h  agreement is 
“neither natural nor automatic,”’"’^  however, and “maintaining the limits on the state is 
problematic because of a massive social coordination problem.”’"’® As Weingast 
explains, imposing limits on the state demands that citizens act in a consistent and 
unified manner when faced with violations of core individual rights and the 
fundamental ideals of the nation. This requires citizens not only to reach an agreement 
on what is really worth protecting, but also effectively to exercise a concerted action
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of State policing. The fact that citizens have a range of different interests and beliefs 
makes it very difficult to achieve the coordination necessary to maintain the state 
within established limits.’®® This difficulty intensifies considerably in nations with 
high levels of inequality.’®’ Unless citizens can devise a consensus on the limits to be 
imposed on the state, the most likely coalition will be forged between the state and 
one group of citizens against another. Weingast’s model suggests that this is not only 
the most likely, but also the most stable, balance in society.’®^ As he contends “[t]his 
pattern is the most likely equilibrium and prevents society from maintaining 
universalistic limits on the state, and hence from sustaining the rule of law.”’®® 
Accordingly, Holmes posits that treating citizens unequally has been a feature of all 
societies, no matter how liberal or democratic they are. This is because governments 
have no incentives to treat all societal groups equally, since the cooperation of some 
groups, for instance those who are well-organised and detain a higher concentration of 
assets, is more valuable and useful to it than of others.’®"’ Not surprisingly, the rights 
of groups with greater political and economic leverage, whose cooperation 
governments decide they need the most, such as landowners, have been protected long 
before the rights of weaker and considerably less influential groups, such as 
orphans.’®®
This has always been the case in Brazil. The Brazilian elites have been greatly 
favoured by the abuses committed by the government and its officials.’®® This is 
because they and the government have maintained a long-lasting coalition, mutually 
benefiting from each other’s actions, to the detriment of the rest of the population. As
Ibid., p.246
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the state’s transgressions of the majority of the population’s democratic rights do not, 
as a rule, affect them, Brazilian elites have never yet had incentives to act and impose 
limits on the state.
Weingast argues that this cycle, whereby elites and governments cooperate with each 
other to gain mutual privileges at the expense of the fundamental rights of the majority 
of the population, cannot be easily surmounted. This is because, without incentives, 
the elites will not forego their privileges, and the stable alliance they maintain with the 
government will be sustained and reproduced across generations. It follows that a 
coordination agreement between the elites and the population, necessary to impose 
limits on the government, is exceptional and, therefore, not likely to happen at a 
fortuitous moment of a polity’s history. The dilemma, according to Weingast, can only 
be solved when the elites, often through pacts and prompted by sufficiently 
compelling incentives, impose limits on the government, given they exert great 
influence on the state’s policy choices. Citizens in general can only react against 
abuses of their democratic rights and, with that, “provide a component of the elite 
incentives.”’®^
In order for elites to accept compromised privileges and, with that, destabilise their 
coalition with the state, there must be an element exogenous to this model in play. 
Such a factor may be presented by situations such as crises, economic changes or 
economic and demographic growth. The important thing is that the status quo must be 
significantly altered by a situation outside of the model of equilibrium maintained in 
society, so as to provide an opportunity for new rules of societal interplay to be 
created.’®^ Holmes agrees in terms, but argues that only an external shock might 
prompt internal transformation.’®® For him, the threat posed by foreign elites may be a 
strong catalyst for national elites to restrain themselves, thus choosing to transfer legal 
certainty, individual rights and democratic influence downward, even if only formally 
or temporarily. Notwithstanding, by allowing ordinary citizens to become stakeholders 
in the political decisions of their community and by widening legal access and 
democratic consultation processes, a propitious environment for the rule of law to 
emerge is created.’®® Holmes’s arguments, as Weingast’s, imply that there must be a
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sufficiently compelling trigger to the coordination device to disturb the status quo and 
prompt hegemonic elites to recognise that, despite the benefits they gain from siding 
with the government, they will be better off in the longer term by imposing limits on 
the state.’®’
This thesis will argue that substantial elements, extraneous to the model that has 
prevailed throughout Brazil’s history, are increasingly affecting Brazilian society, 
namely the empowerment of the masses, economic development and astounding levels 
of violence. One or a combination of these factors may, arguably, create a propitious 
environment for the accomplishment of Weingast’s coordination between the elites 
and the rest of the Brazilian population. It will be suggested that an interplay of 
ongoing political, social and economic circumstances may potentially offer enough 
incentives for the elites to act by siding with the majority of the population in 
demanding limits on the abuses perpetrated by the state. As such, this thesis will 
bridge the divide between theoretical discourse and the conditions for the practical 
implementation of the rule of law. Considering that the realisation of the rule of law 
may culminate in meaningful societal change, it is important to avoid the formation of 
a social vacuum, where incivility and violence can thrive.’®^ Hence, the significance of 
adopting a conception of the rule of law able to provide a legal framework which will 
guide these changes in the right direction and set out a goal worth pursuing. 
Dworkin’s conception of the rule law provides Brazil with the formal foundation for 
its legal system, establishing the protection of substantive rights against the state and 
the aim of achieving equal concern and respect for all. In addition, it endows its 
citizens with a significant role in shaping the scheme of principles that will regulate 
the future relationship between citizens and the state and between citizens themselves. 
This theoretical framework can, in turn, provide Brazilian citizens with more 
knowledge and leverage to convince the elites that it is in their interests to limit state 
power, strengthening the phenomenon of empowerment of the masses that is already 
taking place in the Brazilian society and, in the process, be an important tool in the 
implementation the rule of law and consolidation of the country’s democracy.
In the following chapters, the concrete circumstances which may have a decisive 
bearing on the Brazilian elites’ decision to side with the rest of the population in
Weingast, 'The Political Foundations o f Democracy and the Rule o f  Law'
Holston, Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions o f  Democracy and Modernity in Brazil, p.303
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imposing limits on the country’s public officials’ exercise of power and, consequently, 
the conditions for the implementation of the rule of law in the contemporary socio­
political context of Brazil, will be investigated further. The importance of the 
achievement of the rule of law lies in providing Brazil with a framework that 
encompasses not only the formal requirements of rule validity, but also substantive 
rights, values and principles based on the shared political morality of the community 
that will establish limits on the exercise of power by Brazilian public officials. 
Confusion about the theoretical meaning of the rule of law and overuse of rhetorical 
claims and accusations based on unelaborated and unqualified conceptions of the term 
may perpetuate complacency about the advantages that this indeterminacy may bring, 
particularly in the political arena, but do not make the ideal of the rule of law a 
superfluous and meaningless political virtue.’®® For Fallon, this is true for at least two 
reasons. One is that the values associated with it are too important to be sidelined from 
theoretical or public and political debates and deserve not less, but more strong 
defence.’®"’ Thus, appeals to the ideal of the rule of law serve a purpose, namely they 
highlight the virtues and failures of legal systems, from institutional arrangements, to 
judicial decisions and executive and legislative actions, consequently drawing 
attention to the need for society to discuss the moral basis of substantive justice based 
on the perceived values that it upholds.’®® The second reason is that the rule of law is 
not a dispensable and meaningless sum of its parts; its worth and, thus, its appeal lies 
in providing the community and the legal system with a prioritisation of values and 
theoretical grounding for the means of their promotion by linking and converging 
independent values and elements into a mutually complementary and reinforcing 
relationship. As such, the rule of law can be considered an “architectonic ideal”’®® 
which not only embodies some of the many values that the legal system should ideally 
reflect, but also orders them in a manner consistent with the community’s goals.’®^ For 
Hutchinson and Monahan, the overarching value of the rule of law is, however, its 
function and significance as an ideal, as its power is instilled in the consciousness of 
those upholding it. As they remark.
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“[a]t times, the Rule of Law has been used to legitimize and galvanize 
a challenge to entrenched power; at others, the ruling elite has relied 
upon it to sanction its power and resistance to would-be usurpers. Like 
any ideal, it only exists in the political consciousness and conscience. 
But, like every other ideal, it exercises a tenacious grip on the 
imagination and actions of its adherents.”’®^
The belief in the ideal of the rule of law as an ambition to achieve a fairer and more 
egalitarian society, where all are under the aegis of the law, is an important aspect of 
rule of law building and democracy consolidation for this thesis. Legal systems are 
interconnected with socio-political realities and, as such, changes effectuated in them 
can only reverberate through society when their desirability and importance has been 
internalised and filtered through all societal groups.’®® Decades of international efforts 
in promoting the rule of law abroad and millions of dollars spent on legal reforms in 
developing countries have shown that off-the-rack transplantable institutional 
solutions can only produce patchy and minimal results.’ ®^ Law’s deeply contextual 
character demands that any attempts to achieve the rule of law emerge from within 
and for the society it is to benefit.’^ ’ The agency aspect in substantial legal change is 
thus e s s e n tia l ,a s  it is its socio-political setting.’ ®^ Hence, the relevance of adopting 
Dworkin’s conception of the rule of law, which endows the community with an 
instrumental control over law building by allowing it to establish the principles and 
values that are to guide society in the long-term. Accordingly, by demanding that the 
rights and duties of citizens emanate from a system of principles conceived by the 
community itself, law as integrity embodies the community with the ability not only to 
inform its own legal system with the principles and values that it holds most dear, but 
also to stay as true to it as it wishes. Very importantly, the rule of law, as formulated 
by Dworkin, also depicts law as it, ideally, ought to be. In order to create a community 
of principle, Dworkin’s formulation of the rule of law demands that the community’s
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system of principles be informed by the ideal of integrity, which should not only work 
alongside the ideals of justice, fairness and procedural process, but should also inform 
them, so as to guarantee that government’s actions are carried out in a principled and 
coherent manner, applying the standards of justice and fairness to all in society. Law 
as integrity thus imposes limits on democratic governments by rejecting the 
majoritarian premise in favour of a concept of democracy that encompasses the 
protection of individual rights and the promotion of the common goal of treating all 
members of the community with equal concern and respect. This aim should be 
advanced by all government institutions, regardless of their activities and in spite of 
their immediate ends and policies. Above all, the community as a whole should not 
compromise on the principles they endorse in matters concerning moral rights, and 
coercive force should not be exercised by the government, even if in the pursuit of 
noble ends, unless it is condoned or required by the individual rights and 
responsibilities flowing from the community’s scheme of principles. As an ideal, 
Dworkin’s version of the rule of law will never be fully achieved in practice. As 
Holmes contends, “inequality before the law never gives way to equality before the 
law. No legal system treats all citizens equally.”’ "^’ This does not make the rule of law 
any less important, for the aim is for society to approximate it as much as possible. In 
this sense, as an ideal conceived within a liberal political theory, the rule of law 
advances equality before the law as a utopia, a vision which ignores that society is 
composed not only of individuals, but also of organised interests. In practice, the ideal 
of the rule of law can be approximated by according more leverage to a higher 
proportion of the population through legal and political instruments that can be 
employed, in addition to the extralegal means they generally have at their disposal, to 
protect their rights and interests.’ ®^ As such, the rule of law can instruct societies to 
have a more balanced relationship between its strongest and weakest groups, one in 
which law is not monopolised by the powerful and, even if  not equally, is an 
instrument also useful to poorly organised and politically inarticulate groups.’ ®^ 
Therein lies the significance of adopting Weingast’s theory on the consolidation of the 
rule of law. For a theory on the rule of law can only benefit society if its achievement 
is possible in practice and if its idealised conception is contextualised in a less than
Holmes, 'Lineages o f the Rule o f Law', p.22 
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ideal political setting. Weingast’s theory is thus essential in providing the necessary 
connection between the rule of law’s theoretical discourse and its practical 
applicability, making its achievement possible for Brazil, provided the conditions for 
its realisation are timely and compelling enough to provide an incentive for the 
Brazilian elites to act. Whether those conditions are present is the subject of the 
following chapters.
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CHAPTER 4
MILITARY POLITICS, DEMOCRATISATION, 
CONSTITUTIONALISATION 
OF RIGHTS AND EMPOWERMENT 
OF THE MASSES
Empowerment of the masses is the first element this thesis advances as a possible 
factor compelling the elites to forge a coordination device with the rest of the 
Brazilian population as a means of keeping government officials’ exercise of power in 
check and, as a consequence, of deterring major transgressions of citizens’ rights and 
freedoms by the state. Emerging in the 1970s with the growth and increased clout of 
social movements, this empowerment developed more strongly in Brazil both from the 
inclusive and democratically-driven constitutional-writing process during the 
country’s transition to democracy in the 1980s and from the subsequent enactment of 
the Brazilian Constitution in 1988. As will be seen in this Chapter, the military played 
a prominent role in Brazilian politics since the end of the Empire and, assuming power 
in a 1964 coup d’état, installed an authoritarian regime which lasted over 20 years, 
during which period the rights and freedoms of Brazilians were openly and severely 
curbed. In its latest stint in power, the military ruled the country through a number of 
legislative acts, permeating the Brazilian legal system with laws with iniquitous and 
authoritarian content, whilst still vesting them with a veil of legal legitimacy. The 
transition to democracy after the fall of the regime provided Brazilians with an 
unparalleled opportunity to have a say in the future of the nation. This, the emergence 
and specialisation of social movements’ rights’ demands, and the extensive rights 
recognised by the 1988 Constitution have, since, empowered the Brazilian citizenry, 
which feels entitled to see its rights observed in practice for, perhaps, the first time in 
the life of the nation. As will be seen, their demands may offer the elites enough 
incentives to act in limiting the abuses of power perpetrated by the state and, 
therefore, may one of the factors contributing for the implementation of Dworkin’s 
‘rights conception’ of the rule of law and the consequent consolidation of the 
country’s democracy.
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4.1 The Military’s Role in Brazilian Politics and the Dictatorship Regime (1964- 
1985)
The military was involved in national politics from the overthrow of the monarchy and 
Declaration of the Republic in 1889.  ^ As Levine explains, the late nineteenth century 
in Brazil was marked by pressures for a Republican form of government, as the 
centralisation of power and consequent political isolation of the provinces dissatisfied 
local and regional elites, who felt that their unique needs and challenges were 
overlooked, thus preventing them from achieving their full commercial potential.^ 
Although Republicanism had inspired regional revolts in the 1830s and 40s, its 
influence waned with the implementation of Dom Pedro IPs unifying strategy, which 
was successful in accommodating divergent interests and, consequently, in 
strengthening support for the monarchical regime.^ This reality changed late in the 
nineteenth century, when a new generation of Brazilians began to question the 
political and social framework of Imperial Brazil. Represented mainly by the sons of 
an increasingly more powerful economic strata of coffee planters, this new generation 
- many of them graduates from the newly established Brazilian Universities - regarded 
the privileges and nepotism of the Coimbra-graduated bureaucracy of the Empire as 
backward and detrimental to the modernisation and industrialisation of Brazil."  ^ The 
rapid industrialisation of the U.S. only reinforced the younger generations’ distaste for 
Brazil’s slavery and predominantly agrarian society.^ In addition, although Emperor 
Dom Pedro II had, for the most part, been an astute ruler and a unifying force in the 
Empire, by the end of his nearly fifty-year rule he had grown physically and 
psychologically weaker and had made serious errors of judgement that were to impact 
considerably on the country’s political future. Notable among them were his support 
for the ruthless military offensive in Paraguay, which tainted Brazil’s image abroad,^ 
and his appointment of a Conservative government in 1968, despite the Liberal
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majority in the Chamber of Deputies/ The latter was particularly damaging to his 
reputation as a conciliatory non-partisan political force, as his decision alienated the 
Liberals, who accused him of abusing his ‘moderating powers’ by taking a biased 
political stance/ The disapproval of the Emperor led a more militant Liberal faction to 
found the Republican Party and issue a Republican Manifesto in 1870, calling for the 
end of the monarchy and the installation of a Republic/
In addition to republicanism, a further doctrine exerting considerable influence in 
Brazil around 1870 was positivism, particularly the school of thought advanced by the 
French philosopher Auguste Com te.Positivism  as propounded by Comte holds that 
authentic knowledge is that which is based on experience and positive verification. 
Consequently, that credible and rational assertions are those that can be scientifically 
attested or logically or mathematically proved, thus rejecting both theology and 
metaphysics in favour of scientific law.^  ^ According to Skidmore, perhaps as a late 
Enlightenment, positivism reverberated strongly with Brazilians in the late nineteenth 
century because it offered the only plausible and well structured doctrinal replacement 
to a declining Catholic ideology. Positivism took different forms in Brazil, from a 
more radical and pure view of Comte’s doctrine, whose followers founded the 
Brazilian Positivist Church in 1881, to a more pragmatic view of it, sympathetic to 
parts of Comte’s teachings, such as the rejection of Catholicism, whilst repudiating 
others, including Comte’s view on the limited role of the state, with those in between 
being known as ‘heterodox’ positivists.^^ Its strong, albeit diffuse, influence continued 
into the twentieth century, although its duration was less down to its dogmatic 
teachings than to its intellectual style, particularly the calls for a more scientific 
approach to understanding history and society. Positivism resonated with young 
army officers, notably those connected with the Rio Military Academy, but the 
rising dissatisfaction with the Empire and the increasingly divisive issue of the 
abolition of slavery turned it, together with republicanism, into an influential doctrine
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in national intellectual circles, particularly in the south of the country, and military 
academies/^ Disaffected lawyers, journalists and other professionals began to share 
their discontent with young military men in Republican clubs across the nation/^ The 
younger generation of army commanders who had gradually been replacing the senior 
officers involved in the Paraguayan War, believed that the troops’ lack of education -  
many of the conscripts had been recruited under duress and were serving in the 
military against their wil/^ - would impede them from satisfactorily maintaining 
social order, leading many within the armed forces to believe that education should be 
at the heart of Brazil’s policies if it was ever to achieve progress/^ There was also an 
increasingly open conflict between the army and the Empire’s political elite after the 
Paraguayan War, with the former accusing cabinet ministers of interfering in the 
affairs of the military and sacrificing the country’s military interests for political 
reasons/^ Republicanism and positivism thus thrived in military and academic circles 
precisely because of their appeal to those dissatisfied with the country’s socio-political 
system and structures, based on elitism and nepotism, slavery and agrarianism, and 
against the international trends of modernisation and industrialisation, republicanism 
and limited government/^
Apart from the army, another important source of opposition to Dom Pedro IPs power 
came from slave owners, who vehemently opposed the looming ending of slavery. 
Furthermore, although the Emperor remained a popular monarch throughout his reign, 
the continuing separation of Church and state alienated millions of Brazilians, for 
whom Catholicism was a way of life.^  ^ With his rule ever more unstable, one year 
after the law for the abolition of slavery was signed by Princess Isabel on 13 May 
1888, a civil-military coup forced the Emperor to abdicate power and seek refuge in 
England, leaving power in the hands of the military General Manoel Deodoro da 
Fonseca.^^ The New Republican system symbolised a dramatic change of structure in 
national politics, now based on the decentralisation of power and the establishment, by
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Article 1° of the Republican Constitution of 24^  ^ February 1891, of a federalist 
system/^
The transition from Monarchy to Republic was met with euphoria and optimism ran 
high for the new federation, seen at the time as a model of efficiency, once it endowed 
the states with more powers to govern their own political affairs and economic 
policies/"^ Despite this, the first years of the Republic were socially unstable and 
burdened by internal political dissent/^ Albeit being a popular figure and considered a 
national hero by many. General Deodoro da Fonseca proved a weak head of state and, 
under pressure from the military, resigned after his attempt to dissolve Congress in 
November 1891, only two years after coming to power. Marshal Floriano Peixoto, his 
successor, was unpopular for his aggressive style, brutal approach to political dissent, 
and determination to end landowning elites’ privileges and political influence.^^ In 
addition, the ruthless quashing of an uprising in the city of Desterro, the capital of the 
southern state of Santa Catarina, was remembered with disgust for generations. After 
the military defeat, rebel leaders were executed and the city was mockingly renamed 
by Peixoto as Florianopolis, a name that stands to this day.^^ His growing unpopularity 
made Peixoto’s Presidency unsustainable, eventually leading the army to relinquish 
power to the civilian Prudente José de Morais Barros, from the state of Sao Paulo, 
whose candidacy was supported by the republican coffee planters, the other forces 
behind the coup that overthrew the Empire.^^ According to Levine, the military’s exit 
from power was the result of a combination of poor government performance and 
conflicts within the armed forces.^^ Scattered military uprisings divided the army’s 
ranks, compounding the inefficacy of Deodoro’s presidency and the growing 
unpopularity and isolation of Floriano Peixoto, ultimately allowing civilians, under the 
government of Prudente de Moraes, to regain control of the country.
Prudente de Morals’s government consolidated the power of Sao Paulo’s coffee 
planters rural oligarchy, who ruled through an unwritten power sharing agreement
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with the landed elites of other states, in particular dairy producers from the state of 
Minas Gerais - an arrangement that became know as the Coffee with Milk {Café com 
Leite) alliance/^ Accordingly, although the military had gained prominence in the 
First Republic (1889-1930), oligarchs of the most powerful states managed to secure 
the domination of national and regional politics, by installing a national system of 
power alternation, and a regional system of rule of local bosses -  who rigged elections 
and controlled state and municipal policies - denominated Coronelismo/^ Despite this, 
Levine contends that the military’s direct involvement in the coup that created the 
Republic marked the beginning of a period of nearly a century in which the military 
would stand ready to intervene in national and state politics to oust those it 
disapproved of and maintain social and political control/^
Since the beginning of Vargas’s first government (1930-1945), the prominence and 
influence of the military had guaranteed the armed forces an important place in the 
country’s political affairs. Their presence was to be felt more strongly until the 
military coup of 1964, when they would be installed permanently in power for over 
two decades. Accordingly, during that time, the military was prepared to intervene in 
any government it regarded undesirable to rule the country, beginning with the 
overthrow of the elected government in the elections of 1930 in favour of Vargas and 
the Liberal Alliance, which was defeated by the popular vote.^ "^  Another coup ensued 
in 1937 and a further one, in 1945, aimed at ousting Vargas from power, was “stopped 
only by the bullet by which Vargas took his own life.”^^  The threat of intervention 
continued during successive governments, with rumours of new coups during the 
presidency of Vargas’s successors, Joao Café Filho, and Juscelino Kubitschek. After 
1960, the presence of the military could be felt more presently, with rumours of 
possible coups growing steadily upon the inauguration of the reformist Jânio Quadros 
in 1961 and rising considerably when Joao Goulart, Quadro’s left wing Vice- 
President, returned from China to assume the presidency.^^
Goulart posed a potential threat to the right wing National Democratic Union Party 
{Uniao Democratica Nacional - UDN) and the military, as the Brazilian right feared
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that his populist style would lead him to seek an alliance with the Communists, 
eventually facilitating their rise to power/^ In addition, as Skidmore contends, at the 
time of his accession to power, Goulart was returning from an official mission in the 
Democratic Republic of China, purportedly confirming the concerns of the right/^ 
The three military ministers of the Quadros administration had denounced Goulart as a 
subversive and pledged to prevent his succession to the presidency/^ Intense popular 
debate followed, with supporters, dubbed legalists, claiming Goulart’s legal right to 
power based on his democratic election to the vice-presidency/^ Fearing civil war, 
centrist Congressmen negotiated hard for a compromise. Guaranteeing the support of 
the three military ministers, they achieved a cross-party agreement, whereby Goulart 
would assume the presidency with reduced powers and a parliamentary system, to be 
established through constitutional am endment.Goulart reluctantly accepted the deal, 
but vowed to restore his powers through popular referendum, scheduled for 1963."^ ^
Governing in an increasingly divisive political environment internally, and amidst 
growing international political antagonism created by the Cold War and Castro’s 1959 
Cuban revolution, Goulart struggled to maintain control."^  ^The threat of a Communist 
revolution led the Brazilian right to become stronger, antagonising further the national 
political scenario."^ "^  In addition, Goulart inherited an economy in crisis, which 
continued to deteriorate during his time in power, as inflation rose from 25.4 percent 
in 1960 to 34.7 percent in 1961.^  ^ Despite this, he secured an important political 
victory by regaining full executive powers'^^ early in 1963, when the population voted 
in a plebiscite to revoke the constitutional amendment imposing parliamentarism in 
Brazil."^  ^ Skidmore contends that Goulart paid a high price for this, as suspicions of 
communism from the right, in particular army officer corps, grew ever deeper."^  ^
Economic instability continued to create difficulties for the President not only at home
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but abroad. Foreign investment decreased significantly and foreign suppliers started 
demanding immediate payment for the value of shipments, putting an extra strain on 
the country’s finances, given Brazil’s reliance on imported oil to fulfil over half of its 
demand. As the U.S. considered Goulart to be an undesirable left wing influence on 
the continent,"^  ^ the American government limited its assistance to Brazilian states 
where anti-Goulart governors were in power. This heightened anti-American feelings 
from the left, which believed that the U.S.’s open favouritism to right wing governors 
was an unacceptable intervention of liberal capitalist forces in the affairs of the 
nation.^® The deepening of the economic crisis and rumours of a possible coup turned 
Goulart further to the left, launching rallies to announce presidential decrees that 
included expropriations for land reform and the nationalisation of all oil refineries. 
Together with other measures that threatened the elites, such as enfranchising 
illiterates and allowing those enlisted in the military be union members, this prompted 
the immediate organisation of marches by the right, during which Goulart was accused 
of being anti-Christian and anti-family.^^ What followed was a coup d’état on 
March 1964, when key government offices in the capital Brasilia and in Rio de Janeiro 
were seized by the m ilita ry .A s  Skidmore points out, as in 1989, 1930, 1937 and 
1945,
“the civilian political confrontation was cut short by a military coup
d’état.”^^
Behind the latest coup were many of the officers who had compelled Vargas to end his 
second term in government - which he did by taking his own life in 1954 - and who 
had offered strong opposition to Goulart’s succession to Jânio Quadros in 1961. Their 
intention was not only to end Goulart’s presidency, but also the Vargas era.^ "^
According to the 1946 Constitution,^^ the office of a living President could be 
terminated before the end of his tenure only in case of impediment to exercise office 
or resignation (Article 79); if the President did not assume his position within 30 days 
of investiture (Article 84); if the President left the country without congressional
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approval (Article 85); or by congressional impeachment (Article 88 and 89). Without 
the perspective of Goulart’s resignation and, counting on the likelihood that centrist 
congressional leaders would have opposed an impeachment, not least due to concerns 
that a far right government would remove them from office, the president of the 
Senate, Auro Moura Andrade, bowed to the pressure from the military and declared 
the presidency vacant. Although this act had no legal basis, it paved the way for a 
constitutional solution to the problem. Article 79, § 1° of the Constitution provided 
that, when the presidency became vacant, the successor would be the President of the 
Chamber of Deputies, then Ranieri Mazzili, for a maximum of 60 days, until Congress 
elected a new president.^^ As Skidmore posits, “[t]he Revolution’s assumption of 
power, bom in an arbitrary act, was now following strict constitutionality. This would 
not be the last example of such schizophrenia.”^^
Although the then Justice Minister, Abelardo Jurema, called upon government 
supporters to demonstrate against the coup, the military assumed took power without 
much resistance. To assert its authority, the military ordered the police to arrest 
leading figures from the left, from union leaders to politicians and later bureaucrats 
and other individuals considered subversive and dangerous to the new regime.^^ Once 
the military was in power, civil and political rights were severely encroached by 
repressive measures.^^ Carvalho contends that, although repression was present 
throughout the military regime, it was more prominent in the periods between 1964- 
1965 and 1968-1974.^^ The legal instmments utilised by the military to enact 
repressive legislation were presidential decrees denominated Institutional Acts {Atos 
Institucionais). In order to address the regime’s lack of legitimacy under existing 
constitutional law. President Castelo Branco enacted, on 9^  ^April 1964, a presidential 
decree. Institutional Act No 1,^  ^ bestowing the military with unlimited powers.^^ The 
Act also provided for the suspension, for ten years, of the political rights^^ of
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The 1946 Constitution is not specific about what constitutes political rights and, unlike other 
Brazilian Constitutions, does not contain a Title or Chapter dedicated to them (Constituiçâo dos Estados 
Unidos do Brasil, de 18 de Setembro de 1946). According to the doctrine, the political rights embraced
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opponents to the regime and the consequent repeal of any federal, state and municipal 
legislative mandates they may have held (Article 10 and Complementary Acts N° 1, 2 
and 4),^ "* the suspension for six months of constitutional and legal guarantees of 
irremovability and security of public office (Article 7), and the grant of emergency 
powers to the President (Article 6). Through Institutional Act No 2 of 1965,^  ^ the 
military, amended § T  of Article 108 of the 1946 Constitution, by extending the 
jurisdiction of the Military Justice system to civilians accused of crimes against both 
national security and military institutions (Article 8), established indirect elections for 
the presidency and instituted Congress as an electoral college (Article 9),^  ^ and 
abolished all political parties, replacing the multi-party system with a bi-partisan one 
(Article 18 and Complementary Act No 4 of 29^  ^October 1965). As Carvalho points 
out, within the new party-system created by the military, the government party. 
National Renewal Alliance (Alianga Renovadora Nacional - ARENA), always had the 
majority in Congress, passing all government’s proposed plans, including its most 
repressive policies and legislation.^^ Hence, unlike the authoritarian regimes in 
Argentina and Chile, Brazil’s military dictatorship did not suppress the country’s main
by the 1946 Constitution are active and passive electoral capacities and the organisation and 
representation o f political parties. Active electoral capacity consists o f the right to enlist to vote and the 
right to vote whilst passive electoral capacity encompasses the right to be voted (PJ Dorella, 'Os 
Direitos Politicos nas Constituiçôes Brasileiras' Jus Navigandi 
<http://jus.uol.com.br/revista/texto/1502> accessed 23rd March 2011). Articles 131 to 140 o f the 1946 
Constitution prescribe about the right to vote, the conditions for enlistment, suffrage and the right o f  
proportional representation o f political parties, list cases o f ineligibility to be a candidate in public 
elections and establish the conditions for re-elections. The same matters, except the organisation, 
fimctioning and extinction o f political parties, are specified in Chapter II, entitled ‘Political Rights’, of 
the 1967 and 1969 Constitutions, Articles 142 to 148 and 147 to 151, respectively. Article 136 o f the 
1946 Constitution prescribes that the loss o f political rights entails the simultaneous loss o f public 
office or function. In addition. Article 16 o f the Institutional Act No 2 establishes that the suspension of  
political rights, both founded on the same Act and on Article 10 o f Institutional Act No I, would incur, 
apart from what Article 337 o f the Electoral Code and Art 6 o f the Political Parties Organic Law 
prescribe: (I) the cessation o f jurisdiction privileges based on the prerogatives o f public office; (II) the 
suspension o f the right to vote and be voted in union elections; (III) the prohibition o f any political 
activity or manifestation; and (IV) the application, when necessary, o f security measures such as: (a) 
supervised freedom, (b) prohibition to attend certain places, (c) and appointed residence. Institutional 
Act No 10 (Article f ‘) determines further consequences to the suspension o f political rights and the 
repeal o f public offices, such as the prohibition to exercise activities in companies, institutions and 
organisations related, directly or indirectly, to the public administration, compulsory retirement, and 
cessation o f any other federal, state or municipal public mandate not expressly repealed.
The names o f the first Congressmen, governors and other political and union leaders, as well as 
intellectuals and members o f the armed forces were issued on three different lists which complemented 
the Act. Among them were the names o f Joao Goulart, Jânio Quadros, Luiz Carlos Prestes (the leader 
of the Brazilian Communist Party) and Leonel Brizola (a political leader and supporter o f Goulart).
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civilian political institutions. Congress and the Judiciary remained operative, albeit 
with restrictive powers and despite the fact that many of their members were expelled, 
elections were held periodically, although most became indirect; and political parties 
still existed, even though the number, role and the activities performed by them were 
substantially limited.^^ Direct elections for state governors were suspended in 1966,^  ^
whereas direct elections for the presidency did not effectively happen from 1960 to 
1989. During that period, presidents were chosen by the military leadership, and put 
forward for ratification by the C ongress.A s such, the regime accorded legitimacy to 
the process by requesting its presidential appointments to be formally approved by the 
Congress, thus operating under the Brazilian constitutional framwork.^* This is 
important evidence of the inadequacy of legal formality as a conception of the rule of 
law, as argued in Chapter 2. By adhering to the formal requirements of rule validity, 
authoritarian regimes, such as the dictatorship in Brazil, can vest their acts with a veil 
of legal legitimacy, employing the law to repress the rights and freedoms of its 
citizens, yet providing them with a legal basis. As will be seen more in depth in 
Chapter 6, international pressure from other states, human rights organisations and 
transnational tribunals can offer a compelling reason for regimes to comply with the 
rule of law and may, eventually, drive political change. By acting within strict legality, 
tyrannical regimes can avoid such pressures, making the law that serves these 
purposes more pernicious since aimed at achieving unfair, immoral and inequitable 
agendas. For this reason, the opposition party, Brazilian Democratic Movement 
{Movimento Democratico Brasileiro - MDB), was put in a difficult position: continue 
operating, despite the repeal of the mandate of some of its members and the 
impossibility of being a real opposition party, or auto-dissolve.^^ For Carvalho, the 
choice between forming the only opposition to the regime and ceasing to exist was 
very difficult for the MDB as, on one side, the party could offer some counter-balance 
to the military regime but, on the other, would be legitimising the military coup 
precisely by acting as the opposition.^^ Although the party considered dissolving itself.
Ibid., pp. 165-6; Kinzo, 'A Democratizaçâo Brasileira: Um Balanço no Processo Politico desde a 
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it ultimately decided to offer the little resistance it could by using Congress as a 
platform to protest against anti-democratic proposals. Even this soft opposition offered 
some risks, as Congressmen who criticised the government and its proposals more 
vocally usually had their political term ended. "^^
For Carvalho, the military regime in Brazil offers three distinct phases. The first, from 
1964 to 1968, encompasses the government of President Castelo Branco and the first 
year of Costa e Silva’s government. This period was characterised by repression with 
later signs of mitigation and was led by the liberal branch of the military, represented 
by General Castelo Branco.^^ In the economy, this first phase was marked by the fight 
against inflation, a drastic decrease in the minimum wages and slow economic growth, 
although the economy recovered by 1968, when growth equivalent to that of the 1950s 
was seen.^^
The second phase, from 1968 to 1974, Carvalho describes as the darkest phase of 
history of the country, from the civil and political rights perspective. Ruled by General 
Garrastazu Medici - who took power after Costa e Silva’s departure due to illness - 
together with the most brutal representatives of the military, this was the most violent 
and repressive period of Brazil’s history. In contrast to such a dark socio-political 
scenario, Brazil was experiencing an unprecedented period of economic growth, albeit 
with the rise in social inequality, as minimum wages continued to fall.^^ During 
Medici’s government, a new National Security Act was introduced,^^ and the death
Ibid.
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The National Security Act (Lei de Segurança Nacional - LSN) introduced through Decree-Law No 
314 of 1967, legalised the doctrine o f national security which underscored the regime imposed by the 
military in 1964. Article 3'^  ^prescribed that the preservation o f national security also encompassed the 
prevention and repression o f adverse psychological war as well as revolutionary and subversive wars, 
as defined by the article’s paragraphs. § T*, for instance, defined internal security as threats or 
antagonic pressures o f any kind, form, or nature, manifested or producing effects in the national sphere, 
while § 2"^  stated that psychological war included the employment o f political, social, psycho-social 
and military propaganda aimed at influencing or provoking emotions, attitudes and behaviour of  
foreigners, enemies, neutrals and friends, against the advancement o f national goals. Chapter II o f the 
Act (Articles 5 to 43) listed the crimes against national security and their correspondent punishment, 
including detention for 6 months to 2 years for disturbing, or tiying to disturb, legislative or judiciary 
sessions or international conferences through threats, commotions or noises (Article 35) and detention 
of 3 months to I year for public employees who collectively, as a whole or in part, stop performing 
their duties (Article 34) (Decreto-Lei n° 314, de 13 de Março de 1967 (DOU de 13/03/1967 - Seçâo 1, 
Pagina 2993)). This Act was repealed and replaced, in 1969, by a new LSN, introduced by Decree-Law 
No 898, which stated an even longer list o f crimes against national security in Chapter II (Article 5*^  to 
55). (Decreto-Lei n° 898, de 29 de Setembro de 1969 DOU de 29/09/1969 - Seçâo 1, Pagina 8162) ).
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penalty by firing squad was reinstated (Article 1 of Institutional Act No 14 (AI-14))^^. 
Capital punishment had been officially abolished with the Proclamation of the 
Republic in 1889/® and had not been practiced in Brazil since its independence/^ In 
addition, in November 1968, Federal Law No 5.536^^ introduced censorship of theatre 
and cinema and created the Superior Censorship Council (Conselho Superior de 
Censura) and, in 1970, Decree-Law No 1.077^  ^ expanded censorship to books, 
periodicals, radio, TV, public shows and spectacles. The enactment of Institutional 
Act No 5 (AI-5),^"  ^ in 1969, vested the President with wide powers to defend the 
‘Revolution of 1964’ and persecute those against its ideals and the consolidation of its 
movement; among them were the power to close Congress (Article 2"^) and to 
intervene in the states and municipalities to protect the national interest (Article 3^ ^^ ). 
By branding all those against ‘the Revolution’ enemies, as well as excluding all action 
and measures aimed at the implementation of AI-5 and its Complementary Acts from 
judicial review (Article 11), the regime encroached widely on individual rights and 
freedoms of the individual.
The last period of the military regime began in 1974, with the installation of General 
Ernesto Geisel in power, culminating in 1985 with the indirect elections of President 
Tancredo Neves. Geisel signalled his attempt to liberalise the political system by 
relaxing some of the repressive legislation enacted by the military and replacing 
regional commanders with officers of his own, more liberal, faction. His political 
programme, named ‘distention’ or ‘decompression’ (distensao), initiated a gradual 
relaxation of authoritarianism.^^ Although such measures were firmly opposed by the 
repressive organs of the military, this phase of liberalisation continued to gather force 
under the government of General Joao Batista de Figueiredo (1979-1985), when it was 
denominated a “politics of opening,” ®^ during which period repressive laws were
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slowly revoked and the voice of the opposition progressively grew/^ The outstanding 
economic achievements that the military had enjoyed since the birth of the regime 
began to wane when the economy showed signs of weakness after the oil crisis of 
1973, with economic growth rates decreasing dramatically - a trend which continued 
into the 1980s, when the country’s economic performance became negative/^
In the next section of this Chapter, the opening of the military regime and the 
transition to democracy will be analysed. As will be seen, popular pressure gathered 
strength in the early 1980s. This, together with economic recession, made the 
dictatorship regime unsustainable, leading eventually to the country’s transition to 
democracy in 1985. Despite nationwide popular protests against the repressive rule of 
the military and unprecedented democratic participation in the making of the new 
constitution, a number of authoritarian rules and practices were to outlive the regime, 
perpetuating the Brazilian legal system’s protection of the interests of the political, 
economic and military elites.
4.2 Liberalisation of the Military Regime and Transition to Democracy
The pre-democratic period^® was characterised by protests and demonstrations 
throughout the country.®® These gained force after 1983, when state governors began 
again to be chosen by direct elections,®  ^ culminating, in 1984, with the creation of a
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Kinzo divides the liberalisation o f the military regime into three phases. In the first phase, from 1974 
to 1982, the transitional process was controlled by the military and resembled more an attempt to 
reform the regime than the first steps to a democratic transition. The second phase corresponds to the 
period between 1982 and 1985 which, although also controlled by the military, had an important 
civilian contribution. The third phase, from 1985 to 1989, is the period when the military no longer had 
a prominent role in the political transition and was, thus, dominated by civilian politicians and 
characterised by a strong civil society participation (Kinzo, 'A Democratizaçâo Brasileira: Um Balanço 
no Processo Politico desde a Transiçâo', pp.4-5). Pinheiro, on the other hand, argues that the pre- 
democratic period started in 1985, with the nomination o f the candidate o f the opposition for President, 
Tancredo Neves, and the subsequent inauguration o f Vice-President José Samey, who took power after 
the unexpected death of Tancredo Neves on the day he was to be invested into his new position. The 
end o f this period was completed, for the scholar, with the promulgation o f the 1988 Constitution 
(Pinheiro, 'Transiçâo Polftica e Nâo-Estado de Direito na Republica', pp.288-91).
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mass movement calling for direct presidential elections, the Diretas Ja/^ Such was the 
confidence in the return of democracy that, on 25^  ^ January 1984, the Diretas Ja 
movement®^ organised a rally at Praça da Sé, in the centre of the city of Sao Paulo, 
gathering 300,000 people to demand direct presidential elections and the end of 
dictatorship.®"^
Although social mobilisation no doubt influenced the transition to democracy, 
political liberalisation in Brazil was a negotiated and gradual process.®  ^ As Codato 
points out, the opening and controlled political liberalisation of the dictatorship was 
initiated by the ‘castelistas’ faction of the military, led by Generals Ernesto Geisel and 
Golbery de Couto e Silva.®  ^ Among other measures. President Geisel (1974-1979), 
with the collaboration of the opposition, sanctioned the weakening of some of the 
political controls exercised by the regime and the re-establishment of classical liberal 
rights.®  ^ Accordingly, in 1978, the Brazilian Congress approved Constitutional 
Amendment No. 11®^  to the 1967 Constitution,®® introducing political reforms and re­
instating civil and political rights and freedoms, albeit with the maintenance of 
effective safeguards of the military regime.^ ®® Article 3 of the Amendment abolished 
all Institutional Acts, including one of the most repressive laws passed during the 
dictatorship, AI-5. As a consequence of the repeal of AI-5, the writ of habeas corpus 
was re-established, freedom of speech, which had been severely curbed by the 
censorship of all means of communication, was restored, and the independence of the 
judiciary, hindered by Article 6^  ^ of AI-5, which suspended judges’ constitutional
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guarantees of stability, life tenure and irremovability, prescribed by Article 113 of the 
1967 Constitution, was re-instituted/®^ The right to life was also reinstated with the 
revocation of life sentences and capital punishment/®^ In addition, a number of 
political refugees were allowed to return/®^ Despite this, the Amendment contained 
provisions designed to safeguard some authoritarian powers of the Head of State. The 
amended Article 156 of the 1967 Constitution, for instance, established that the 
President could declare a state of siege when subversion posed a threat to the 
independence or integrity of the country. Paragraph 2"  ^ of the same provision 
permitted coercive measures during a state of siege, among them detention, 
suspension of freedom of assembly and association, and search and seizure operations. 
In addition, parliamentary immunity was not completely re-established and, although 
the President could no longer terminate Congressmen’s mandates and suspend their 
political rights. Deputies and Senators could be tried by the regime for crimes against 
national security. ^®"^ Another strong sign of regime opening was the enactment, in 
1979, under Figueiredo’s government, of the Amnesty Law {Lei da Anistid)}^^ 
Despite this, and although the bill had long been championed by the opposition, it 
represented a serious compromise for opponents to the regime. This is because the 
amnesty would be applied not only to those accused of crimes against national 
security, but also to agents of the government who had imprisoned, tortured and killed 
the regime’s detractors. Notwithstanding the compromise, the amnesty re-instated the 
political rights of those whose rights had been repealed during the regime which, for 
Carvalho, was a significant step in the fight against the dictatorship.^®®
It is important to note the negotiated and compromised elements of the Brazilian 
démocratisation process were not unique to Brazil, but a common feature of the ‘third 
wave démocratisation’ -  an extensive group of transitions undergone between 1974 
and 1990s in approximately 30 countries in Europe, Asia and Latin America -^ ®^
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described by Huntington/®^ As he contends, most of the third wave’s transitions were 
characterised by negotiations, compromises and agreements reached between political 
elites, the key players, and societies’ main social groups. Geisel’s plan for democratic 
opening epitomised the will of reformers in governments around the world to accede 
to opposition demands for democracy. Opposition parties and groups, on the other 
hand, sought to be part of that process by adapting and moderating their demands.^®®
A combination of reasons is said to have contributed to the end of the regime. Firstly, 
it is argued, albeit non-democratic, the convictions of the military faction to which 
Geisel belonged were liberal and, thus, their aim had never been to remain in power 
indefinitely, but to rid Brazil of the populist policies and style of government 
introduced by Getulio Vargas, and subsequently carried forward by Goulart.^'® In 
addition, by late 1970s, Brazil was experiencing an economic downturn, prompted by 
a succession of global recessions and short-sighted government policies to contain 
them.^^  ^ Although the military had been successful in addressing high inflation and 
had led the country through a period of unprecedented economic growth between 
1967-1973, known as the ‘Brazilian Miracle’ {Milagre Brasileiro)}^^ the 1973 oil 
crisis, and the consequent dramatic rise in the price of oil, hit the Brazilian economy 
hard, since 80% of the its oil demand was fulfilled with imported oil. In an attempt to 
stimulate the economy, Geisel invested massively in energy and infrastructure in an 
ambitious import-substitution programme, paid with international loans. With a 
sizeable foreign debt, and heavily exposed in the international markets, Brazil’s 
economy was particularly ill-prepared to withstand a second oil crisis in 1979 and the 
global economic downturn of 1982. The recession caused the return of inflation and 
economic stagnation, two historical problems of the Brazilian economy, straining 
further popular support for the regime. In addition to poor economic performance, 
Carvalho contends that later analyses of the years of the economic ‘miracle’ exposed 
its deep social deficiencies as, although the economy grew rapidly, the inequality gap 
rose in the same period. Accordingly, whilst in 1960 20% of the poorest and least 
economically active sectors of the population detained 3.9% of the national income, in
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1980 this number had fallen to 2.8%. By contrast, the income of the 10% richest 
increased during that interval, rising from 39.6% to 50.9% of the country’s national 
income. A third possible reason for the opening has to do with the internal workings 
of the armed forces. As Carvalho and Kinzo point out, the dictatorship had diverted 
members of the armed forces from following a traditional military career to becoming 
politicians and high echelon administrators.^^® The ambition for power and success 
began to permeate their ranks and undermine the importance of their professional 
obligations, ultimately eroding the morale of officialdom.^^® Their exit from political 
life was, in this sense, a way of preserving the institution of the armed forces. 
Although this was the case, the liberalisation measures implemented by Geisel 
intensified, rather the resolved, internal conflicts within the military institution, as they 
were vehemently opposed by the regime’s h a r d - l i n e r s . I n  addition, the 
dictatorship’s repressive machinery had created a different class of military officers, 
whose self-determining attitude threatened the hierarchy of the military institution. 
This group, which was involved in torture and repression in the name of the regime, 
created a stigma of ‘torturers’ for those in the armed forces, staining the image of the 
military establishment and undermining the view of those who, like Geisel and the 
officers close to him, perceived the armed forces as a professional career path.^^^
In the run-up to the elections for members of Congress in 1974, Geisel allowed a more 
open debate between the government party and the opposition, not least by permitting 
the opposition to air their electoral campaign on television with relative freedom. 
The results would surprise not only the regime, but also the opposition, as the 
government party suffered a large decrease in its Congressional seats. Of the 22 
available seats, the opposition party, MDB, won 16 of them. Despite not reaching a 
majority in the Chamber of Deputies, the MDB considerably increased its presence 
from 87 to 165 seats, leaving the ARENA party with 199 Deputies, down from 223. 
These results meant that the government lost the two-thirds qualified majority
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necessary for the approval of constitutional amendments/^^ representing a huge set 
back for Geisel and, consequently, weakening his position within the regime/^^ As 
Kinzo contends, the result of the 1974 elections made clear that, despite the military’s 
excellent economic track record until then, it did not enjoy popular support/^^ In 
addition, the MDB, a party that was supposed to be an ally by providing legitimacy to 
the façade of bi-partisan politics, had now become an important instrument of 
democratic opposition/^"^ In order to re-assert his power and ease pressure from 
radicals within the armed forces, the President partially retreated from his opening 
project by attempting to change the electoral rules ahead of the 1978 elections/^® One 
example was the enactment, in July 1976, of the Falcon’s Law {Lei Falcao)}^^ which 
restricted the broadcasting of electoral propaganda in state and municipal general 
elections. Most changes were, however, made in April 1977 when, faced with the lack 
of legislative majority, Geisel suspended Congress for 15 days on the of April 1977 
by enacting Complementary Act No 102,'^^ during which period he passed the Acts 
and Constitutional Amendments, known as the April’s Package {Pacote de Abril), 
that would save his government. Among them was the confirmation for indirect 
elections for state governorships; the rule that two-thirds of Senators - pejoratively 
known as Bionic Senators - would henceforth be indirectly elected; the expansion of 
restrictions on broadcasting and propaganda of electoral campaigns to national general 
elections; the increase of the presidential mandate from 5 to 6 years; and the 
elimination of the rule requiring two-thirds congressional approval on constitutional 
amendments. As a result, Geisel neutralised internal pressures, avoiding both the 
interference from the radical factions in his own government and their imposition of a
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successor/^® According to Kinzo, the retreat and appeasement of the radicals within 
the armed forces was evidence of Geisel’s ability to deal with both sides of the 
transitional process. Accordingly, Geisel sought to please the military as well as the 
opposition, the first by ending the Congressional mandate of the most fervent 
opponents to the regime and controlling the political clout of the opposition, and, the 
second, by reacting to the excesses of the military radicals, for instance, by dismissing 
the Commander of the armed forces in Sao Paulo in response to the torture and deaths 
of a journalist and a steel worker in the precincts of the political police department, the 
DOI-CODI
In 1979, the multi-party system was re-instated with six new parties. ARENA 
beeame the Social Democratic Party (Partido Democratico Social - PDS), the MDB 
came to be the Brazilian Demoeratic Movement Party {Partido do Movimento 
Democratico Brasileiro - PMDB), the former Brazilian Labour Party {Partido 
Trabalhista Brasileiro - PTB) was split in two, the PTB and the Labour Democratic 
Party {Partido Democratico Trabalhista - PDT), moderates of the MDB formed the 
Popular Party {Partido Popular - PP), which later merged again with the PMDB, and 
the Labour Party {Partido Trabalhista - PT), the newest, most progressive and 
inclusive party in Brazilian politics, was created in February 1980.^^  ^ As Carvalho 
asserts, all Brazilian parties before and after 1964, with the exception of the 
Communist Party {Partido Comunista), had been created by professional politicians or 
through the influenee of the Brazilian E x e c u t iv e ,a n d  had been dominated by the 
social and economic elites. The PT, on the other hand, was founded after ample and 
open discussion amongst the party’s hundreds of mil i tan ts .Thanks  to the openness 
of the party and the wide platform for discussion that it offered, three very distinct 
groups came to prominenee within the PT: the progressive arm of the Catholic
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Church, union members, and Marxist intellectual figures, such as the communist 
political scientist Carlos Nelson Coutinho/®®
Another important step in the liberalisation of the regime was the decision to reinstate 
direct elections for state governors. These were the first elections to be held under the 
new party system and took place in 1982, together with the elections for Congress. 
The opposition won nine of the twenty two state governorships available, including 
important states such as Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas Gerais, also winning the 
majority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies in Congress.
According to Carvalho, one of the last acts of the transition by the military was their 
choice not to put forward a military General as a candidate for the 1985 presidential 
elections. A coalition between the opposition and the Liberal Front (Frente Liberal) - 
formed by dissidents of the government party, PDS, who were unhappy with the 
PDS’s candidate, Paulo Salim Maluf — led to the opposition candidate, Tancredo 
Neves, winning the e lec t ions .Dur ing his campaign for the presidency, Tancredo 
Neves promised Brazilians a new constitution that would consolidate the transition 
from dictatorship to democracy. He became severely ill before taking office, however, 
and his Vice-President and successor, José Samey, was left to fulfil that promise.
As Carvalho points out, although Samey was a long-standing ally of the military, he 
was a civilian who had also been voted in by the opposition. These events symbolised 
the end of the dictatorship period, although, as will be seen in more detail below, 
residues of authoritarianism continued to be perpetuated in the country’s legal system 
and in its social and political practices.
Although not amounting to a clear mpture with the military regime, as Brazil’s 
democracy was being built on authoritarian institutional foundations, Bethell argues 
that the new political system was not simply a continuation or adaptation of the old. 
As she contends, expectations for change were considerable and new forces, including 
popular pressure for the progressive and substantial attainment of democracy, 
propelled the new government into enacting a series of constitutional amendments to
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that effect/"^^ Accordingly, although Samey successfully manoeuvred the Constituent 
Assembly into increasing the presidential and, therefore, his own term in power from 
4 to 5 yea rs ,Congress  made Constitutional Amendment No 25/"*"* The Amendment 
introduced comprehensive constitutional electoral amendments finally enfranchising 
illiterates, most of them black,*"*® legalising political parties from the left, including the 
Communist Party, and tuming elections for mayors, state govemors and the President 
into direct elections/"*® The first ever elections in Brazil based on universal suffrage 
were the municipal elections held in November 1985, albeit illiterates had limited time 
to register, and less than half registered for the subsequent elections, of November 
1986, for Congress and state govemorships/"*^ Article 14 of the 1988 Constitution 
maintained illiterates’ right to vote, as well as lowering the voting age from 18 to 16 
years.
The presidential elections of 1989 mark, for Kinzo, the end of the Brazilian transition 
to democracy.*"*  ^Held symbolically 100 years after the Proclamation of the Republic, 
these were the first presidential elections in the history of the country to be founded on 
universal suffrage.*"*® Eighty-two million people were registered to vote,*®® whilst over 
70 million Brazilians cast their votes in the first direct presidential elections for more 
than 30 years.*®* As Lamounier contends, the limited political activity allowed by the 
military before the historical elections of 1989 had concealed a large expansion of the 
electorate in Brazil; the elections thus revealed that the democracies before and after 
the regime had changed significantly, from a democracy with a restrictive base to a 
democracy of the masses. Accordingly, only 13% of the Brazilian population voted in 
the 1945 elections and 22% in the last direct presidential elections before the military
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regime, in 1960. By contrast, 55% of the population voted in 1989.*®^  Major factors 
contributing to this were undoubtedly the achievement of universal suffrage (Article 
14, 1988 Constitution) and the will of the population to actively participate in the 
choice of their first democratic President in nearly three decades.*®® In this 
environment of great popular participation, the election of President Fernando Collor 
de Melo represented a symbolic end to a long and complex process of democratic 
transition.*®"*
4.2.1 Social Movements and their Role in the Transition to Democracy
Concomitant to the process of opening, Carvalho contends that, since 1974, there was 
the renewal and re-gathering of forces of the movements of opposition, with a range of 
movements being reborn or revitalised and new movements created. This phenomenon 
was initially a product of the liberalisation measures implemented by Geisel, but 
social movements were later responsible for re-orienting and speeding the transitional 
process.*®®
The main movement against the dictatorship in its early years comprised clandestine 
groups formed by left-wing activists and dissidents from the Communist Party. 
Frustrated by the lack of legal means of opposition, they sought to undermine the 
regime by using militarised guerrilla tactics.*®® The first major operation was the 
kidnap, in September 1969, of the American ambassador to Brazil, Charles Elbrick, in 
an act of defiance against the regime. The result of this and other operations, such as 
kidnappings of ambassadors and consuls in exchange for political prisoners, political 
killings and bank and supermarket robberies to finance the movement, was the scaling 
up of repression by the military which, until the end of Medici’s government, met the
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guerrilla’s methods with more torture, disappearances, arbitrary imprisonment and 
killings.*®  ^ Opponents of the regime, or those accused of being so, were either 
disappeared or killed in car accidents. The media was not allowed to report on 
disappearance cases or to contradict the official version of events.*®  ^ The 
intensification and strengthening of the repressive machinery of the regime, as well as 
its commitment to weeding out its opponents, led to the failure, in the beginning of the 
1970s, of the opposition groups that had sprung up since 1968.*®® Many of their 
members were killed, imprisoned, went into exile or eventually left the guerrillas after 
realising that a solution to the dictatorship was not to be found through violent and 
revolutionary means.*®®
These groups were later replaced by other civil and religious organisations and social 
movements that gradually offered an effective opposition to the military, although 
their ends were not necessarily political. One of these organisations was the Catholic 
Church, which, although initially neutral, came to adopt a clear stance for the defence 
of human rights and opposition to the dictatorship. The military reacted to the 
Church’s involvement in the political affairs of the country by imprisoning and 
murdering Catholic priests.*®* This did not deter the Catholic Church which, with a 
very significant presence and influence in Brazil, was too strong an organisation to be 
intimidated by the regime, as the political parties and unions had been.*®^
The militant activities of the Catholic Church in Brazil were exercised mainly by the 
Grassroots Ecclesiastical Communities {Communidades Eclesiais de Base - CEBs) 
that formed from 1975. Previously, Catholic militancy was exercised in the unions, 
through the Catholic Youth Workers (Juventude Operaria Catolica - JOC), and in 
student movements, both through Catholic Youth Students {Juventudes Estudantis 
Catolica -  JEC) and Catholic Youth Universities {Juventudes Universitaria Catolica - 
JUC).*®® The CEBs expanded and spread throughout the country, including rural 
areas, reaching 80,000 members around 1985. The intention of the Church was to be 
closer to the masses, especially the poor, and, as a result, it started working with those
Carvalho, Cidadania no Brasil: O Longo Caminho, p. 163 
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 182 
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 183 
Ibid.
Ibid.
166
living in the cities’ suburbs and at the margins of society. Although senior members 
within the Church were reluctant to accept political party affiliation, the Church’s 
efforts in raising political consciousness of the economically and socially excluded, 
led it to becoming ever closer to the Through its persistent activism and its fight 
to secure the protection of human rights, the Church became the bastion of the fight 
against the dictatorship regime in Brazil.
According to Cornwall, Romano and Shankland, the work of the Catholic Church with 
rural communities and the Peasant Leagues laid the foundations for birth of the 
Landless Workers’ Movement {Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra - 
MST),^^^ which from the 1980s fought for agrarian reform .R epresenting  a part of 
the population that had been largely forgotten by successive Brazilian governments, 
the MST was organised by rural workers demanding the redistribution of vast amounts 
of unproductive land owned by a small minority of land owners. One of the legacies 
of the Spanish and Portuguese colonialism in Latin America was the 'latifundia', or 
exorbitantly large estates that constituted the power-base for ruling oligarchies. As 
Rosenn points out,
“[i]n Latin America, oligopolistic control over land produced a highly 
stratified rural society, with a tiny upper class, virtually no middle 
class, and a huge lower class. The scarcity of arable land outside the 
large estates tied labor to the estates and made landless agricultural 
workers dependent upon the landowner for protection and support.”^^®
Although some of the MST’s methods and strategies were highly contentious and, in 
some cases, bordered on il le g a li ty ,th e  movement’s pioneering practices such as 
road side encampments, direct occupation of ‘unproductive’ land, and collective
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production of areas the government has designated for resettlement, have been copied 
by mainstream rural workers’ unions,strengthening and highlighting the urgency of 
the struggle against the eenturies-long political lack of political will in addressing land 
re-distribution. As a result, the MST has become a political force in Brazil, 
contributing to the further démocratisation of the country’s socio- political system.
It is important to note, however, that, in spite of MST’s political clout and success in 
giving and maintaining political prominence to land issues, this form of politics is 
necessarily limited and characterised by tension with law, politics and the state. 
Land occupation as a strategy for pressuring the state to fulfil its constitutional legal 
obligation towards land^^  ^depends, for its efficacy, on the will of the state, which is 
more often interested in protecting the interests of the landed elites than the 
constitutional rights of the poor. For this reason, despite offering “significant sources 
of political leverage to formally powerless social classes,” the pressure they 
effectuate can only translate into meaningful political and legal change when the elites 
feel sufficiently pressured or compelled to act in demanding the state to meet its 
constitutional mandate to reallocate unproductive large-sized rural properties to the 
poor landless classes.
The birth of the PT also strengthened Brazilian social movements, as, since its 
foundation in 1980, the party had an avenue in formal political forums to advance 
their demands. With a member-base comprised of grassroots activists, union 
members, factory workers, and left-wing intellectuals, rather than professional 
politicians, and offering a wide platform for discussion, the PT represented a fresh 
approach in Brazilian politics.D ifferently  from the other mass political parties, the 
PT sustained close links with social movements, especially in its formative phase. 
There was also a consensus among the members of the party about the need to address
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the inequalities and injustices ingrained in the Brazilian s o c ie ty /T h e  PT built its 
identity by associating itself both with workers and civil society groups, a fact which, 
for Kinzo, stressed and encouraged the principle of participatory dem ocracy/H ence, 
although it is commonly argued that negotiated democratic transitions will generally 
rely on covert or exclusionary pacts reached by “elitist, hierarchical and socially 
conservative” parties, resulting in a “restrictive democracy” where social 
movements become increasingly “isolated, repressed or marginalised,” this depends 
on the political culture of the country undergoing the transition. In the case of Brazil, 
Foweraker evidenced a very different outcome, whereby the PT represented a fresh 
response to the popular struggle against the dictatorship.
The new trade unions also represented a different and more grassroots approach to the 
unionism practiced during and inherited from the New Estate. The Union movement, 
voiced through strikes, proved an effective form of opposition to the regime. 
Composed largely of steel workers from national and multinational car-makers and 
heavy machinery steel industries based in the industrial outskirts of Sao Paulo, trade 
unions had expanded significantly in the years of rapid economic growth during 
Medici’s government, due to the investment and expansion in the new sectors of the 
economy of durable and capital g o o d s . T h e  movement started in 1977 with 
demands for higher wages and culminated in 1978 and 1979 with massive strikes that 
spread to other regions in the country. The growing discontent with working 
conditions, as well as their strength as a means of political opposition, led 300,000 
workers to join mass demonstrations in 1978 and more than 3 million in 1979, when 
workers from the most diverse professions and regions in the country took to the 
streets to protest against the government. The distinguishing feature of the new 
union activism in Brazil was that, contrary to the bureaucratic union organisation of 
the New State, unions were organised from the bottom up, starting from the factories, 
and their leadership was composed of industry workers from the line of production. 
Their démocratisation symbolised a rupture with the paternalistic union model
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implemented by Vargas. Great emphasis was, therefore, placed upon commissions, 
established inside factories and overseen by union commissioners. The final decisions 
of the unions were agreed upon in massive assemblies of up to 150,000 workers, 
rather than by small managerial committees. The new union leaders had great 
charisma and amongst them, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, known as Lula, became one of 
main figures in Brazilian politics. By disrupting old patterns of state dependency 
and co-relation, the new union movement played an active role in changing the 
country’s socio-political status quo.^^° In their fight for independence from the 
government, the unions began negotiating working conditions directly with 
employers, thus away from the Brazilian Labour Courts, through collective contracts. 
At first, the government reacted strongly to this new approach by intervening in the 
unions, imprisoning their leaders (amongst them Lula) and employing police brutality 
to threaten members. Gradually, however, the practice became more accepted, 
probably partly due to the multinationals’ past experience with unions and their 
willingness to negotiate directly with workers.
Other important organisations offering successful resistance to the regime were the 
Brazilian Bar Association {Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil -  GAB)^^^ and the 
Brazilian Press Society (Sociedade Brasileira de Impresa - ABI). The GAB, having 
adopted a neutral stance early in the regime, became a real force of opposition after 
1973. Even though many lawyers and judges continued to work for the government, 
thus legitimising the abuses of the regime, the institutional posture of the organisation 
was reversed. As Carvalho points out, despite protecting their professional integrity, 
as the dictatorship posed limitations on the activities and practices of the organisation 
and its members, one of their main motivations was a genuine belief in the value and 
importance of human rights. The prominence of the organisation amongst the 
opposition was confirmed in 1979, when its chairman, Raimundo Faro, was 
considered as a possible candidate for the opposition in the presidential elections. 
The ABI also provided significant resistance to the regime and their fight against the
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dictatorship helped re-build democracy in B raz il/A n o th e r  organisation furthering 
the principles of the opposition was the Brazilian Association for the Progress of 
Science (Associaçâo Brasileira para o Progressa da Ciência - SBPC), whose annual 
meetings progressively acquired a tone of political opposition/
The height of popular mobilisation against the regime occurred in the run-up to the 
first presidential elections in over two decades, due to take place in January 1985/^^ 
In an attempt to modify the election rules, the opposition proposed a constitutional 
amendment for the re-establishment of elections by popular vote/^^ In addition, for 
the first time since the start of the regime, the opposition went beyond competing only 
symbolically in the elections. The PMDB led the way in gathering the support of the 
other opposition parties, as well as distinguished organisations such as the OAB and 
the ABI, and in releasing the Diretas Ja campaign in the streets of Brazil calling for 
direct elections. With a simple majority in Congress, the opposition depended on the 
vote of members of the PDS to achieve the two-thirds majority required to pass 
constitutional amendments (Article 48 of the 1967 Constitution).C ounting on the 
crucial backing of the opposition governors of three of the most important states in 
Brazil - Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais - the campaign amassed 
significant popular endorsement, ultimately resulting in an “impressive popular 
mobilization with millions of people, carrying banners and wearing T-shirts with the 
slogan ‘Diretas- Ja,’ attending public rallies all over the country.” ®^® For Carvalho, 
Diretas Ja was undoubtedly the biggest popular mobilisation the country had ever 
experienced. It started with a protest of 5,000 people in the city of Goiânia and, after 
reaching the biggest Brazilian cities, ended with one rally of 500,000 people in Rio de 
Janeiro and another of over 1 million people in Sao Paulo. Although the regime made 
occasional attempts to obstruct the manifestations, they were unsuccessful due to a 
now mostly free press and the considerable popular support the campaign enjoyed.^^^ 
The impact of the demonstrations had been so significant that some PDS 
Congressmen deserted their party, fearing the consequences of siding with the
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government and voting against the amendment/®^ Despite receiving the votes of 55 
PDS dissidents, the amendment was 22 votes short, and the bill was defeated. The 
campaign was not in vain, however, and the opposition released the name of Tacredo 
Neves, the experienced governor of the state of Minas Gerais, as its candidate against 
the government’s nominee. The name of the Vice-President was chosen among PDS 
dissidents, who had formed a new party, the Party of the Liberal Front (Partido da 
Frente Liberal - PFL). The campaign for the opposition candidate was very strong 
and, this time around. Deputies could not ignore the popular support for Tancredo 
Neves. Although the Electoral College was dominated by the government, Neves 
received 480 votes, against 180 for the government candidate. This event marked the 
beginning of the end of dictatorship in Brazil.^®^
Although the transition to democracy was a negotiated and compromised process, 
securing the total and irrevocable amnesty of those who had carried out gross 
violations of human rights and who had curbed the constitutional rights and freedoms 
of the Brazilian people, the strengthening of social movements,^®"  ^the birth of the PT 
and the activism of ordinary citizens against authoritarianism were crucial in 
significantly decreasing the paternalistic relationship between the Brazilian state and 
the masses. The realisation of their power to fight for change was also reinforced by 
the unparalleled democratic participation in writing the new constitution,^®^ detailed in 
the next section of this Chapter. As will be contended, although residues of 
authoritarianism persist both in Brazil’s legal system and in its socio-political 
practices, revealing the compromises that had to be made in the transitional process, 
the empowerment of the Brazilian masses may prove a meaningful factor in the 
implementation of the rule of law and consolidation of the country’s democracy.
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4.2.2 The 1988 Constitution: The Citizen Constitution {Constituiçâo Cidada)
The democratic legislative process of constitution-building culminated with the 
promulgation, on 5^*^ October 1998, of the new democratic Constitution, which 
enshrined a range of provisions for the defence of civil and human rights and 
democratic ideals.^ ®® Accordingly, as seen in Chapter 3, the 1988 Constitution protects 
first, second and third generation rights. Among the first are fundamental rights, such 
as the right to life, liberty, security, and equality (Art. 5), freedom of conscience and 
belief (Art. 5, VI), and freedom of association (Art. 5, XVII). Among the second 
generation are the rights to health, education, work, and leisure (Art. 6), cultural rights 
(Art. 215), and the rights of urban and rural workers, including, among others, the 
right against unfair dismissal (Art. 7, I), the right to severance pay (Art. 7, III), the 
right to a minimum wage capable of satisfying the worker’s and his or her family’s 
basic needs, including, inter alia, food, housing, education, health, clothing, and 
hygiene (Art. 7, IV), the right to paid weekly leave, preferably on Sundays (Art. 7, 
XV), and the right to retirement pension (Art. 7, XXIV). Third generation rights 
include the protection of an ‘ecologically balanced environment’ (Art. 225). Art.l also 
prescribes that the ‘dignity of the human person’ and the ‘primacy of human rights’ 
are fundamental principles of the Constitution and must be upheld by the ‘democratic 
government under the rule of law’. The principle of a representative democracy is 
further protected by Art. 1. Some of the most important rights and principles laid out 
by the Constitution are further protected by Art. 60, which consists of a 'clausula 
pétrea' or entrenchment clause, precluding any amendment of the Constitution aimed 
at abolishing the individual rights and guarantees of the citizens; the federative form 
of the state; the right to vote in direct, universal, secret and periodic elections; and the 
doctrine of the separation of powers.^®  ^The 1988 Constitution also expanded access to 
the courts with the creation of small claims courts (Juizados Especiaisf^^ and
French, Drowning in Laws: Labor Law and Brazilian Political Culture ; Pinheiro, 'Democratic 
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Zimmermann, 'Constitutional Rights in Brazil: A Legal Fiction?' p.31 
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nationwide system o f small claims courts had already been established by the military regime in 1984 
through Law No 7.244 (Lei n° 7.244, de 7 de Novembre de 1984 (DOU de 08/11/1984) (Revogada) ).
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broadened the scope of the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality {Açào Direta de 
Inconstitucionalidade - ADIN)/®^ The ADIN mechanism can now be brought before 
the Supreme Federal Tribunal by a wider set of plaintiffs, namely the President, the 
Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, state assemblies, state governors, the General 
Prosecutor, the OAB, political parties, and national class or union confederations. 
Furthermore, the Constitution also created an additional autonomous federal 
prosecutorial body, the Public Ministry {Ministério Publico) , w h i c h  has been 
endowed with far-reaching powers and, due to this and to its proactive stance in 
defending the public in terests ,^ it is sometimes referred to as the ‘fourth power’ of 
the state.^^^
Notwithstanding the fact that Brazil’s present Constitution contains an authentic bill of 
rights,^^^ and that the constitution-making process represented a real example of 
democratic partic ipation ,^its two-year legislative process cannot be considered 
flawless. Although representatives of a wide range of groups in society participated in 
the constitution-building project, political power holders saw this historical moment as 
an opportunity to accommodate their own interests, which necessarily involved 
protecting the elites’ demands. As will be contended, the transfer of rights and of 
democratic processes can be employed by the elites as a strategy to appease the 
masses and foreign elites. Their effectuation in practice will only take place, therefore.
As Prillaman contends, however, the implementation o f the system had been sporadic due to budgetary 
constraints and local indifference to the new legislation (WC Prillaman, 'Brazil: A Shotgun Approach to 
Judicial Reform' in WC Prillaman (ed) The Judiciary and Democratic Decay in Latin America: 
Declining Confidence in the Rule o f  Law (Praeger, London 2000) 75-110, p.81). The lack o f follow- 
through was rectified by the explicit language with which the Constituent Assembly formulated Article 
98 o f the Constitution, which mandates the Union and the states to create Especial Courts “with powers 
for conciliation, judgement and execution of civil suits o f lesser complexity and criminal offenses of 
lower offensive potential, by oral and summary proceedings, allowing, in the cases established in law, 
the settlement and judgement o f appeals by panels o f judges o f first instance” (Constitution o f the 
Federative Republic o f Brazil o f 1988 (translated in English)). In accordance with the Constitution, the 
Especial Courts were established in 1995 by Law No. 9.099 (Lei n° 9.099, de 26 de Setembro de 1995 
(DOU 27/09/1995 - Seçâo 1, Pagina 15033)), which was partially amended by Law No. 10.259/01 (Lei 
n° 10.259, de 12 de Julho de 2001 (DOU de 13/07/2001) (Alterada pela Lei n° 11.313, de 28 de Junho 
de 2006 - DOU 29/6/2006)).
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when the elites can see this as advantageous, as keeping the government within 
constitutional limits requires the population to coordinate with the elites in policing 
the state and denouncing transgressions. For this reason, as will be evidenced in the 
Brazilian case, both the negotiation of transitional processes and the socio-political 
reality which contextualises constitutional texts may be compromised by the 
protection of the interests of the ruling classes and by public officials’ refusal to act 
within the country’s legal framework.
According to Rosenn, one of the first legislative weaknesses of the 1988 
Constitution’s writing process was that, instead of an independent constitutional 
assembly being appointed to draft the new constitution, the next Congress was given 
the power to form a constitutional assembly -  the National Constituent Assembly 
{AssembUia Nacional Constituinte - ANC) -  created by Constitutional Amendment 
No 26^^  ^to the 1967 Constitution.^For Rosenn, this duality of roles by the Brazilian 
Congress presented potential problems. One of them was that, in the newly elected 
Congress, there were 23 Senators who had been elected in 1982, during the 
dictatorship and who, as such, did not have a specific mandate to participate in the 
making of a new democratic constitution.^ The second has a more general and 
functional character. For Rosenn, the reason why Congress should not be called upon 
to draft a new Constitution is that this institution possesses a short-term, strong 
political agenda whereas constitutions require a long-lasting and non-political 
commitment. As he puts it, “[a]s a basic political player. Congress had a clear conflict 
of interests. It is not surprising that the constitutional document it drafted aggrandized 
Congressional power at the expense of other institutions and conferred numerous 
favors upon special interest groups.”^^  ^ Rosenn believes that in order to guarantee a 
fully democratic Constitution, President José Samey should have summoned a 
separate constituent assembly instead of amending the 1967 Constitution and vesting 
the Congress elected in 1986 with such pow ers.^Such a possibility might not have 
been available, however, and could also have being criticised as undemocratic by the 
different parties struggling for power. As Reich points out, the transition to democracy
Emenda Constitucional n° 26, de 27 de Novembre de 1985 (DOU de 28/11/1985, Pagina 17422) 
Rosenn, 'Brazil’s New Constitution: An Exercise in Transient Constitutionalism for a Transitional 
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in Brazil was underscored by a process of political liberalisation that was far advanced 
by mid-1980s, a fact which created two main problems. Firstly, early liberalisation 
meant that political reform could only be effectuated with the consent of all the main 
political actors of the transition, including the military, the political parties and their 
major supporters, such as the business elites and labour organisations, and the 
President. Secondly, factors such as the absence of a central or dominant force in the 
political scenario, tensions between the main actors, and the foreseen and unforeseen 
complexities of the process, made reaching an agreement on the minimum acceptable 
terms of the transition a very difficult task.^^ ® Furthermore, Kinzo contends that, 
although the Constituent Assembly was initially criticised for functioning as the 
regular Congress, it “was the most democratic experience in Brazilian constitutional 
history given the procedures under which the constitutional deliberations were carried 
out.”^^  ^ Accordingly, the structure of the works was decentralised, as all members of 
the Assembly were able to participate in each stage of the constitution-making 
process. In addition, the Constituent Assembly allowed society to play a very active 
role in the making of the Constitution. Organised groups could either participate 
directly, by advancing their proposals and concerns in the subcommittee hearings, or 
indirectly, by applying pressure and lobbying Assembly members for the approval of 
their proposals. Furthermore, the Assembly’s allegiance was very mixed and, 
therefore no group or party managed to dominate its workings.^^^ This meant that, in 
order to reach a majority vote. Assembly members had to deliberate intensely on 
constitutional proposals and negotiate endlessly on almost every single issue.^^  ^Reich 
also contends that the decision by congressional leaders to invest the new Congress 
with the authority to devise the new Constitution was the product of the failure of an 
early attempt to divorce the processes of constitution-making and institutional reform 
from the divisive party politics of the day by delegating the former to an independent 
commission, created by Samey and headed by the jurist Afonso Arinos.^ "^^
The ‘Arinos Commission’ was composed of 55 distinguished figures from the areas of 
law, politics and business. From the outset, however, the Commission was afflicted by
GM Reich, 'The 1988 Constitution a Decade Later: Ugly Compromises Reconsidered' (1998) 40 
Journal o f Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 5, p.l 1 
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deep disagreements over the political system of government to be adopted by the 
country once the Constitution was promulgated. From such disagreements, four camps 
were formed, with views raging from pure parliamentarianism and presidentialism, to 
mixed regimes.^^^ In addition, the Commission proved to be vulnerable to political 
pressures. Although its blueprint should not have been influenced by the then political 
setting, the document it produced revealed dangerous compromises. For instance, 
although during sessions members of the Commission ultimately decided on a 
parliamentary system, it settled on a mixed system whereby the chief executive was to 
be chosen by direct elections, a fact which, for Reich, demonstrates that Commission 
members had been influenced by political and popular pressures from the Diretas Ja 
movement as well as by the initial approval of President José Samey.^^^ In the end, the 
Commission proved too weak to control both the President and the Brazilian 
Congress, two forces seeking to advance their own competing agendas. The former, 
opposed to the handing of political power to a parliament, decided that the 
Commission’s blueprint should be dismissed and a new draft Constitution 
commissioned. The latter, willing to promote its own agenda for institutional change, 
decided that Congress was the right body to carry out the writing of the new 
Constitution.^^^ As Reich contends “[u]ltimately, the blueprint was merely a set of 
rules that corresponded neither to the president’s nor the congress’s perceptions of 
their interests and bargaining resources.”^^ ^
The legislative process undertaken by Congress, through the ANC, became overly 
complex and burdensome, according to Rosenn.^^^ Congress was divided into eight 
thematic committees,^^® with up to 63 members and auxiliary members, which were
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themselves divided into three subcommittees each/^^ As will be seen in more detail, 
amendment proposals could be submitted not only by ANC members, but also by civil 
society groups/^^ The rapporteurs of each committee and subcommittee would then 
translate the proposals into draft articles for the new Constitution, and, finally, 
forward them to the ‘Systématisation Committee’, which was responsible for collating 
all the articles and producing the final draft of the Constitution/^"^ For Rosenn, such 
complex arrangements created huge harmonisation and integration problems which, 
ultimately, jeopardised the structural integrity of the final constitutional document/^^ 
By contrast, Souza and Lamounier contend that the constitution-making process and 
public debates it inspired played an important role in widening the scope of the 
political debate, thus increasing the relevance of the themes that were exposed to the 
Brazilian citizens/^^
As the draft of the Constitution was concluded by the Systematization Committee at 
the end of 1987, the once welcome progressive and democratic ideas came under 
attack from business and military’s elites direct attack/^^ Business elites were 
vehemently opposed to economic and social provisions in the draft which protected 
the least well-off, which included prescriptions for land redistribution, job stability for 
both public and private sector workers, limits on interest rates, and prohibition of 
foreign investment in some sectors of the e c o n o m y M em b e rs  of the military, on the 
other hand, with the support of President José Samey, opposed the draft Constitution’s 
reduction of the presidential term from six to four years and the shift of power from a 
president to a prime minister, as the head of the State/^^
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In a bid to coerce ANC members to change the internal rules of the Assembly to 
facilitate amendments to the draft Constitution, an alliance known as Big Centre 
{Centrao) between conservatives and the military, with the support of the President, 
threatened a military coup/"^® According to Reich, although the conservative’s 
objective was not to install a new dictatorship, they were willing to use this risky 
strategy to override the draft/"^  ^ Such threats were also supported by a wide range of 
political tactics to force the draft to be altered. Media stories, for instance, began to 
appear about a possible military coup.^ "^  ^ This, coupled with the reporting of the 
crippling of the economy and high inflation,^"^  ^ was designed to stir fear among 
politicians and, particularly, ANC members. Moreover, the National Front for Free 
Enterprise, led by business elites and large landowners, was created to campaign 
against the draft Constitution produced by the ANC, which it did by airing one-minute 
TV adverts and sending out 200,000 letters on behalf of opponents to the draft. 
Another important actor in this campaign was an organisation of landowners called 
the Ruralist Democratic Union (UDR). Counting on 230,000 members -  an increase 
of 180,000 between 1986 and 1987, due to its use of the media to mobilise landowners 
against the land redistribution provisions of the draft - this lobbying group was an 
effective activist. By raising considerable sums of money through the auction of 
livestock, UDR organised and led large demonstrations against the ANC’s draft.^ "^ "^
Despite outcry from the centre-left politicians, who had exerted major influence on the 
Systématisation Committee, and although the ANC’s President, Ulisses Guimaraes, 
was determined to protect the Constitution’s draft by resisting the demands of the 
conservative coalition, the latter’s campaign ultimately proved successful. Under 
pressure from the President as well as from the military, business and landed elites, a 
number of centrist members of the ANC acceded to Centrao’s pressures and signed a 
petition requesting that the rules of the ANC be changed. Faced with a petition 
containing the signature of 309 ANC members, Ulisses Guimaraes had no option but 
to adopt Resolution No 3, acquiescing to the terms of the petition. The new rules 
allowed any member of the ANC to propose a maximum of four amendments to the
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draft, which would automatically be accepted if supported by 280 signatures/"^^ As 
Reich remarks, “[t]he rule change had profound consequences for the emerging 
constitution, effectively allowing the Centrao to supplant key provisions of the 
Systematization Committee draft with its articles.
Such compromises meant that some problematic precepts of the 1967 Constitution 
were either intentionally or unintentionally allowed to remain. Examples of this are 
the century-old problem of concentrated land ownership in Brazil which was not 
addressed,^"^  ^ the preservation of corporatist interests in the constitutional text,^ "^  ^ and 
the prescription for the intervention of the military in case of a political crisis, when 
requested by either one of the three branches of the government (Art. 142).^ "^  ^ In 
addition, the separation of powers was weakened by the maintenance of the head of 
the Executive’s ability to legislate. As Rosenn, Reich and Ros point out, debates in the 
ANC reveal that Assembly members were committed to divesting the President of the 
powers to issue ‘decree-laws’, which had been extensively used during the military 
regime.^^® There was a shared feeling that, in order to promote an effective separation 
of powers and reverse the dictatorship’s trend of excessive Presidential policy-making, 
legislative power should remain with Congress.^^^ Despite this, the majority of 
constituents defended the idea of according the President the power to issue decrees, 
as they regarded them to be a necessary modem democratic instmment.^^^ Instead of 
decrees. Article 62^^  ^ of the new Constitution allowed the President to enact
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Provisional Measures {Medidas Provisorias - MP) in cases of relevance and urgency. 
Such measures, commonly known as executive decrees or decree p o w e r s , w e r e  
conceived as temporary and extraordinary in character, hence requiring Congress’s 
approval in 30 days. In case of failure to convert the measure into law through the 
usual legislative means prescribed by Articles 64, 65 and 66 of the Constitution within 
the time limit of 30 days, the provisional measure is deemed ineffective.^^^ The 
Constitution also allowed Congress to entrust the Executive the ability to legislate 
through delegated laws, save in a few specific subject-areas.^^^ Although delegated 
laws have not proved very useful to Presidents, once Congress retains the 
discretionary power to allow the Executive to legislate in each specific case, 
provisional measures have been continually misused in Brazil.^^^
Carey and Shugart explain that a decree can be defined as executive authority to enact 
law without the approval of the legislature.^^^ Laws established by the executive that 
require the approval of the assembly or congress also fall within this definition, as 
long as they can enter into effect prior to the approval of the legislative body.^^  ^
Executive decree provisions are more common in presidential systems and can be 
found in countries such as the U.S., Italy, France, Russia and many countries in Latin 
America. As the executives of presidential systems across the world tend to be 
dominated by a single party, the power of heads of the Executive to issue decrees may 
undermine democracy and usurp legislative power.^^® This is not necessarily always 
the case, however. As Carey and Shugart point out, legislatures in some cases 
condone, and even favour, the use of decrees, as they might see their use as translating
National Congress immediately, and if  Congress is in recess, a special session shall be called to meet 
within five days.” And its sole paragraph adds: “Provisional measures shall lose effectiveness fi-om the 
day o f their issuance, if  they are not converted into law within a period o f thirty days as from their 
publication and the National Congress shall regulate the legal relations arising therefrom” (Constitution 
of the Federative Republic o f  Brazil o f 1988 (translated in English)).
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the preferences of the majority of political actors involved, rather than a policy 
imposed or unilaterally implemented by the executive/^^ As Carey and Shugart argue
[w]hen a Yeltsin (In Russia) or a Fujimori (in Peru) calls out the tanks 
to surround the legislature and decrees that the institution is shut down, 
it would be senseless to argue, on the basis of constitutional texts, that 
we are not observing executive usurpation of power. On the other hand, 
presidential decree authority is far more often exercised under less 
dramatic circumstances -  that is, when legislatures are in session and 
frequently according to guidelines formally established either by 
constitution or by statute.”^^ ^
Although Provisional Measures were conceived by the ANC for exceptional 
circumstances, safeguards were easily bypassed by Brazil’s President. Accordingly, 
by decreasing the deadline for approval or rejection of the decree by Congress from 60 
days (Art. 58 of the 1967 Constitution) to 30 days and requiring Congress’s express 
consent for the continued efficacy of the rule, as opposed to deeming it automatically 
approved if Congress did neither rejected it nor approve it in 60 days, as before, 
constituents anticipated that Presidents would be compelled to assess carefully the 
likelihood of the decree receiving legislative approval, ultimately inhibiting them from 
issuing a high number of measures.^^^ The rationale was that, by enacting successive 
decrees. Presidents would be limiting the chances of turning them into laws, leading 
them to employ their powers for matters that were effectively urgent in character.^^"  ^In 
practice, however, the protections introduced by Article 62 of the 1988 Constitution 
have not deterred Presidents from overusing their powers. As authors such as Rosenn, 
Ros and Powers have argued,^^^ Brazilian Presidents have issued Provisional
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Measures as substitutes for the ‘decree-law’ powers they once had. As Ros contends, 
although the decree power of Article 62 has an emergency character. Presidents in 
Brazil have applied such measures ordinarily in order to change the status quo.^^  ^ In 
many cases. Presidents have also ignored their unconstitutionality by re-promulgating 
them when Congress has not approved the measure in the required time.^^^ For 
Rosenn, lack of sufficient safeguards to prevent the Executive from abusing its powers 
to legislate has been a drafting failure of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . O t h e r  powers 
characteristic of authoritarian regimes allowed to survive democracy were the powers 
of siege and state of defence, which, if misused, may provide the President with 
dangerously broad powers over civil rights and liberties. Furthermore, the creation 
and modification of legal instruments, such as the ADIN, designed to increase access 
to justice and widen the scope of challenges against initiatives of the executive and 
legislative branches in higher courts, have not had the desired effect. Although they 
have undoubtedly broadened access to the high courts, their employment is still 
restricted to organised political actors. New mechanisms for ordinary citizens to 
contest government policies in the lower courts, such as the public law suit {Açào 
Civil Publicaf^^ and the popular suit {Açào Popular),^^^ proved too complex, costly 
and slow in practice, thus limiting significantly their effectiveness.^^^
Hence, the constitutional outcome reflects the influence of a range of antagonistic 
forces vying to protect their interests during the two-year constitutional writing 
process. The lack of an organised civil and political society at the time made a pact on 
the fundamental issues to be protected hard to agree, resulting in a dense constitutional
promulgated a large number o f decrees on a monthly basis. As examples, President Itamar Franco, who 
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text that embodies a large range of protected interests, many of which are 
contradictory and conflicting in nature/^^ As Kinzo argues, “[t]he fact that the 
Constitution included in its transition act provisions for constitutional revision five 
years later was symptomatic of the lack of consensus.
Despite this, the Constitution recognisably represents a progressive advancement of 
democratic and liberal ideals,^^^ deserving of its title of Citizen Constitution 
(Constituiçâo Cidada) I t  protects a wide range of individual rights and its 
provisions, which are also designed to strengthen the judiciary, offer a suitable 
framework for its precepts to be applied in practice.^^^ Its legislative process was also 
incredibly democratic,^^^ as the Constitutional Assembly passed Article 24 allowing 
submission of proposals for the amendment of the Project of the Constitution, 
provided their were presented by a minimum of three legally constituted associations 
and contained no less then 30,000 signatures of Brazilian electors.^^^ Groups 
representing a wide range of societal interests participated actively as a result of this 
unique opportunity and, consequently. Congress received 122 qualified popular 
amendments from civil organisations, some with as many as over 700,000 supporters, 
totalling more than 12 million signatures. In order to organise such overwhelming 
popular participation, plenary organisations sponsored debates around the country and 
sought the articulation of the ideas contained in the proposals by groups representing 
all sectors of Brazilian society.^^®
It is also important to denote that some of Rosenn’s criticisms of the Constitution did 
not take into account the political and social realities of Brazil in the late 1980s. As 
Kinzo asserts, “[t]he drawing up of the 1988 Constitution was a good indication of the 
complexities of the Brazilian case of transition.”^^  ^ Accordingly, due to the protracted 
nature of the transition, the constitution-making involved intense debates between 
groups with competing and antagonistic interests, which ultimately sought to either
Kinzo, 'Transitions: Brazil', pp.31-2 
Ibid., p.32
Carvalho, Cidadania no Brasil: O Longo Caminho, p.199; Rosenn, 'Brazil’s New Constitution: An 
Exercise in Transient Constitutionalism for a Transitional Society', p.789 
Carvalho, Cidadania no Brasil: O Longo Caminho, p. 199
Ibid. ; Kinzo, 'Transitions: Brazil', p.31; Taylor, 'Citizens Against the State: The Riddle o f High 
Impact, Low Functionality Courts in Brazil'
Holston, Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions o f  Democracy and Modernity in Brazil, p.251 ; Kinzo, 
'Transitions: Brazil', p .31
Holston, Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions o f  Democracy and Modernity in Brazil, p.251 
Ibid.
Kinzo, 'Transitions: Brazil', pp.30-I
184
C^ /Uéi 2cf%eM^  TaiZut»^
“enlarge or restrict the scope of the social, economic, and political framework to be 
established.”^^  ^For Kinzo, the nature of the transition to democracy created a climate 
whereby the political forces in favour of the military regime demanded prominence in 
the new democratic system, whereas those who had fought for democracy and were 
responsible for negotiating the transition became susceptible to criticisms for the 
limitations faced and the regressive concessions that had to be made in practice/^^ In 
this environment of fiercely disputed interests, Kinzo believes that the final 
Constitutional settlement is much more democratic than one could have anticipated, 
given the controlled process of transition/^"^ In addition, Rosenn’s criticisms of the 
amount of popular participation allowed in the making of the Constitution, which 
purportedly made the drafting process too cumbersome, is disputed here. Although 
this may have slowed the legislative process, mass popular participation was an 
important element not only in the shaping of the Constitution, but also in empowering 
the Brazilian population. Furthermore, Kinzo argues that, although the Constitution 
does have some serious imperfections, all the mechanisms of a representative 
democracy were guaranteed, such as plebiscite, referendum, and the people’s right to 
initiate bills (Article 11). The Constitution has also strengthened the legislature and 
the judiciary, as well as subnational elements of the federation and, with that, provided 
a system with less concentration of power.^^^ By weakening the Executive and 
promoting a more efficient separation of powers, the enactment of the 1988 
Constitution has laid the foundations for important elements of the rule of law to be 
implemented in practice, such as accountability and stability and, most importantly, 
limitations on the exercise of power by the state. Similarly, Souza and Lamounier 
contend that some of the criticisms of the Constitution have been motivated by 
expectations that ultimately cannot be met by the legislature alone, but have to be 
crystallised over time in society. Despite this, they point out that the Constitution is 
not only a symbolic instrument of change, but also a lever for the redistribution of 
power in the country.^^^
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Congruent with the arguments advanced by this thesis, the formal entrenchment of 
rights has not prevented a divide forming between constitutional precepts and social 
practice/^^ An example of this is the country’s security apparatus and the practices 
carried out by the Brazilian police. As will be seen in Chapter 6, policing in Brazil is 
pervaded by authoritarian methods, such as the widespread use of corporal 
punishment against crime suspects, as the police often serve the interests of those in 
power, taking a paternalistic and criminalising approach towards the poor and 
excluded.^^^ Police violence has reached astounding levels and extra-judicial killings 
are often carried by out by members of the police force/^^ despite the wide range of 
civil and human rights guaranteed by the Constitution. As Ungar argues, the police are 
at the heart of government’s activities and bear great relevance to the assessment of 
state practice and compliance with the rule of law.^ ^® This is because the police 
perform their functions as well as implement government’s policies in constant and 
direct contact with the population, often in environments involving physical danger 
and resistance.^^^ Many of their activities affect citizens’ full enjoyment of their rights, 
an illustration being the police’s involvement in monitoring public protests and 
gatherings and the rights of freedom of association and speech. Hence, for Ungar, “the 
police shape the protection and interpretation of civil and political rights.”^^  ^ The 
nature of the relationship between the police and the population -  characterised by 
close encounters, the employment of guns and subordination to power - and between 
the police and the state -  marked by the police’s essential role in maintaining order 
and carrying out government’s policies - exacerbates difficulties in democratisation.^^^ 
This is especially the case in new or unstable democracies, where policing structures 
and rules are novel and where the political and social scenarios are characterised by 
high levels of uncertainty and unpredictability. The multifarious character of 
transitional democratic processes means that police issues in transitional states
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represent one of the widest gaps between the pace of démocratisation and the 
expectations created by it/ "^^
Moreover, many of the constitutional guarantees have not taken root in the Brazilian 
society, as this requires not only a wide attitudinal change, from state officials, 
institutions and the population,^^^ but a pervasive change in the political and 
institutional structures in Brazil. An illustration of this is the comprehensive social 
protection established by the Constitution. As Kinzo remarks, the 1988 Constitution 
enacts a range of social security provisions, for instance the rights to education, health, 
work, leisure, security and social security (Article 6), which represent an important 
advance in the field of social protection, thus paving the way for a more egalitarian 
and universalistic society.^^^ Despite this, Brazil continues to be one of the most 
unequal countries in the world,^^^ and a large proportion of its population remains 
afflicted by poverty and extreme poverty.^^^ According to the Institute for Applied 
Economic Research (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada - IPEA), despite the 
rates of poverty and extreme poverty having fallen to 33.6% and 49.8% respectively 
between 1995 and 2008,^^^ in 2008, 28.8% of Brazilians still lived in poverty,^ ®® and 
10.5% in extreme poverty.^®  ^ Again, this evidences the fact that the observance of 
legal formality and the formal recognition of rights is not, in itself, sufficient for the 
implementation of the rule of law. Unless government officials are prepared to accept 
the limits imposed by the established law and are, thus, willing to promote and 
advance the principles and rights enshrined in the Constitution, the majority of 
Brazilians will continue to have their rights and entitlements frustrated in practice, 
albeit enjoying their formal recognition by the state.
Consequently, although the Constitution is extremely long and detailed, its articles 
could not miraculously correct Brazil’s political and economic systems in itself. As
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Pinheiro points out, the legal system is a reflection of society rather than exogenous to 
it and, as such, it crystallises its approach to social issues. In the same vein, Holston 
contends that the gap between legislated text and social practice is not extraneous to 
law, but rather a product of it. For Holston, the legal system does not lay out only 
formal requirements and procedures affecting citizenship; instead, by allocating rights, 
duties, power and liabilities, legal systems prescribe the channels for the exercise of 
citizenship.^®^ Holston also believes that legislation embodies the social order of 
society, “especially elite conceptions of if ’^ ®^ and points out that, in practice, 
legislation acquires a meaning that is dependent on social exploitations such that the 
meaning of legislation is not only a mirror of society but also a product of societal 
action.^ ®"^  In societies such as Brazil, which are pervaded by inequality, the legal 
system will reproduce the unequal treatment that is ingrained in the dealings of state 
officials with the population.^®^ When promulgated, the Constitution represented, 
therefore, more a symbol of change than change itself. Politicians continued to abuse 
power and corrupt the system.^®  ^ The elites continued to take advantage of their 
privileges. The judiciary continued to be slow, cumbersome and inaccessible.^®^ As 
Holston argues that,
“[i]n this persistence, the elite construction and application of law has 
been a significant factor. Far from ‘having no law’ or a law that 
‘doesn’t work,’ as one frequently hears from Brazilians and foreigners 
alike [...] elites have used law brilliantly -  particularly land law -  to 
sustain conflicts and illegalities in their favor, force disputes into 
extralegal resolution where other forms of power triumph, maintain 
their privilege and immunity, and deny most Brazilians access to basic 
social and economic resources. This use of law not only sabotaged 
universal application but also estranged most Brazilians from the
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institutions of law itself as an ally of their citizenship. Rather, it 
became what I call a misrule of law: a system of stratagem and 
bureaucratic complication deployed by both state and subject to 
obfuscate problems, neutralize opponents, and, above all, legalize the 
illegal. This law has little to do with justice, and obeying it reduces 
people to a category of low esteem. Thus, for friends, everything; for 
enemies, citizens, the poor, squatters, marginals, migrants, inferiors, 
communists, strikers, and other others, the law. For them, law means 
humiliation, vulnerability, and bureaucratic nightmare.” ®^^
Despite this, the 1988 Constitution cannot be said to represent only a vague promise to 
the country’s poor. Due to a shift or adaptation of the ideological foundations of urban 
social movement organisations, from a needs-based to a rights-based approach, poor 
citizens in urban areas of Brazil have learned to employ a rights language to reclaim 
their status as bearers of rights, as opposed to social subjects with needs.^®  ^
Accordingly, Constitutions are important for the rule of law because, in spite of the 
degree of observance by state officials, they still serve as “focal devices”^^® or 
guidelines, informing people what to expect of others and of the government, and thus 
helping individuals to know when to act in concert once major transgressions to its 
precepts occur.^^  ^ Accordingly, by announcing what the state plans to do and the 
limits within which it plans to stay. Constitutions provide safety to citizens and 
facilitate coordination of efforts against breaches by the government.^ As Maravall 
and Przeworski contend, “[i]n this sense, publicly promulgated rules provide an 
equilibrium manual.”^^ ^
As will be seen more in depth throughout this Chapter, although law is usually 
employed as a tool of social control, aiding the ruling classes in consolidating their 
social, political and economic domination, it has also an autonomous character.^ As 
Genovese argues, ruling classes are unable to sustain power unless they proclaim to
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be, through legal systems, the guardians of the interests of those being ruled, as this 
ensures the containment of society’s antagonisms to levels which do not threaten their 
legitimacy/Accordingly,  Thompson argues that if the law is not founded on 
standards of universality, equity and benefit to the majority, save for a few exclusions, 
it becomes an ineffective instrument of legitimisation of class p o w e r / T h i s  is 
because,
“[m]ost men have a strong sense of justice, at least with regard to their 
own interests. If the law is evidently partial and unjust, then it will 
mask nothing, legitimize nothing, contribute nothing to any class 
hegemony.”^^ ^
Hence, although the law is intrinsically linked with mediating, and masking, societal 
class relations, it is also a partially independent institution, endowed with its own 
characteristics and history, and following its own evolutionary pattern. In this sense, 
Thompson argues that for law to function effectively as an ideology, it ought to be 
seen as just and free from gross manipulation. In pursuit of that, rulers will feel the 
need to accord legitimacy to their power and morality to their functions. It is therefore 
simplistic to regard the ruling ideology as purely deceitful, as those in power will 
often feel the need to be perceived as just and will, thus, abide by the established legal 
system, which, in turn, acquires its own logic and standards of equity, with occasional 
just outcomes as a resul t .^The moral and theoretical foundations of the legal order, 
both inherent and imposed as a legitimacy-seeking strategy by the ruling classes, will 
also gradually infiltrate and influence society as a whole, eventually driving ideational 
and institutional change .^As Genovese remarks, “[tjhus, the fashionable relegation 
of law to the rank of a superstructural and derivative phenomenon obscures the degree 
of autonomy it creates for itself.”^^®
This autonomous nature contradicts the assumption that the law is simply a reflection 
of class relations and dominance, endowing legal systems with a mutable and evolving 
character shaped by the ideas, values and social arrangements prevalent in society.
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Accordingly, this view demystifies Marxist reductionism, which views the law as a 
class-bound system contained within a superstructure designed to protect the interests 
of the ruling classes by serving the needs of an infrastructure mirrored in society’s 
class relations/^^ Hence, despite offering a Marxist analysis of American slavery 
society, Genovese’s conclusion about the nature of law is in contrast to Marxism’s 
perception of law purely as an expression of class domination, since being the means 
through which the powerful subjugate the powerless. As such, Genovese’s depiction is 
in consonance with Weingast’s elite theory on the implementation of the rule of law 
since, although viewing society and the law as partially reflective of the 
interdependencies between elites and non-elites, it ultimately assigns the law an 
autonomous character and, thus, an essence of its own, be it moral or institutional. In 
this view, law’s content matters and so do the principles on which is founded.^^^ This 
is central to the core argument advanced by this thesis. Although significant social 
change, particularly in societies with high levels of social and economic inequalities, 
such Brazil, can only be ultimately driven with the acquiescence of the elites, once 
they have been implemented, they may continue to influence society as a whole in 
spite of the will of the ruling classes.^ "^  ^Unlike positivism, which views the law as an 
autonomous phenomena dissociated from politics, Genovese’s theory on the legal 
order is in harmony with that of Dworkin’s, as it regards law as deeply political and 
reflective of its environment, whilst also assigning it a certain degree of autonomy.^^^ 
Dworkin’s theory, which encompasses an important aspect of agency in shaping the 
legal structures and consciousness of a nation, is therefore adequate to drive Brazilian 
society through furthering the implementation of the rule of law once the Brazilian 
elites accept limitations on the short-term privileges they gain from siding with the 
government in favour of their long-term interests.
An evidence of this is the function of the legal system in the southern slave states of 
the U.S.. As Genovese points out, in mid 1800s the law in southern America was 
indubitably an expression of the hegemony of the ruling classes, the slaveholders, who
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shaped and employed it to advance their interests and reinforce their class dominance. 
Despite this, other social classes pursued the law as an active, rather than merely 
passive, vehicle of social pressure, revealing a partially autonomous character of the 
law, which served as a mediating force in the class struggle for the abolition of slavery 
and, eventually, compelling the ruling classes to bow to the demands of the ruled.^^  ^
Accordingly, although the law was silent in respect to the nature of slaves, judges 
progressively came to recognise their humanity, and thus their free will, as a means of 
explaining and therefore punishing antisocial behaviour by slaves or as an imposition 
of obligations of slaveholders towards their slaves and, ultimately, towards society as 
a whole.^^^ In 1838, a Kentucky Court recognised slaves to have a dual status, for 
although property, they were still human beings.^^^ Similarly, in 1946 Judge Green of 
the Tennessee Supreme Court declared that
“A slave is not in the condition of a horse or an ox. His liberty is 
restrained, it is true. . . . But he is made after the image of the Creator. 
He has mental capacities, and an immortal principle in his nature, that 
constitute him equal to his owner but for the accidental position in 
which fortune has placed him. . . .  [T]he laws under which he is held as 
a slave have not and cannot extinguish his high-born nature nor deprive 
him of his many rights which are inherent in man."^^^
Other laws and rulings also recognised some limitations upon slaveholders based on 
the social and economic impact of their actions on the wider community.^^^ These 
concessions and rights were appropriated by slaves, and were employed by anti­
slavery activists as a means to expand their rights and fight for the abolition of 
s lavery.Equal ly ,  the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution is not, per se, sufficient 
for the implementation of the rule of law for, as seen in Chapter 3, the enactment of 
laws cannot, in itself, compel those in power to adhere to their content and does not 
prevent their usurpation by the elites to the detriment of the rights of the rest of the 
population. Its importance, however, cannot be underestimated. Constitutions provide 
a formal framework that allows the population to identify major transgressions of the
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state’s exercise of power, thus facilitating a coordination device between the masses 
and the elites when they occur. In addition, the law’s autonomous character means 
that, as the elites accept limits on their privileges and demand the state to act within 
the established legal rules, the law may continue to evolve, allowing the population at 
large to employ it as a tool for preventing violations of rights and freedoms. In this 
process, the population, which has already been empowered by having actively 
participated in constitution-building, can appropriate the precepts of the country’s 
higher law and develop guiding principles for the country’s legal system and political 
decisions of the state. As will be seen in the next section of this Chapter, the 
strengthening of social movements and the specialisation of their demands may 
contribute in this process.
4.3 Social Movements, Appropriation of Rights and Empowerment of the Masses
Social movements grew stronger in the 1970s and began to attract workers from the 
most industrialised region in Brazil, the ABC in the metropolitan region of Greater 
Sao Paulo, who organised strikes and protests for better wages and working 
conditions.^^^ By the beginning of the 1980s, these social movements carried a more 
far-reaching message that included human rights as central to their claims.^^^ From an 
all-inclusive demand for the implementation of egalitarian policies extending social 
and economic rights to the poor, civil society evolved and its claims became more 
specialised and compartmentalised.^^"^ Calls for the protection of vulnerable groups 
such as women, homosexuals, the disabled, blacks, children and indigenous people, 
became increasingly common, and competed with the more typical demands for 
housing, health and education.^^^ According to Pinheiro, civil society’s claims for the 
re-establishment of democracy were supported by this dynamic network of social 
movements, which had also spread to the countryside. Collective mobilisations, in 
turn, were bom from structures pre-existent in society, such as the Church, universities
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and labour unions. Central to the evolution of the engagement of the masses was 
dictatorship, as the eagerness of the population to play a role in the direction of their 
country served as a catalyst for the creation of these diverse movements and 
demands.^^^
Such an ideological shift, from a needs-based to a rights-based approach, was not 
confined to Brazil. It was, rather, part of a trend in Latin America as a whole led by 
the left since the 1970s, which changed the ideological foundations and discourse of 
social movements across the continent. Amidst calls from the international community 
for the démocratisation and liberalisation of Latin American nations during 
dictatorship regimes, theories placing rights at the core of these ideals gained 
ground.^^^ This discourse, in turn, filtered through to grassroots organisations in 
Brazil, who disseminated the idea that social rights are inherent in the concept of 
citizenship.^^^ As Holston explains, law’s “aura of social legitimacy and power”^^  ^
lent the rights-based discourse special significance among Brazil’s urban poor, who 
utilised it not only to challenge social and economic inequality in general and the 
handicaps of living in urban peripheries, in particular, but also as “a strategy of 
countering (not furthering) illegality and marginalization through the demonstration of 
competence (“know your rights”) and negating humiliation through dignity of 
participating in the public sphere as bearers of rights.” "^^® As he contends, although the 
law has, historically, been regarded as a tool for advancing the interests of a favoured 
few, labour laws promulgated by Vargas provided the Brazilian working classes with 
a “sense of the dignity of rights, however restricted their realization.” "^^ ^
The argument that there has been a shift in the discourse of social movements in Latin 
America is not unanimously defended, however. The prominence of the rights-based 
discourse may have been an adaptation, due to the success of this strategy, rather than 
an ideological shift, as rights-based discourses tend to be universal in nature and, in 
consequence, more easily disseminated in the national scenario.^"^^
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As Foweraker contends, social movements in Latin America tend to articulate two 
different kinds of demands. The first are material demands for a more equal 
distribution of resources, public utilities and social benefits. Social movements have 
initially been motivated by such claims, the equivalent of Gramsci’s ‘economic 
corporate demands’, which are ultimately demands for social inclusion and greater 
participation in the decisions that are to benefit the majority. Such demands are more 
specific and relate to a sector, territory, community, union or firm. In this sense, 
although these claims may affect national development targets and policies and may 
influence or reveal weaknesses in the political structures, they do not challenge the 
central norms of the political system or require that new national rules be 
implemented.^"^^ The second ones are claims for legal and political rights, among 
others habeas corpus, equality before the law, and land, labour, and voting rights. 
Together, such demands represent a claim for citizenship and, in this sense, may 
challenge the core values and the operational rules of the system. Foweraker argues 
that legal and political rights demands do not necessarily take place posteriorly. In the 
case of Latin America, for example, these different kinds of claims cannot be 
attributed to specific sectors or social groups, but are integral to a relatively 
continuous process of demand-making.^"^"^
Although they can be advanced concomitantly, Foweraker emphasises that the 
political effects of these different kinds of demands are very different. The majority of 
‘economic corporate’ claims can be easily absorbed or diverted by political systems 
where clientelistic and corporatist practices prevail. This is because such systems can 
effectively isolate and separate demands of this nature and consequently provide their 
partial satisfaction, which is generally achieved through cooptation by the granting of 
favours and p r iv i l eg e s .A s  Young posits, this process of appropriation of economic 
corporate demands is facilitated by the fragmented and privatised nature of the 
political process in capitalist societies, which favour the dominance of more powerful 
interests. Such outcome is also compounded by the fact that, due to pluralism, both the 
policies and demands pertaining to the individual are compartmentalised by interest 
groups, therefore making the assessment of how issues relate to one another and
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where the priorities should lie much vaguer and unclear.^"^  ^ Demands of citizenship 
are, on the other hand, universal in character, and therefore necessarily challenge the 
“particularism of clientelistic power relations that are so pervasive throughout the 
continent.” "^^  ^ Despite the allegation that in Europe struggles for the extension of 
citizenship are often compartmentalised and cannot necessarily be considered the 
product of collective effort, in Latin America citizenship struggles are central to the 
political activity of social movements exactly because their scope and content are 
universal in nature. "^^  ^ Despite this. Young argues that the tendency to homogenise 
citizens and express citizenship through the idea of a common will has also promoted 
the exclusion of groups unable to absorb and defend this general point of view.^ "^  ^
Although civic republicanism founded on the antagonistic pillars of the pursuit of the 
common good and the exclusion of certain groups, for instance women, from the idea 
of universal citizenship has been replaced by a liberal and all-encompassing 
conception of citizenship, Young argues that the generality and wide-ranging reach of 
this conception means that differences among citizens are neglected.^^^ In this vein, 
universalistic conceptions of citizenship may propagate and reproduce oppression in 
society, as more privileged and articulated groups may usurp or influence democratic 
political processes to advance their own interests.^^^ For Young, only by implementing 
political equality concomitantly to economic and social equality can the ‘paradox of 
democracy’, whereby social power promotes the equality of some and not of others, 
whilst equality of citizenship may render some more powerful than others, be solved. 
Accordingly, the value of social and economic equality reinforces the value of 
political equality and vice-versa, a cycle which can be advanced by the promotion of 
institutionalised mechanisms of recognition and representation of oppressed groups.^^^
The path that social movements took was particular to each Latin American nation. In 
the case of Brazil, Foweraker explains that the new movements, which emerged in the 
late 1970s, embraced a wide variety of claims, raging from living conditions to gender 
and race to equality issues. They also mobilised a number of different areas such as
IM Young, 'Polity and Group Difference: A Critique o f the Ideal o f Universal Citizenship' in D 
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poor neighbourhoods, squatter settlements and working class communities. The urban 
middle class also formed a temporary alliance with the popular sectors of the 
population in the campaign for direct elections, Diretas Ja, and, therefore, made an 
important contribution to the struggle of social movements.^^^ Despite the campaign’s 
successes in mobilising large numbers and in applying pressure on those negotiating 
the transition, the alliance had been built on a single demand and its precariousness led 
to its dissolution once the opposition’s bill for direct presidential elections was 
defeated in Congress on 25 April 1984.^ "^^  As Foweraker posits, the Diretas Ja 
campaign was evidence of the population’s engagement in promoting an enduring 
democratic outcome as a solution to the precarious political arrangement in place. 
Despite this, the campaign is also an illustration of the unpredictability of popular 
protest and the shortcomings of demands based upon the unstable maintenance of high 
levels of mobilisation.^^^
This is especially true, according to Foweraker, in cases of democratic transitions. For 
him, social mobilisation plays an important role in the outcome of the transitional 
processes and, therefore, citizen mobilisation can be very effective in informing the 
democratic transition, as it can open or widen ruptures in the dominant coalition as 
well as influence the elites and their perceptions of the economy and the state. An 
enduring crisis during democratic transition also means that repression becomes more 
difficult, leaving a space where social mobilisation can thrive and win new 
opportunities for their political demands. Foweraker affirms that, temporarily, 
pressure from citizen mobilisations may become even more important than sustained 
organisation. Over time and once the negotiations of the transition begin, social 
mobilisation starts to lose momentum, however. This is particularly the case when the 
process of democratic transition is controlled or negotiated, as the authoritarian elites 
can still exercise influence over the state apparatus and reach compromises and pacts 
which generally end in great institutional continuities.^^^ For Dagnino, this is due to 
the fact that the exercise of citizenship through democratic processes involves the 
sharing of decision-making power; this, in turn, occurs within a framework that is 
usually established by dominant neoliberal forces. As she contends, this situation
Foweraker, Theorizing Social Movements, p. 100 
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creates a perverse convergence of interests, whereby the state will elect ‘reliable’ 
representatives from social groups to transfer its responsibilities to either civil society 
or the private sector.^^^
Foweraker explains that social movements in Latin America were largely unsuccessful 
in influencing the distribution of resources in countries where the democratic 
transition happened concomitantly with an economic crisis and this meant that they 
lost some of the reason for existing. The social movements’ inability to significantly 
affect transitional outcomes was compounded by the imposition of austerity 
programmes by foreign financial institutions, in particular the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and foreign banks, and the implementation of neo-liberal economic 
reforms which created a market economy of individual demands, rather than a social 
arena that fostered collective political action.^^^ In addition, social movements failed 
to acquire meaningful political clout, thus becoming vulnerable to populist 
manipulations and clientelistic tactics by the state. Forweraker contends that Brazil is 
a clear example of this, as the struggle of social movements for corporatist protection 
in the 1988 Constitution rendered them susceptible to new forms of corporatist 
control. In a scenario where political elites vied for position, the executive struggled 
for support in Congress, politicians competed for a new electorate, and all actors 
promoted clientelism, populist politics became the order of the day.^^^
Another factor contributing to the limited power that social movements and pressure 
from below can have on democratic transitions is that transitional processes are 
generally marked by an appropriation by the state of the struggle for citizenship, 
which moves to the constitutional sphere. In this vein, the state will build its 
legitimacy by institutionalising rights as well as promoting the exercise of political 
obligations and, later, citizens’ rights.^^® In general, the ruling classes may choose to 
claim the legitimacy of their position and elevated status in society, gain the support of 
the masses when needed, as well as keep social peace and appease the demands of 
foreign elites, by transferring rights and democratic decision-making to the lower 
classes, thus dominating democratic and rights’ achievement to secure their own
Dagnino, 'Citizenship in Latin America: An Introduction', p.218 
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interests.^^^ In this scenario, social movements are stripped of their “pre-eminent role 
as defenders and promoters of legal and political rights.”^^  ^Accordingly, the dominant 
classes will take upon themselves the task of defending and disseminating citizenship 
as applicable to all regardless of social class and regional differences as well as 
against specific claims and identities of social movements. Despite the fact that such 
achievements can be generally attributed to the efforts of social movements in 
pressing social and political institutions for such rights to be enshrined in law and to 
be respected in practice, once these demands are met in democratic transitions, social 
movements see their political strength dwindle and may lose the reason to exist.^^^
These arguments are in tune with the central claim of this thesis. Social movements 
can play an important role in social and political change by applying pressure on 
power holders as well as by convincing the elites to coordinate with the rest of the 
population to demand a change in the status quo. They can, however, have only 
limited efficacy when the process of change is considered as a whole, as they need an 
alliance with the elites in order to make a real difference in the political and social 
systems. In this vein, Foweraker explains that social movements face some significant 
constraints in their struggle. They press their demands and vindicate their rights 
through mobilisation, which can entail high costs. In addition, alliances are difficult to 
achieve, which means that mobilisation is often cyclical and movements are 
discontinuous. Although these factors can place limitations on the effectiveness of 
social movements, this discontinuity can be more apparent than real, as the 
perpetuation of social needs and the demand for the recognition of rights means that 
new movements will emerge from the old ones.^ "^^  Despite this, for social movements 
to be able to sustain a long-term activity they will, in general, require permanent 
negotiation. Although they may be successful in disseminating the importance of the 
enshrinement and protection of rights and the idea of citizenship, the fact that 
transitions to democracy are often the product of a complex process of negotiation 
means that “social movements rarely have direct access to it.”^^ ^
Notwithstanding, the major changes that such negotiated pacts effectuate, especially 
related to constitution-making processes, will usually engender gradual adaptations
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and, depending on the degree of appropriation of concessions made, on the further 
realisation of any rights enshrined in law. According to Habermas and Rehg, 
constitutions only represent a “founding a c f o f  a process of constitution-making 
that will last for generations.^^^ This can be evidenced in Brazil, where the 1988 
Constitution is still producing changes and shifts in the power relations in society. As 
Holston demonstrates, the 1988 Constitution has been instrumental in crystallising the 
rights discourse of Brazilian social movements into a text-based guarantee.^^^ As he 
points out, urban poor citizens who have been fighting for years for the recognition of 
land ownership (a reality common to urban peripheries throughout Brazil) know what 
their legal rights are and some even carry a pocket-sized copy of the Constitution to 
prove their point during community meetings.^^^ The experience of poor residents of 
urban peripheries in reclaiming their citizenship rights on the basis of equality, rather 
than privilege, was propagated to the rest of the country, empowering poor citizens 
with unprecedented confidence in the citizenship rights ensured by the Constitution.^^®
Souza and Lamounier explain that the reality until the promulgation of the 1988 
Constitution was very different. They argue that the relative stability of the political 
structure in the face of high levels of inequality in Brazil can be attributed, to a large 
extent, to the absence of action that inequality created, where the poor lacked access to 
organised political resources and, therefore, sought to escape poverty through 
individual mobility rather than collective means.^^^ For Holston, this change in 
attitude among the Brazilian lower classes amounts to an “insurgent citizenship”,^  as 
it was bom as a means to counter the dominant state of affairs.^^^
Insurgency, for Holston, characterises the demand for change from below rather than 
an imposition from the top.^ "^^  This conception of citizenship from below materialises 
when excluded groups within society recognise their rights and reclaim them by
J Habermas and W Rehg, 'Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union o f Contradictory 
Principles?' (2001) 29 Political Theory 766, p.768 
Ibid.
Holston, Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions o f  Democracy and Modernity in Brazil, p.264 
Ibid.
Ibid., pp.247-67
Souza and Lamounier, 'A Feitura da Nova Constituiçâo: Um Reexame da Cultura Polftica 
Brasileira', p.5
Holston, Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions o f  Democracy and Modernity in Brazil, pp.3-15
Ibid., pp.33-4
Ibid.
200
demanding their recognition by society at large/^^ Holston’s theory is in consonance 
with those of Harbermas and Rehg’s, who argue that the idea of human rights, as 
translated into the basic rights of the nation, may neither be imposed on the lawgiver 
as a limitation in the sense that the legitimacy of laws is dependent on their 
observance, nor be undermined by democratic will and represent a mere legislative 
formality. Rather than defending one of these two alternatives, they believe that both 
principles have equal weight and are inter-dependent.^^^ In this vein, Harbermas and 
Rehg argue that private and public autonomy require each other and are related by 
material implications.^^^ Based on the political rights guaranteed to them, citizens’ 
exercise of their public autonomy can only be appropriately made when their private 
autonomy is equally protected, thus granting them sufficient independence to do so. 
On the other hand, citizens may only practice their private autonomy to an equal 
extent when the political autonomy granted by the system is exercised by them.^^  ^
This idea of autonomy means that those to whom the law is addressed must be able to 
see themselves as its authors. Although this does not provide the united members of a 
society with unlimited freedom to make any decisions they wish, it does accord 
citizens, based on the freedom of choice, with the “autonomy in the sense of a 
reasonable will-formation, even if this autonomy can only be enjoined and not legally 
required of them.”^^  ^This argument is also supported by Dagnino, for whom,
“[t]he process of building citizenship as the assertion and recognition 
of rights has been seen as a process of transformation of practices 
rooted in the social as a whole. This political strategy implies moral 
and intellectual reform, a process of social learning and the 
construction of new kinds of social relations -  on one hand, the 
constituting of citizens as active social subjects but, on the other hand, 
learning to live on different terms with these emergent citizens who 
refuse to remain in the places socially and culturally assigned to 
them.”^^®
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Cases such as Brazil, where an insurgent form of citizenship can be evidenced through 
an appropriation of some of the basic rights safeguarded by the Constitution by the 
mass of the population, are in contrast with old conceptions of citizenship, which were 
devised by the dominant classes and state as a means of incorporating excluded 
sectors in a limited and gradual fashion either with the aim of greater social 
integration or as a pre-condition for the establishment of capitalism.^^^ This new 
conception of citizenship is, dissimilarly, “a conception of noncitizens, of the 
excluded -  a citizenship from below.”^^  ^ In an environment where the social 
movements’ struggle is dependent on the “need to assert rights to have a right”,^ ^^  a 
Constitution recognising those rights symbolises a commitment by the state toward the 
socially excluded.^^"^
Clearly, the legislative process of making the Constitution provided Brazilians with an 
unparalleled opportunity to participate democratically in its formulation and they did 
not miss the chance to do so. For Holston, this strong response from society is an 
evidence of a “mass insurgence of citizenship”^^  ^which was, in the main, successful 
in the process of moulding its own Constitution.^^^ In consequence, the masses feel 
more empowered than ever and their insurgency applies pressure to the national and 
states’ governments to address their exclusion and needs. The legal system in Brazil 
has always favoured the rich, through laws and judicial decisions that privilege owners 
of land and property, as well as the restriction of access to the judiciary to those able 
to understand its intricacies and cope with the long, expensive and painstaking process 
of judicial resolution of disputes.^^^ Nevertheless, the lower classes have absorbed the 
rights language and have been using it to reclaim the rights they have been persistently 
denied. Even criminal organisations have found it expedient to base their claims on 
human rights discourse.^^^ This appropriation of the rights language by the lower 
classes in Brazil is a component of Holston’s “insurgent citizenship”.^ ^^  The insurgent
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citizen is the one who reclaims his or her “right to treatment as an equaP',^^^ that is, 
the right to be treated with the same concern and respect, as opposed to what Dworkin 
denominates a “right to equal treatment, which involves an equal distribution of 
resources, opportunities and burdens in society.^^^
The phenomenon of insurgent citizenship in Brazil is evidence that the masses are 
acquiring the power to demand the observance of their rights against the state and, as 
such, it is an indication of the significant social change that is taking place in the 
Brazilian society. The fact that the rights language has filtered down to those at the 
bottom is precisely the type of legal mobilisation that authors such as Schor and 
Strauss regard as necessary for the effective application of rights.^^^ The 
constitutionalisation of rights and the consequent empowerment of the judiciary must 
be seen as favourable by power holders, who will only accept a restriction on their 
privileges if they can envisage this as advantageous to their own interests. Only when 
ruling elites have an incentive to act - such as when faced with economic demands, 
extremely high violence levels, demographic changes, the growing political influence 
of minority groups within society - will they demand the observance by state officials 
of the rights safeguarded by the constitution and, thus, promote their enjoyment in 
practice.^^^ On the other hand, once constitutional change has been achieved and the 
rights of minorities have been constitutionalised, it is possible that this change may 
foster permanent positive consequences within society that were not anticipated, or 
even desired, by the ruling elites.^ "^^  As Hirschl posits, political power holders may 
only contemplate the short-term advantages of their decision, therefore overlooking its 
long-term consequences. This is compounded by the fact that political outcomes are 
difficult to foresee in contemporary multi-faceted political systems.^^^ Once in place, 
even if enacted as a means to legitimise the elites’ ideology, the law will follow its 
own logic. Hence, the status that constitutional arrangements will have across
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generations partly depends on the appropriation of rights language by peripheral 
groups to advance their own interests. The entrenchment of the constitution in society 
requires, however, the will of the elites in compromising on the privileges they receive 
from siding with political power holders. In turn, elites will only accept such 
compromises when they feel it is in their interest to do so. Significant elements 
extraneous to the prevailing model of power-relations in society -  such as the 
empowerment of the masses through the dissemination of rights language, significant 
economic development, high levels of criminality - may provide enough incentives for 
the elites to forge the coordination device necessary to impose limits on the state.
As was demonstrated in this Chapter, social movements, created in Brazil out of the 
struggle for the end of dictatorship, have expanded and infiltrated Brazilian society on 
a large scale since the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution.^^^ The appropriation of 
rights language by the Brazilian population, most significantly by the poor, may be 
seen as evidence of a positive consequence of the constitutionalisation of rights that 
symbolised the start of the new democratic system. This phenomenon, this thesis 
contends, may provide Brazilian elites with one incentive to act. In this vein, the 
reality of social exclusion and the lack of enjoyment of basic rights enshrined in the 
1988 Constitution by the majority of the Brazilian population may be slowly 
changing, exactly because citizens feel empowered and are gradually changing their 
attitude toward law, in general, and the Constitution, more especially. Only by fully 
understanding that the provisions of their Constitution are the instrument for the 
effectuation of their rights will Brazilian citizens protect their constitutional rights and 
guarantees. This is already happening in Brazil, although this thesis recognises that an 
attitudinal change of this magnitude may take many decades to consolidate. Such 
attitudinal change, coupled with the will of elites to compromise on their short-term 
privileges in exchange for long-term benefits, may provide an ideal ground for 
constitutionalism to flourish in Brazil and for the rule of the law finally to be fully 
observed. As Brazilian elites and the rest of the population begin to act in concert in 
imposing limits on the Brazilian political rulers, constitutional precepts and the 
fundamental rights of the individual become more entrenched and the coordination of 
sanctions against major transgressions by the government may become more common.
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As seen both in this Chapter and in Chapter 1, the Brazilian political, economic and 
military elites have fiercely defended their interests to the detriment of the legal 
entitlements of the rest of the population. By the end of the dictatorship, the military 
had stood ready, or had intervened directly in national politics, for nearly a century. 
Their successive stints in power were marked by the repression of social movements 
and political dissent, the encroachment upon citizens’ rights and freedoms and by 
gross violations of human rights. All this was carried out under a mantra of legal 
legitimacy, proving compelling further evidence that unless the conception of the rule 
of law adopted addresses the content of rules, the law may justify and legitimise 
immoral and evil exercise of power. From the extreme of the Institutional Acts of the 
military regime, which legalised torture, political persecution and state repression, to 
that of the 1988 Constitution, which protects an extensive array of civil, social, 
political and cultural rights, as well as democratic ideals, ultimately acceding to the 
very think version of the rule of law espoused by the Commission of Jurists in New 
Delhi in 1959. The formal legal achievement which sealed the transition to democracy 
through the constitution-writing process and, eventually, Brazil’s Citizen Constitution, 
could not have provided a greater contrast to the purposes the law had served in the 
previous twenty years. Over twenty years from this significant moment in the history 
of the country’s legal system, repression and authoritarianism can only be felt through 
the residues of the slow and protracted process of democratic opening, whilst many of 
the rights enshrined by the Brazilian Constitution continue to be distant from the 
reality of many. As will be seen in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6, those extensive 
constitutional protections have been frustrated in practice by the widespread violence 
committed both by state agents and criminals, poverty, inequality, and deprivation. 
This is because, although Brazilian elites have formally recognised the rights of all, 
they have not felt sufficiently compelled to demand the state’s compliance with the 
established legal framework. As the state values its centuries-long close relationship 
with the elites more dearly than it does its relationship with the rest of the population, 
unless the elites decide to act in concert with the masses, the 1988 Constitution will 
remain an unachievable reality. In that lies the importance of the empowerment of the 
masses analysed in this Chapter. It can offer an incentive for the elites to act, help the 
population to foresee abuses of power and thus to coordinate their efforts with the 
elites in curbing state transgressions of rights, as well as produce further autonomous 
legal change, beyond the will, interests and ideology of the ruling classes.
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CHAPTER 5 
ECONOMIC GROWTH
In this Chapter, Brazil’s present economic setting, as well as the policies that made it 
possible, will be analysed. Such achievements will be compared with Brazil’s 
economic performance in past decades and predictions for the future of the economy 
will be presented. In addition, this Chapter will analyse Brazil’s outlook in the energy 
and agricultural sectors and the geopolitical advantages that this position is likely to 
secure the country in the near future. Brazil’s foreign policy and relations with other 
countries will also be investigated, so as to demonstrate that the country’s long-term 
belief that it deserves international recognition as a world power^ may be closer to 
realisation, in the face of the government’s current foreign policy and its efforts in 
shaping a more balanced world order, where developing and emerging countries exert 
stronger influence in international affairs. Finally, this Chapter will address the issues 
of poverty and inequality in Brazil and the government’s advances in tackling them, as 
well as examine the ramifications that these policies might have for the 
implementation of the rule of law in the country.
5.1 Economic Development and the Prospects for Brazil
Brazil is gaining importance in the world as an economic power and could become a 
key actor in international financial markets.^ This may represent an example of the 
significant change that Weingast sees as necessary to provide elites with an incentive 
to pressurise the state to observe the country’s established legal framework and 
promote its constitutional obligations. According to Wilson and Purushothaman, the 
consolidation and maintenance of the rule of law is one of the core conditions for 
growth, alongside other elements, such as improved life expectancy, lower inflation.
* Hurrell, 'Brazil: What Kind o f Rising State in What Kind o f Institutional Order?' p. 129 
 ^ Nassar, 'Brazil as an Agricultural and Agroenergy Superpower'; Rathbone, 'South America’s Giant 
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trade-friendly policies, higher schooling, lower fertility and government 
consumption.^ As the authors contend, such core growth determinants are inextricably 
linked and, without efficient institutions and an effective maintenance of the rule of 
law, other conditions, such as macroeconomic policies, cannot be put into place."^  
Despite the fact that Wilson and Purushothaman employ the concept of the rule of law 
in a vague, formalistic manner, dependent on the conditions of rule validity and 
institutional efficiency, their point is valid for this thesis. Although no causal 
relationship is necessarily argued to exist between the rule of law and economic 
growth, public agents’ compliance with the law and the community’s general respect 
for the system of principles it harbours are important to social, political and economic 
stability, as they increase accountability and transparency, diminish corruption and 
violence and improve transactional and contractual predictability.^ For this reason, this 
research will argue that Brazil’s current economic growth may serve as one of the 
main incentives for the national elites to act. In order to comply with the requirements 
of foreign investors and international financial institutions, as well as to project Brazil 
in the international arena, elites may see, in the maintenance of the country’s 
development and growth, enough incentive to uphold the rule of law. In this vein, the 
elites may act in conjunction with the rest of the population in imposing limits on the 
abuses practiced by the state. As Bandeira asserts, “internal peace, reflecting the 
efficient exercise by the ruling social group of its internal hegemonic function, is 
indispensable if a state is to be an international power.”^
Along with this, there is already evidence that the poorer classes are enjoying growing 
economic power.^ This represents a real change if one considers the history of the 
country, whereby the majority of the population were poor and bore the brunt of the 
successive economic recessions, inflation and economic stagnation.^ Capitalist 
societies depend largely on consumer spending and the fact that the buying power of 
the Brazilian lower classes has boomed in recent years^ may, according to this thesis.
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make a difference to the government’s policies. The next section of this Chapter will 
therefore analyse the country’s current economic record, as well as its future economic 
prospects, in order to determine whether the positive economic growth that the 
country is experiencing is likely to continue into the foreseeable future and, thus, 
whether it has the potential to affect the elites’ decision to side with the rest of the 
population against the state, consequently fostering the implementation of the rule of 
law.
5.1.1 Sound Economic Policies
Brazil’s economy has always been susceptible to the volatilities of the markets and 
economic recessions of other major world powers, particularly the U.S.. A common 
metaphor used by the media to characterise its instability is that when the U.S.’s 
financial system sneezed, Brazil caught a cold; when the U.S. caught a cold, Brazil 
was lying in bed with pneumonia.^® This situation has changed and Brazil is part of a 
group of four new, large, emerging economies in the world order, denominated BRJCs 
(Brazil, Russia, India and China).
An acronym coined by Jim O’Neil of Goldman Sachs in 2001,^^ the prediction that the 
BRIC countries -  then worth less than 15 percent of the G6 (US, Japan, U.K., 
Germany, France and Italy) - would emerge as contending forces in the world 
economy was first made by Wilson and Purushothaman in a study commissioned by 
Goldman Sachs in 2003.^^ According to the authors, if “things go right,” the BRIC 
economies could, together, become bigger than the G6 in US dollar terms in less than 
40 years, a considerable contrast to today’s global scenario. Of this increase, around 
two-thirds would be achieved by higher real growth and one-third by currency 
appreciation, as the BRJCs’ real exchange rates are forecast to rise by up to 300
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percent between 2000 and 2050.^^ Accordingly, Brazil's real GDP growth rate should 
be, on average, 3.6% per annum in the next 50 y e a r s . I f  growth is maintained at 
these levels, by 2050 Brazil's GDP in dollar terms would be greater than that of most 
of the G6 countries, except Japan and the U.S.^^ Although possibly over-optimistic, 
Wilson and Purushothaman explain that their forecast does not require “miracle 
performance,”^^  only the maintenance by the BRJCs of favourable conditions for 
growth with growth-supportive policies,^® which should include sound 
macroeconomic policies and a stable macroeconomic background; strong and stable 
political institutions; openness to trade and foreign direct investment; and high levels 
of education.^^
Despite such a seemingly dramatic outlook for the world economic order, whereby in 
2050 only Japan and the U.S. would remain among the six largest economies,^^ 
Wilson and Purushothaman assert that there are equivalent historical events. The cases 
of Japan and Germany are illustrative, as 50 years ago both economies were struggling 
to reconstruct their countries after the devastation of World War 11.^  ^Apart from that, 
the authors contend that a similar 40 year projection exercise with 11 countries (U.S., 
U.K., Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Brazil, Argentina, India, Korea and Hong Kong) 
starting in 1960 would produce similar results to their present economic realities, 
particularly for the more developed countries such as the U.S., U.K., Japan, France, 
Germany and Italy. Brazil's real growth, however, would have fallen below their 
projected line, as would India's and Argentina's. This is because these countries have 
not implemented growth-supportive policies in the past 40 years. "^^
That risk is again a reality for Brazil and could affect the country’s future economic 
prospects, consequently diminishing the likelihood that economic growth may play a 
decisive role in compelling the elites to act in concert with the rest of the population in 
keeping the government and its agents in check. As Wilson and Purushothaman 
contend, Brazil is the only BRIC country that has underperformed in reaching the
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Ibid., p. 10 
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growth rates projected by Goldman Sachs^^ since, although the Brazilian economy has 
grown on average 5.3% per year in the last 50 years, the nation’s economic growth has 
suffered a steep downturn since the 1980s debt crisis,^^ prompted by a combination of 
sudden exponential increase in the interest rates in the world economy and lower 
commodity p r i c e s .T h e  debt crisis marked the end of the state-led development 
model implemented by the military regime, which was underpinned by large 
infrastructural projects and technological building in strategic sectors, such as 
aviation, mining, and energy.^^ State intervention by Brazilian leaders since Getulio 
Vargas in 1930 was seen as necessary in order to lead the country towards 
independence and self-sufficiency. In the manufacturing sector, there was a belief that, 
in order to modernise and be competitive, a nation should invest and possess 
capability in key industries, especially those in the heavy manufacturing and 
chemicals sectors.^^ Vargas’s and the military regime’s protectionist policies and 
nationalistic development programmes led the state to exercise a prominent role in the 
economy, successfully investing in key areas, such as hydroelectric power (with the 
construction of Itaipu Hydroelectric Plant),^® biofuels, aircraft manufacturing (through 
former state-run company Embraer), mining (through former state-owned company 
Vale), and oil exploration and petrochemicals (through the state-controlled company 
Petrobras).^^ Largely funded by external financing, the public debt amassed by the 
military regime, both to steer the country out of recession caused by the oil shocks of 
the 1970s, and to promote Brazilian self-reliance in these strategic sectors, proved
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economically harmfiiL^^ Accordingly, high inflation and negative economic growth or 
stagnation would afflict the Brazilian economy throughout the 1980s and into the 
1990s.^  ^ Since then, the country’s GDP has grown slowly, at an average 2.9% per year 
from 1982 to 2003, a problem symptomatic of over-reliance on external financing and 
the country’s crippling public debt.^ "^  In addition, Brazil’s growth rate prospects could 
be affected by the fact that, when compared with China and other Asian economies, 
the country is less open to trade, has lower rates of investment and savings, and has 
much higher public and foreign debts.^^ Relative isolationism, coupled with the belief 
that government intervention in the economy is desirable, led successive Brazilian 
governments to become relatively insulated to trade.^^ For Prideaux, from as far back 
as the country’s history as its colonisation by the Portuguese, when the country was 
flooded by British imports but growth remained sluggish or stagnant, Brazil has been 
suspicious of free markets, although commodity exports have been one of the 
trademarks of its economy.^^ Kingstone pinpoints Brazil’s historical closeness to trade 
at the start of the Great Depression, arguing that the country has remained insulated by 
imposing tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in order to protect its national industries 
and, in the process, has consistently undermined and undervalued its agricultural 
competitiveness.^^ In 2008, for instance, trade accounted for only 24% of the 
country’s GDP.^^ Although this is short of the trade figures of other major economies, 
the past decade saw trade averaging 25% to 30% of its GDP, which is a significant 
improvement from the 15% to 20% of GDP of previous decades."^ ® Import tariffs have 
also been greatly decreased, averaging now only 14%, down from 112% in the
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1980s/^ As mentioned, however, Brazil’s investments and savings are nearly half of 
that of China’s and considerably lower than the Asian average, whereas public 
spending and foreign debt are a lot greater than those sustained by Asian economies."^^
For these reasons, although Goldman Sachs’ study still includes Brazil as an economy 
that could, by 2050, be one of the world’s six richest, it also points out that its forecast 
can only materialise if significant progress is made and sustained high economic 
growth is achieved."^  ^According to Walsh, although growth in 2007 reached 5.2% and 
inflation was kept under control, Brazil’s economy will only be able to grow at the 
same rate as the other BRICs when fundamental reforms to its tax system and bloated 
public service are implemented."^"  ^ These warnings are based on the failure of the 
country to fulfil its potential in the past. As Prideaux points out, “Brazil has been 
democratic before, it has had economic growth before and it has had low inflation 
before. But it has never before sustained all three at the same time.”"^  ^ Such periods of 
relative stability in the past have provided a sample of the country's potential. Between 
1947 and 1962, for example, the Brazilian economy grew on average 6% a year and it 
was regarded in the world economy as a success story."^  ^ Growth reached its peak 
between 1968 and 1973 when, led by strong state intervention and an import- 
substitution-industrialisation (ISI) p o l i c y t h e  country's economic growth reached 
more than 10% a year, during the period of the Brazilian Miracle."^  ^As seen, Brazil's 
highly successful economic performance, which had already been hit hard by both the 
1973 and 1979 oil shocks,"^  ^ ended with the debt crisis of 1982.^® Macroeconomic 
instability, very slow or stagnated growth, rising inflation, and a crippling external 
debt pervaded the following years, leading to the “lost decade”  ^^ of the 80s. As 
Kingstone points out, although in the transition to democracy there was a recognition
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that the economic formula adopted by the military regime had to change, the new 
democracy grappled with the implementation of new macroeconomic policies to 
control the country’s sky-rocketing inflation and stimulate growth. Neoliberal 
economic reforms such as wide privatisations and trade liberalisation were adopted in 
order to steer the country out of the economic turmoil, but political instability and 
unsuccessful economic policies meant Brazil plunged deeper into economic crisis.^^
Although these past experiences call for caution when it comes to predicting Brazil's 
economic prospects for the future, Brainard and Matinez-Diaz assert that current 
forecasts are likely to be based on much more solid ground,^^ since there are 
significant differences between Brazil’s previous economic greatness and the very 
positive economic situation the country is experiencing now. The first significant 
distinction lies in the political regime; unlike in the 1970s when the country was under 
a military dictatorship, Brazil is now a vibrant dem ocracy.A nother major difference 
has to do with the economic policies adopted in both periods. As seen, in the 1970s, 
economic development was largely fuelled by state-led intervention in the economy 
through investments financed by foreign bor row ing .Th is  policy proved to be 
especially damaging, as the country’s huge external debt meant not only that the 
government could not borrow money cheaply to stimulate the economy after the 
global economic downturn of 1982, but also that for more than two decades Brazil’s 
external debt would undermine its development.^^ The current economic growth, on 
the other hand, is the result of conservative macroeconomic policies underlined by a 
sustained period of low inflation. Moreover, Brazil is now inserted into the global 
economy and has fostered good foreign relations with developed and developing 
countries worldwide.^^ Kingstone concurs, arguing that,
“[a]s of 2008, the situation has changed a lot. Brazilian economic and 
social policy is widely praised for its stability, innovativeness, and 
adherence to prudent macroeconomic principles. And though Brazil’s 
economic performance continues to lag behind the region’s leaders, it
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is dramatically improved relative to its own past performance, with the 
trend pointing towards continued improvement.”^^
Significantly, Goldman Sachs issued another report in 2005 stating that not only had 
all BRIC countries outperformed its 2003 forecasts, but also predicting that they could 
realise the ‘dream’ more quickly than first anticipated, ultimately contending that 
“[t]he case for including the BRICs directly in global economic policymaking is now 
overwhelming.”^^  In the case of Brazil, positive signs of economic strength are seen in 
its increased trade with China, as well as Chinese investment in the country.^® Brazil 
has also demonstrated real leadership among developing countries in agricultural 
policymaking at the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) trading negotiation process.^^
Brainard, Martinez-Diaz and Kingston emphasise the importance of Brazil’s 
achievements under the former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva,^^ more commonly 
known as Lula, who was once a socialist labour leader and one of the founders of the 
Workers’ Party in 1980.^  ^When Lula took office in 2002 - the first candidate from the 
PT ever to be elected as President of Brazil -  investors were fearful that he would 
adopt extreme left policies and steer the country away from capitalism.^"  ^ Concerns 
over a possible moratorium of Brazil’s external debt panicked investors and the Real 
currency lost around 50% of its value.^^ In Washington, the possibility of Lula's 
victory at the 2002 presidential elections was regarded as threatening to the U.S., 
especially among important figures of the Republican Party and some of those 
responsible for the American interventionist policies in Central America in the 1980s 
during Ronald Reagan’s presidency.Due to his left-wing tendencies and labour 
union leadership, Lula was considered a revolutionary who would, together with Hugo 
Chavez of Venezuela and Fidel Castro of Cuba, form an axis of evil, taking Latin
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America on an anti-American, communist path.^^ The concern was so great among 
some Congressmen, including the then Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neil, that some 
members of Congress requested George Bush senior to “take a tough stand against 
Lula da Silva.”^^  A senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, Constantine C. Menges, also 
denounced the serious threats to the U.S. posed by the election of a Marxist and pro- 
Castro President in Brazil, and the danger of South America falling into power of an 
axis of evil. Menges’s warned about the possibility of Brazil reviving its nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missile programmes, and the potential for it to establish links 
with terrorist regimes, such as Cuba, Iran and Iraq.^^
In order to assuage growing concerns of both voters and foreign investors, in June 
2002 Lula issued a ‘Letter to the Brazilian People’.^ ® In the letter, Lula addressed the 
general apprehension and uncertainty about his approach to macroeconomic stability 
by both recognising the risk of rising inflation to the country and acknowledging the 
importance of honouring the country’s obligations towards its foreign debt. In 
addition, Lula emphasised his commitment to social justice, whilst reiterating 
criticisms to the records of the Cardoso govemment.^^ As Kingstone contends, the 
letter intended to reach both the Brazilian voters and the country’s foreign investors, 
as he assured the national audience that inflation control would have precedence over 
some of his earlier political promises against neoliberal economic policies, whilst 
providing foreign investors with credible signs that he would continue to follow the 
path of stability, by maintaining the macroeconomic policies implemented by the 
Cardoso government.
Lula and the PT's shift from radical socialist programmes and demands to a softer 
approach on economic orientation was part of a change in the Party's course during the 
mid-1990's.^^ In its early years of existence, the PT and their presidential campaigns^"  ^
had been marked by a policy-led ideological approach with a strong emphasis on the
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redistributive and developmental roles of the state and a rejection of the orientation of 
Brazilian politics, namely subservience to a market-led form of capitalism where 
neoliberal economic policies such as privatisation, liberalisation, deregulation and the 
drive for minimal government intervention prevailed over social justice/^ A number 
of contextual and historical factors led PT to change its orientation and soften its 
political ideology/^ According to Hunter, the Party went through a major 
reassessment after Lula's defeat to Cardoso in 1994. Economic policies and the 
country’s future economic orientation had, until then, been used as key socialist 
platforms by the PT. Accordingly, the Party regarded the rejection of the neoliberal 
capitalist model prevalent in Brazil and advanced by the major international financial 
institutions dictating the country’s, as well as the continent’s, macroeconomic policies, 
such as the IMF, as indispensable to achieve a more egalitarian socie ty.After  being 
defeated by both Collor and Cardoso due, in the main, to the lack of support from the 
poor,^^ and witnessing the success of Cardoso’s Real Plan^^ in stabilising the economy 
and taming inflation,^® the PT began to recognise not only the importance of low 
levels of inflation to Brazilians,^^ but also the challenges ingrained in radical change 
of the status quo due to constraints both from international financial institutions and 
the Brazilian political system.^^ This shift was a necessary element of PT’s willingness 
to become a more competitive Party in the electoral political system of Brazil.^^ 
According to Article 77, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the 1988 Constitution, in order to win a 
presidential election, candidates have to obtain the majority of votes in direct popular 
elections. In this system, candidates situated further from the centre of the political 
spectrum are at a disadvantage.^"^ According to Hunter, “[i]n this light, moderate 
leaders worked strenuously to convince their radical counterparts to be more realistic 
about the given parameters of competition.”^^  After the defeat in 1994, Party leaders.
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prompted by PT’s more moderate ranks, began to understand that Lula had captured a 
significant amount of votes in the elections of 1989 on a radical platform not due to an 
irrevocable acceptance of the Party's radical ideology, but due to the special 
circumstances of that election. The second round of the contest of 1989^  ^ was a 
polarised dispute between a candidate from the right, who had affiliations with the 
military regime and a left-wing candidate, Lula, who symbolised a clear break with 
the politics of a whole era.^  ^This understanding led the PT to recognise that against a 
more centrist candidate, such as Cardoso, Lula’s radical call for reforms and for a 
change in the status quo would be less well received, as was the case in the 1994 
elections.^^ As Kingstone contends, long economic instability led Brazilians to 
become “deeply intolerant of inflation.”^^  Lula’s warnings that the Real Plan would 
reduce the purchase power of the poor by as much as 30% did not materialise; on the 
contrary, the Plan had the opposite effect, becoming the singular most effective way of 
reducing poverty rates in modem Brazilian h i s t o r y . A s  a result, Lula’s open 
campaign against Cardoso’s Plan to tackle inflation did not resonate well with the 
lower classes, leading him lose the presidency again to Cardoso, who was re-elected in 
1998.^  ^ In addition, moderate PT candidates had proven more successful at winning 
local and regional elections, whereas radicals had more chances of winning seats in 
the lower houses of state legislatures - where seats are allocated through proportional 
state representation^^ - of the South and Southeast.^^ This was another reason for 
pragmatist Party members to argue that, in that context, the advancement of PT's 
radical policies at direct popular elections would diminish the Party's chances of 
winning meaningful posts at local and state elections, thus curbing Lula's prospects of 
winning the presidency. Another incentive for change was the fact that Lula himself
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enjoyed the support of Brazilians who were less sympathetic to the Party’s 
organisation.^^ As Hunter puts it,
“[t]he evidence pointed to an unavoidable conclusion. The PT needed 
to be more attuned to the preferences of the electorate and to attract 
more support that had systematically leaned toward more conservative 
options: residents of small towns and rural areas, people from Brazil's 
Northeast, North and Center-West regions, the least educated and 
poorer segments of the population, the elderly, and women. Efforts to 
secure their backing seemed to require a centrist ideological shift as 
well as measures that would modify the party in organizational terms, 
deemphasizing programs and highlighting personality (that is, the 
figure of Lula) and even providing concrete immediate material 
benefits.”^^
Hence, a shift towards vote maximisation took place from mid-1990. As Hunter 
contends, although Lula and the PT had matured and softened some of their 
ideological convictions, changes to the Party's strategies did not happen all at once, 
but took place in a layered manner over a period of time.^^ As a result, by the time of 
the 2002 elections, Lula was strongly committed to macroeconomic stability and fiscal 
discipline.^^ This was the reason why concerns that he would default on both Brazil’s 
foreign economic commitments, as well as on the maintenance of sound 
macroeconomic policies on the national level, did not materialise.^^ Instead, Lula 
applied a soft touch when it came to running the economy and respecting financial 
m arke ts ,un l ike  other Latin American Presidents such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez 
and Evo Morales, of Bolivia. Political analysts attribute this to a combination of 
respect for the financial markets and the implementation of social programmes
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targeting the poorest and most deprived citizens in Brazil, responsible for lifting 
millions of Brazilians out of poverty.
The Real Plan committed the government to managing exchange rates closely as a 
means of retaining the credibility of Brazil’s new currency, the real. Cardoso had been 
committed to protecting the value of the real and had to guarantee sufficient reserves 
to sustain the linkage of the real to the dollar. Although the Plan was effective in 
combating high inflation, with the reduction of inflation rates from 15% to 2% only 
three months after its implementation, contradictions within it eventually produced 
undesirable consequences to the economy. Accordingly, in order to ensure that the 
country had sufficient reserves, Cardoso's administration had to attract foreign capital 
into Brazil, for instance through privatisations. These inflows could only be 
maintained by keeping interest rates high, which, in turn, discouraged investment and 
led to rising public debt. In addition, the real was artificially overvalued, a good 
policy for imports, but highly damaging to Brazilian agricultural exports and to 
domestic industries, undermining the ability of the government to protect the value of 
the c u r re n c y .T h e  complexities of the Real Plan eventually led to its end. Cardoso's 
many effective policies to maintain the country in good fiscal health were not enough 
to keep the real’s parity with the dollar and, in January of 1999, when the government 
could not defend the currency any longer, the Plan ended, with the real currency 
devalued significantly and allowed to float. As Kingstone contends,
“[t]he ensuing period leading up to the 2002 elections was one of 
relatively erratic economic performance as the country suffered the 
consequences of the shock. Cardoso had put to rest concerns about 
ungovernability and drunkenness and set the country on a clear path for 
the future. But, in the short term, the path to stability remained a 
difficult one.” ®^^
With the end of the Real Plan, Lula’s main macroeconomic task was keeping inflation 
targets, a policy he followed with orthodoxy. His commitment to the maintenance of
Barrionuevo, 'Brazil Rides Wave o f Growth'
Kingstone, 'Sobering Up and Going Global: Brazil’s Progress from Populism and Protectionism', 
p.114 
Ibid.
Ibid., pp.l 14-5 
Ibid., p. 115 
Ibid.
219
Zci>e/Cif*
economic stability was strongly evidenced when he appointed Herinque Meirelles as 
Présidente of the Central Bank and Antonio Palocci as his Finance Minister. Both 
were very well known and highly respected market-oriented figures. Lula also 
benefited largely from policies and reforms initiated by his predecessor, Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, who is now credited with laying the foundations of Brazil’s current 
economic stability. Very importantly, unlike other Latin American Presidents, Lula 
proved to be a left-wing politician, but not a populist, by not changing the Brazilian 
Constitution to be re-elected for a third-term, instead supporting the candidacy of 
his Chief of Staff, Dilma Rousseff, for the 2010 general elections. In the face of Latin 
American countries’ historical experience with populist rulers and dictators, Lula’s 
exit from office, despite his enviable approval ratings,^represents a democratic 
achievement not only for Brazil, but for the whole continent.^The elections of 2010 
were meaningful not only in that it was the first time Lula was not running as a 
candidate since 1989, when Brazil’s transition to democracy was consolidated, but in 
that Dilma Rousseff, due in the main to Lula’s support, was elected Brazil’s first 
female President.
A mixture of internal and external factors has been significant in defining Brazil's 
current economic posit ion.^Apart  from sound macroeconomic management, 
Brazil has also implemented programmes to address poverty and inequality, which 
have succeeded in taking millions out of poverty and increased significantly the 
country’s lower middle c l a s s .R e s e a rc h  by the Getulio Vargas Foundation has 
shown that the Brazilian middle class -  those earning between 1,115 reais and 4,807 
reais per month - has risen by more than 10% from 2002 to 2008, from 42.4% to
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52.9%/^^ In addition, there is currently high demand for Brazil's agricultural and 
commodity exports, and investment in biofuels as well as major gas and oil finds have 
placed the country in a strong geopolitical position, underlined by the nation’s energy 
self-sufficiency and its growing importance as an energy expor ter /Braz i l ian  
corporations are also becoming stronger and achieving increasing global success/
Despite scepticism as to the inclusion of Brazil in the BRICs,^^^ Brazil’s economy has 
also proved resilient to the current worldwide recession and optimism is growing for 
the country’s prospects for the future/^® The banking sector, which suffered heavily in 
most developed countries, recovered rapidly in Brazil, thanks to tight regulation 
imposed by the Brazilian Central Bank/^^ Such regulation, which required banks to 
have high reserves and maintain balance sheets for all operations, including those 
carried out by their non-financial subsidiaries, was seen before the 2008 crisis as 
conservative and over-cautious, but has now been hailed as a model to be followed by 
other central banks/^^ In addition, the resilience of Brazil’s economy has attracted 
investors with both stocks and the exchange rate already returning to pre-crisis levels. 
Direct foreign investment and investment in the economy have also remained 
strong. Unlike in other economic crises, Brazil was one of the last countries to go 
into recession and it has been one of the first to come out it,^ "^^  with just two quarters 
seeing economic contraction after returning to growth at 1.9% in the period of April to 
June 2009.^^  ^ According to the Brazilian Institute of Statistics and Geography, the 
Brazilian economy grew an impressive of 7.5% in 2010,^^^ the highest growth rate
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since 1986/^^ Strong economic performance in the face of a continuing global 
downturn has led some commentators to predict that Brazil will be one of the major 
forces pulling the global economy out of recession/^^
In addition, it is important to note that labelling groups of rising states, although 
increasingly important in evaluating their economic and political prospects and in 
providing practical as well as normative platforms for them to act diplomatically, 
provides only a vague and narrow appraisal of emerging countries. As Cooper points 
out, these conceptualisations fail to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the 
individual differences of rising states and, in many cases, their narrow scope 
demonstrate no similarities in political, strategic or social matters. This is the case 
of the BRIG label, as its framework is centred on the size of the economies of Brazil, 
Russia, India and China, rather than on an ideational or value-driven commonality 
between these countries. Economically, the acronym BRIC makes sense, as the four 
countries hold significant foreign exchange reserves, offer attractive investment 
perspectives for multinational companies, and their combined weight accounts for 15 
per cent of the global economy. Despite this, there are substantial differences between 
the four economies, from the level of democratic consolidation, to their civil society 
and media openness, economic and urban-rural inequality rates, to their internal 
political and social instabi li t ies.Even in the economic arena, the BRIC framework 
is silent about their sizeable economic structural distinctions, failing for instance to 
account for the relationship each nation state holds with their private sectors. In 
addition, Goldman Sachs’s positive predictions for the four economies overlook how 
corruption, which is rated poorly in all four countries according to Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index 2010,^^  ^ may undermine their efforts to 
grow economically. As Habib and Zurawicki point out, corruption can impact
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negatively on countries’ economic growth, level of investment, income distribution 
and productivity/^^ Accordingly, corruption may hamper economic growth and lower 
investment due to its multi-faceted social, political and economic impact. Socially, 
corruption hinders the development of human capital due to its adverse effects on the 
population’s access to a wide range of services, including basic needs such as food, 
health and education. Economically, corruption increases general costs to the 
economy and makes the delivery of services more costly to customers. It also prevents 
real competition, as it impedes businesses from competing openly and in accordance 
with market forces. Consequently, corruption impacts more heavily on the least 
advantaged members of society, who are more dependent on the provision of state 
services and on whose income the higher costs of corruption bear much greater 
weight. Politically, protracted corruption may undermine the legitimacy of the state 
and lower the population’s support for the government.
The BRIC framework may, however, be useful in boosting the four countries’ 
diplomatic efforts to build stronger connections with other developing nations, 
particularly in Africa and, in that, constrain the national elites into abiding by 
international regulatory frameworks and international law. China for instance, 
initiated, in 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCA), whereas the 
Presidents of all countries have made numerous visits to African countries. Brazil’s 
former President Lula went further than the other countries in this respect by making 
six official visits to African nations since 2003. In addition, Lula co-hosted, with the 
Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2006, the first ever African-South American 
Summit in Abuja, N i g e r i a .T h e  first BRIC Summit was held in Yekaterinburg, in 
Russia, in June 2009. Hailed as a ‘historic event’ by Russian President Medvedev, 
during that meeting the BRIC countries showed unity on many issues, the most 
important of which is their commitment to a re-balanced global order, where 
developing countries play a stronger role.^^  ^ As will be seen, countries’ increased 
global economic and diplomatic presence come at a great cost for national elites, who 
become increasingly compelled to abide by international rules and regulations. This,
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in turn, requires them to constrain their power at the national level by relinquishing 
some of the decision-making processes from which they derive privileges in favour of 
more participatory and inclusive political mechanisms, which demonstrate, or appear 
to demonstrate, their commitment to democratic and law-driven internal 
transformation/^^
Brazil’s increased prominence in the international arena and enviable current 
economic performance could lead the country to fulfil the nation’s aspirations and 
historical promise to achieve greatness. Considered widely as the “eternal country of 
future” until very recen tly ,B raz il struggled through its history to unlock its vast 
potential. Endowed with an immense territory, Brazil shares its borders with all 
South American countries apart from Chile and Ecuador, and yet has peaceful 
relations with all its neighbours, with no parts of its territory in dispute. The country 
is also very rich in natural resources, possessing huge reserves of iron ore and other 
minerals, large petroleum deposits and hydroelectric resources, as well as enjoying an 
abundance of fertile land ideal for agriculture. Recent oil and gas discoveries have 
also added greatly to its wealth. In addition, Brazil has a significant internal market 
and its corporations are acquiring an increasing global character. All these elements 
have led academics, foreign investors and policymakers to speeulate, for many 
decades, the country’s rise in the international economic scenario, predictions which 
seemed unlikely to materialise until very recently. Despite this, Brainard and 
Martinez-Diaz contend that some of the policies Brazil implemented in the 1960s and 
70s to guarantee the country’s independence in the future are now, ironically, some of 
the major factors promoting the eountry’s insertion into the global economy and
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strengthening its relations with other countries/"^^ Particularly so are the policies the 
country implemented in order to become an agricultural powerhouse and achieve self- 
sufficiency in energy, including promoting and subsidising the biofuels’ sector/'^^
For Brainard and Martinez-Diaz, Brazil will only be able to make the most of its 
advantages, both during and after the current financial crisis, if it addresses two main 
economic challenges. Firstly, in order to capitalise on the current surge in demand for 
its agricultural products, as well as its other natural resources, the country must ensure 
that revenues from these sectors are reinvested into education, infrastructure and 
technology, so that the foundations for sustained, long-term growth are laid. Secondly, 
in order to sustain its continued growth, the government should implement consistent 
economic policies promoting economic integration and better governance of 
international markets. As the authors contend “Brazil’s ambivalence on these issues 
manifests itself in an inconsistent and uneven position, especially on trade policy, 
which limits its ability to influence global rules and institutions in its favour.”^
Although this is the case, Brazil’s prospects are very promising as the country is 
presently benefiting from two-long term global trends that have converged. The 
first is the increased demand for commodities, due to the rise in global population, in 
general, and the growing numbers of people joining the middle classes in countries 
like China and India, in particular. As China and India develop at a fast pace, their 
need for commodities such as soy, iron and other commodities steadily increase. 
Despite the current slight decline in commodity prices evidenced as a result of the 
global economic crisis, Brainard and Martinez-Diaz argue that their long-term value is 
set to rise precisely due to the growth of income of large numbers of people in 
emerging econom ies.Projections of the Brookings Institute reveal that by 2020, 
half the world’s population will be enjoying higher disposable i n c o m e . I n  a world 
where more people lead a middle class lifestyle there will certainly be a much greater 
demand for commodity and manufactured products, which positions Brazil in a very
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advantageous s itu a tio n /A n o th er global trend likely to favour the country is the 
growing concern over climate change and the need for the world climate to be 
stabilised. With the largest and most bio-diverse rainforest in the world, the Amazon, 
located in Brazil, as well as the country's strong position in the biofuels' sector, 
Brainard and Martinex Diaz contend that Brazil is likely to attract significant amounts 
of international transfers towards carbon sequestration. According to the authors, the 
increase in value of such practices is not only likely, but also necessary, in a post- 
Kyoto protocol framework world.
In the next sections of this Chapter, Brazil’s main geopolitical strengths in the global 
economy, namely its current and improving position in energy security and its 
powerful agricultural capacity, will be further investigated. As increasing signs of 
global power, both these sectors may be crucial contributors to Brazil’s bid to acquire 
significantly more international economic and political clout. As will be seen, in this 
process elites will inevitably have to forgo some of the privileges they gain from 
maintaining a mutually beneficial relationship with the government in favour of a 
more democratically-driven and accountable society, thus enhancing the conditions 
for the implementation of the rule of law in Brazil.
5.1.2 Geopolitics: Brazil’s Future International Political Standing in the Face
of its Energy and Agricultural Prospects
5.1.2.1 Energy Security
In addition to sound policies and economic decisions, Brazil is well positioned in 
terms of energy self-sufficiency, an important barometer of future geopolitical 
power. Brazil declared itself self-sufficient in petroleum in 2006,^^^ after 
undergoing a progressive but steady decline on its reliance of foreign oil since the 
1980s. As Baer explains, until the 1970s, Brazil fulfilled only 20% of its petroleum
Ibid.
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needs. In a historic policy move in 1975, the military regime allowed private 
companies, in addition to Petrobras, the state oil company, to undertake oil exploration 
in the country through 'risk contracts'. The main aim of this policy was to diminish 
Brazil’s dependence on foreign currency and to insulate the country from future oil 
shocks by implementing a petroleum self-sufficiency plan.^^^ Risk-contracts 
apportioned equal gains of any findings between foreign companies and Petrobras, 
financing costly explorations with foreign capital and furthering the development of 
Brazil's capacity in the exploration and extraction of oil. This strategy, aided by oil 
discoveries in the 1980s and 1990s, gradually eased Brazil’s dependence on foreign 
oil, until achieving full self-sufficiency in 2006.^^  ^ Notwithstanding, Brazil’s current 
production of 2 million barrels a day of largely heavy oil would not be sufficient to 
fulfil the country’s growing demands, particularly considering its present pace of 
g r o w t h . I n  2007, however, Brazil’s fortunes changed for the better when Petrobras - 
which under current rules is allowed to trade publicly despite being state controlled^
- discovered huge oil fields 200 miles off the southern cost of Rio de Janeiro, in the 
Tupi r e s e r v e . F i r s t  estimated at between 5 and 8 billion barrels, a significant 
discovery amounting, in comparison, to the total oil remaining in the North Sea,^^  ^the 
area where the Tupi reserve is located could potentially hold anything between 50 and 
100 billion or more barrels of crude. Added to Brazil’s current reserve of 14.4 billion 
barrels, this finding would position the country amongst the five top producers in the 
world. More conservative estimates predict that Brazil will be the tenth largest 
producer in the world, behind the Middle Eastern countries Russia, Nigeria and 
Venezuela. Around the same time, Petrobras also discovered a large natural gas 
reserve 23 miles west of Tupi, which can potentially help Brazil attain self-sufficiency 
in natural gas.^ ^® The discovery by Petrobras is even more significant when its 80% 
stake in the field is considered.
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The new oil and gas discoveries are located under the South Atlantic continental shelf, 
in very deep waters, at an estimated three to four miles below the surface. They are 
also sheltered by a thick layer of salt, hence being known as the ‘Pre-Salt’ {Pré-Saï) 
fields, making their extraction not only technologically challenging, but also very 
costly, and potentially requiring years of work and capital-intensive investment 
before they are in full production. In addition, the Pre-Salt findings were partly 
overshadowed by concerns of foreign investors over the government’s plans to 
introduce a new legislation changing the regulatory model in place at the time of the 
discoveries, which culminated with the promulgation of Law No 10.351*^ "^  of 2010, 
instituting Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) for the exploration, development 
and production of the Pre-Salt f i e l d s . T h e  current general oil and gas legal 
framework allows Petrobras and other oil companies to buy concessions to explore 
geographical blocks at their own expense, thus acquiring the right to own any oil and 
gas found in return for the payment of taxes and royalties. Although 30% of the 
Pre-Salt region had already been offered to concession, the Brazilian government 
sought to introduce a new system of production-sharing contracts for the remainder of 
the Pre-Salt fields in the face of potential new findings, the high commercial value of 
the light crude found in the fields and expected low risk costs of exploration. Under 
the new rules, the nation owns any oil found in the region and a share of it is 
awarded to the oil company that has produced it. Moreover, Petrobras has been
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granted at least 30% of each venture, but it could be awarded 100% through auction. 
The control of each consortium been given to a new government-owned company 
called Pre-Salt Petroleum S.A. {Pré-Sal Petrôleo S.A. - PPSA), which has veto power 
on any operational matter, from acquisition rights to rates of production. This means 
that Petrobras would become the lead operator in any venture, whilst PPSA is 
responsible for overseeing, through its participation in the operating committee, 
production sharing contracts established under the new legislation. Law 10.351 also 
prescribes for the establishment of a special Social Fund (Fundo Social - FS) for the 
Pre-Salt revenues, to be spent in areas such as education, the amelioration of poverty, 
public health, sports and other social programmes (Chapter VII, Articles 47 to 60). As 
Phillips posits, by changing the system, the government guarantees control of strategic 
oilfields. Critics of the proposed reforms have argued that the government could 
have achieved its objective of retaining a larger share of the revenues from the pre-salt 
area to invest in poverty-reduction initiatives through the existing oil and gas legal 
framework, a process which would not only have been easier, but also fairer, clearer 
and open to those investing or willing to invest in oil and gas exploration in Brazil. 
Some also believe that the high involvement of the state in the sector raises cause for 
concern.
Despite this, the new-found oil and gas place Brazil at a geopolitical and economic 
advantage in the world a r e n a . B r a z i l ’s current pace of development is set to 
continue, requiring a growing need for energy. As Onis contends, electricity 
demand from both the heavy industries’ sector and from development projects, for 
instance to take electricity to rural areas, is growing fast in Brazil, at a rate of between 
5% and 6% per year.^^  ^Delays in creating further capacity, as well as shortfalls in the 
supply of natural gas from Bolivia, which provides half of Brazil’s gas supplies, has 
meant that occasional power shortages are still a reality for many Brazilians, a fact 
which is damaging to the country’s booming economy.
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Brazil is also a leader in the mining industry. The company Vale, privatised in 
1997,187 -g largest producer of iron ore in the world. Since its privatisation, the 
company has been expanding globally and important steps in this direction have been 
the purchases of nickel and copper producers in Canada and mining properties in Peru 
and African countries, as well as deals with Chinese and South Korean investors to 
develop steel mills in B r a z i l . V a l e ’s strategy for the future is to diversify and 
become a “‘one-stop-shop’ for the world’s steel industry”. T h e  company has made 
huge strides since its privatisation and is set to achieve its goals in the future. 
According to Wheatley, since 1997, Vale’s production of iron ore has risen from 114 
million to 300 million tonnes in 2009, with its 2014 target estimated at 450 million. In 
addition, the company’s number of employees worldwide has risen almost six-fold in 
the same period, from 11,000 to 60,000.^^  ^Despite these impressive achievements, the 
company was recently at odds with the Brazilian government over its business 
strategy. Although private, the Brazilian government’s ownership of Vale’s shares, 
which are held by the government owned Brazilian Development Bank {Banco 
Nacional de Desenvolvimento -  BNDES) means it still has some influence on the 
private giant. Accordingly, given Vale’s size, strategic nature of business, and 
geopolitical power, the government has expected the company to act in the best 
interests of the country. Considering the global economic crisis, this involved raising 
its exports and investing further in steel plants at home.^^^ For this reason. Vale’s 
decision to cut the production of iron ore by 30 million tonnes in the midst of the 
recession whilst still investing abroad has been condemned by the government, which 
has pushed the company to boost the Brazilian economy by securing existing jobs and 
promoting GDP growth. Future geopolitical concerns have also led the government to 
criticise publicly the company’s position in investing insufficiently in steel plants in 
Brazil, which could, in the near future, lead the country to being in the unfavourable 
position of depending on imported steel to fulfil the growing demands of its expanding 
economy despite being an exporter of iron ore.^^  ^As Wheatley posits, Brazil’s pace of
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growth, with increasing requirements for better transport and infrastructure, large 
investments in the energy sector, and the need to build facilities for the 2014 World 
Cup and the 2016 Olympics, will raise significantly its steel demand/Des pi te  the 
government’s concerns. Vale and another major Brazilian steel producer, Gerdau, 
have both announced plans for substantial investments in steel production for the 
coming years, a move which will certainly be positive for the continued growth of 
the country.
Brazil is also currently the world’s leading producer of ethanol, due to its pioneering 
attitude towards alternative fuels since the 1970s, when the government launched the 
‘Pro-Alcohol’ {Pro-Âlcooïf^^ programme promoting the production and consumption 
of sugarcane-based e t h a n o l . A s  Onis contends, biofuels, which include both 
ethanol, an alcohol produced from sugar cane, and biodiesel, a fuel produced from the 
oilseeds such as soyabeans, palm nuts and castor beans, offer a clean-energy 
alternative to fossil fuels in a world with an ever greater demand for energy. Both 
ethanol and biodiesel emit fewer carbon emissions when burned than fossil fuels such 
as oil and coal, a credential that is attracting large amounts of investment in the 
production of sugar cane and in sugar cane distilleries in Brazil. As Sennes and 
Narciso contend, following on from the large drive toward sugarcane-based ethanol 
biofuel in the 1970s, the sector has, in recent years, regained momentum. The current 
surge in production and consumption of ethanol biofuel is due to three main factors: 
the increase in international oil prices; the development of biofuel and fiexi motors, 
which allows drivers to fill their tanks with both gasoline and ethanol indistinctively; 
and technological advancements in the production of ethanol, most importantly the 
usage of waste from ethanol production to generate thermoelectric energy, which can 
be used by smaller connected factories or sold back to the grid, at a 35% profit.^®  ^In 
order to support its biofuels sector further, the Brazilian government has made ethanol
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and biodiesel a compulsory component of gasoline sold at Brazilian petrol stations/^^ 
In addition, the Brazilian Development Bank is financing foreign companies that 
produce biofuel with Brazil’s sugar-alcohol technology and is investing in the 
production of ethanol in Central America, which has preferential access to the U.S. 
market.^®  ^ The government’s investment in the sector is set to generate the country a 
valuable lead in this form of energy, which is predicted to grow significantly over the 
next years.
5.1.2.2 Agriculture
In the last decade, Brazil has developed into an agricultural powerhouse.^®"  ^ It is now 
the world’s biggest exporter of beef, chicken, orange juice, green coffee, sugar, 
tobacco, ethanol and soya dérivâtes, such as beans, oil and meal, as well as the fourth 
biggest exporter of pork and maize.^^^ Hi-tech approaches to the agricultural sector^^  ^
combined with a sustained investment, including in the areas of management and 
technology development for productivity optimisation, have contributed to an 
exponential increase and diversification of yields.^®  ^ In addition, Brazil possesses 
crucial advantages in this area, including tropical weather - very propitious to 
agriculture due to relative predictability in amounts of both rainfall and sunshine 
and, very significantly, vast stretches of arable land,^^^ in some areas so fertile, it can 
generate farmers three crops per year.^ ^® Even in areas where the soil is of a poorer 
quality, sugar cane, which thrives in the tropical weather and does not require highly
Law No 10.203 o f 2001 has instituted that both common and premium gasoline should receive 
between 20% and 24% of sugar-cane based biofuel. (Lei n° 10.203, de 22 de Fevereiro de 2001 (DOU 
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fertile soil, can be planted and turned either into sugar or ethanol fuel/^^ Cheap labour 
is another advantage of Brazil’s agricultural market, as it allows production costs to 
stay low/^^ As Wheatley points out, the success of such a variety of determinants and, 
in particular, of government investment in the sector, is evident when current 
productivity is compared with that of a few years ago. Although the amount of land 
planted with grains rose by 26% between the harvests of 1990-1991 and 2008-2009, 
from 37.9 million to 47.7 million hectares, the production of grains rose by almost 
250%, from 58 million tonnes in 1990-1991, to 144 million tonnes in 2008-2009, a 
two-fold productivity increase per hectare.^^^ Other figures are also illustrative of 
Brazil's success in the implementation of management efficiency and technological 
advances to its agricultural sector. From 1994 to 2008, for example, the production of 
beef and pork rose by 77% and 133%, respectively, whilst the production of chicken 
rose by 217% in the same period.^ "^^
Although these figures demonstrate that Brazil's agricultural sector is reaping the 
rewards of policies implemented in the past decades, Wheatley contends that the 
importance of the country as a global supplier has to do more with its potential, than 
with its current and past productivity records.^ Brazil still boasts 96 million hectares 
of available land suitable for agriculture, excluding areas of forests and/or 
environmental sensitivity. Out of the remaining 244 million hectares of land suitable 
for agriculture currently in use, 72 million are used for crops and 172 million for 
pasture. If higher-density ranching is replicated across the country, there could be a 
further 62 million hectares of land available for the cultivation of crops. As Wheatley 
points out, scientific research led to significant advancements in the area, as better 
strains of grass developed in agricultural research centres nationwide have allowed 
more efficient use of pastures. As an illustration, between 1970 and 2009, the number 
of cattle rose from 78.6 million to 169.9 million, whilst the amount of land under 
pasture has increased much more modestly, from 154.1 million to 172 million 
hectares. In the state of Sao Paulo, for example, where the use of pasture is much more 
efficient than the national average of 0.98 cattle per hectare, there are 1.55 head of 
cattle per hectare. If this ratio, which Wheatley points out is low by international
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standards, can be replicated widely across the country, there could be a further 62 
million hectares of land currently utilised as pasture available for crops/^^ As Onis 
asserts, “[n]o other country has such a large untapped reserve of land, water and 
farmers with the technology and expertise to add value to natural resources.”^^ ^
Apart from the need for more research and further implementation of efficiency 
management in the use of land for crops and pasture, Brazil also needs to invest 
heavily in infrastructure if it is to reach its full potential as an agricultural 
superpower /Al though farmers, supported by agricultural research centres and 
organisations, have made serious strides in their expertise, they still have to contend 
with poor roads, outdated ports and logistical problems to supply the national and 
international markets, factors which greatly increase the costs of production/^^ 
Furthermore, unlike in other major agricultural nations, Brazilian farmers are not 
protected by the government or offered insurance to cover their losses due, for 
instance, to adverse weather conditions, fluctuations on foreign exchange rates, 
increases in interest rates and negative outcomes of trade negotiations 
Notwithstanding, Onis asserts that the Brazilian government has been offering a 
significant amount of incentives to farmers and ranchers, as well as encouraging them 
to use technology in order to maximise their production/^^
Both the energy and the agricultural sectors may thus provide Brazil with an important 
geopolitical advantage in the international arena and, consequently, with an increased 
economic influence in international trade talks and agreements as well as a global 
voice in international political decision-making. This, as well as the country’s 
economic prospects, may, however, be undermined by Brazil’s poverty and inequality. 
As will be seen in the next section of this Chapter, government programmes to address 
Brazil’s social problems have lifted millions out of poverty and narrowed the 
country’s astounding economic and social inequality gap. Despite this, a great 
proportion of the population is still deprived of basic needs and services and, 
therefore, of the social rights enshrined in the 1988 Constitution. This harms the 
country economically, as it limits the internal market; socially, as it creates violence
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and social divisiveness and unrest; and internationally, as it damages the country’s 
image abroad and hampers foreign investment. Importantly, this also perpetuates a 
cycle by which the elites feel entitled to a far greater share of the country’s wealth 
than the rest of the population, precluding the implementation of the rule of law and 
the consolidation of the democracy.
5.2 Inequality
Brazil is still a world away from reaching the status of an economic superpower and, 
in order to achieve this, it will have to overcome many obstacles. One of them is 
addressing the stark levels of social and economic inequality, which make it one of the 
most socially unequal countries in the world.^^^ One illustrative comparison is that of 
the ratio between the richest and the poorest 20 percent of the population. Whilst in 
Europe the richest 20 percent earn four times as much as the poorest 20 percent, and in 
the U.S. eight times as much, in Brazil the ratio is thirty-four to one.^^  ^ As Justino, 
Litchfield and Whitehead argue, inequality is not usually seen as an obstruction to 
development but as a likely consequence of it. The authors contend, however, that 
poverty reduction policies will not suffice in boosting the development of the country 
- or the whole Latin American region, for that matter - as “persistent inequalities waste 
financial and human resources, erode social cohesion and, consequently, pose serious 
constraints to the process of social and economic development.”^^ '^  Medrano, 
Sanhueza and Contreras’s study of inequality in Latin America also reinforces this 
argument. For the authors, inequality may prevent economic goals from being fully 
achieved. Although the conclusions are similar, the latter study justifies this by the 
fact that the unequal distribution of resources may render part of the population unable 
to feed itself properly, consequently being prevented from working and generating
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income/^^ Another important and often neglected consequence of inequality is its 
negative impact on the middle class, particularly in places where it is sizeable, as in 
Brazil, where it comprises 20 to 25 percent of the total population/^^ A combination 
of lack of political will and the savvy exploitation by the rich of the country’s complex 
and outdated tax system, makes the economic elites hard to tax, whereas a large 
number of poor Brazilians either do not meet the low tax threshold or do not pay 
income tax since working informally or without a signed worker’s card. As a result, 
tax revenues are insufficient to provide satisfactory social services, such as health and 
education. The lack of adequate services for those who cannot afford to go private, 
and the drain on the income for those who can, strains the middle professional sectors, 
limiting the growth of the professional and semiprofessional occupations. In addition, 
inequality and poverty hamper opportunities for economic development and 
investment by restricting the growth of the domestic market of goods and services 
whilst increasing the incentives for state and government corruption “in ways that 
generate continual injustices and frustrations, great and small.”^^ ^
For Skidmore, Brazil has become one of the most unequal countries in the world for a 
variety of reasons, which he has grouped into two sets: the nature of the world 
economy and Brazil’s specific historical context.^^^ Among the first set of reasons, 
Skidmore includes the global consequences of industrialisation and Brazil’s insertion 
into the world economy. As he contends, since the Industrial Revolution, income 
distribution has become more unequal across the world, including in developed 
nations. In this capital-intensive, as opposed to labour-intensive world, industries can 
afford to pay much higher wages to skilled workers, thus widening the gap between 
those at the top and at the bottom of society. In addition, owners of capital tend to 
receive a disproportionate share of productivity in an industrialised world, creating 
further inequality in society. This phenomenon is exacerbated in societies where 
industrialisation was taking place at a time when there was a labour surplus. This was 
the case of Brazil, where rapid population growth since 1945 caused the widening 
between the income of the unskilled and unemployed and that of skilled labourers.
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who were absorbed by the rapid industrialisation growth of the 1920s and beyond/^^ 
Still within the first set of reasons, the second major cause of inequality in Brazil 
relates to the fact that the country inserted itself into the world economy as an exporter 
of commodities, which have no added value. By exporting low-value commodities and 
importing high-value industrialised products made with the commodities it exported, 
Brazil’s economy became uncompetitive, lagging behind that of most Eastern Asian 
countries.^^^
Among the set of reasons specific to Brazil’s history, Skidmore significantly contends 
that inequality stems, in large part, from the elites’ defence of their self-interests and 
their power to sway government policies in their favour. According to Skidmore, 
privileges conceded to the Brazilian elites throughout the country’s history have led 
Brazil to sustain regressive tax, pension and education systems, where redistribution 
of wealth happens from bottom up rather the top down.^^  ^As such, the Brazilian elites 
have the power to influence government policies in important areas such as tax, 
pensions and benefits giving them disproportionate privileges to the detriment of the 
rest of the Brazilian population. The Brazilian tax system, for instance, is marked by a 
regressive dependence on payroll and indirect taxes, which is advantageous to only 
10% of the population who control most of the wealth, but detrimental to the majority 
of Brazilians who, proportionately, benefit considerably less in return for their taxes 
than the middle and upper classes.^^^ Another illustrative example of “successful elite 
defence of self-interest,”^^  ^ is Brazil’s generous pension scheme for federal, state and 
municipal public employees, as well as private-sector workers in the formal economy, 
which runs at an estimated 20 million U.S. dollar a year deficit in the general revenues 
of the nation.^ '^  ^ Although employing the contributions of all Brazilian taxpayers, in 
2001 the World Bank estimated that 50% of the total pension system benefited the 
10% wealthiest in the country, whilst amongst the poorest 10% of Brazilians, only 1% 
benefited from the country’s social security system.^^^ In addition, Brazil awards a 
lifetime pension to unmarried daughters of deceased military officers, an eligibility
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which incentivised women to forego the institution of marriage/^^ Politicians have 
also employed the perks of public office to attract supporters by adding them to the 
public payroll. According to Skidmore, José Sarney, the first democratic Brazilian 
President after the end of the dictatorship, was alleged to have included hundreds of 
thousands of people in the federal payroll, the majority of whom had not been selected 
through competitive exams for public office,^^^ as prescribed by Article 37, paragraph 
2 of the 1988 Constitution. Municipalities have also multiplied in Brazil since the 
mid-1990s, adding a significant number of employees to an already swollen public 
payroll.^^^ The protection of elite interests is also evidenced in the country’s education 
system. Brazilian federal universities are free of charge, whilst entrance exams are 
very rigorous and competitive. Due to a severe lack of government funding, those who 
attend primary and secondary public schools perform badly compared to their 
privately-educated counterparts, who, as a result, will be much more likely to enjoy 
the privilege of free higher education.^^^ As Skidmore asserts, “this represents a 
significant distributional bonanza for the children of well-to-do families, the majority 
of whom could afford to pay part or all of the university tuition costs.” "^*^ Government 
attempts to address such disparities have consistently been met with fierce resistance 
from the Brazilian elites and those protecting their interests in Congress. An 
illustration of this is the Cardoso government’s unsuccessful attempt to pass a bill in 
Congress reducing generous federal pensions. At least four times the bill was 
introduced and, each time, the government was defeated due to intense lobbying by 
those trying to protect their own interests, which included the members of the 
Legislative House.^ "^ ^
Despite this, Brazil has been attempting to address the problem of social exclusion by 
investing heavily in poverty and deprivation reduction programmes. Its Family Grant 
(Bolsa Familiaf^^ programme is tackling the issue on a massive scale by providing 
between 11.2 and 13 million families with a minimum income guarantee, with the
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condition that they keep their children in school/"^^ Bolsa Familia’s federal 
programme followed Sao Paulo’s municipal version, Minimum Income {Renda 
Minima) , w h i c h  reaches out to around 600,000 people in almost 150,000 low 
income families/"^^ The programme, initiated by President Cardoso and greatly 
expanded by President Lula, has, together with other measures such as a two-fold 
increase in the minimum wage since 2004 and the granting of access to credit to the 
less well-off, seen income inequality fall by 5.6% and average income rise by 28% in 
the period of 2004-2009.^"^  ^ In addition, the conditionality of the programme ensures 
that future generations will have better schooling and, hence, will be more prepared 
and qualified to compete in the job market than their parents. For Houtzager, “These 
programmes represent a silent revolution in the form and size of the Brazilian 
government’s anti-poverty intervention.” "^^  ^ Their efficacy is evidenced by the real 
income rise of the poor as well as by falling inequality.^"^  ^ According to IPEA, the 
number of families with a per capita monthly income equal or greater than the 
minimum wages increased from 29% to 42% between 2004 and 2009, from 51.3 to 
77.9 million people. "^^  ^ IPEA’s report highlights that the government’s social policies 
were central to growth of per capita household income in the period, both through 
increases in the minimum wages and the expansion of the cash transfer 
programmes,^^^ despite pointing out that in the same period 107 million Brazilians still 
lived with less than the monthly minimum wages.^^^
Although Brazil’s development has gathered pace, many factors may hamper its 
success. For Justino, Litchfield and Whitehead, inequality may be one of them, as 
there is evidence that countries with higher levels of inequality tend to achieve lower
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economic growth than more egalitarian societies/^^ Other likely hurdles for Brazil’s 
growth are the reform of its institutions and of its pensions, tax and labour systems/^^ 
Its expensive and bureaucratic public sector is also an area in dire need of reform/^"^ 
As O’Donnell contends, overly bureaucratic state procedures strip poor and socially 
weak citizens of their rights by depriving them of the mechanisms they need to access 
formal public services, such as working permits, social security, health and ID cards, 
among others/^^ Whether politicians will want to face the challenge of reforming the 
government when the fruits of their policies may remain unrecognised during their 
period in power is, as yet, uncertain.
As will be seen in the next section of this Chapter, Brazil’s national elites may feel 
compelled to implement such changes to comply with the regulations of international 
markets and demands of foreign investors. Transnational regulatory frameworks, 
international law and foreign elites may offer enough pressure or incentives for 
Brazilian elites to address the discrepancies that privilege the better-off, distancing 
them even further from those at the bottom of society.
5.3 External Pressures and the Brazilian Elites
As Habermas contends, the establishment of economic and monetary zones is viewed 
by functionalists as creating a ‘path to dependency’ whereby transnational 
interdependencies constrain national political elites and their future altematives.^^^ He 
asserts that,
“[o]n this reading, political elites find themselves constrained, even 
against their will, to pursue an agenda that favors integration. For they 
are bound, due to unforeseen consequences, by the determinations of a 
set of decisions that were accepted in the past and have become 
progressively entrenched.”^^ ^
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Harbemas’s argument supports an important element of Weingast’s theory, according 
to whom factors extraneous to the prevailing social model of elitist favouritism may 
provide incentives for national elites to restrain themselves. Underscored by the 
prospect of both economic growth and increased international political clout on one 
side, and the demands of international economic, political and judicial accountability 
mechanisms on the other, greater regional and international integration compel 
national elites to desire, or appear to desire, internal transformation. Accordingly, 
adhering to an international system entails the abdication by national elites of some of 
the established decision-making processes they have been used to at the national level 
in favour of a normative integration that involves compromises amongst 
“domesticated major powers”^^  ^ at the transnational level.^^^ In this sense, the threat 
posed by foreign elites destabilises the internal status quo by demanding entrenched 
ruling classes to create a more participatory, inclusive and legally certain socio­
political system through the granting of legal access to ordinary citizens, widening of 
the scope of democratic decision-making processes and recognition and promotion of 
individual r i g h t s . T h i s  argument is complemented by North’s, who argues that 
regional and global trade encompass significantly higher transaction costs than small 
scale economic exchanges and are, therefore, marked by a more “infrequent 
clientization of players.”^^  ^ In this environment, generally distinguished by the 
absence of central political authorities and, consequently, by the lack of a unified 
political structure or formal rules, more resources are allocated to ensuring the 
enforcement of the system through the standardisation of the conduct of those 
involved.^^^ Within states, North challenges the neoclassical economic model 
establishing that, even though the initial models of transactions may have been 
erroneous or diverse, they will adjust themselves, punish deviant behaviour and guide 
the surviving actors to the correct models. Implicit in the competitive-market model is 
the assumption that institutions will prompt actors to acquire the information 
necessary to lead them to the correct models.^^^ This assumption ignores the fact that.
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“institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially 
efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve 
the interests of those with the bargaining power to devise new rules.
Accordingly, North posits that the creation of relatively efficient institutions, which 
allow nations to attain wider gains from trade, can only be effectuated when this 
objective coincides with the interests of those who possess the bargaining strength to 
promote institutional change and who will, under some circumstances, implement the 
institutional solutions which have, historically, proved to be socially efficient.^^^ 
North’s theory corroborates with the arguments advanced by this thesis. Regional and 
international integration offer real opportunities for greater economic gains through 
increased trade. This is attractive to national elites who, with this objective in mind, 
may accept the likely costs entailed in doing so, namely the promotion of institutional 
reforms leading to more efficient and socially inclusive institutions, and the 
recognition and acceptance of the regulatory and accountability mechanisms which 
are bound to unbalance the internal socio-political interplay and create, in the long 
run, politically and legally more egalitarian and inclusive national systems.^^^
Brazil’s economic development and increased prominence in the international 
scenario is thus of consequence to its national elites. Internally, the institutional 
changes necessary for the country to realise its economic potential are dependent on 
the will of the elites, who must see these adjustments as part of their private interests 
and, therefore, alter the country’s institutions so as to maximise the advantages that 
they can attain from global trade. Externally, the greater the involvement of Brazil in 
regional blocs and multilateral institutions, the more national elites will have to 
compromise on their established decision-making dominance at the national level and 
conform to foreign demands imposing standardising conduct from states at the 
international level. As will be seen below, Brazil’s long-term aspiration to achieve a 
more prominent status and role in international affairs^^^ is an important element of its
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current foreign policy which, combined with rapid economic growth,^^^ an increasing 
geopolitical advantage in oil, gas and food productions,^^^ and the opportunities it 
currently has to help re-shape the ideational and institutional post-world crisis 
order,^^® may translate into more clout in the international arena. This, in turn, will 
provide the elites with further incentives to demand limits on the Brazilian state’s 
exercise of power and the observance of the rights and freedoms it constitutionally 
recognises its citizens to have.
5.3.1 Brazil’s Foreign Policy and the Opportunities and Challenges Brought 
by the Current World Crisis
A historical aspiration to greatness^^^ and a will to fulfil “its 'natural' role as a 'big 
country' in world affairs”^^  ^has, at times, informed directly Brazil’s foreign policy. 
With varying degrees of intensity since early in the twentieth century, the country has 
pursued the achievement of international recognition as one of the priorities of its 
foreign agenda.^^"  ^As Lima and Hirst posit, the exercise of Brazil's foreign policy has 
been marked by a soft approach, rather than one based on the employment of military 
force, a fact which is supported by the country's limited development of hard power. 
The motivation of this strategy is the belief that foreign threats affecting Brazil are 
driven by economic, rather than military, impetus. In the same vein, economic 
considerations have permeated Brazil's overall foreign policy, which has been marked 
by strong autonomy-oriented and developmentalist elements.^^^ Another important 
feature of Brazilian foreign policy is the country’s willingness to retain a degree of
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independence in both the maintenance of its ability to dictate its own actions and, 
consequently, to exercise fully its right to self-determination, and the preservation of 
an autonomous voice in the international arena. These priorities have naturally 
softened with the end of the Cold War abroad, and dictatorship at home, but are still 
prevalent today.^^^ As Hurrell contends, these ideas reflect the links between the 
Brazilian foreign ministry (known as Itamaraty) and academia. Writings of diplomats 
reveal the two most prominent views underlying the country’s pursuit of its foreign 
policy. One is classical political realism, as opposed to neorealism, which emphasises 
the value of power and pragmatism. The other is derived from the legacy of 
dependency theory, which highlights the shortcomings of the global capitalist world 
order and the constraints this poses on Brazil’s development.^^^ This combination of 
thoughts has fuelled anti-hegemonic and conspiratorial views of the U.S.’s foreign 
policy and the idea that the U.S. can seriously restrict the fulfilment of Brazil’s 
regional and international role.^^^
Furthermore, Brazil's foreign policy has also been motivated by an intention to play a 
more prominent role in the international scenario, more recently evidenced in areas 
such as regional politics, the agenda of developing countries and in multilateral 
institutions. Some of the current examples are the strengthening of its relations with 
major powers outside Europe or the U.S., such a China and Russia, as well as its 
increasing relations and willingness to forge South-South coalitions with developing 
countries in and outside the Americas, particularly African countries and India.^^^ In 
South America, Brazil has been promoting the formation of a new regional block, the 
South America Community,^^® and has been actively seeking to strengthen the 
importance and power of the M e r c o s u r . I n  addition, Brazil is currently supporting 
the appointment of its own candidates for both the WTO and the Inter-Development 
Bank and has been campaigning for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC).^^^
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For Lima and Hirst, Brazil's national policies towards eradicating poverty and 
addressing inequality can be considered part of the same goal of expanding its role 
and responsibilities in the international arena/^^ Hurrell concurs, contending that 
some of the most important tools of Brazil’s foreign policy have been its claim for 
greater fairness in the representation of multilateral institutions, supported by the 
country’s campaign for LTN Security Council membership, and Brazil’s promotion of 
distributive justice, of which its active involvement in the 2004 Action against Hunger 
and Poverty is an example?^"^ Although maintaining some of its core policy features, 
Lima and Hirst argue that, under Lula’s presidency, Brazil's foreign policy underwent 
significant changes, the first and most significant of them being the inclusion of the 
social agenda in foreign affairs. The country's current foreign policy is also greatly 
motivated by an effort to pursue the revision and practical reform of major multilateral 
institutions, particularly the United Nations (UN), by tackling the unequal distribution 
of power and wealth within them as well as the general framework on which they are 
based, which Brazil believes promotes distortions and the privilege of entrenched 
interests.^^^ Its proposed reform agenda for the UN, for instance, is founded on three 
main long-standing concerns, firstly, the enforcement of the UN’s demand for 
authorisation on the use of coercive instruments, as prescribed in Chapter VIII of the 
UN Charter,^^^ coupled with the promotion of the UN’s principles, particularly non­
intervention and pacific resolution of disputes, and the need for appropriate regulation 
and pre-authorisation of sanction regimes; secondly, the conceptual revision and 
practical observance of the distinction between peace-keeping and peace enforcement; 
and thirdly, the reform of the decision-making structure of the UNSC and, 
consequently, the need for increased representativeness and legitimacy in the post- 
Cold War order, a concern underlined and intertwined with Brazil’s demand for the 
substantial promotion of the democratic values by the international community.^^^ 
President Dilma Rousseff is set to continue advancing Lula’s general foreign policy, 
as she made clear in her address to the UN’s 2011 General Assembly in New York, by
Lima and Hirst, 'Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and 
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demanding a greater role for emerging economies, emphasising the need for reform of 
multilateral institutions - particularly the UN, the IMF and the World Bank -  to reflect 
the world’s re-balancing of power, pressing for a concerted solution to the global 
economic crisis, and reiterating Brazil’s continued pursuit of a seat at the UNSC.^^^
According to Hurrell, from early 2003 until the outbreak of the financial crisis in 
September 2008, Brazil’s foreign policy aspirations were pursued in a benign 
international environment. Global economic growth and the emergence of major 
nations such as China, boosted demand for its commodities and raw materials and 
increased the opportunities for exports to developed countries. In addition, the 
implementation of orthodox domestic economic policies favoured Brazil’s position 
with financial institutions and foreign investors, particularly from Wall Street.^^^ The 
growing importance of multilateral governance increased the role not only of 
established powers, but also of emerging ones, providing Brazil with an opportunity to 
exploit this international institutional environment. In an attempt to exert increasing 
influence in global decision-making, Brazil has endorsed multilateral institutions 
whilst pressing for them to include greater representation from developing and 
emerging nations; it has also engaged on a variety of informal networks, negotiating 
processes and groups, as its role in the informal negotiating rounds of the WTO and in 
climate change discussions with ‘special engaged states’ illustrate.^^®
As Hurrel points out, the current financial crisis was significant in its effects on the 
current world order because it exposed instabilities and vulnerabilities at the very core 
of the Western-led capitalist system, rather than just at the peripheries. This has paved 
the way for the re-evaluation of the presumption that the West can dictate the global 
system’s main rules and priorities and control international institutions.^^^ These 
changes are offering considerable challenges and pressures on the old institutional 
structures and are, therefore, opening the possibility for new structures to take 
place.^^^ According to Hurrell, the greatest challenges, as well as opportunities, faced 
by Brazil in its attempt to play a more active and prominent role in re-shaping the old 
structures are in the areas of ideas and institutions. Intellectually, crises offer
BBC News, 'Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff Urges Reform at UN' BBC News, Latin America & 
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incentives for ideational change, by providing a more open and contested arena for 
new ideas to take place?^^ Accordingly, the current financial crisis has created a 
credibility gap, which was exacerbated by the fact that the same Western capitalist 
societies who championed the dissemination of the liberal orthodoxies of the 1990s 
and who were largely responsible for the excesses that led to the worldwide economic 
slump in 2008, are now the main actors managing the recovery. Brazil’s diplomatic 
contribution in restructuring the liberal global order from within the main structures of 
global governance, however limited, can bring the country new opportunities. In 
addition to the anti-protectionist message it has been advancing in the WTO for years, 
it can also advocate for new rules to reflect a more balanced and inclusive global 
order, in which domestic states have a more prominent role and where the relationship 
between state and the markets are re-defined.^^"  ^Brazil also has an opportunity to press 
for the enforcement of deeper and tighter regulatory systems, so as to avoid the 
perpetuation, in a post-crisis environment, of the distortions of the system currently in 
place, in which financial, industrial and technological power is dominated by a small 
number of global companies. If no significant reform or re-thinking is achieved, Brazil 
and other emerging and developing countries run the risk of returning to a low 
bargaining position. Although these countries would suffer with the deepening of the 
recession, any solution that entails a return to ‘business as usual’ can hinder emerging 
economies from exercising a more significant political role in a post-crisis world 
order.^^  ^ In addition, the new ideology should be embedded in efficient and legitimate 
institutions if they are to be effective and long-lasting. The challenge of re-evaluating 
and reorganising the international institutional framework is, however, greater to 
Brazil than other emerging powers, as the effectiveness of the formal economic and 
political structure is paramount for the country to conduct its exclusive soft power 
policy and, therefore, both advance its claim of being the most suitable representative 
of the interests of the South as well as forge strategic coalitions with other countries. 
Hurrell argues that this is partly the reason why, when compared to other emerging 
powers such as India, Brazil has spent considerably more effort pressing for the 
reform of the major multilateral institutions, such as the UNSC, and promoting
Ibid., p. 146
Ibid.,pp.l46-7
Ibid., p. 147
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institutional innovation, such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)^^^ in the 
late 1990s.^^  ^ Unlike small, informal alliances of powerful states which may offer 
more responsibilities and less clout, a stronger role in the main transnational structures 
provides Brazil with more opportunities to influence meaningful global decision­
making, whilst enjoying the protections of formal regional and international regulatory 
mechanisms,^^^ including the possibility of financial help from regional blocs or the 
IMF, the recourse to international tribunals for the solution of transnational disputes, 
the opportunity to find joint solutions for issues that require transnational regulation, 
such as those concerning the protection of the environment, and to devise enforcement 
mechanism to their effective implementation,^^^ among others.
Hence, emerging powers such as Brazil may have their roles and responsibilities in the 
world affairs expanded as a result of the global economic crisis. This, in turn, will 
demand ever greater compromises from the Brazilian elites, who will have to share the 
national decision-making arena with the demands of the international system. 
Accordingly, national elites can control internal legal systems and ensure the 
perpetuation of unfairness, unequal distribution of resources and opportunities and the 
exclusion of the masses. Even in this case, as seen in Chapter 2, the law possesses an 
autonomous character and measures implemented by the elites to justify the 
legitimacy of their acts and the morality of their position in society may produce 
unwittingly and unforeseen consequences in years to come. At the international level, 
this is not merely their choice. The more countries participate in a globalised 
economic market and political framework, the more national elites will compete with 
international forces and the more their power will be constrained within national 
decision-making processes. For the lack of central authority in the international arena 
ensures a greater clientilisation of players, who feel compelled to adhere to 
transnational regulatory systems, many of which will entail reform of the legal system 
at the national level. Once the decision to allow transitional policies to dictate 
domestic needs is made, external pressures may become progressively entrenched and
Defined in Article 12 o f the Kyoto Protocol as a mechanism designed to assist non-signatory states 
to achieve sustainable development and to contribute to the reduction o f the world’s carbon emissions 
(Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework: Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol) 
(United Nations, 1998)).
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increasingly influencial on national political outcomes.^^® In addition, Brazil’s 
increased presence and importance in the international arena will entail growing 
responsibilities. Its condemnation of an undemocratic and unequal global order will be 
increasingly heard and, consequently, increasingly countered by criticisms of 
hypocrisy as, internally, the country still sustains high levels of inequality, poverty, 
social exclusion and elitism. Even if Brazil does not come to exercise a significantly 
more meaningful role in the international scenario, its current policies of regional 
integration and greater participation in multilateral institutions will demand significant 
compromises by the Brazilian ruling classes. Moreover, Brazil’s economic growth is 
dependent on its compliance with international rules which will impose greater 
constraints on its elites. Accordingly, in order to forge major trade partnerships, attract 
meaningful foreign investment and continue enjoying positive credit ratings, the 
country will have to tackle some of its most difficult problems, such as violence, 
inequality, poverty and corruption. A greater realisation of the gains from trade can 
only be obtained if Brazil promotes wide institutional change leading to a more 
effective and efficient institutional environment. This and the other reforms can only 
be achieved if the elites consider them to be in their interest, and thus promote the 
solutions for their implementation, which will necessarily entail siding with the rest of 
the population in imposing limits on the abuses perpetrated by the state. Provided they 
are guided by a suitable conception of the rule of law, elite-led reforms may also 
advance a more substantive protection of the individual rights and freedoms enshrined 
in the 1988 Constitution and the consolidation of the country’s democracy. Again, this 
possibility may be undermined, as well as enhanced, by the levels of violence 
perpetrated in Brazil. As will be argued in Chapter 6, police and criminal violence are 
widespread, reaching all in society, including the elites who, in the past, had 
successfully insulated themselves from the problem by living, working and socialising 
away from the lower classes and ignoring the wider social and political consequences 
of the problem. This has changed, however, as not only is their physical integrity 
increasingly threatened, but crime affects Brazil’s prospects of fulfilling its economic 
potential, thus preventing the ruling classes from reaping the rewards of economic 
growth and foreign trade. For this reason, this thesis will argue in the next Chapter that
Habermas, The Divided West, pp.67-8
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crime may also compel elites to impose limits on Brazil’s public agents’ abuses of 
power and gross violations of rights in favour of a more law-abiding society.
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CHAPTER 6
VIOLENCE
This Chapter will demonstrate that violence in Brazil has been pervasive and 
widespread, affecting the elites’ personal lives and businesses as well as Brazil’s 
economic growth. Although crime affects the poor and black living in major urban 
centres disproportionately, ^  it has become an all-encompassing problem. As such, 
Brazilian elites can no longer insulate themselves from violence by buying their 
security and personal safety and isolating themselves from the lower classes.^ This 
situation, this thesis will contend, may lead the dominant classes to rethink this close 
alliance with the government, as the state’s failure to protect them undercuts the 
expectation of protective privileges that their mutually beneficial relationship has 
historically entailed. This means that violence may provide the elites with enough 
incentives to want, and possibly demand, change, even if in consequence they might 
lose some of the privileges they have acquired by siding with the government. The 
state’s inability to deal with rising crime may, however, decrease the elites’ 
confidence in the state’s legitimacy, providing an incentive to forge an alliance with 
the rest of the population in calling for action or change. The elites’ willingness to 
change may be compounded by the peripheral consequences of sustained high rates of 
crime in the country. Among them are the negative effects of crime on Brazil’s further 
development and economic growth,^ the burden that crime places on the country’s 
resources,"^ as well as on the elites’ present and future economic prospects,^ and the 
effect that high rates of crime may have on the legitimacy of the state and the 
democratic project.^ Consequently, the issue of violence is central to Brazil’s 
realisation of its potential. In addition, in allowing its agents to perpetrate crime in an 
extensive manner alongside failing to protect its citizens from general violence, the
' Pinheiro, 'The Paradox of Democracy in Brazil', p.l 15 
 ^Karstedt and LaFree, 'Democracy, Crime and Justice', pp.9-10 
 ^Mesquita Neto, 'Public-Private Partnerships for Police Reform in Brazil', p.49 
Downie, 'Crime: Effort to Mend a Violent Reputation', p.313 
 ^Mesquita Neto, 'Public-Private Partnerships for Police Reform in Brazil', p.49 
 ^Bitencourt, 'Crime and Violence: Challenges to Democracy in Brazil', pp. 171-2
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Brazilian government breaches its human rights’ commitment before the international 
community. Were individuals and organisations to file complaints against the 
government and denounce abuses of rights as part of a concerted action to bring the 
Brazilian state to account, this would exert pressure on the dominant classes, who may 
envisage overall compliance with the state’s obligations in the international arena as 
necessary to achieving increased economic and political prominence in the world 
order. In this Chapter, the overall levels of violence in the Brazilian society will be 
illustrated through the conventional parameter of number of homicides per hundred 
thousand inhabitants; the phenomenon of state violence will be explored in view of 
three notorious cases of police violence, the state’s general approach to law and order, 
and the structure and authoritarian legacy of the government’s security apparatus; the 
link between high levels of crime and démocratisation, as well as the negative impact 
that violence may have on democracy, will be investigated; the impact that 
persistently elevated crime rates may have on the Brazilian society, in general, and on 
the country’s elites, in particular, will be scrutinised; and Brazil’s responsibilities 
concerning private and state violence in the Inter-American System of Human Rights 
and its efficacy as a mechanism of elite pressure will be examined.
6.1 The Problem of Violence in Brazil: State and Non-State Crime
Brazil has seen levels of state and non-state violence increasing at bewildering rates.^ 
In the early 1980s, Brazilian homicide rates (around 10 per hundred thousand per 
year) were close to that of the U.S., but had more than doubled the American average 
by the end of the decade. When compared with European and Japanese rates, these 
disparities are even starker. Whereas the American rates between 1970 and 1990 
averaged between 8 and 10 homicides per hundred thousand, the European average 
oscillated between 0.3 and 3.5, and the Japanese rates at around 1.  ^ In 1996, Brazil’s 
rate was 25, whilst the seven economies preceding it as the largest economies in the 
world had rates of 8.22 (U.S.), 4.86 (Germany), 4.11 (France), 2.43 (U.K.), 4.90 
(Italy), 1.99 (Canada) and 2.43 (Spain) per hundred thousand.^ According to data from
 ^ Ibid; Caldeira and Holston, 'Democracy and Violence in Brazil', p.697; Carroll, 'Land o f Contrasts'; 
Pinheiro, 'Democratic Governance, Violence, and the (Un)Rule o f Law', pp. 122-3
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the Sangari Institute in Brazil/^ in 2007 in the two of the most violent cities in Brazil, 
Maceio and Recife, homicide rates stood at around 97.4 and 87.5 homicides per 
hundred thousand, respectively.^^ From 1997-2007, the homicide rates in the states of 
Alagoas, Maranhao and Minas Gerais have seen increases of at least 150%. Eighteen 
of the 27 Brazilian states saw increases in the same period, with only 9 states 
experiencing a decrease. A case in point is the state of Sao Paulo, which saw its 
homicide rates drop by 58.6% in the same period .T hese  rates are so shocking that it 
becomes easier to make comparisons with past and present war zones than peaceful 
regions around the world. Annually, gunshot wound related deaths between 1993 and 
2003 were greater than in many past conflicts such as the ones in Chechnya, Algeria 
and the Gulf War. Individual violence in Brazil is not equally distributed across the 
geographical territory or among social groups, however. The phenomenon is 
predominantly urban, and the majority of victims is young, black and poor.*^
Apart from the human cost of such levels of violence, the country also suffers 
financially with the costs of preventing and combating crime. In 2007 report, for 
example, IPEA revealed that violence cost the country about 5 per cent of its GDP, 
equivalent to R$92 billion ($57 billion), in 2004.^^
Some of the worst forms of violence are perpetrated by members of the Brazilian 
police force against civilians every year. Human rights abuses by the authorities are a
The data is found on the report Map of Violence, which is part o f a series published by the Sangari 
Institute since 1998. Some o f the reports were published with Brazil’s Justice Ministry. They are 
compiled based on data from the Database o f the National System o f Information on Mortality (Base de 
Dados Nacional do Sistema de Informaçôes de Mortalidade (SIM)) o f the Brazilian Ministry o f Health.
Waiselfisz, 'Mapa da Violência 2010: Anatomia do Homicidios no Brasil', p.27
Apart from Sao Paulo, decreases in the levels o f violence were also evidenced in the states o f Acre, 
Amapâ, Rondônia, Roraima (in the north), Rio de Janeiro (in the south-east), Distrito Federal, Mato 
Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul (in the centre-west)(Ibid., p. 19).
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Despite this, there has been an ‘intériorisation’ o f violence in Brazil in the past decade. Accordingly, 
the proportion o f homicides in the capitals fell from 42.6% in 1997, to 34.7% in 2007. In the 
Metropolitan Regions, the decrease was even greater, falling from 58.6% in 1997, to 45% in 2007. As 
the total homicide rate in Brazil has remained almost constant in the same period (25.4 homicides per 
hundred in 1997 and 25.2 in 2007), the data denotes a steep increase in violence in the rural 
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daily reality for Brazilians/^ Police corruption, involvement with organised crime, and 
practices such as torture and death squads to impose their own version of law and 
order are instilled in the culture of the country’s police force/^ As Lutz and Sikkink 
point out, although the use of torture had diminished significantly in the Latin 
American region by the mid-1990s, there is strong evidence to suggest that it was still 
frequent and widespread in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela/® Brazilian 
police violence jumped from 10% of the total killings in the metropolitan region of 
Sao Paulo between 1986 and 1990 to 15.9% in 1991 and 27.4 in 1992. As a means of 
comparison, the average rate in the 1990s of the New York police was 1.2% and Los 
Angeles 2.1%. As Caldeira and Holston argue, even though these numbers have been 
falling since 1993, they represent an absurd reality.^^ In addition, notorious extra­
judicial killings have left hundreds of people dead - such as the cases of Carandiru 
(1992), Candelaria (1993), Vigario Geral (1993) or the very recent reaction of the 
police to the attacks of the criminal faction PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital) in 
2006^^ - presenting an even grimmer picture of a police force that “shoot to kills rather 
than to subdue”.^ ^
6.1.1 Police Violence: Carandiru, Candelaria and Vigario Geral
Carandiru is a case that illustrates very well this picture. In October 1992, a gang fight 
broke out in the Carandiru House of Detention (Casa de Detençâo) in Sao Paulo. The 
fight allegedly escalated into rebellion and the military police decided to invade 
Pavilion 9 of the detention centre and employ all necessary means to quell the 
rebellion. Even though some of the prisoners resisted the police’s attempts to retake 
the prison by throwing make-shift bombs at them, there is strong evidence, both 
testimonial and forensic, to suggest that the great majority of detainees returned to
Caldeira and Holston, 'Democracy and Violence in Brazil'; Pinheiro, 'Democratic Governance, 
Violence, and the (Un)Rule o f Law'; Vieira, 'Inequality and the Subversion o f the Rule o f Law in 
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their cells and stripped naked, as required in these situations. Despite the surrender, 
the police still shot dead 111 detainees with automatic machine guns, many of them 
from behind, some lying naked on their beds and at least two with their hands already 
tied behind their backs. The police force suffered no casualties.^"  ^ Public outcry and 
outright condemnation from the media ensued. Surveys conducted in the aftermath of 
the attack revealed, however, that between 29 and 44 percent of respondents supported 
the police action that day.^^
In response to the population and media’s general disapproval of the police force’s 
actions, the Governor of the state of Sao Paulo, Luiz Antonio Fleury Filho, dismissed 
the Secretary of Public Security, Pedro Franco de Campo, and suspended six other 
police commanders.^® Save for that, no police officer or commander spent one day in 
jail for the atrocities the police committed that day. This, despite the fact that a civil 
prosecutor brought formal civil and criminal charges against a commander of the 
operation,^^ and a military prosecutor pressed charges, including homicide, against 
120 other officers. In fact, by 1999, 7 years after the events, none of the police officers 
and commanders had even stood trial and most of them continued to hold jobs in the 
military police force.^^
In the Candelaria case, in 1993, seven street children and one young adult were 
assassinated on the steps of Candelaria Church in the centre of Rio de Janeiro,^® when 
hooded men, many of them police officers, opened fire on the fifty street children 
sleeping outside the church.^® The attack happened in revenge for an incident the 
previous day, where a rock had been thrown at a police car, injuring one police 
officer.^ ^ Of those killed, four boys died instantly and one was shot fleeing the attack. 
Three other children were abducted and taken to the Aterro do Flamengo gardens 
nearby, where they were shot. Two of them were killed and the third, Wagner dos 
Santos, was left for dead but survived a shot to the face. Many of the remaining
Ahnen, 'Between Tyranny o f the Majority and Liberty: The Persistence o f Human Rights Violations 
under Democracy in Brazil', p.331 
Ibid., p. 117 
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children were injured and one young adult died of his wounds in hospital four days 
later/^
As with the Carandiru Massacre, what became know as the Candelaria Massacre was 
met with condemnation, both nationally and internationally/^ As a result, 
investigations moved quickly and, based mainly on testimony from survivors, three 
military police officers and one civilian were charged with the murders. Despite the 
swift progress, deep flaws were identified in the process of investigating and 
prosecuting those responsible for the massacre.^"  ^Victims were not awarded protected 
witness status or taken to a place of safety. The only exception was Wagner dos 
Santos, who was afforded full federal protection after a further attempt on his life in 
December 1994. Many of the other survivors continued sleeping on the streets of Rio, 
where they were often threatened, allegedly by military police officers.^® In addition, 
despite the fact that witnesses reported the involvement of two cars and around eight 
men in the shooting, only three were condemned for the killings. The two military 
policemen convicted confessed their involvement in the massacre but their statements 
exonerated five other officers also allegedly involved. Their version of the events also 
contradicted the account of the survivors, as the policemen claimed that there had 
been only one car involved and their statements, as well as that of the other policemen 
who were later indicted, placed most of the blame on a police officer who had been 
killed in 1994 in an unrelated incident.^® Moreover, although the rare conviction of 
police officers for the killings should be hailed as a milestone in the history of police 
violence in Brazil, Amnesty International points out that once the media turned its 
attention to other cases, life returned to normal for the survivors of the massacre and 
other street children living on the streets of Rio de Janeiro, who continued being the 
targets of threats and persistent violence by police.^^
Another notorious case was that of Vigario Geral, a favela in Rio de Janeiro, which in 
1993 was invaded by masked men, believed to be military police officers, who
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murdered twenty one people and set fire to many houses/^ Once again, the incident 
was reportedly an act of vengeance for the alleged murder of four police officers who 
were supposedly involved in the extortion of drug traffickers/^ Eight members of one 
family were killed in the incident, as they had the misfortune of seeing the face of one 
of the twenty police officers involved when he removed his balaclava. Although the 
Secretary of Public Security and the Head of the Military Police offered to resign over 
the case, the then Governor Leonel Brizola kept them in their posts and promised to 
enact measures to restructure the security services.^®
Such cases of state abuse and impunity demonstrate the lack of accountability of 
Brazilian state officials, in particular police officers. Although Brazil’s Constitution 
provides for the protection of life, liberty and security (Article 5), citizens’ rights are 
not upheld in practice. This is evidence that, although fulfilling a formal conception of 
the rule of law, Brazil does not meet the requirements of the substantive conception of 
the ideal in general, and the formulation advanced by Dworkin, more specifically. For 
Dworkin, the use of state coercion is only legitimate when the community places 
integrity at the centre of politics, by recognising that the rights and duties of its 
members derive from the scheme of principles adopted by the community.^^ 
Accordingly, Dworkin asserts that the acceptance of justice as a political virtue 
requires that state officials distribute resources and protect civil liberties so as to 
ensure a morally defensible outcome. ”  ^ In addition, the dimensions of scope and 
fairness of Dworkin s rights conception require public officials to act within the 
constitutional framework of the state and refrain from adopting practices or policies 
that disfavour minority or disadvantaged groups from enjoying their constitutionally 
recognised rights and freedoms."^  ^ Hence, by criminalising the poor and excluded, 
infringing its constitutional mandate to uphold individual fundamental rights and 
guarantees (Preamble and Article 4 of the 1988 Constitution), and frustrating citizens’ 
exercise of their rights to liberty, security, well-being, development, equality and
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justice as supreme values of a fraternal, pluralist and unprejudiced society,”"^"^ the 
Brazilian state fails in its duty towards its citizens and, therefore, cannot be said to 
abide by the rule of law. Very importantly, public officials not only fail in their 
obligation to both protect Brazilian citizens and facilitate the enjoyment of their rights 
but, as will be seen in the next section of this Chapter, employ brutal and widespread 
violence against the population, thus exercising its monopoly to use coercive force in 
an illegitimate and arbitrary manner. This undermines the state’s democratic 
legitimacy as well as, potentially, weakening the relation that it maintains with the 
elites, facilitating a coordination between the ruling classes and the rest of the 
population against major constitutional transgressions.
6.1.2 Brazilian Authorities’ Approach to Law and Order
For Pinheiro, “(t)he police tend to see the rule of law as an obstacle rather than as an 
effective guarantee of public security. They believe that their role is to protect society 
from ‘marginal elements’ by any means available, even if those means are illegal.”"^® 
One example of this is the violence perpetrated by hired gunmen, know as justice 
makers (justiceiros) or hit men (pistoleiros), acting on their own or as part of 
extermination groups, death squads or other gangs, often with the acquiescence or 
actual support of military or civil police officers. Similarly, lynchings, which take 
place predominantly in the urban centres of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Salvador, 
are carried out by mobs on behalf of a crime victim or by the victim’s family either at 
time of the crime or in prison invasions, often with the approval or direct assistance of 
local authorities, such as mayors, municipal and state Assembly members."^® Such 
crimes reveal deep divisions within a society that dehumanises perpetrators of crimes, 
stripping them of the human worth to have rights. This is exacerbated by the fact that 
police officers and many state officials take personally the task of ‘cleaning up the 
streets’ by removing bad elements on behalf of the state. As Bitecourt contends.
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“[pjolice violence in large urban centres bas reached the point that, in 
some regions, policemen are more feared than drug traffickers, who 
can ultimately pose as the real protectors of law and order.”"^^
This abuse of power is not only pervasive but also highly damaging to the 
implementation of the rule of law in the country/^ According to Vieira, the 
‘démonisation’ of those socially and economically excluded is one of the facets of a 
system where inequalities are extreme and persistent. In addition to those excluded 
becoming ‘invisible’ and the privileged becoming ‘immune’, the ‘démonisation’ 
factor is a process by which “society deconstructs the human image of its enemies 
who from now on will not deserve to be included under the reach of the law.”"^® For 
Vieira, this can be evidenced in routine abuses of power in encounters between the 
police and the poor, like police raids and treatment of inmates.®® One of the 
consequences is that, for those on the receiving end of the abuse, there is no incentive 
to respect the law. Moreover, when the state condones violence, it cannot expect its 
citizens to refrain from it.®^
In addition to police violence, Brazil has been acutely inefficient in dealing with high 
levels of urban crime. The institutions and organisations that form its security 
apparatus and judicial systems are outdated and inadequate as well as pervaded by 
influences of the country’s military past. Accordingly, its police force is poorly trained 
and seen as violent and corrupt, its judicial system is slow and outdated, and its penal 
system is overcrowded and so weak that criminal gang leaders are able to conduct and 
control their criminal activity from their prison cells.®  ^As will be seen, such a flawed 
law enforcement system fosters a feeling among the population that the state has failed 
in the protection of their most basic rights and freedoms and, therefore, that 
democracy itself is flawed. As high rates of crime create a pervasive sense of fear 
among those living in urban centres, over time this may eventually lead the population 
to losing confidence in the state and the democratic project. In addition, the rise in 
violence increases the gap between the upper and lower classes, as well as the
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marginalisation and stigmatisation of poor and deprived areas, exacerbating the 
consequences of social exclusion and increasing the lack of faith in the state.®®
As will be demonstrated below, the phenomenon of state violence in Brazil is partly a 
consequence of both the residue of authoritarian practices that have outlived the 
military regime and of the repressive and socially exclusive approach to law and order 
sustained since country’s early history. By taking matters into their own hands and 
punishing those who they feel are unworthy of rights, the police and state authorities 
have perpetuated a patrimonial, discriminatory and backward view of law and order 
and, in consequence, have contributed greatly to social divisiveness in Brazilian 
society.
6.1.3 Brazil’s Security Apparatus
The structural organisation of the Brazilian police, and the lack of accountability of 
public officials who commit violations of citizens’ rights, has promoted, rather than 
discouraged, the employment of coercive force and the stigmatisation of the poor and 
excluded. Both these factors determined the persistence of high levels of state violence 
in Brazil and will, for this reason, be explored more in depth below.
6.1.3.1 The Authoritarian Legacy
Codato and Pinheiro attribute Brazil’s rampant levels of state violence to the nature of 
the country’s transition to democracy, which engendered a change in the political 
system without the démocratisation of the country’s security apparatus.®"  ^As Codato 
contends, a fundamental characteristic of the transition process “was the exceptional 
continuity that it represented in terms of authoritarianism [...] in the institutions of 
government that were supposed to represent a ‘government of transition’.”®® 
Accordingly, the military had enough time to negotiate its withdrawal from power.
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thus exerting strong influence in the transitional process/® For Karsted and LaFree, 
this is symptomatic of democratic transition processes, as new democracies are 
marked by the perpetuation of authoritarian practices carried forward from their recent 
past, which taint the criminal justice system of the new regime. Some of the most 
undemocratic rules and practices reported in transitional states are those concerning 
the abuse of force by the police, including the use of torture, endemic and widespread 
corruption and mass killings.®  ^ Despite this, Pereira and Ungar point out that the 
Brazilian police have always shown a tendency to authoritarianism.®^ As they contend, 
since colonial times, policing in Brazil has embraced a punitive aspect, including 
widespread use of corporal punishment against suspects, a fact which is underscored 
by the police’s subservience to the immediate interests of dominant classes and their 
willingness to criminalise dissent.®  ^ For this reason, the authors contend that 
authoritarianism within the Brazilian police institution is not only the residue of the 
military regime that immediately preceded the most recent démocratisation of the 
country, but also a product of historical authoritarian traditions from colonial times. 
Accordingly, many of the repressive tactics currently seen in Brazil pre-date the most 
recent military regime and have only been reinforced by it.®® Referring to Latin 
American countries in general, Pereira and Ungar assert that the weaknesses presented 
by their contemporary democracies fostering diminished notions of civil rights and 
accountability are rooted, in the main, in their histories.®^
6.1.3.2 Security Apparatus’s Structures
For Bitencourt, Brazil’s double tier federal-state law enforcement system is overly 
complex, laying the foundations for the state’s failure to address the country’s crime 
problem.®  ^ The federal police force is under the remit of federal government, and
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according to Article 144, paragraph 1 of the 1988 Constitution, it is responsible for 
investigating interstate and international offences against the political and social 
orders as well as offences affecting the property, services and interests of the Union 
(I); tackling drug related crimes by preventing and suppressing drug trafficking and 
smuggling (II); protecting Brazil’s borders through its coast guards, air force police 
and border patrol (III); and exercising exclusively the functions of criminal police of 
the Union (IV). The military and civil police forces as well as for the fire departments 
fall under the responsibility of the states (1988 Constitution, Article 144, paragraph 6), 
which can regulate their activities in their own constitutions. Since military organised 
and acting as ancillary forces and reserve of the Army, both the military police - 
created by the military regime in 1970, by the unification of the municipal guards and 
the state’s public force - and the fire departments are still heavily influenced by the 
military (1988 Constitution, Article 144, paragraph 6).®® As Bitencourt asserts, 
although both military and civil police are supervised by the state security secretariats 
-  which are subordinated to the National Council of Public Security at the federal 
level - the military police has kept close ties with the federal government since the 
dictatorship period.®"^  For Bitencourt, this complicated and overlapping public security 
system has created logistical and organisational problems, leading ultimately to 
inefficiency, a lack of accountability and corruption within each police force and, 
most importantly, preventing the Union and the states from devising a unifying 
strategy to combat crime.®®
Brazil’s penal system, which includes correctional and detention institutions, is 
managed by the National Council of Criminal and Prison Police and the Federal 
Prison Department, both under the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice. Within the 
first category are correctional facilities, penitentiaries, penal and agricultural colonies, 
and custodial and treatment facilities. Within the second are military prisons, detention 
centres, and juvenile detention facilities.®® As Bitencourt points out, the penal system 
in Brazil is riddled with problems ranging from overcrowded prisons to facilities 
where riots, violence, killings and escapes are common.®^ Allegations of the use of 
torture and maltreatment of inmates are often raised by both detainees and national
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and international human rights organisations, which have also consistently denounced 
the subhuman conditions of detention facilities nationwide and the lack of basic 
human rights accorded to prisoners.®^ In addition, prison guards tend to be corrupt, 
accepting bribe from inmates wanting to escape or smuggle drugs and mobile phones 
into prisons. Brazil’s detention centres are also under the control of organised criminal 
groups, in particular drug gangs, who are able to recruit gang members and continue 
running criminal activities from inside the prison.®® As Bitencourt notes, “[wjith all 
these weaknesses, the penal system has become more of the problem than the solution 
to crime and violence in Brazil.” ®^
An added complexity of Brazil’s security system is the overlapping-responsibility of 
federal and state governments in tackling the problems. Tensions between state and 
federal authorities often arise, creating further inefficiency and delays.^^ Although the 
responsibility for crime prevention and law enforcement falls primarily with state 
governors, they often blame central government for allocating insufficient resources 
for them to deal appropriately with the problems.^^ The fractious relationship between 
the Federation and the states on this matter was exemplified in the task force created 
by the federal government in 2002 and imposed on the governor of Rio de Janeiro, 
Benedita da Silva, to address the astounding levels of crime afflicting the state’s 
capital.^® Based on Article 84, VI, ‘a’ of the 1988 Constitution, President Cardoso 
issued Decree No 4.295 of 2002,^ "^  creating a Task-Force under the Ministry of Justice 
to intensify and consolidate the Urban Violence Prevention Plan (Plano de Prevençâo 
da Violência Urbana) in the metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro. For months. 
Governor da Silva had resisted federal help for political reasons, fearing this would 
harm her prospects for re-election in the upcoming 2002 general elections. The 
situation was aggravated when gangs began attacking public buildings, culminating 
with the kidnap and violent murder by drug traffickers of a well-known and award- 
winning investigative reporter of the TV Channel Rede Globo, Tim Lopes, whose 
tortured body was found in one of Rio’s favelas. Such cases, the latter of which 
created great international and national condemnation, coupled with the population’s
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growing dissatisfaction and appeals for government control on the spiralling 
criminality, pressurised Rio’s governor to accept the federal intervention, a move that 
may have contributed to her ultimately losing the election/®
Corruption, authoritarianism, and inefficiencies in the Brazilian criminal system have 
therefore led to state violence, generally, and police violence, especially, being a daily 
and pervasive occurrence in the Brazilian society. As will be seen, rates of crime and, 
particularly, state crime, endured by Brazilians have significant consequences not only 
to the country’s democracy but on the social cohesion, or lack thereof, of society as 
whole.
6.2 Sources of Astounding Levels of Crime in Brazil and their Relation to the 
Démocratisation Process
As Karstedt and LaFree assert, crime and social control are intrinsically linked to 
democracy and démocratisation. High crime rates undermine the legitimacy of 
democratic institutions and thwart démocratisation by fostering distrust and divisions 
amongst members of society.^® Accordingly, high levels of crime deepen the 
differences between societal groups, as deprived areas associated with crime -  and 
those living in them - become stigmatised, whilst the wealthy employ their economic 
power to insulate and protect themselves, often by living in gated communities, hiring 
private security and utilising security devices in their cars, houses and offices.^^ This 
situation exacerbates inequality and its consequences to society by increasing the 
divide between the better and worse off. In addition, high crime rates may hamper 
economic growth and development by discouraging foreign investment and diverting 
governmental resources towards crime prevention and control.
For Karstedt and LaFree, the way the criminal justice system is conducted by the state 
is crucial to democracy and its implementation. This is because citizens’ feelings 
about the state’s handling of criminal matters and social control are directly linked to 
their perceptions of democracy.^® As the authors put it.
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“The criminal justice system figures as a powerful institutional symbol 
of the state’s monopoly of the use of violence against its own citizens, 
and its restrictions are emblematic of the firm establishment of the rule 
of law in democracies.” ®^
As a result, sustained high levels of crime can have pervasive and devastating 
consequences for newly emerged and fragile democracies like that of B ra z il.T h e  
ineffectiveness of the government in tackling the problem, the persistence of 
corruption within the institutions responsible for protecting the population, and the 
adoption of a heavy-handed approach by the authorities can undermine the country’s 
democratic institutions and citizens’ support for the democratic project,^^ as the state’s 
failure in addressing criminality and, therefore, in protecting their basic rights and 
freedoms may translate into a failure of democracy itself.^® As Karstedt and LaFree 
posit, when the population perceives institutions of criminal justice to be deeply 
unfair, and the government’s handling of crime and social control as misguided and 
inequitable, wide and far-reaching consequences may follow, including mistrust in the 
government and general cynicism towards the legal system .A ccordingly, endemic 
violence may hamper the consolidation of Brazil’s democratic system by fostering a 
general sense of frustration with the political system, licensing societal groups to call 
for undemocratic, temporary, draconian and palliative measures to tackle crime.^® 
Authoritarian practices still pervade Brazilian institutions and structures of power and, 
according to Bitencourt, they still inform the political culture of the country. For this 
reason, norms and practices that would be considered authoritarian in countries with 
longer democratic traditions are acceptable and unquestioned in Brazil. An illustrative 
case is that of the task force assigned to Rio de Janeiro in 2002. One of the elements of 
the operation consisted of employing military intelligence on ordinary Brazilians for 
the use of the civil and military police forces. As the military is not subject to external 
controls in Brazil, this meant that no executive or legislative supervision or
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accountability mechanism was in place to prevent abuses and violations of rights 
during covert operations, a clear infringement of democratic principles. Despite this, 
the plans received no major criticisms from leading academics or the media and, 
consequently, no popular outcry ensued. For Bitencourt, this situation denotes that 
authoritarian practices such as this are not always imposed by the army, but in many 
cases are legitimised by the population’s support for the army’s special constitutional 
rights.^®
For Karstedt and LaFree, crime threatens the stability of democratic regimes because 
it exacerbates social disparities and tensions.^^ Bitencourt, on the other hand, argues 
that the threat that high violence rates can pose to democracy could come from two 
fronts. As the military still exercises considerable influence over the country’s affairs, 
particularly its security apparatus, the failure of the government in addressing the 
violence problem and the consequent instability that this situation creates, could lead 
the Army to plan another coup d’état to regain political and social control of the 
country.A lthough purely hypothetical, this possibility should never be completely 
disregarded, especially considering that Brazil’s military “does not take well to the 
notion of state authority deteriorating.” ®^ Hence, “military officials could be tempted 
to intervene under the assumption that they should ‘save’ democracy, for the state has 
lost control over crime, and crime networks have established a parallel state.”®® The 
second possible threat that crime poses to Brazil’s “evolving democracy”®^ is that, 
when considered as a complex and sophisticated political system, Brazil’s democracy 
can be said to be “disjunctive” or limited,®  ^ a conceptualisation whereby citizenship 
has expanded in some areas of rights but shrunk in others, and where the distribution 
of rights among citizens is unequal.®® The disjunction of Brazil’s democracy lies in the 
fact that citizens can fully enjoy their political rights and freedoms whilst lacking the 
social and civil rights necessary to fulfil the notion of citizenship.®"  ^ According to 
Bitencourt, the promotion of social rights in Brazil has been seriously compromised
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by the country’s sustained high levels of poverty and inequality, whilst the
population’s civil rights have been largely affected by both crime, from state agents
and criminals, and a lack of civic culture.^^ In addition, as seen throughout this thesis, 
although recognised on an equal basis, the ruling classes are able to exercise their 
constitutional rights much more fully than the rest of the population. In fact, 
Bitencourt believes that free and fair elections can disguise democratic government’s 
lack of fulfilment of its constitutional mandate, pacifying the population to the 
detriment of the attainment of universal and equal protection of rights and of the 
accomplishment of social and civil elements of citizenship. As he contends, within a 
democracy where there is a lack of civic culture, where violence, including state 
condoned, is rife, where social and civil rights are not observed, and where impunity 
and lack of accountability are the norm,^^
“[...] frequent elections, which should characterize the exercise of
political rights, have had the paradoxical effect of hindering initiatives
of reform that could broaden the scope of citizens’ civil and social
rights. Indeed, defining democracy as the mere exercise of political
rights has led Brazilian civil society to be less demanding about
expressing its civil and social rights. Therefore, Brazilians do not seem 
to value the association between civil and social rights as a basis for 
citizenship and a stronger democracy. Similarly, this perception helps 
to explain why Brazilian civil society, although shocked and pressured 
by urban crime, does not seem to be particularly sensitive to the 
relationship between crime and democracy.
For Caldeira and Holston, this disjunction is inherent in and internal to democracy 
itself, meaning that an ideal form of democracy can never be fulfilled.^^ For the 
authors, the simultaneity of political democracy and violence against citizens, as is the 
case in Brazil, characterises a common and particular form of disjunctive democracy, 
whereby the civil element of citizenship is significantly weaker than the political 
element.^^ In the specific case of Brazil, Holston contends that the transition to 
democracy coincided with the strengthening of social movements that emerged in the
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1970s, giving rise to the phenomenon of insurgent citizenship/^^ As seen in Chapter 
3, the insurgent citizen is more aware of his or her rights and, therefore, demands 
respect for the democratic and civil rights granted by the Constitution. Holston 
explains that the development of an insurgent citizenship is not stable, as old patterns 
of dominance are challenged, and the old sense of order and security becomes 
unbalanced, requiring citizens to grapple with an uncertain and incoherent system as a 
replacement. Hence democratic change may foster antagonistic reactions to the 
erosion of the old order. A differentiated citizenship, which persists in this process of 
evolution, continues to create injustices and incivilities simultaneously with the 
growth of the insurgent citizenship.^®  ^ For this reason, Karsted and LaFree argue that 
deep political transitions are often accompanied by a period of societal instability, 
during which crime waves tend to take place and, consequently, the population feels 
more insecure and distrusting. This, in turn, increases dichotomisation between 
societal groups, as well as fear and mistrust in the new regime. This happens in a 
scenario where new and old paradigms compete and overlap, and where citizens 
become divided between embracing and resisting the new, leaving a vacuum where 
violence will t h r i v e . S u c h  violence can take the shape of “criminal and police 
violence, incivility in public encounters, criminalization of the poor, indignation at 
impunity, massive property conflicts, new privatizations of security, and popular 
support for violent measures of social control.” For Karstedt and La Free, the fact 
that many countries can enjoy relatively stable democratic political systems whilst 
sustaining in their criminal justice systems rules and practices from their authoritarian 
past which involve serious abuses of human rights, lack of accountability, and the use 
of force and violence, demonstrates that the start of transitional processes do not 
necessarily depend on the démocratisation of the criminal justice s y s t e m . I n  
addition, the implementation of the rule of law and the démocratisation of the criminal
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justice system may also be directly affected by the ingrained and profound distrust that 
the population may feel towards it and its institutions/®^
In this vein, transient societies become vulnerable to endemic levels of violence and 
incivility due to the deep instability that ensues in the decades following a significant 
political regime change. This, together with the survival of the practices and rules of 
the past -  which, in the case of Brazil, pervaded deeply the system in the face of 
historical patterns of authoritarianism, as well as the fact that the military had over 
twenty years to instil its blueprint in the country’s structures - creates the perfect 
scenario for violence, perpetrated by state agents and by the general population, to 
take place. ^ ®^ As demonstrated in the beginning of this Chapter, the incivility of the 
democratic transitional process has endured, and indeed continues to grow, over 25 
years after the end of dictatorship. As will be seen in the next section, these sustained 
high levels of violence have had deep consequences for Brazilian society, presenting 
both new challenges and reinforcing patterns of social exclusion and tension, the 
stigmatisation and victimisation of the poor, lack of trust in the state authorities and 
popular support for authoritarian measures of crime control.
6.3 The Impact of Violence on the Brazilian Society
Pervasive violence and the consequent elevated state of fear it creates leads the 
Brazilian population to support controversial and democratically dubious measures 
and policies to tackle criminality.^®^ An example of this was the programme Operation 
Rio {Operaçâo Rio) launched by the city of Rio de Janeiro in 1994 with the support of 
the population, during which the Army was sent to the streets of the city to control 
spiralling crime. ^®® Popular support for the deployment of the Army to combat 
criminal violence is a response not only to crime, but also to the pervasive fear and 
outright lack of confidence Brazilians have in current institutions.^^® Although rates of 
violence are much more prevalent in deprived areas,^^  ^ a “culture of fear”^^  ^has taken
Ibid., pp. 13-4 
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Bitencourt, 'Crime and Violence: Challenges to Democracy in Brazil', p. 177 
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root in the Brazilian so c ie ty /D esp ite  being more common in authoritarian regimes, 
where repression and state violence are routine, in Brazil the expansion of this 
phenomenon or culture has coincided with democratic opening and the increased 
recognition of human and civil rights and l i b e r t i e s / A s  Caldeira and Holston 
contend, paradoxically even the working classes, who are most victimised by police 
violence, support abusive and undemocratic p o l i c i e s / N o t  surprisingly, when its 
trust in the security apparatus of the state is so eroded, the population seeks alternative 
institutions and methods as a solution to criminality. According to Pinheiro, many in 
Brazil perceive police stations as dangerous places, even for making complaints, and 
refrain from reporting crimes as a consequence.^^®
Violence also presents further challenges for community life. As Cardia explains, as 
the fear of victimisation rises, so do the number of strategies devised by individuals to 
cope with their violent surroundings .^In general, such strategies include 
isolationism, whereby individuals and families tend to confine themselves to their 
homes, therefore interacting less with their community. This, in turn, fosters further 
distrust in the community and lowers the potential for important social networks to 
develop within society by directly impacting on people’s ability to act and participate 
collectively. Lower collective participation means that solutions to the problems of the 
community are more difficult to find and less easily agreed on.^^  ^ Faced with high 
levels of violence, people may also come to accept more violence as an occurrence of 
daily life or become desensitised to it.^ ®^ In addition, as people start changing their 
routines and lifestyles to cope with the risk of crime, further deterioration of the 
community and depletion of collective life will take place. Such changes may include, 
among others, the avoidance of public spaces and public transportation, increased use 
of security devices and other private security measures, lower participation in 
collective activities, and withdrawal from community and collective life.^ ^® Very 
importantly, fear of crime may also reinforce prejudices and stereotypes.
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strengthening the sense of distrust in certain groups, such as the poor, young and 
121strangers.
These consequences of crime are compounded by the impunity that follows them. In 
Brazil, police violence goes largely unpunished, fuelling a sense of discredit not in the 
country’s courts, but in its rule of law. This environment flagrantly demonstrates the 
ineffectiveness of the judicial system in the protection of the population’s civil rights, 
“an incapacity which creates the belief that crime pays, that breaking the law goes 
unpunished, that citizens cannot enforce their legal rights, and that their legal 
disability allows criminals to act with impunity.”^^  ^Despite this, Caldeira and Holston 
demonstrate that some positive changes have begun to take place in different areas of 
Brazilian law. Among them, the Public Ministry has shovm a willingness and 
proactiveness in its role as a prosecutorial institution; drug trafficking and organised 
crime congressional investigative committees (Comissoes Parlamentares de Inquérito 
- CPIs) were initiated in both national and state legislatures in 1998; and in 1999 a CPI 
to investigate the judiciary was launched and uncovered several cases of corruption. 
Although these are welcome improvements in the legal system, Caldeira and Holston 
assert that the failures of the judiciary in promoting the democratic ideals enshrined in 
the 1988 Constitution have received little attention in comparison to the abuses 
committed by the police. This has been a significant oversight in the evaluation of the 
Brazil’s democracy, due to the fact that,
“the judiciary’s prevailing inability to secure and communicate a sense 
of effective justice, fair and timely treatment, and reasonable access for 
all Brazilians not only renders it an isolated and even irrelevant 
institution for most people: such failures also cripple Brazilian 
democracy with an undemocratic rule of law.”
Impunity and lack of accountability creates a further consequence. As Vieira, Caldeira 
and Holston argue, the ‘demonization’ of the excluded, on one hand, and impunity of 
the perpetrators, on the other, create an ‘us and them, ‘good and evil’ d i v i d e T h i s  
divide works both ways, however. Seeing criminals as evil or part of the ‘other’ helps 
government to obtain the support of the population to commit violence against its
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poorer citizens (impunity), highlighting the criminality perpetrated by the poor and 
excluded (criminalisation)/^® In addition, this situation antagonises the poorer sectors 
of the population, who also play a role in the ‘us and them’ divide. They are, 
nevertheless, on the opposite side of the spectrum and, feel, in many cases, a self- 
righteousness in commiting c r i m e s . M a n y  criminal organisations in Brazil have 
adopted a rights language to justify the atrocities they commit. Illustrations of this 
are criminal organisations called commandos, which have sprung up since the 
beginning of 1990s with the declared intention of fighting for inmates’ rights. 
Tor ture ,appal l ing  prison conditions'^® and human rights abuses in the prison 
system^^  ^ were some of the wrongs these organisations were created to combat. Their 
central ideology has, nowadays, become a justification for their criminal activities run 
in and outside prisons. These criminal organisations have also infiltrated the poorest 
urban areas of the major cities in Brazil and, alongside killings, extortions and drug 
trafficking, provide essentials to the communities such as milk, nappies and 
medication, and even run social programmes, in exchange for their loyalty. 
Although the commandos have a clear criminal intent, they often justify the violence 
they perpetrate by the need to attract attention to the neglects and abuses suffered by 
prisoners. As Holston contends, “[tjhis use offers strange proof of the generalized 
legitimacy of democratic discourse in Brazilian society.”
These and other consequences of crime affect Brazilians’ daily existence, posing a 
threat to community life, furthering the social divide, and undermining their trust of 
the state and, consequently, the democratic project. By failing to address the 
astounding levels of crime, the Brazilian government frustrates, at a fundamental
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level, citizens’ enjoyment and exercise of some of their most basic constitutional 
rights. Importantly, the violation of its duty to use coercive force only when justified 
by the set of principles informing the community, hampers the implementation of the 
rule of law in Brazil. Paradoxically, however, crime has become so widespread and 
‘inclusive’ that it may have an impact on the elites’ willingness to enforce 
accountability and other judicial mechanisms constraining public officials’ exercise of 
power and thus fostering the implementation of the rule of law. Moreover, by 
practicing crime and relinquishing its duty to protect citizens from violence, the state 
is also violating its obligations in the international arena. Pressure from transnational 
courts and international organisations may, as will be seen below and as has been 
demonstrated in Chapter 5, offer significant incentives for national elites to compel the 
state to observe its constitutional and international obligations. In the next section, the 
role of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in prosecuting and, consequently, 
curbing private and state violence will be investigated, so as to understand their 
efficacy, or inefficacy, in compelling the Brazilian elites to condemn, together with 
the rest of the population, rights’ transgressions by public officials.
6.4 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Private and State Violence and State 
Responsibility
The question of whether the state can be held responsible for human rights abuses 
perpetrated by non-state actors is a hotly debated issue in international law,^ ^® and one 
that is too wide and complex to be undertaken in depth by this research. Although this 
is the case, it is pertinent for this thesis to address aspects of this issue, particularly the 
approach of the Inter-American system on human rights on the matter, as it bears a 
direct relationship with the problem of violence in Brazil and the country’s inability to 
appropriately protect its citizens’ human rights. In this vein, this section will 
investigate this important perspective on the matter, by highlighting decisions of both 
the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
related to violence in Latin American countries, as well as analysing the effectiveness 
of legal activism through international courts as a means of restraining national ruling
S Farrior, 'State Responsibility for Human Rights Abuses by Non-State Actors' (92nd Annual 
Meeting: The Challenge o f Non-State Actors, Washington, DC 1998), p.300
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classes, curbing gross violations of human rights, and fostering more equity and 
fairness in national legal systems.
6.4.1 Inter-American Human Rights System & State Parties’ Obligations
The Inter-American Human Rights system was created by the Organisation of 
American States (OAS) in 1948,^ ^® and since then has gradually established a robust 
and effective means to promote and protect human rights. In view of that, the OAS 
adopted the American Convention on Human Rights in 1969 (also known as the Pact 
of San José),^^^ which came into effect in 1978.^ ^® The observance of Convention 
rights is ensured by two OAS organs, the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (lACHR), created by the OAS as a Charter organ in 1959 (Article 106 of the 
Charter),*"^ ® and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, created by the 
Convention in 1978 (Article 33 of the Convent ion) .According to Chapter VII, 
Article 41 of the Convention, the lACHR is responsible for compiling reports and 
country studies on the situation of human rights in the OAS member states; 
investigating violations of human rights; reviewing complaints from individuals and 
organisations against human rights violations perpetrated in any OAS member state; 
and initiating proceedings against member states for the infringement of Convention 
rights. The Court will hear cases of human rights violations only at the request of the 
Commission (Chapter VIII, Article 61.2 of the Convention) and may take provisional 
measures and award damages against member states when necessary (Chapter VIII, 
Article 63 of the Convention).Complaints  from individuals and organisations are
Established by the Charter o f the Organization o f American States (A-41) (Signed in Bogota in 
1948) (Amended by the Protocol o f Buenos Aires in 1967, by the Protocol o f Cartagena de Indias in 
1985, by the Protocol o f Washington in 1992, and by the Protocol o f Managua in 1993).
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thus filed before the lACHR, which will investigate the matter and refer it to the Court 
if appropriate. In addition, the Commission may receive complaints against OAS 
member states, regardless of whether the country has ratified the Convention (Chapter 
VII, Article 44 of the Convention). Article 46(1 )(a) of the Convention prescribes 
that the admission by the lACHR of any complaint is conditional on the party having 
pursued and exhausted all domestic remedies. This requirement is not applicable, 
however, if the legislation of the member state does not afford due process of law, if 
the claimant has been prevented from exhausting all the remedies available or is 
denied access to such remedies, and if there is undue delay in the final judgment when 
those domestic remedies have been sought.
As Santos contends, when compared with other Latin American countries, Brazil was 
slow in recognising the regional human rights norms established by the OAS. Whilst 
the Convention was ratified by a number of Latin American states in the 1980s, Brazil 
only ratified it in 1992 and was one of the last countries to recognise the jurisdiction 
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in 1998.^ "^ ^
Under Article 1(1) of the Convention, state parties have both a negative obligation to 
‘respect’, and a positive obligation to ‘ensure the free and full exercise’ of the rights 
and freedoms prescribed by the Convention. The fact that the Convention recognises 
primarily civil and political rights, or first generation rights, means that state parties 
have mainly a negative obligation to refrain from interfering with the individuals’ 
rights and freedoms. Although this is the case, the obligation that State Parties have 
to ‘ensure’ the full exercise of Convention rights is undoubtedly a very important one, 
and one which entails addressing difficult and technical issues. As Davidson contends, 
it is arguable whether such an obligation refers only to the vertical obligation that 
State Parties have to those to whom the Convention applies, that is, the obligation of 
states to create institutional mechanisms which allow for the rights formulated in the 
Convention to be protected, or whether it extends to the horizontal relationship 
between private individuals. The answer to this question can have great 
implications for state parties, as the latter option implies that signatory states can be
Santos, 'Transnational Legal Activism and the State: Reflections on Cases Against Brazil in the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights', p.38 
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considered in breach of the Convention when unable or unwilling to address 
lawlessness that prevents citizens from fully exercising their human rights/"*  ^
Remarkably, both the lACHR and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have 
interpreted Article 1(1) to mean that the obligation of state parties is extended to 
human rights abuses committed by non-state actors/'^^ The lACHR made its position 
very clear in a report on the situation of human rights in Guatemala in 1981 by stating 
that,
“[t]he Commission has repeatedly stressed the obligation the 
governments have of maintaining public order and the personal safety 
of the country’s inhabitants. For that purpose, the governments must 
prevent and suppress acts of violence, even forcefully, whether 
committed by public officials or private individuals, whether their 
motives are political or otherwise.
In the life of any nation, threats to the public order or to the personal 
safety of its inhabitants coming from persons or groups making use of 
violence can reach such proportions that they require temporary 
suspension of the exercise of certain human rights.”^^®
This position of the Commission has wide implications for Brazil’s obligation to curb 
the shocking levels of crime in its urban centres. As stated, the country’s obligations 
extend beyond its duty to provide measures through which the population can 
vindicate the rights established in the American Convention on Human Rights. 
According to the Commission, Brazil also has the duty to prevent human rights 
violations against its citizens, even when perpetrated by non-state actors, when such 
violations prevent individuals from exercising the full rights and freedoms enshrined 
in the Convention.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights first pronounced on the matter in the 
landmark decision in Velasquez Rodrigues v. H o n d u r a s Referring to the 
obligations of state parties, the Court emphasised emphatically that it is the duty of 
member states to apply all necessary means to punish violations of human rights
148
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prescribed in the Convention, thus reinstating the full exercise of individuals’ 
rights/®^
“[t]he State is obligated to investigate every situation involving a 
violation of the rights protected by the Convention. If the State 
apparatus acts in such a way that the violation goes unpunished and the 
victim's full enjoyment of such rights is not restored as soon as 
possible, the State has failed to comply with its duty to ensure the free 
and full exercise of those rights to the persons within its jurisdiction. 
The same is true when the State allows private persons or groups to act 
freely and with impunity to the detriment of the rights recognized by 
the Convention.” ®^^
The Court concedes that the existence of a particular violation does not, in itself, 
prove that the state has not taken the appropriate preventative measures to curb the 
abuses. Any violations of Convention provisions are, however, imputable to the 
state when they can be attributed to an act or omission of state agency. This means 
that, regardless of the identity or motivation of the perpetrator of the violation, the 
state has an obligation to deploy all necessary measures to prevent it or punish those 
responsible.^^® According to the Court, the state’s duty to prevent human rights 
violations involves the mobilisation of all means, including means “of a legal, 
political, administrative and cultural nature” ®^® aimed at promoting the protection of 
human rights. In addition, states have an obligation to ensure the free and full exercise 
of Convention rights by making sure that human rights’ violations are “considered and 
treated as illegal acts”,^ ®^ that perpetrators are punished, rights are restored and 
victims offered appropriate compensation.^®^ Again, the Court acknowledges the fact 
that it may be difficult to investigate human rights’ violations and that, like the duty to 
prevent, such obligation is not breached and the state considered responsible for the 
infringement merely when the “investigation does not produce a satisfactory result.” ®^^ 
The Court was clear, however, that it is the legal responsibility of the state to carry out
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proper, objective and serious investigation to address violations of human rights^ ®® and 
goes further, pointing out that,
“[tjhis is true regardless of what agent is eventually found responsible 
for the violation. Where the acts of private parties that violate the 
Convention are not seriously investigated, those parties are aided in a 
sense by the government, making the State responsible on the 
international plane."^®^
Such an approach was reinstated by the Court in Margarida Maria Alves v. Brazil}^^ 
The case concerned Margarida Maria Alves, an activist for the rural workers rights 
and President of the Alagoa Grande Rural Workers Union (Sindicato dos 
Trabalhadores Rurais de Alagoa Grande), whose assassination at her home at close 
range in 1983 was not properly investigated or punished by state. Margarida Alves 
played a pivotal role in representing sugar cane workers in the state of Paraiba and had 
been successful in encouraging workers to demand their rights in Brazilian courts. 
Through her actions, at least 73 labour law suits were said to have been filed in the 
Labour Courts against sugar mills and sugar cane estates in Paraiba. Before her 
assassination, Margarida Alves had allegedly received threats demanding an end to 
her activism and the severance of her relationship with the union. ^ ®^ The Court held 
that the petition was admissible and that Brazil had breached Article 1 of the OAS 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man^ ®"^  (Right to Life, Liberty and Personal 
Security), Article 8 (Right to a Fair Trial) and Article 25 (Right to Judicial Protection), 
in relation to Article 1(1).^ ®® In its reasoning, the Court stated that the observance of 
the right to life by state parties to the Convention entailed not only the negative 
obligation to respect the right that the individual has of not having his or her life ended 
arbitrarily, but also the positive obligation to adopt all necessary measures to preserve
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and protect that right, therefore, guaranteeing the free and full exercise of Convention 
rights/®®
Similarly, in 2009, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights unanimously declared 
Brazil to be in violation of Articles 8 and 25, in relation to Article 1, of the 
Convention, in the case of Garibaldi v Brazil, for failure to investigate and punish the 
murder of Sétimo Garibaldi/®^ Garibaldi was killed in 1998 during an extrajudicial 
operation carried out by 20 armed and hooded men to evict the families of landless 
workers occupying a farm in the state of Parana/®^ In the reasoning, the Court 
reinstated its recognition of the relationship between signatory states’ general 
obligation to guarantee the rights prescribed by the Convention (Article 1(1)) and the 
specific rights protected by the same instrument/®® Drawing on decisions of Vargas 
Areco v Paraguai^^^ in 2006 and Garcia Pietro at al v El Salvado/^^ in 2007, the 
Inter-American Court reiterated that states’ obligations to guaranteed Convention 
rights gave rise to the obligation of “ensuring] the free and full exercise of the rights 
established in the Convention to every person subject to its j u r i s d i c t i o n . I n  
addition, the Court emphasised that not only the prevention, but also the investigation 
of human rights violations are positive measures that signatory states’ must adopt in 
the pursuit of protecting the rights embodied in the Convention. As in Velasquez 
R o d rig u ez/E sch er  at al/^^ and Tristan Donoso/^^ the Court declared that the 
obligation to investigate human rights violations is an “obligation of means and not of 
results”, meaning that states do not comply with it when the investigation is merely 
fulfilling a formality and, thus, “predestined to be ineffective” or protecting special
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interests and dependant on the initiative of the victims, next of kin or on the private 
contribution of probative elements/
Brazil’s historical resistance to supranational human rights governance as a 
unacceptable intervention in its sovereignty, evidenced by its long-delay in 
recognising the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court and admitting the scrutiny of 
human rights violations by the monitoring bodies of the Inter-American Commission, 
successfully prevented, according to Macaulay, the lACHR from prosecuting the 
country for complaints r e c e i v e d / A s  Cassese points out, states’ rejection of human 
rights enforcement mechanisms as an infringement of their sovereignty was the 
dominant doctrine in international law, which gradually changed with the proliferation 
of human rights treaties and the establishment of human rights monitoring procedures 
by the UN and other international and regional multilateral organisations/^® Within 
the Inter-American human rights system, Serrano argues that the resistance of 
authoritarian and military regimes in accepting ‘interventions’ by the lACHR and the 
Court began to change after the end of the Cold War and with the evolution of its 
human rights regime due to the impact of government decisions and country reports, 
gaining further impetus with the enactment of the Convention in 1978/^® In the case 
of Brazil, NGOs and other human rights organisations have also been slow in 
employing the complaint’s procedures of the lACHR against human rights abuses. As 
Santos contends, although there have been a growing number of complaints against 
Brazil since the 1990’s, this form of transnational activism has only been modestly 
employed by the Brazilian human rights organisations when compared with other 
countries in the region. Whilst in 1969 and 1970 Brazil ranked second in the number 
of complaints for human rights violations, with 40 complaints, in 1999 it had only 
thirteen complaints filed against it and 46 cases being processed by the Commission, 
ranking tenth in the region. This number had increased by 2006 to 66 complaints, 
almost double the combined number of the years of 1999 and 2000^^  ^ and again in
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2010, when there were 97 pending cases and petitions against B r a z i l / S i n c e  the 
recognition of the jurisdiction of the Court by the Cardoso government, Brazil has 
become more cooperative with the Court and the Commission, submitting important 
reports on abuses of human rights and accepting the oversight mechanisms designed 
to enforce Convention rights/^^ Despite the country’s successful avoidance of both 
the lACHR and the Court, the cases above illustrate that each institution is likely to 
assign liability to OAS member states for breaches of human rights, including when 
violations are perpetrated by non-state actors. Although they do not evidence a clear 
position of the Court, they set precedents affirming emphatically the duty of the state 
to adopt all necessary measures to ensure the full and free enjoyment of Convention 
rights. This means that human rights violations carried out by state or non-state actors 
are imputable to the state, among others, when it fails to prevent such infringements, 
when its agencies and institutions do not investigate the crime in a serious and proper 
manner or do not prosecute those responsible for the crime, when it does offer 
appropriate remedies for the parties to have their rights upheld, when the remedies 
offered by the state cause unwarranted delay in reaching a final judgement and 
restoring the right, and when it does not afford the due process of law.
Accordingly, when it comes to the shocking levels of crime in the urban centres in 
Brazil, the country is not only responsible for violations perpetrated by its own agents, 
particularly the police, but also for the violations carried out by other criminal groups, 
regardless of their motivation, due to its persistent inability to investigate crimes in a 
proper and thorough way and to its corrupt, slow and inefficient justice system, which 
ultimately prevent citizens from enjoying their Convention rights in a full and free 
manner. Were human rights activists to pursue these cases more robustly at the Inter- 
American Court, they could increase pressure on the Brazilian government to protect 
its citizens more effectively against violence and abuses of Convention rights. Hence, 
by filing cases before the Commission, Brazilian human rights organisations can set 
precedents that may influence the legal, political and cultural approaches to this 
problem in Brazil. As Cassese asserts, despite the difficulties in the enforcement of the 
Convention, important decisions by both the Court and the Commission, as well as 
Advisory Opinions issued by the Court, offer a relevant element of state pressure.
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particularly in a continent pervaded by the authoritarianism of its past and present and 
by endemic problems of dem ocracy/O utside the Court human rights activists were 
partially responsible for a ehange in attitude of the Brazilian government, from 
obstructionism to cooperation, particularly towards the Commission. This has 
facilitated ‘friendly solutions’ of gross Convention rights violations identified by the 
monitoring bodies of the Commission, an illustration being the Cardoso government’s 
acquiescence to the demolition of the notorious Caradiru prison and, albeit grudgingly, 
acknowledgement in the UN Committee of the widespread and systemic abuse of 
detainees by the police. Such legal activism, however, can only have a limited 
effect in changing the status quo.^ ^® As Serrano contends,
“In the Americas, as elsewhere, mobilization around human rights 
norms played an important part in the overthrow of authoritarian and 
repressive regimes and, in many places, transition to democracy was to 
have a significant impact on the human rights landscape. And yet, 
tracing the contribution of democratization and democratic rule to the 
protection of human rights can be a tricky business. Often 
democratization processes can have murky trajectories, with their 
contributions to human rights clouded and not clearly apparent. A 
growing sense of this is also near the heart of current uncertainties.
Furthermore, the introduction of legal mechanisms designed to enforce the democratic 
ideals and respect for human rights is effective only as part of a broader strategy to 
address these issues. Examples of this are the enactment of the Washington Protocol 
to prevent the overthrow of democratically elected governments in Latin America and 
the creation of the Inter-American Court to curb the perpetration of human rights 
abuses in the region. These legal devices were important in addressing the high degree 
of democratic instability, widespread use of torture and other gross violations of
Cassese, International Law, p.391
Macaulay, 'Human Rights in Context: Brazil', p. 140
Santos, 'Transnational Legal Activism and the State: Reflections on Cases Against Brazil in the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights', pp.4I-2
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human rights across the region/^® As Lutz and Sikkink argue, as domestic law reflects 
the social values and norms of the community, so is transnational human rights law 
expressive and reflective of the context to which it is applied/®® In Latin America, 
these norms played an important role in significantly increasing the number of arenas 
in which human rights violations could be raised, as well as legitimising the cause of 
human rights activists, particularly exiles and victims of the military regimes/®^ The 
case of Paraguay, which endured one of the longest military regimes in the region 
(1954-1989) and where the use of torture was extensive and widespread, is instructive. 
Unlike its neighbours, Paraguay had not legalised international mechanisms against 
torture in the 1970s and, therefore, had neither ratified OAS and UN treaties 
prohibiting the use of torture nor accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American 
Court. Despite this. Commission visits and subsequent annual and special reports on 
human rights abuses in the country had a discernible impact on the use of torture and 
unlawful imprisonment by General Storessner’s regime. ^ ®^ Despite this, legalised 
channels are not the only, or even the most important, mechanisms in addressing 
oppression, authoritarianism and state violence. Their effectiveness is contingent on 
the employment and efficacy of other political pressures highlighting and promoting 
an increasing consensus for the established norms and, in this sense, legal and political 
enforcement mechanisms reinforce each other. ^ ®^ As Lutz and Sikkink contend, in the 
case of Paraguay, it is difficult to disconnect the influence of the Commission from the 
pressures exercised by President Carter’s administration on the regime as, most likely, 
both channels promoted the enforcement of human rights norms in the country. ^®"^ The 
case of Uruguay also illustrates well how legal and political pressure can reinforce one 
another and support further the enforcement of international human rights norms. 
Although Uruguay had one of the longest traditions of democratic rule in the 
continent, the military regime which took power in 1973 curbed the independent 
functioning of the courts and civil society, and committed severe violations of human 
rights. In 1970, in line with its longstanding respect for democracy, Uruguay had been 
one of the few countries in the region to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and
Ibid.
Ibid., p.657 
Ibid., p.658 
Ibid., pp.642-5 
Ibid., p.658 
Ibid., p.645
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Political Rights^ ®® (ICCPR) and its First Protocol. Until 1976, when the ICCPR 
entered into force, little attention had been paid to Uruguay’s abuses of human rights, 
despite the fact that most political prisoners were arrested between 1972 and 1974.^ ®® 
With the ICCPR in effect, Uruguayan citizens, who had grown accustomed to 
resorting to domestic legal remedies, began filing petitions against their government in 
the Human Rights Committee, established under the ICCPR (Part IV, Article 28.1). 
The substantial number of complaints brought the attention of the violations to the 
Committee, who responded by finding Uruguay responsible for treaty violations in the 
great majority of cases and calling on the Uruguayan government to both release the 
prisoners of arbitrary detention and provide compensation to the victims of torture and 
other human rights abuses. These findings, in turn, came to the attention of the then 
burgeoning non-governmental international human rights movement, which widely 
publicised the situation and furthered the cause of the victims and human rights 
activists. ^ ®^ The victims also appealed to the lACHR, which wrote several reports on 
the abuses committed in the country, despite Uruguay’s refusal to cooperate with the 
investigations. The reports, which were later adopted by the OAS General Assembly, 
also prompted Venezuela and the U.S. to apply pressure on the OAS, leading its 
Permanent Council to block Uruguay’s intention to host the 1978 OAS General 
Assembly meeting. ^ ®^ In addition, several non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
including the International League of Human Rights, the International Commission of 
Jurists, the Secretariat International des Juristes Pour Amnistie en Uruguay and, 
particularly. Amnesty International, dedicated considerable efforts between 1976 and 
1980 to investigating and raising awareness about the situation in Uruguay by writing 
reports, holding symposia, sending missions and trial observers to the country, 
lobbying heads of states and politicians, and pressing governments, such as the U.S., 
to suspend bilateral agreements and aid to Uruguay.^®® According to Lutz and Sikkink, 
a combination of international legal and political pressures strengthened the position 
of the country’s soft-liners and their case for a plebiscite on a new constitution. In 
1980, Uruguayans, voting for the first time since the coup, defeated the constitution
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Adopted and opened for signature, ratification 
and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI)
of 16 December 1966) (entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49)
Lutz and Sikkink, 'International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America', pp.642-3 
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Ibid., p.643 
Ibid., pp.643-4
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proposed by the military government, leading the country on a démocratisation path 
which culminated with the return to democracy by 1985, along with a significant 
decrease in human rights violations/®® Accordingly, Uruguay is a case in which 
international human rights did not function independently, but where,
“a highly legalised international norm with a degree of domestic 
popular acceptance, obligation, and delegation was successfully 
reinforced through persistent international enforcement pressure 
directed at a violating government.” ®^^
Over 25 years after the end of Brazil’s dictatorship, legal activism related to human 
rights abuses during the regime are still producing important victories for the victims 
and their families, potentially playing an important role in changing the authoritarian 
practices that still pervade the country’s legal system. In the contentious and landmark 
case of Gomes Lund et a l ( “Guerrilha do Araguaia) v. Brazil, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights declared the provisions of the Brazilian Amnesty Law that 
prevent the investigation and punishment of serious human rights violations that 
occurred during the military regime to be incompatible with the American Convention 
and, thus, lacking legal effect.^®  ^ The Court found Brazil to be responsible for the 
enforced disappearance of the plaintiffs’ relatives and, therefore, to be in breach of the 
rights to juridical personality (Article 3), life (Article 4), personal integrity (Article 5) 
and personal liberty (Article 7) in relation to Article 1(1) of the Convention.^®^ In 
addition, the Court stressed that Brazil failed to comply with its obligations to adapt its 
domestic law to the American Convention (Article 2, in relation to Article 8(1), 25 
and 1(1)) as a result of the interpretation and application given to the Amnesty Law by 
the Brazilian courts in cases of serious violations of human rights. It also found Brazil 
responsible for the violations of the rights to fair trial (Article 8) and judicial 
protection (Article 25), in relation to Article 1(1) and 2 of the Convention, for failing 
to investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible for the disappearances of 
members of the Guerrilha of Araguaia.^ ®"^  This landmark decision is an important 
evidence of the role that legal activism and international courts may play in the
Ibid., p.644 
Ibid.
Gomes Lund et a l ("Gerrilha do Araguaia) v. Brazil (2010) (Inter-Am C.H.R. 'Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs') (Judgment o f 24th November 2010)
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implementation of the rule of law on a national level. Accordingly, international 
norms and their domestic, regional and international enforcement mechanisms may 
prompt domestic political change, which, in turn, reinforces the efficacy and 
legitimacy of legal and non-legal human rights channels in place, thus strengthening 
and widening the scope of the system of rules.^ ®®
This phenomenon, evidenced by the compelling formal adherence of Latin American 
states to international norms and regulations imposing respect for human rights and 
the democratic ideals and their positive effect on cases of torture and general human 
rights abuses under military regimes in the region, characterises what Lutz and 
Sikkink describe as norms cascade.^ ®® The effects of such norm-affirming events may 
be felt by domestic legislatures for years to come as, once in motion, they may 
develop a momentum of their own.^ ®^  Even if initially prompted by national elites’ 
cost-benefit assessment, whereby they consider the participation in international and 
regional legal orders as beneficial to them, any costs being easily avoidable or 
minimised - particularly considering the lax enforcement mechanisms of international 
legal systems - they may trigger a process of change that goes far beyond their initial 
calculated effects.^®  ^ This is because national elites often undermine the real costs of 
adherence to international treaties, ignoring that their efficacy may not be solely 
attributed to their direct enforcement, but to their powerful effect in widening the 
range and strength of political enforcement mechanisms.^®® This is as valid for the 
incorporation of international norms and mechanisms as it is for substantial legal 
change of purely domestic character. As seen throughout this thesis, ruling classes 
often find difficult to ascertain the full consequences of their self-interested actions, 
particularly when they involve legal change.^*® This is because the partially 
autonomous character of the law means that meaningful changes in the legal system 
will follow the law’s own evolutionary pattern, which may, in the long-term, differ 
from the dominant classes’ desire, thus producing occasional fair outcomes as a 
resu lt.^F o r Lutz and Sikkink, governments’ attitude towards international, regional
Lutz and Sikkink, 'International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America', pp.657-8
Ibid., pp.655-7
Ibid., p.657
Ibid., p.658
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Genovese, 'Of the Willing and the Obedient', pp. 26-7; Hirschl, 'The Political Origins of Judicial 
Empowerment through Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions', pp. 121-2 
Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin o f  the Black Act, pp.259-60
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and domestic norms and pressures cannot be understood independently from the issues 
of legitimacy and esteem/^^ Accordingly, as seen in Chapter 5, the worldwide 
international and regional socialisation of states drives members o f ‘socialised’ groups 
to care about what other states think of them/^^ As Holmes contends, states ratify 
international treaties that they cannot easily break for the same reason that individuals 
assume obligations that will constrain their actions in the future. They regard this as in 
their interest, as international and regional regimes provide them with the power to 
assert themselves and project an image that can help them to advance their goals.^ "^^  
International legitimisation is thus increasingly important for regimes seeking to 
strengthen their domestic legitimacy and ensure their survival. Equally, national 
dominant classes will transfer rights and entitlements downward through the 
enactment of constitutions and the widening of democratic processes once these are 
means through which they can achieve their interests, such as gaining a sought-after 
support of the lower classes, validating and legitimising their functions and position, 
or complying with the pressures of foreign elites.^^® Apart from this, human rights 
pressures produce not only pragmatic effects, by enhancing or diminishing domestic 
legitimacy, but also social effects, as they highlight and stigmatise norm breakers.^ 
Such social processes may have been particularly effective in Latin America, a 
continent with a tradition of commitment to international law and human rights norms, 
as they have been appropriated by a strong civil society, filtering to the language of 
social movements and human rights activists. A combination of pre-established 
normative frameworks and an international enforcement system that echoed domestic 
values meant that local political human rights mechanisms were strengthened by 
external pressures, preventing dictators in the region from succeeding in framing 
human rights as ‘cultural imperialism’. This, in turn, reinforced regional legal systems, 
which became clearer and more robust, providing Latin American citizens with wider 
channels to pursue redress for human rights violations and validating the demands
Lutz and Sikkink, 'International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America', pp.258-9 
Habermas, The Divided West, p.68; Lutz and Sikkink, 'International Human Rights Law and Practice 
in Latin America', pp.258-9; North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance,
p.120
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they made on their governments to abide by regional and international human rights
9 1 7systems.
These claims reiterate the arguments advanced in this thesis, namely that normative 
frameworks can only have limited effect on social and political change and are 
dependent on parallel political processes. In the domestic arena, these processes are 
generally led by political and social elites, which together with the state form the most 
stable and dominant societal coalition.^Accordingly, binding rules of international 
law no doubt play a role in the process of change, but they do so fundamentally 
because they offer elites further incentives to act. National and international legal 
instruments that recognise and enforce the protection of rights can offer an important 
contribution in helping the population appropriate the rights language and demand 
practical, as well as theoretical, protection of their rights. Such demands, in turn, 
increase the likelihood that the elites will see the need for change and will side with 
the population in demanding limits on state power and the abuses perpetrated by its 
authorities and institutions.
6.5 Violence as an Incentive for Change: Crime and its Consequences for the 
Brazilian Elites
As has been indicated, crime perpetrated both by criminal organisations and the police 
has reached such shocking levels in Brazil that it may influence the elites to react in 
concert with the population in demanding limits on the government’s abuses as well as 
further action on promoting and protecting the civil and human rights of the whole 
population. In this sense, crime is a motivation in itself, as the elites begin to feel 
directly affected by widespread criminality and by the inefficiency of the state in 
dealing with the problem .^A lthough the elites have at their disposal enough 
resources to distance themselves from poor and deprived areas with high rates of 
criminal activity as well as to protect themselves from crime by utilising the latest 
security devices,^^® the extent of the problem in Brazil means that their daily lives are
Ibid., p.659
Weingast, 'The Political Foundations o f Democracy and the Rule o f Law', p.246 
Bitencourt, 'Crime and Violence: Challenges to Democracy in Brazil', pp.178-82 
Karstedt and LaFree, 'Democracy, Crime and Justice', pp. 16-7
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directly affected by the fear of crime/^^ Violence has become rampant in Brazil, with 
public places of major urban centres becoming the open scene of all types of law 
breaking activities, from muggings and assaults, to shootings and drug trafficking, to 
violence in traffic and general delinquency/^^ As a result, “[vjiolence of one sort or 
another is a common experience of daily life.”^^  ^As Holmes contends,
“gated communities and prison-building programs cannot utterly
decouple the serenity of the castle from the misery of the cottage, the
prosperity of the suburb from the penury of the ghetto.”^^"^
The elites are also specifically targeted by criminals in kidnappings, which have
become frequent in the past decades,^^® car robberies and thefrs,^^® and house
breakings. As Wright and Wolford point out, the fear of violence and kidnappings, 
together with long traffic jams and unsafe road conditions, have led Sao Paulo’s elites 
to resort to helicopter travel as a preferred mode of transport. With one the busiest 
helicopter traffics in the world, Sao Paulo had, in 2003, around 240 helipads, in 
comparison with 10 in New York.^^^ The fear of crime has also given rise to gated 
communities patrolled by armed guards to house the wealthy, who, if travelling on the 
ground, will often do so in bullet-proof vehicles through varied routes with planned 
detours to avoid kidnappings.^^^
In this vein, the elites feel threatened by crime perpetrated by individuals and gangs 
who take advantage of an outdated, inefficient and corrupt police and justice 
institutions to carry out robberies, assaults, thefts and other acts of violence against the 
general population.^^® What follows is a sense of pervasive fear and an increased lack 
of confidence on the state’s enforcement agents and institutions, which are under­
trained, corrupt, poorly resourced, and, in many cases, inadequate to address the
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problem/^® State violence compounds the problem and “lends a perception of 
impunity that both promotes and trivializes criminal acts.”^^  ^ Inequality and the 
unequal treatment of different classes also heighten feelings of suspicion and distrust, 
a scenario which is “dramatized by the close proximity between the richest and the 
poorest in urban centres,”^^  ^providing a vivid picture of the injustices of the situation 
as well as according “an air of legitimacy to crime.”^^ ^
Apart from offering a reason in itself, high levels of crime may present other 
difficulties and disadvantages to the elites, prompting them to act. As seen in Chapter 
5, recent gro'wth offers Brazil real prospects for further economic development and the 
possibility for the country to acquire increased international economic and political 
influence. This situation would be highly beneficial to the country’s elites, but may be 
hampered by the rising levels of crime. This is because violence imposes a heavy 
constraint on national and foreign investment,^^"  ^ undermines economic development 
efforts,^^® hinders tourism,^®® and casts a shadow on the country’s image abroad. In 
addition, state condoned violence also reduces the nation’s legitimacy and leverage 
before other states and international institutions, and may have a direct impact on the 
country’s ability to play a major role in international organisations and agencies.
As seen in Chapter 2, the duty to obey the law is not purely normative.^^^ Unless the 
state and its agents are compelled by the elites to obey the established the law, they 
will continue privileging the groups whose allegiance is most useful to them, thus 
perpetuating a mutually beneficial and stable relationship with the elites to the 
detriment of the interests, needs, rights and freedoms of the rest of the population.^^^ 
This cycle can only be undermined and, consequently, society’s balance of power 
supplanted by a more egalitarian and law-driven system, when a sufficiently 
meaningful factor extraneous to this model can compel the elites to side with the rest
Ibid., pp. 181-2; Caldeira and Holston, 'Democracy and Violence in Brazil', p.695 
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of the population in identifying and condemning transgressions of constitutional rights 
and guarantees, thus fostering more accountability in society. Until then, the state will 
continue to employ the law for nefarious, arbitrary and inequitable purposes, whilst 
the elites will continue to use the law to legitimise class power and morally justify 
their privileged position in society.^^® As Turner points out, the endowment of the 
rights of citizenship in classical Roman and Greek societies presented those at the top 
with the threat of servitude and loss of status unless their hierarchically superior 
standing was legitimised. Those accorded full rights of citizenship were, 
‘coincidentally’, those who entertained the right to speak and govern, providing them 
with an “ideological need to explain and to legitimise the subordinate status of 
women, adult slaves and children,” "^^® and to “justify on rational grounds the existence 
of slavery.” "^^  ^ This is a feature of all societies, to one extent or another, for rulers and 
those at the top normally feel compelled to assert their power and validate their status 
and functions both morally and legally. "^^  ^ This need will, however, increase 
proportionately to the level of inequality and class divisions in society, a task which 
the young Coimbra-graduates carried out competently during Brazil’s formation as a 
nation-state. Their shared educational, economic and class backgrounds facilitated the 
development and promotion of a common ideology, not least through law, which 
deepened social divisiveness and subjugation, unequal distribution of wealth and 
undemocratic politics. By repressing dissent whenever necessary and maintaining a 
close relationship with the state throughout the centuries, they successfully set the 
foundations for a society where the law serves the interests of those with the greatest 
amount of influence and resources. For this reason, a formal conception of the rule of 
law is inadequate to assess Brazil’s legal system, as well as to provide a framework 
for change and an ideal of what the law should be. The observance of rule validity is 
not only unable to prevent abuses of power, but can legitimise perverse and tyrannical 
regimes.^"^  ^Adopting a theory of the rule of law such as Dworkin’s is thus essential for 
Brazilians to understand their power in shaping the law, in accordance with the set of 
principles that they regard most important to guide the community, and to demand that 
the state to follow them when making political decisions and when considering the use
Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin o f  the Black Act, pp.261-3
Turner, 'Outline o f a Theory of Citizenship', p.201
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of coercive force. The latter task is more difficult and dependant on the elites. Given 
that Brazil is currently undergoing significant political, economic and societal 
changes, namely with the transition to democracy and the consequent empowerment 
of the masses, economic growth and widespread violence, one or a combination of 
these factors may provide the elites enough incentives to desire, or appear to desire, a 
change in the status quo. Either case will require institutional and normative changes, 
many of them to be consolidated by reform of the legal system, which can reverberate 
more profound transformations, not envisaged by the elites, in years or decades to 
come. In this process, a thick version of the rule of law may be implemented and the 
country’s democracy may be consolidated.
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CONCLUSION
The law’s historical subservience to those with most influence and resources often 
relegates it to being a tool for furthering the interests and purposes of the most powerful. 
More easily manipulable by the dominant classes, the law has been the medium through 
which rulers legitimise and perpetuate their power and the upper classes morally justify 
their elevated citizenship status and privileged social standing.^ Both aims are often 
achieved concomitantly, as those in power will protect the interests of the individuals and 
groups whose cooperation can be most useful to them,^ thus making a mutually beneficial 
relationship between rulers and the elites the most stable in society.^ Abiding by the law 
could then be said to be redundant for those in power who, counting on the support and 
cooperation of the dominant classes, could assert their position and impose their rules 
through violence only. In reality, this does not stand. Rulers and elites feel obliged to 
comply with the general framework of the legal system, even if this requires bending 
particular rules and violating others to achieve their objectives. The law is not, however, a 
source of its own normativity and legal rules are not obeyed because they have been 
enacted in accordance with a set of formal requirements in a cycle whereby actions 
follow anterior rules.'  ^ Being the instrument through which states have pursued the 
civilising task,^ the ruling classes observe the law precisely because it works as a general 
framework that maintains order and internal peace as well as legitimising their power.^ In 
order for the law to work as such, however, it must validate itself before several societal 
classes, and not only the ruling classes.^ For the law can only mask or legitimise 
something when founded on standards of equity and universality which are seen as
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applicable to and for the benefit of the majority.^ It is thus in the interest of the dominant 
classes that the law be regarded as just and free from gross manipulation, for this is a 
necessary pre-condition for it to serve as an instrument of legitimisation of class relations 
as well as a means through which the ruling classes can impose their own version of 
rights and entitlements without resorting to outright repression or coercion/ This is truer 
in modem societies, where power can become unstable and, on occasion, untenable, 
unless the ruling classes proclaim to protect and promote the needs and interests of the 
ruled/^ In addition, the human nature of those at the top dictates their constant need to 
being seen as rightful and, often benevolent and just, holders of the their positions and 
functions/^
Historically, this has driven the most powerful groups to impose their definition of 
property and status through a purportedly benign, altruistic and universal system of law, 
legally sanctioning the subordinate status of minority groups such as women, children, 
illiterates and slaves as well as asserting unequal or alternative definitions of property 
rights, which, for instance, assigned owners of large estates full land rights whilst only 
recognising common rights or reduced land rights of cottagers, foresters and indigenous 
peoples/^ This (mis)use of the law to achieve power, economic and political advantages, 
differentiated citizenship rights and higher social status was zealously pursued by the 
dominant classes during the formation of Brazil as a nation-state. Bonded by an ideology- 
shaping legal education in Coimbra and aided by Portugal’s repression of uprisings and 
successful containment of the dissemination of revolutionary ideas based on expansion of 
social and political rights, rule by the people and on the principles of fraternity, equality 
and universality, they formed a close and firmly integrated group whose ideology proved 
crucial to the maintenance of a politically undemocratic, socially exclusionary and 
economically unequal status quo. Establishing a rare, consensually unified political elite, 
Coimbra’s law graduates played a prominent role in the centralising government of the 
pre-independence period to the end of Brazil’s Empire in 1889, imprinting their ideology 
deeply onto the country’s socio-political and economic make-up. Having given way to
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the power of the landed and military elites, their formula of class and political control 
endured the test of time, defining the manner in which politics and social relations would 
be shaped for most of the country’s history. Until the 1985 end of Brazil’s dictatorship, 
attempts to rebalance the social configuration of the Brazilian society were met with 
fierce resistance by the elites and, on many occasions, with the intervention of the 
military. In addition, the law continued to be pursued not only as a formal structure 
through which the ruling elites could legitimise their power and status, but also as a 
symbol of class differentiation and as an instrument of power. Disproportionately 
affected by the pressures and prejudices of the legal profession and isolated from other 
human sciences, the teaching of and research into law in Brazil have tended to promote 
the uncritical application of constitutional and ordinary legal rules. By meeting the 
requirements of rule validity, the Brazilian legal system has not nurtured accountability, 
security, stability or obedience by state officials, qualities which are generally professed 
by rule of law advocates. On the contrary, substantially through law, Brazil became the 
land of contrasts widely depicted in the media and academic writings, where the 
abundance of resources and rights of the few was even starker because highlighting the 
dispossession and lack of enjoyment of basic human rights of the many. How can this 
seemingly endless cycle of cooperation between the dominant classes be supplanted by a 
more egalitarian and equitable system? Just as law can further the interests of those in 
positions of power and influence, to the detriment of the rights and well-being of the 
majority, it can also be employed as a tool to narrow inequality before the law. This is a 
utopian ideal, for full equality before the law can never be achieved but only 
approximated.'^ Central to this endeavour is the implementation of the rule of law, an 
often vague and over-hyped ideal that has come to signify the solution for all ailments of 
legal systems. Its promotion as an easy path to democratic consolidation and its link to 
international lending institutions, transnational organisations and governments advancing 
it as a means to achieving economic development with minimum government 
intervention and market regulation, may eventually lead to its discredit or depreciation. 
Its inability to produce desired outcomes is a product of the lack of understanding of the 
term by those who advocate it most ardently. Pursued more commonly through a formula
Holmes, 'Lineages o f the Rule of Law', pp.21-3
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elaborated by development aid specialists and practitioners encompassing institutions to 
be reformed and laws to be issued and updated, these ‘off-the-rack’ transplantable 
solutions are often imposed on nations transitioning to democracy via deals forged behind 
closed doors, at the expense of democratic processes. More importantly, the fulfilment of 
some of the classic requirements of rule validity envisaged by authors such as Joseph Raz 
and Lon Fuller are then dissociated from their theoretical meaning and promoted as able 
to achieve ends that are only encompassed by substantial conceptions of the rule of law. 
This exercise can produce a damaging effect. Not only are expectations frustrated in 
practice, with the consequent gradual devaluation of the concept of the rule of law, but 
the wide promotion of a miracle cure to problems ranging from corruption to impunity, 
poverty to violence, lack of access to justice to pervasive violations of human rights 
without carefiil consideration about what the term does, or should entail, can play 
dangerously in the hands of those advancing a covert political agenda. Herein lies the first 
meaningful contribution of this thesis. By investigating authoritative conceptions on the 
rule of law -  both formal and substantive - this thesis has adopted a theory that is not only 
suitable to explaining why Brazil’s general compliance with formal legality has not 
curbed widespread gross transgressions of citizens’ rights and freedoms by the state and 
its agents, but has also advanced a conception of the rule of law that can serve as an ideal 
and a practical framework of law change into the future. In this sense, Dworkin’s rights 
conception, which places the ideal of integrity at the centre of legal and political morality, 
reveals that, despite observing most of the general requirements of rule validity, Brazil’s 
legal system has not ensured the fulfilment of one of the most essential elements of the 
rule of law, namely that the state should refrain from any coercion, except when 
indubitably condoned or required by the individual rights and responsibilities flowing 
from the community’s principles. In addition, Dworkin’s formulation of the rule of law 
conciliates the constitutionalisation of important fundamental rights in Article 5 of the 
1988 Constitution, such as the rights to equality before the law, life, security, liberty and 
equality with the principle of democratic ideal, enshrined in Article 1, by abandoning the 
majoritarian premise in favour of a view of democracy which champions the promotion 
of equal concern and respect for all citizens. By so doing, Dworkin’s theory provides 
Brazil’s legal system with a theoretical basis that refutes that the defining goal of a
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democratic state is to allow its collective political decisions to be informed by the 
majority, arguing instead that the ultimate end and value of democracy is to ensure that 
collective decisions are made by political institutions that treat all with equal concern and 
respect.'"' Very importantly, Dworkin’s formulation of the rule of law endows the 
community with the essential task of developing the set of principles that are to inform its 
political decisions as well as the relationship between the state and its citizens and 
between citizens themselves. By personifying the community, Dworkin allows his 
formulation of the rule of law to work differently for different communities, according 
them the power and ability to be faithful or unfaithful to their own principles and to 
develop the law within their own socio-political settings.
The adoption of a theory of the rule of law that can suitably assess Brazil’s legal system 
in the face of the pervasive transgressions of rights by the Brazilian government, 
perpetrated despite the observance of the main requirements of formal legality, is thus 
crucial if the relationship between the Brazilian state and the majority of its citizens is to 
be reshaped by narrowing inequality before the law, promoting equal concern and respect 
for all, fostering a higher degree of obedience by state officials and rebalancing the 
relationship between the weaker and the most powerful groups in society. This goal, 
however, cannot be achieved unless Dworkin’s formulation of the rule of law can be 
implemented in practice. The most meaningful and original contribution of this thesis is 
therefore in advancing a theory that suitably and authoritatively establishes the possible 
conditions for the implementation of the rule of law in Brazil. As such, Weingast offers a 
crucial, and often overlooked, link between the theoretical discourse of the rule of law 
and its practical implementation that goes beyond institutional reform and legislation 
revision. Often under-resourced, short-sighted and imposed, these reforms fail not only 
because not instigating cross-institutional reforms required to achieve end-results, but, 
most importantly, because they are based on a primarily erroneous premise which 
envisages law as an empty amalgamation of rules and principles and ignores that the law 
is deeply ingrained in and reflective of its socio-political setting. The enactment of laws 
in accordance with rules of legal validity and the promotion of institutions which 
facilitate access to justice do not prevent legal systems from harbouring laws of evil and
Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading o f the American Constitution, pp. 15-7
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immoral content. On the contrary, a formai conception of the rule of law will legitimise 
such legal systems both nationally and internationally, providing dictators and tyrants 
with a legal basis for their repugnant actions. Accordingly, by employing the law, the 
Brazilian military bequeathed the regime unlimited powers that ultimately legalised 
practices such as political persecution, disappearances, torture, killings, and censorship 
when practiced by the state in the name of national security. This mantra of legitimacy, 
ensured by Congress’s continued operation and by the promulgation of so-called 
Institutional Acts, allowed the army to impose its own version of law and order in Brazil 
for over two decades, during which time the rights and freedoms of the Brazilian 
population were severely constrained or altogether suppressed. A legal system that 
accommodates iniquitous and nefarious laws cannot itself be considered moral, for the 
morality of the law must lie in the goals and purposes to which it is put.'^ Perhaps with 
this in mind, rule of law building practitioners have devised the implementation of a 
version of the rule of law which, although primarily formal in nature, only encompasses 
‘good laws’, guaranteeing that legal systems are ultimately committed to the 
advancement and promotion of individual rights. Despite this, the implementation of the 
rule of law through such solutions is still doomed to fail and, indeed, has produced only 
minimal or patchy results worldwide, because it dissociates law from politics, means 
from ends, ignoring that societal arrangements will play a decisive role in informing how 
such laws will, ultimately, be employed.'^ These solutions neglect that the state will 
generally side with those whose cooperation is most advantageous to them, that the 
wealthy and powerful will manipulate the law in the pursuit of their own benefit and that 
procedural justice and the crystallisation of rights cannot supplant societal action, class 
relations and the relationship generally maintained between the state and its citizens.'^ 
For this reason, although the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution was a symbolically 
meaningful event in the history of Brazil’s legal system - sealing the end of the 
authoritarianism and repression of a brutal military regime that killed and tortured many, 
and protecting a large array of rights and freedoms - it could not, per se, address the
Tamanaha, On The Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, p,95 
Horwitz, 'Review: The Rule o f Law: An Unqualified Human Good?' p.566
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ingrained social, political and economic imbalances of the Brazilian society, for these are 
woven deep into the fabric of the country’s societal interplay and into the manner in 
which the state has shaped its relationship with its citizens. Indeed, since the 
promulgation of the first Brazilian constitution upon independence, the 1824 
Constitution, the rights of individuals have been constitutionally safeguarded. The 
Imperial Constitution, for instance, prescribed the inviolability of civil and political 
individual rights, which were underscored by the protection of liberty, individual security 
and property (Article 179), and guaranteed equality before the law (Article 179, XIII). 
This formal framework not only concealed the social and economic discrepancies and 
inequalities promoted by the dominant classes, which employed the law, both 
ideologically and practically, to support slavery, widespread poverty and destitution, 
unequal distribution of land, and lack of access to education to the majority, but also 
further legitimised the system on which they were based. For “[ejntitlements are the 
property of the poor.”'  ^ Hence, the formal transfer of rights and entitlements within an 
unfair and unequal legal system will generally not produce short-term meaningful societal 
changes and, consequently, the implementation of the rule of law. This is because such 
transfers are employed by the ruling classes as a means of achieving political stability and 
appeasement of the lower classes through a strategic award of a share in the system of 
private property to even the worst-off.'^ Rather than through the promotion of ‘good 
laws’ and institutional efficiency, the problem of leaders who refuse to be ruled by the 
law can therefore only be solved when the mutually beneficial and stable relationship 
between the elites and the government is disturbed by an external factor that offers the 
elites a sufficiently compelling motive to demand that the state observe the established 
legal system. Political officials only act under incentives,^'' for their agenda is generally 
informed by their pursuit of power and the anticipation of the short-term advantages of 
their decisions.^' They will, therefore, only obey the law when its inobservance puts their 
political future at risk.^  ^As the support of the elites is paramount for those holding public
Holmes, 'Lineages of the Rule o f Law', p.42 
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office, the elites’ condemnation of transgressions will have far greater weight on their 
decision to abide by the constitutional framework of the state. This, in turn, will only 
happen if elites feel that imposing limits on the government is in their interest. In this 
sense, Brazilian elites are pivotal in the implementation of Dworkin’s rights conception 
of the rule of law and consolidation of the country’s democracy. By applying Weingast’s 
theory to the specific case of Brazil, the central and most original claim of this thesis lies 
in asserting that one, or a combination of, factors, namely the empowerment of the 
masses, economic development and violence, may provide Brazilian elites with enough 
incentives to act in concert with the rest of the population in denouncing major 
transgressions of the state’s constitutional mandate. Aside from the more obvious benefit 
of curbing widespread corruption and violence by state officials, this may, very 
importantly, engender wider accountability, security and predictability in Brazil’s legal 
system. In so doing, the Brazilian society will be able to develop the set of principles that 
is to guide the state’s political decisions, or demand that the constitutionally enshrined 
fundamental principles of democracy, sovereignty, citizenship, dignity of the human 
person, social value of labour and free enterprise and political pluralism (Article 1), 
underpin the country’s political decisions and regulate their relationship with the state 
and their conduct with each other. In this process, the 1988 Constitution will cease to be a 
mere symbol of the equal protection of the rights of Brazilians, becoming instead the 
main focal device instructing the elites and the population at large the limits within which 
the government should operate. The ultimate value of constitutions lies precisely in 
defining and informing the population what to expect of the state and, thus, in serving as 
guidelines helping citizens to detect and denounce abuses of power. As with other 
institutions, such as democracy and an independent judiciary, constitutions must be 
supported by public officials who will only do so if not honouring them proves to be 
costly.^  ^ In societies without a substantial version of the rule of law, constitutions often 
arise out of a strategy pursued by the dominant classes, who perceive the extensive 
granting of rights and entitlements as politically stabilising or as necessary either to gain 
the cooperation of the masses or to satisfy the pressures of foreign elites. Despite this, the 
endowment of rights may create unforeseen consequences. For the law is not a static
Ibid., p. 110
300
ZcfuZU* H^ i/i^ ZUno
infrastructure which purely reflects the class relations and dominance of a 
superstructure/"' Its deeply political and partially autonomous character endows it with its 
own evolutionary pattern and history, which is shaped by and for the society it serves/^ It 
is in this sense that the masses may appropriate the rights they have been accorded by 
gradually pursuing their observance through the judicial system. By demanding respect 
for their rights, the population at large may put in place a slow process of entrenchment 
of the constitutional framework, ensuring the evolution of the legal system in a way not 
anticipated by the dominant classes. The 1988 Constitution thus provides opportunities 
that go beyond the will of the elites. The democratic constitutional-writing process 
allowed the Brazilian population to feel that their Constitution reflects their deeply held 
values, although the residues of authoritarianism evidenced in the powers given by the 
Executive to legislate, are proof of the compromises that had to be made during the 
protracted democratic opening. This process is, however, ultimately contingent on the 
will of the ruling classes, who ought, first and foremost, to perceive and advance the 
endowment of rights as favourable to their interests. In addition, the pursuit of the rights 
of the masses through the courts may take generations to produce greater societal change 
and thus the implementation of the rule of law. In the interim, the demand for the 
immediate protection of the constitutional rules by state officials is largely dependent 
upon the will of the elites, who will coordinate with the rest of the population in policing 
the state if sufficiently compelled to do so. Awareness and appeals for the protection of 
constitutional rights and guarantees can only provide the elites a further incentive to act. 
Notwithstanding this, the threat of revolt may be a meaningful incentive, as an active 
citizenry can disturb the stability of the ruling classes whose system of privileges depends 
on a passive and disorganised population and whose refusal to share either property or 
power lies on calculated fears of reprisals.^^ In this task, not only can the population be 
further empowered by social movements, but a strong civil society can apply collective 
pressure on the elites by denouncing transgressions and demanding accountability as well 
as by pursuing collective actions against abuses through the courts, both nationally and 
internationally. By articulating their demands in a compartmentalised and specialised
Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin o f the Black Act, pp.259-60 
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manner, social movements can advance a clear agenda and forge alliances that facilitate 
mobilisation, thus playing an important role in social and political change. The high costs 
of alliance building and mobilisation sustenance means that their effectiveness is 
generally short-lived, however. Once their demands are met, they may lose political 
strength and, thus, the very reason for existing. In addition, social movements are much 
more likely to affect political outcomes when advancing demands of citizenship that 
entail the recognition of citizen’s rights, than when making ‘economic corporate’ 
demands involving more equal distribution of wealth, services, resources and social 
benefits. The latter can be more easily appropriated by the political system and co-opted 
through their partial satisfaction by the granting of favours and privileges in a way that 
satisfies and perpetuates the interests of the most p o w e rfu lT h e  requirements of 
international financial institutions and foreign elites may also ultimately significantly 
weaken social movements’ demands, as claims for more equal distribution of services, 
benefits and resources may be severely undermined by the conditionalities attached to 
financial assistance.^^ Despite this, the demands of foreign elites can, themselves, be a 
strong motivation for the ruling classes to restrain themselves and therefore desire, or 
appear to desire, the widening of the scope of democratic processes and recognition and 
promotion of the rights of the m ajorityIndeed, for Holmes, this external pressure may 
be one of the only ways in which national elites can be sufficiently compelled to 
implement a wide system of transferrals, as, internally, even a small ruling class can 
employ several ‘divide-and-rule’ strategies and successful insulate themselves from the 
threat of revolt.^" Economic development can thus create a conundrum for national elites, 
as the more they seek to enjoy the economic advantages of being part of a global market 
economy, the more they will be subject to the pressures of clientisation and the 
imposition of normative standards of conduct that guarantee the efficacy of a system 
lacking a clear central political authority.^' In addition, transnational interdependencies 
will compel elites to foster and promote regional and international integration, through a
Foweraker, Theorizing Social Movements, pp.80-1; Young, 'Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of 
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process that, in turn, requires them to abdicate some control over internal democratic 
processes, which they usually manipulate to their own advantage and benefit/^ In a bid to 
comply at the transnational level, or when threatened by foreign elites, national ruling 
classes will be more likely to accede to more democratic and rights-driven legal systems, 
transferring downwards legal certainty, individual rights and democratic decision- 
making/^ Without the incentive of an external shock, entrenched elites will be reluctant 
to share power and property unless threatened by the revolt of an active citizenry or 
convinced that the cooperation of groups they generally disregard is desirable/"' This is 
generally accomplished by the employment of resources towards guaranteeing personal 
safety and the integrity of their businesses. Although costly for themselves and the nation, 
the elites may feel appropriately protected and insulated from the general consequences 
of state and criminal violence. In fact, violence may contribute to an increased 
démonisation, criminalisation and social exclusion of the poor, further embedding an ‘us 
versus them’ social dichotomy and strengthening the alliance between the state and the 
elites, as the latter will deploy the state apparatus to protect the upper classes with harsh 
tactics and policies, safe in the knowledge that transgressions will generally go 
unpunished. When, as in the Brazilian case, violence spirals out control and affects the 
ruling classes in an uncommon fashion, however, elites may cease to regard their alliance 
with the state as stable: the state’s inability to protect their interests may provide them 
with an incentive to demand that public officials observe their constitutional mandate and 
refrain, in general, from perpetrating abuses of power. Additionally, by integrating into 
regional and international blocs and signing treaties to gain the confidence of other states, 
statesmen commit to provisions of international normative frameworks, the inobservance 
of which may create diplomatic problems, economic sanctions or may lead to the matter 
being pursued through transnational courts. States may be found guilty of perpetrating, or 
failing to adequately protect their citizens from, human rights violations. Although not 
necessarily efficacious in themselves, these methods of individual and collective activism
Habermas, The Divided West, p.68; Rodriguez, 'The Persistence o f Formalism: Towards a Situated 
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can exert considerable pressure on states and national elites when employed as part of a 
strategy to denounce abuses of human rights both nationally and internationally.
All recent phenomena in the Brazilian society - the empowerment of the masses, 
economic development and violence - can thus provide compelling incentives, both of a 
positive and negative nature, for the Brazilian elites to forgo their privileges in favour a 
system with a higher degree of constitutional obedience. Although the incentives that 
each of these factors may provide have been explored, this thesis does not claim to have 
identified them exhaustively. On the contrary, more research is required into many of 
those incentives, particularly the ones which are dependent on a set of different variables. 
The pressures created by the country’s economic development and its prominence in the 
international arena are dependent, for instance, on the continued success of the economic 
and social policies implemented both by Cardoso and Lula, as well as on a range of other 
factors, among them commodities prices, inflation and currency fluctuations. Dilma 
Roussef, the new Brazilian President, won the elections on the basis of Lula’s support 
and indeed Lula is still playing a prominent role, albeit in the background, in her 
administration. She is likely to continue promoting the macroeconomic policies that 
proved to be crucial for the country’s economic stability during Lula’s presidency.This 
however does not guarantee the country’s continued economic growth, particularly at the 
level required for Brazil to meet the forecasts made by Goldman Sachs. In fact, the 
prediction that the BRIG countries may emerge as major forces in the world economy 
was itself conditioned on the countries’ ability to sustain growth through the 
implementation of growth supporting policies. Goldman Sachs’s report was particularly 
cautious about Brazil’s prospects, warning of possible short-comings, especially in view 
of the country’s record in failing to fulfil its potential in the past. The incentives provided 
by violence and the empowerment of the masses are also contingent on a range of 
changeable and unpredictable variables, which can prove to be, individually or combined, 
more or less crucial to elites’s decision to coordinate with the rest of the population in 
policing the state. In addition, more research is required into the rule of law in the context 
of the Brazilian legal system, an area mostly covered by a general and vague formulation 
of the rule of law; the role of legal activism in providing incentives for Brazilian elites to
The Economist, 'In Lula's Footsteps'
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demand limits on the government; the impact of state and non-state violence on Brazil’s 
economic prospects and, consequently, on its political and economic international 
ambitions; and the role of the Brazilian masses, through their appropriation of the rights 
enshrined in the 1988 Constitution, in pressurising Brazilian elites to coordinate their 
efforts with them in demanding that government officials observe constitutional-set limits 
on abuses of power and respect for the individual rights and freedoms.
Despite this, the identification of the conditions for the implementation of a substantial 
version of the rule of law in Brazil is significant. As a practical concept, the rule of law 
professes to effectuate accountability, security, predictability and transparency, all 
significant elements in a ‘mature’ legal system, where accountability mechanisms ensure 
that corruption and state violence are kept in check, where citizens know what to expect 
from the state and from each other, where economic and social transactions are benefited 
from a more predictable and certain application of the established legal rules, and where 
society is more stable, less unequal and more law-abiding as a result. As an ideal, the rule 
of law promises to foster a legal system where all are equal before the law, where the 
state and its officials respect citizens’ rights and freedoms and refrain from using 
coercion unless absolutely necessary to ensure respect for the rights and responsibilities 
flowing from the community’s deeply held principles, and where the relationship 
between citizens is informed not only by the rights, but also by the duties, they have 
towards each other. As a result, as an ideal, the rule of law is much more than an 
architectonic concept which binds and gives a new meaning to the sum of its elements, 
for its ultimate value lies in its ability to inform a legal system’s culture by infiltrating 
deeply into the consciousness of a nation. Its implementation in Brazil would foster a 
higher degree of respect for the rights, freedoms and guarantees enshrined in the 1988 
Constitution by diminishing the power of the historically mutually beneficial relationship 
sustained between Brazilian elites and the state, a relationship that was ultimately 
consolidated by the Coimbra law graduates during the formation of the country as nation­
state. It is not surprising that its demise depends on the very forces that have created it. 
Nonetheless, although ultimately in the power of the ruling classes, incentives and 
pressures are indispensable if the Brazilian elites are to consider that the task of policing 
the state with the rest of the population is in their interest. If this is likely to happen in the
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near future is impossible to ascertain with certitude. The contemplation of this possibility 
and the establishment of the conditions for that to happen can however provide the 
Brazilian population with an invaluable opportunity to employ all the mechanisms they 
have at their disposal, nationally and internationally, to compel the elites to act. In doing 
so, they will be fostering the evolution of law, thus bestowing their legal system with the 
capacity to engender positive and meaningful change by reflecting a fairer, more equal 
and egalitarian and less social divisive society.
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APPENDIX 1
The fundamental rights and guarantees of the individual are laid out extensively in Title 
II, particularly Article 5, of the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil. Within 
this title there are five Chapters and twelve Articles. Article 5 establishes that “All 
persons are equal before the law, without any distinction whatsoever, Brazilians and 
foreigners residing in the country being ensured of inviolability of the right to life, to 
liberty, to equality, to security and to property, on the following terms [..]” Among the 
terms are: right to equality between men and women. Article 5.1; right to be free from 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. Article 5.2; inviolable right to freedom of 
conscience and belief. Article 5.6; right to not be deprived of any rights by reason of 
religious faith or philosophical or political convictions. Article 5.7; right to privacy and 
private life. Article 5.10; right to freedom of association. Article 5.17; right to property. 
Article 5.22 (Article 5.23, however, prescribes that “property shall observe its social 
function”), as well as that criminal law shall not have retroactive effect. Article 5.40; 
prisoners are ensured protection of their physical and moral integrity. Article 5.49; among 
others. Among the social rights laid out in Chapter II of Title II, Article 6 prescribes for 
the protection of the rights to education, health, work, leisure, security, social security, as 
well as the protection of motherhood and childhood. The rights to health, social security 
and assistance are also ensured through the pursuit of social welfare (Chapter II, Articles 
194 to 204). Article 7 defines the rights of urban and rural workers, among them the right 
to earn not less than the minimum wages as established by law. Article 7.7, and right to 
maternity and paternity leave. Articles 7.18 and 7.19, respectively. Under the political 
rights is the right of citizens to exercise their sovereignty by means of “universal suffrage 
and by the direct and secret voting, with equal value for all”. Article 14. In addition. 
Article 215 secures the protection of cultural rights and Article 250 prescribes the right to 
an ‘ecologically balanced environment’. (Constitution of the Federative Republic of 
Brazil, Law of Library Congress, U.S., Political database of the Americas, Georgetown 
University, available at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/guide/nations/brazil.phpJ
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APPENDIX 2
Anarcho-syndicalism is a segment of anarchism. It emerged from the movement of 
syndicalism, which was bom around 1880s France with the objective of reconstructing 
society as a federalist system premised on existing syndicalist groups, rather than the 
state.* As Vicent points out, the term syndicalism can have a narrow and a broad 
meaning. In its narrow meaning, syndicalism is a neutral term which refers to trade 
unionism in general. Its broad meaning encompasses a revolutionary or militant form of 
trade unionism that is dedicated to the eradication of both capitalism and the state.^ The 
movement gained prominence in France around 1880s and 1890s, spreading to the U.S.A 
around early 1990s and later to Italy, Spain, Austria, Latin America and Britain, among 
others. Due to its anti-state message, syndicalism appealed to a number of anarchists. 
Although syndicalism did not attract the interest and support of all anarchists, its strong 
anti-political working class roots offered an attractive message to many. Some anarchists 
also believed that syndicalism offered a viable new societal model, as decentralised 
structures were already present in society and, therefore, communes would not have to be 
constructed. For these reasons, some anarchists attempted to unify both movements 
following an Anarchist Congress in Amsterdam in 1907. Although many anarchists 
resisted the merge, a new movement, anarcho-syndicalism, was created.^
As an anti state-orientated political system, anarcho-syndicalism rejected state structures 
such as parliaments and political parties, as well as widely accepted political ideals such 
as democracy. In addition, as anarcho-syndicalism was a movement bom from and 
directed at the working classes, it also rejected intellectual and bourgeois thought."* The 
basic ideas of anarcho-syndicalism were premised on transforming society into self­
organised and self-administered associations of workers that would have their own 
political, social and economic structures. Such change in society was to be achieved
' A Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies (3rd edn, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford 2009), p.l 18 
 ^Ibid.
 ^ Ibid.
" Ibid.
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through revolution marked by class war, general strikes and armed violence and 
culminating with the end of capitalism/
Ibid.
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